Fear and Loathing in Ancient Athens

Religion and Politics during the Peloponnesian War

Alexander Rubel

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Preface to the English edition

The German original of this book was published in 2000, a long time ago in terms of academic research. This revised English edition has certain limitations. In the German original, it was possible to take into account publications down to 1998, and even some that appeared in 1999. It would, however, have been impossible to read and comment on everything published in subsequent years, so great has been the volume of books and articles dealing with fifth-century Athenian history. In fact, a glance through recent publications on Greek history reveals that only some of them are really relevant, since just a few deal with the issues touched on in this book. Many new books are in fact textbooks or "companions" (the plague of the twenty-first century), which rarely present new interpretations or bold readings of Athenian history. I have thus been very selective in introducing recent scholarship into the footnotes (and even more so into the text). Recent studies that are missing here are either not relevant, or (I suspect, for the most part) they simply escaped my attention. Time becomes an increasingly scarce commodity.

This book is a "thesis" in the true sense of the word, in that it presents a clear statement of the importance of religion for Athenians in a time of crisis. In a nutshell, as readers of Asterix and Obelix already know, the only thing that the Gauls in general, and the superstitious Obelix in particular, really feared was that "the sky would fall on his head". The argument here is that the Athenians, stricken by a terrible plague, the horrors of war and the loss of an empire, similarly feared that "the sky would fall on their heads". For such is the standard response to calamity in pre-modern societies, in the context of religion and religious strategies. In other words: religion mattered and was far from being a "dead issue". There is a tendency to maintain that the Athenians of what has been called the "Greek Enlightenment", with their wide-ranging and penetrating philosophy, were just like us: sceptical and witty modernists who underwent the acid test of the (real) Enlightenment. We

must, however, keep reminding ourselves that, with the exception of a few zealous but marginalized philosophers, Athenian society was characterized by religious traditions based on the fundamental belief that (a) gods exist, (b) they could influence our world and (c) it is advisable to keep in with them if one wants to avoid the consequences of neglecting the divine.

In such a context, events such as the Arginusae trial, or the impiety trials of philosophers, especially the one against Socrates – events that have disturbed the Athenians' modern admirers, because they reveal an "ugly" side to "our" sublime Greeks – appear in another light. It is argued here that some major events of Athenian history during the Peloponnesian War should be seen as motivated by religious, or, in Doddsian terms, "irrational" concerns.

The original book resulted from a Konstanz PhD thesis supervised by Wolfgang Schuller (and examined by Robert Parker of Oxford). Even if after this revision it feels like a new book, the general tenor and direction have remained much the same, for all that I might have changed my mind about some (minor) issues. *Fear and Loathing* was first translated into Romanian (in 2006) and benefited from a useful index provided by the translator Victor Cojocaru that has found its way into the English edition. There were several reviews, two positive (B. Smarczyk in *Klio* 86 [2003]: 246–9; M. Dillon in the *Classical Review* 52 [2002]: 90–92), one euphoric (by the late Karl Christ, in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* [18 August 2001]), one critical but balanced (W. Nippel in *H-Soz-u-Kult* [10 October 2001]) and one utterly hostile (B. Bleckmann in *Historische Zeitschrift* 277 [2003]: 700–01 – easily explained in the light of the footnotes in Chapter 8).

It has been gratifying to observe, during the past few years, what Robert Parker has called a growing "underswell of resistance to Christiane Sourvinou-Inwood's 'polis religion' model of Greek religion" (in *Classical Review* 60 [2010]: 477–8). My first two chapters can be viewed as an early contribution to this "underswell", since I struck a blow already in 2000 for the importance of individual belief or "personal piety" (see further Rubel 2011, 2013) as a fundamental criterion for any social aspects of religion (Faraone [2008] and Boedeker [2008] also illustrate a growing interest in private aspects of religion). There have been some very interesting recent studies of religious issues during the Peloponnesian War, and it is pleasing to note that M. A. Flower (2009) and D. M. Schaps (2011) – among others – draw pretty much the same conclusions from the evidence as I did more than ten years ago, with the proviso, however, *Germanica non leguntur*. R. Mitchell-Boyask, too, in his important book *Plague and the Athenian Imagination* (2008), is as convinced as I was while writing *Stadt in Angst*, that the "great Plague" had a still underestimated major impact on the morals and behaviour of the Athenians. P. Cartledge (2009) has argued that the Athenians were, indeed, correct to convict Socrates of impiety; they performed a collective civic rite of purification, "purifying the citizen body by purging it of a cancerous religious traitor" (Cartledge 2009: 89). Much the same, with almost the same arguments, could have been read in Rubel (2000: 342–63), and you can read it again in Chapter 9. The bottom

line, however, is that my ideas on the importance of religious fear among ordinary Athenians cannot have been too far-fetched.

Perhaps this will be the major benefit of an English edition of this rather old book: to see that some of my ideas will be received, and, with luck, well received, in the Anglo-American world, and also by those who do not read German. In this context, might I dare to relate a story about Louis Robert? It is said that in the late 1940s, at a time when Franco-German friendship was not yet as cordial as it is today, he always asked, at the beginning of his undergraduate courses at the École Pratique des Hautes Études, whether there was anyone in the class who did not know German. Monsieur Robert was a very small man, of a generally humble appearance, and he used to ask this question in a low, quiet voice. When, as usual, several young men, who were often veterans of the Second World War, proudly raised their hands, Robert leapt around like a dervish, screaming at the top of his suddenly stentorian voice: "In three weeks you know German!" Well, times they are a-changin'. German is no longer the most important *Wissenschaftssprache* in the field of *Altertumswissenschaften*. But the famous saying of the German scholar H. Heimpel is still valid: "*Literaturkenntnis schützt vor Neuentdeckungen*" (knowledge of literature prevents new discoveries).

That this book is now available in English is owed to one individual. Michael Vickers was firmly convinced that it should have more readers, even though he does not necessarily agree with all of my conclusions. In some respects, though, I think that we may be pretty much birds of a feather, in that we both like Eastern Europe (the "Wild East"), and prefer a lively thesis to books that overuse the word "perhaps". Michael not only convinced the publisher, Steven Gerrard, of the importance (his word) of this book, but he also took on the difficult task of putting a useful but rough English translation by Alina Piftor into something a little less like "Translationese", which would have been impossible for me to provide. Thanks are due to all three: Michael, Steven and Alina. Thanks are also due to the VEUK-Club of Konstanz, the Alumni-association of my Alma Mater in Germany, with its president, Hanns Fahlbusch, which provided a contribution to the translation costs.

In conclusion, some apologies to the reader. My teacher Wolfgang Schuller once told me of a book, written in German by a foreign scholar, and published in his series at Konstanz. It received a rather favourable review, but the reviewer drew attention to grammatical errors and idiomatic ambiguities in the text, and added that the editor should have had imposed his authority more vigorously. As he read these lines, Wolfgang smiled and thought to himself, "You should have seen the manuscript!" I thus apologize for all the anaconda-like sentences with no end. Many were cut to pieces by Michael Vickers, but some may have survived together with "Germanisms". For the German original of this book, I occasionally used German editions of books that were in fact originally written in English, and I certainly used the German originals as well, even if there might be English translations. I abstained from including page references to English editions for practical and economic reasons. I also could not resist the urge to use this somewhat

immodest title, but it is in fact an accurate translation of *Stadt in Angst. Religion und Politik während des Peloponnesischen Krieges*. To those who are annoyed by the long, detailed, and very un-British notes (you will be), I recommend Anthony Grafton's book on the history of the footnote, which is, or so it would appear, a German invention.[1]

1
Introduction

Nun sag, wie hast du's mit der Religion?
Du bist ein herzlich guter Mann,
Allein, ich glaub, du hälst nicht viel davon.[1]

1.1 Religion and the Peloponnesian War

When Socrates met Euthyphro in front of the Stoa Basileios, near the entrance to the law courts, the famous philosopher told him of the accusations that had been brought against him. When explaining the charges – that Socrates was the "inventor" of new deities (ποιητὴν εἶναι θεῶν), and that he did not believe in the ancestral gods (δ'ἀρχαίους [θεούς] οὐ νομίζοντα) – Euthyphro was hardly surprised. On the contrary, he observed that such an accusation was likely to be successful, because such calumnies would easily find their way to the ears of the mob, a fact of which the accuser Meletus was well aware (εἰδὼς ὅτι εὐδιάβολα τὰ τοιαῦτα πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς).[2]

Euthyphro, presented as a seer and an expert soothsayer, is usually taken as a conservative representative of traditional religiosity and, as such, as an expert in religious matters: the sort of specialist that Socrates confuted with dialogues in his characteristic style.[3] Euthyphro's observation, presented shortly before Socrates' trial for impiety (399 BCE), that the Demos would easily adopt the charge of religion profanation, or at least its significant points, is thus expressed by an authoritative voice.

At first sight, however, the statement of this specialist in religious matters is astonishing. Such imputations of religious intolerance seem unacceptable for democratic Athens during the classical period, labelled by K. Popper, for example, an "Open Society" in a well-known paper.[4] Was Pericles not correct when, in his famous speech for the war dead, he praised the tolerance of democracy in the context of which everybody is granted personal freedom to the highest degree? Aristotle expresses the same opinion about an Athenian democracy that allowed everyone to live as they pleased:[5] ζῆν ὡς βούλεταί τις. Furthermore, many recent publications on Greek religion mention that institutions within the polis did not

care for the "orthodoxy" of their citizens, a concept that was in fact alien to polytheism. Instead, they focused on the correct practice of religion (orthopraxy) and, as such, they were concerned as to whether citizens were fulfilling their legal religious obligations.[6]

The basic freedom from dogma in Greek religion, a religion that lacked the organization of a centralized "church", or any hierarchical structure, or any priestly class with exclusive special knowledge, is always underlined by modern scholars in order to differentiate it from modern religious conceptions dominated by Christianity.[7] When analysing the passage from Plato, we might also have to take into account the possibility that the author might have exaggerated slightly in denouncing what in his view was the outrageous injustice brought against his famous teacher on account of the Athenians, as a violent deed of the Demos and as a judicial assault.[8] Could it be that Plato's viewpoint – present throughout *Euthyphro* – came about only on account of the denunciation of Socrates, without corresponding in any way to Athenian public opinion in *c*. 400?

When considering more closely, however, the period for which according to Plato Euthyphro offers his view concerning the general atmosphere of the time, and looking back as far as the 430s, religious issues move to centre stage. This interval of around thirty years, when the Athenians lost not just a war, but also a maritime empire, when they experienced two oligarchic coups, and when the population fell to less than half on account of plague and war, was dominated by religious themes.[9] That they are not expressed in an obvious manner is due to the reticence of Thucydides, the main source for this period. The great historian refers to religion-related issues but rarely and insufficiently; to a certain extent, he excludes religion on principle.[10] Nonetheless, this phase of Athenian history witnessed important events that are studied more for political analysis than for their indisputable religious significance. The same period of Athenian democracy is marked by numerous charges of impiety brought against philosophers[11] who had criticized religion, but mostly against the persons who had mutilated the Herms and profaned the Eleusinian Mysteries in 415 BCE. Such religious trials were unique to this period.[12] It is thus legitimate to talk about a "heated" atmosphere at Athens at the end of the fifth century, expressed through the trials judged by the Assembly and by the courts, where the accused were charged with religious offences.

Otherwise, scholarly attention is attracted by a series of new gods and cults, "borrowed" during this interval; there is still no firm explanation for this development. Bendis, Sabazius, Cybele, Asclepius and Adonis make their solemn entrance to the city, thus enlarging the spectrum of the traditionally worshipped divinities. At the same time, in 411/10 there was a revision and codification of Solon's calendar for cults and festivals. This measure is rightly regarded as the strongest traditional element of conservative religious politics.[13]

There was also an important religious component, often played down, in the 406 prosecution of the generals who had won the battle of Arginusae.[14] These genuine

religious disputes had from the start a direct influence upon the history of the city. Because Alcibiades, probably the most skilled general of his day, was convicted of impiety, he was pushed into the arms of his enemies. Similarly, the naval victory of 406 became a defeat *post factum*, through the collective conviction of the generals. In the same context belong the major architectural monuments built during the war; through their function and configuration, they underline traditional religious virtues, frequently interpreted as the influence of a conservative current.[15]

What is often referred to as the Plague of Athens was of crucial importance during the Peloponnesian War. Moreover, it constitutes the starting-point of this paper. It is essential to realize that this (still not entirely understood) malady, which killed about a third of the population between 430 and 427/26, was the crucial event in the life of the Athenians at the beginning of the war. The consequences of this plague marked the public conscience for a long time. The religious dimension of the epidemic, interpreted from a pre-modern perspective as a punishment from the gods, has often been overlooked, largely because of Thucydides' rationalist approach.[16] Some scholars have of course commented correctly and provided a real insight into the religious aspects of these events and of their consequences.[17] Nevertheless, there is still no work on these consequences as a homogeneous system of a crisis, defined in its essence through the experience of the plague and of the difficulties caused by the war.[18]

One wonders whether, generally speaking, these events and their consequences, with their predominantly religious connotations, should be seen in the context of a coherent overall picture of religious anxiety. I refer here to the charges of impiety brought against philosophers, to the persecution of the profaners of the Mysteries and mutilators of the Herms, to the admission of new deities in the city, to the conviction of the victorious generals after the battle of Arginusae and, eventually, to Socrates' fate. Against this background, we must examine to what extent the period of the Peloponnesian War can be seen as a crisis period when, given the religious hysteria of the mob, the Assembly voted many inducements to radical action and important decisions, relevant in the context of the war. Among them should be mentioned the deposition of Pericles in 430, the recall of Alcibiades, and the conviction of the generals after Arginusae. As W. Furley has succinctly put the matter: "religion was anything but a dead issue".[19]

This then is the central theme of my research. The decision-maker, and thus the sovereign of the democratic state, was the popular Assembly, where all Athenian citizens, regardless of origin and social status, voted on the political interests of the state.[20] Obviously people from lower socio-economic groups delivered most votes during the session of the Assembly.[21]

This is why, in the context of this book, the opinions of the Demos – which the politicians took into account or should have influenced – will take centre stage. Such research is, however, handicapped because the Athenian Demos is less represented in the sources. The historians and philosophers of that time naturally belonged to social elites and usually shared the political outlook of their aristocratic

or oligarchic upbringing; they do not have many good things to say about the fickle Demos, and even then, only if its concerns were brought forcefully to their attention.[22] Their interpretation of the behaviour of the masses during important political votes is subordinated to their elitist view of the world; this is why they seldom saw democracy as a congenial political system.[23]

Plato and the "Old Oligarch" saw the Assembly less as an institution that supported the state than as a meeting of the mob, where illiterates and the poor could speak against the norms of reason.[24] Nevertheless, even these tendentious views provide enough material for the present research, because the contemporary interpretations and estimations are also based on events that are open to fresh interpretation.

Methodologically, the research has to be conducted from the other direction, since the literary sources – written by members of the elite – only allow indirect insights into the attitude of the Demos on religious issues. Thucydides, for example, does not seem to be at all interested in religion, since he eliminated it for the most part from his concept of history. He does, however, provide some ideas about the religious life of his contemporaries, if only between the lines. For example, when he wants to denounce the superstitions of the Demos as old-fashioned and irrational, he inevitably ends up speaking of widely held superstitions and religious fears.[25] Thus, when talking about the plague, he mentions a very puzzling oracle; in this context, people associated the sombre prophecy with the plague, thus propagating the idea, which led to a general state of anxiety.[26] Through this episode, Thucydides provides an important fact that he would have otherwise certainly omitted, had he not wanted to draw attention to the narrow-mindedness of the mob.

The orators – with some exceptions – and Aristophanes were more explicit. Given their professional background, they had to frequent the Agora; they were thus well aware of generally accepted opinion relating to religious issues, and they made their own statements about widespread beliefs. For the most part, the orators display a rather more positive attitude to democracy and, unlike historians and philosophers, they serve mainly a "common ideology".[27]

Texts survive of popular decrees regulating the conduct of cults, or referring to the development and endowment of sanctuaries, and they provide additional information regarding state organization of religious life. Other epigraphic sources (votive epigrams, for example) constitute particularly eloquent testimony in the field of private religiosity.[28] In addition, the ever-growing archaeological material, mostly discovered during the past few decades, provides more knowledge about the day-to-day religiosity of the Athenians. Thus, after 430, the year of the plague, there are indications that the Agora witnessed the invigoration of old heroic cults.[29] Even the fact that during the war, despite the difficult financial situation, Athenians retained an interest in erecting expensive temples and developing cult-related monuments (often with distinct archaic characteristics) provides indirect information regarding the status of religion during this period.[30] By including the results of recent archaeological research, the present study is more evidence-based than older accounts such as the fundamental work of E. R. Dodds.

The documentary material is heterogeneous and the presentation of the literary sources, mainly referring to issues related to politics and the state, is tendentious (and thus unsatisfactory). This is why it seems more appropriate to measure the Athenians' attitude to religion less through the words transmitted by written tradition than through the attested actions and reactions of the Demos. It will thus first be necessary to analyse the religious implications of various democratic decisions, with their consequences for the fate of Athens. In this context, it is worth considering whether the votes of the Assembly were based in the main on political, rational, concepts or, in view of the period of crisis, whether religious fears and considerations were given more importance than usual.

1.2 Religion and politics

1.2.1 The concept of "religion" in the study of religion[31]

In his handbook on Greek religion, W. Burkert begins with a brief presentation of the history of research before developing the subject both chronologically and thematically. He naturally starts with the idea that a phenomenon such as "Greek religion", or "religion" in general, exists *per se*, and the reader is expected already to possess a fairly clear idea of the underlying concepts. The author can thus reasonably count on the pre-scientific understanding of the reader, with sufficient understanding of the relevant concepts, to make detailed explanation superfluous.

To proceed in the same manner would, however, run the risk of taking as read concepts that are open to question. It is not that one hesitates to enter *in medias res* or because one wishes to see problems where they do not exist. One is simply trying to draw a distinction between "religion" and "politics", the distinction to which attention was already drawn in the heading of this sub-section. In view of the current state of research on "Greek religion", the distinction perhaps requires a brief explanation. Its purpose is to ensure that the separation of the ancient concept of politics will not be considered methodologically inadmissible; it was only in modern times, in the context of secularization, that a distinction has been made between "religion" on the one side and "politics" on the other.

In what follows, we shall consider a topic with several possible answers in the context of research on religion. This study has many branches that include, for example, the sociology of religion, the psychology of religion, the phenomenology of religion or, indeed, *Religionswissenschaft*. The existence of such research implies a certain consensus about the subject.

It is indisputable that in all known cultures there are phenomena that we call "religious". "Religion, in one way or another, is present in each human society."[32] The exact definition of religion is, however, much disputed within the disciplines constituting *Religionswissenschaft*. Moreover, if scholars in the field of religious studies have reached a consensus, it is that there is no universal definition

of religion, specific to all cultures.[33] In the first place, we cannot formulate such a universal definition, since in most languages there is no equivalent for the word we use so freely and for the meaning that it implies. The title of the research topic itself thus reveals the Western origin of the concept.[34]

Ancient Greek (unfamiliar with the concept) lines up with most of the languages that do not have an equivalent for the term "religion".[35] The fact, moreover, that the concept has such a broad meaning suggests that so far as the historicity of the concept in central Europe is concerned, it evolved rather late, as a post-Reformation concept; previously, "religion" was related exclusively to Christian thinking.[36]

Thanks to Schleiermacher's philosophy of religion, which in many ways provided the foundation for the modern study of religion, research grew away from the Christocentric idea that was still dominant during the Renaissance. In the twentieth century, inspired by the important ethno-sociological writings of E. Durkheim and B. Malinowski, there developed a predominantly functional concept of religion. This held that in the first place, religion constitutes a social phenomenon; such a view progressively replaced the hitherto dominant theological orientation within the study of religion, and by the beginning of the twentieth century, even R. Otto supported the new perspective.[37] In this philosophy, religion is studied not for its spiritual content, concerning specific manifestations of belief, or for its relevance for individuals, but mostly for its social bases and its socially stabilizing functions, in particular in the context of ritual. A functional assessment came to prevail and with further support from N. Luhmann's systemic theory, it has essentially determined current research within *Religionswissenschaft*.[38]

With regard to the field of religious representations, there is a consensus that religion serves as a meaningful symbolic system. In so far as distinct cultural determinations are concerned, this system usually acquires the function of a model to explain the world, whose meaningful elements help people recognize a certain order beyond the apparently chaotic conditions of nature.[39]

Kehrer harshly described current discussion of a universal and generally unifying definition as "an uncertain dispute around a functionalist or materialist concept of religion". He also believes that, in this context, the two opinions are different because the method of materialist definition, following a historico-hermeneutical tradition, aims to show what religion *is*, while the functional method, supported by the socio-ethnological theory, aims to point out what religion *does*.[40]

The fact that there is no consensus with regard to the exact scientific definition of religion is indeed an impediment, but at the same time "this is not a catastrophe, since the object of study remains".[41]

The incompatibility of definitions does not bring research on concrete religious systems to a close. And what is more, even though a biologist would find it similarly difficult to define the concept of "life", a psychologist that of "soul" or a historian that of "history", not many would question the scientific character of biology, psychology, or history and the outcomes of their knowledge.

1.2.2 On the similarity between religious systems

In view of all this, it is important to acknowledge that so far as the study of "Greek religion" is concerned, the term "religion" should be considered a modern one dominated by a Christian vision; the Greeks did not even have a name for it. The science of religion exists only as a mark of Western culture and one cannot conceive of it without taking into consideration the imaginative horizon of Occidentals. Consequently, this historical fact determines the nature of the questions that a Western scholar of religion asks. "It is utterly naïve to speak of promoting an 'impartial', or 'objective' approach to religion."[42]

This naturally leads to an essential issue of theoretical knowledge and epistemology that makes comparative religion difficult beyond cultural borders, and this was increasingly debated during the twentieth century within the study of Greek religion.[43] A. D. Nock used to present the issue during his seminars by means of an anecdote. He spoke of an anthropologist exposed to a danger similar to that of a classical scholar when studying Greek religion. The Danish anthropologist Knut Rassmussen asked an Eskimo chief whether or not he or his people believed in gods. The Eskimo looked blank and could only reply: "We do not believe; we fear."[44] This story shows clearly that anthropologists, like scholars in the field of religious studies, are determined by specific cultural matrices and thus often formulate questions that do not really concern the object of their study.

This observation, referring as it does to the distinction between religious concepts marked by the monotheism of a deeply secularized modern industrial society, and that of pre-modern cultures, may simply indicate the profound gap that after 2,500 years separates the world of our concepts from that of the Greeks of the classical period. Consequently, the latest research has implicitly insisted upon the basic difference and strangeness of ancient Greek culture and its religion.[45]

1.2.3 Religion and polis

Fundamental to such research is the view formed during the course of the last century that "religion" and "politics" represented in Greek states a phenomenon opposed to modern concepts, and that a distinction of a kind that would be natural in the way both fields are regarded today would be anachronistic in the field of Greek culture.[46] The principal cult obligations in Greek cities were established by means of documents that today would be regarded as purely political, and this led to the widespread view that it was not possible to draw a distinction between politics and religion in the sphere of public life, since in the world of the polis, the two phenomena were mutually sustaining. Such inseparability of "religion" and "politics" is always – and correctly – defined in recent studies as a particular characteristic of the Greek city-state. In this sense, stimulated by important discoveries in anthropology and the sociology of religion, the focus has always been on the functional aspect of Greek religion and on the *social* importance of religion.

Extraordinary importance therefore attaches to the socially unifying function of religious practices and rites that rarely took place in classical Greece in private,

but frequently as part of a public cult. Much later, a secularized modern period imposed a distinction between the area of "the political" in the modern sense of the word, and that of religion.[47] Modern research has paid tribute to the realization that there is a basic unity between religion and politics through the concept of "polis religion",[48] which enables the modern observer to regard the often elusive intertwining of the two areas as an essential characteristic of the ancient city-state.

Plato himself defines the meaning of religious practice in precisely the same way, in presenting correct and legal cult practice not only as a precondition for the happy life of all "good" people, but also as the foundation of the political community.[49] The fact that religion typically dominated the entire public life of the polis is clear in the case of Athens from the annual appointment of archons. After the candidate had made a sacred oath in a certain part of the Agora (the political centre of the city), he had to repeat the same words on the Acropolis, the most important religious centre of Athens.[50] In this way, the archon's duties attest the unity of political and religious functions. The eponymous archon, the highest state magistrate, was charged with, for example, organizing important celebrations and processions. The basileus, besides his judicial functions, was also in charge of the traditional cults, celebrations and sacrifices. The polemarchs had similar duties.[51] The concept of the special importance of religious institutions for the prosperity and well-being of the entire city is, moreover, clear from the oath by which the ephebes of Athens swore to protect by arms the "sacred" and "sacralized" institutions of the polis.[52]

The polis also regulated by law official relationships with the most important protecting divinities of the city-state, whose support had to be ensured. For Plato, earning the favour of the gods through an official cult was the foundation of any civic order, and religion (τὰ ἱερά) was always the starting point. Aristotle too concludes that the state should have the gods as its primary concern.[53] The economic or military prosperity and success (τύχη) of a political community depended in large part on a serious concern with cult-related duties.[54]

The institutions of the polis were thus charged with the correct organization of sacrifices, with the creation of the official calendar of celebrations, as well as with the construction and maintenance of religious monuments. In a word, the city regulated all the interests of its religious life.[55] From birth, through "rites of passage", initiation, marriage, to death, religion and cult practice were an indisputable, natural part of public and private life. There were no exceptions – war and peace or commerce and agriculture – religious rituals accompanied all activities.[56] Religion was, in the terms of its social function, a cohesive force that guaranteed the stability of the polis, and which played an integrating role, especially during domestic or external crises.[57] This is why, in hard times, the city gods were naturally seen as the protectors of the community, being invoked together with other divinities.[58] Popular feelings of belonging to the community were reinforced by collective cult practice.[59]

The polytheistic religion of the polis was characterized by a freedom from dogma, as there were no mandatory beliefs, no authoritarian clergy with special

knowledge, and no "church". There was thus no risk of heresy. Nevertheless, despite all the apparent openness of polytheism, there was an "unwritten" duty to acknowledge and attend the cults of the city. This is why the very acknowledgement of fundamental beliefs and the public participation of all the citizens at solemn sacrifices and cult-related activities guaranteed the favour of gods. Without this, the community believed there was no hope of stability. In addition, fragile rural communities felt themselves defenceless without the protection of gods; they felt vulnerable against the menace and danger of a hostile environment in a period when war was a natural instrument of politics.[60] S. Price was thus right to criticize the still widely held view that the Greeks' polytheism, unlike Islam or Christianity, offered a relatively liberal and open religious system: "This romantic view of Greek religious liberalism has little to commend it."[61]

1.2.4 Religion and psyche

A combination of the realization of the way that cults within Greek religion served to support the state, and an increasingly functionalist orientation within *Religionswissenschaft*, has led to the impression that Greek religion, and even more the religion of Graeco-Roman antiquity as it is viewed by classical scholars, should be understood in the first place from the perspective of the social significance of its symbolic content. Although such an approach is justified, the functional aspect in so far as Greek religion is concerned has brought about a certain narrowing of vision.[62]

This slightly one-sided consideration of the social and symbolic dimension of Greek religion originates not least in the fact that the functional aspects of the Greek religion, with no confessions (mentioned in the sources, at least), are better described from existing sources. In addition, the psychological and emotional sides of religious practice frequently play no part in historical analysis.[63] At the beginning, I referred to the fundamental issue of "otherness" specific to ancient culture, attested by the very fact that, unusually in our opinion, religion dominated the public life of the polis. This distinction leads to an epistemological issue that directly concerns research on Greek religion, and is thus impossible to solve. I underline this strangeness and distance that separate us from the realities of Greek culture. Nonetheless, one should not overlook (if preoccupations concerning Greek religion are not to end in an impasse) that certain phenomena that bear no relation to our own world, and that never fully cast off their strangeness, must and can be "translated" (or at least paraphrased) so that we understand them. At the same time, little can be achieved by the appeals of scholars who have dedicated themselves to anthropological comparisons, meant to ensure the necessary distance from the object of study, by underlining its foreign character and the heterogeneity of the phenomena studied.[64]

The dilemma is that there is on the one hand a danger of falsifying the object of study during the process of description; this is something that scholars of religion expose themselves to when they focus too much on models dominated by

the Western tradition. On the other hand, by adopting models specific to other cultures, they end up speaking a very different language and will thus cease to be understood. In practice, this means that in describing the religious practices of antiquity, it is inevitable that we should employ concepts dominated by Christian tradition and difficult to separate from its connotations. Concepts such as "belief" or "piety" are often rejected as categories to determine certain phenomena of Greek religion. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore them.[65]

To enable a comparative understanding within *Religionswissenschaft*, we must use a "metalanguage" in order to name and classify religious phenomena. The related process of abstraction inevitably involves "an estrangement of the symbolic system elaborated and, of course, an alienation from the religious life itself".[66]

In spite of the obvious differences between our perception of religion and that specific to ancient Greeks, and in spite of efforts to produce a universal and wide-ranging definition of religion, we can however assess theoretical knowledge of the ancient system of symbols and see that there are "certain fundamentals", as Stevenson justly stated.[67] In other words, there are certain essential points that make comparison between religions possible.

As for comparisons with Greek religion, A. Henrichs once made the very pertinent observation: "If, in the given circumstances, we dare to relate to the present, we end up facing Antiquity only if we remain aware of the totally different character of our historical situation."[68]

If there is thus a slightly "anachronistic" distinction between "religion" on the one hand and "politics" on the other, at least from an analytical perspective, this does not in any way contradict the original statement, since any distinction is not substantial.

By focusing research on the social function and on the symbolic character of collective cult practice, attention will be drawn away from an aspect of Greek religiosity that has been more or less ignored in the specialized literature and which goes beyond the purely political. Its social function apart, religion is without doubt an emotional and psychological phenomenon that can be classified in the category of "religious experience".[69]

Apart from its social function, religion always finds a place in each individual's life and, as such, it is related to "experience". In this sense, R. Otto's view is of fundamental importance; he defined the "sacred" as a basic category of religious experience within which the "numinous" serves as the power of divine action, qualitatively different from man and the world.[70] As a systematic category, the sacred is the "totally other" opposed to mankind.[71] This opposition regarding the insurmountable essence of the sacred towards mankind makes the latter feel fear, fright, veneration; these are phenomena that Otto defines as "sentiment of being" (*Kreaturgefühl*).[72]

Otto's aprioristic concept of the sacred was especially influential, for all that it was not an infallible method, being influenced by his religious experience. Beyond legitimate criticism, it refers in this sense to people's essential orientation towards another – or "totally other" – reality where we are obviously talking about an

essential experience, with a matching basis of experience in all traditional cultures, "seemingly related to the constant presumptions of a profound human existence".[73]

A. D. Nock offered some indications of the ways the religious customs and beliefs of the Greeks – so strange for moderns and oriented towards the community of the polis – existed "side by side with deep feelings of dependence and devotion and awe".[74] This "side by side" action of both dimensions of religion, of its functional and emotional sides – in a way the two sides of the same coin – should be properly taken into account in what follows.

In particular, fear of the gods is a category of fundamental importance, responding in large part to emotion; it therefore plays a pivotal role in our research. One deduces fear or respect for the gods from essential knowledge gained from the experience of surrendering to certain powers that are generally beyond personal control.[75] In the first instance, and as an easy example, we might invoke the natural powers whose concrete influences, such as the positive and negative actions of the forces of nature on the environment and vegetation, are perceived by people as such and are divinized in many polytheistic religions. With regard to what man cannot dominate, religious experience has always collided with an awareness of a limit to what can be rationally grasped. In this sense, the Enlightenment and Modernism have always kept alive a sense of the rational insoluble. Fear is thus related, perhaps, to a lack of progressive knowledge of the world within societies once described as "primitive" or "archaic" and, for this reason, any "Enlightenment pathos" is inappropriate in this sense.[76]

In contrast with the Greeks of the classical period, modern observers in our technological age see nature as "profane", but there are still essential unsolved mysteries, such as growth and decay, life and death, which could "surprise people who are not completely over-sophisticated".[77] This is why the basic comparison between religious phenomena appears to be fully justified, distanced as it is in time and beyond cultural frontiers, within the limits of the theoretical knowledge described.

In this sense, fear of the gods is related to "the basic experiences of Religion" and it thus appears as mankind's subjective response to the transcendence perceived in the uncontrollable forces of certain divine powers.[78] Man experiences a sense of fear, a *tremendum* (that has its origins in his conception of the divinity as fundamentally marked by its "otherness"), even when addressing Zeus as though he were a father.[79] Starting from the insurmountable gap between people and gods, a frequent theme in Greek myth (while venerating any essential superiority of the gods), man develops a sentiment of being that influences his actions and experiences related to the divine, characterized by submission.

Plato describes the relationship between people and gods as like the rapport between a master and his slaves.[80] In the field of Greek religion, we can invoke numerous relevant examples of the fear of gods as a necessary and integral part of religious beliefs.[81] Ζεὺς ὁ πάντων κύριος (Zeus the lord of everything) appears in Pindar, and in a Chorus in *Antigone* there is a celebration of the fall of the

Labdacids, brought to ruin by the arm of a mighty god that knows no mercy: οὐδ' ἔχει λύσιν.[82]

There is also a brief sketch of the emotional repercussions of such fear during the early Hellenistic period at Athens in one of Theophrastus' *Characters*, in the entry on δεισιδαιμονία, a genuine "fear of the gods", but which, when taken to excess, leads to superstition.[83] Theophrastus gently lampoons, from an enlightened viewpoint, current religious customs, magical practices and the excessive fear of his fellow Athenians regarding supernatural forces.[84]

An essential observation in the field of *Religionswissenschaft* is the fact that individuals and communities experience not only submission to superior forces, but also dependence on them. Theognis clearly shows that no man might be responsible for personal success or achievement, since both derive from the gods.[85] Starting from such "absolute dependence" (*schlechthinnige Abhängigkeit*) – as Schleiermacher defines the phenomenon – people use magic or religion in an attempt to make these forces advance or recede, depending on their own intentions.[86]

This leads to another practically universal characteristic of religion, namely the fundamental belief that supernatural powers govern people's destinies and that their attitude towards people is determined, largely, by people's behaviour in relation to these forces.[87] That belief animated all religious facts and feelings of the Greeks, and it fundamentally determined the concept of "gift exchange" between people and gods.[88] The orators constantly recall the important practical influence of the gods on human destiny.[89] The gods are mainly present in battle, when, for example, they support one side by weakening the enemy forces, or when they indicate through mantic practices the expected outcome.[90]

The victory over the Persians, Herodotus assures us, was first that of the gods and then that of the Athenians, since the gods banished the Persian king.[91] The gods provide victory or determine defeats. Whoever defies a peace treaty reinforced through an oath to the gods – as the Spartans did in 382 BCE when they took the Theban Acropolis by surprise – will have no more victories in war. In this way, as Xenophon demonstrates, the Spartan catastrophe at the Battle of Leuctra (371 BCE) might be explained by the fact that they violated the treaty negotiated soon after the Theban victory under Epaminondas.[92] For both community and individuals, the favour of the gods was of equal significance, and it was the principal objective of religious practice to guarantee it.[93] We can see how, mostly in the area of offerings and sacrifices, individuals asked the gods for help to protect their children and their property, or to be guarded against disease. In exchange, the gods received thank-offerings for having saved people from danger, such as from shipwreck, for curing disease and many other such things.[94] Hard times, long wars with bad luck, natural catastrophes, diseases, poor harvests or other such misfortunes made the Greeks, and many other cultures, believe that the gods had forsaken them.[95]

Fear of divine punishment, or at least of not having the support of the city gods, is an understandable emotional response to expressions of oppressive poverty and of hard times. People's first reaction is to take religious measures, exemplified by

the German proverb "need teaches one to pray" (*Not lehrt beten*). Livy expressed the same idea in the pregnant sentence: *adversae res admonuerunt religionum*.[96]

Emotional reactions that have left perceptible traces in the social and public behaviour of the Athenians, as well as attempts at re-admission to the favour of the gods through religiously motivated actions, constitute the subject matter of our research. Finally, it is worth mentioning the three essential beliefs for the religion of the Athenians that H. Yunis once noted[97] are of fundamental importance when judging the events of the Peloponnesian War, namely: (a) the gods exist; (b) they are concerned about human affairs; (c) and there exists some form of reciprocity, however unequal, in the relationship between the gods and humans. Theophrastus elegantly put the essential rapport between the gods and humans in a nutshell: τριῶν ἕνεκα θυτέον τοῖς θεοῖς· ἢ γὰρ διὰ τιμὴν ἢ διὰ χάριν ἢ διὰ χρείαν τῶν ἀγαθῶν.[98]

In view of the emotional and psychological aspects of religion that are underlined here, aspects that have their place together with social phenomena, it seems right to make an abstract differentiation between "religion" and "politics" for analytical purposes, so long as it does not lead to the loss of the differences between modern individualizing religious concepts and the social accomplishments of religion within the Greek polis. Modern Western religious practice still leaves room for the social dimension of religion. We think, for example, of the US president George Bush, Sr., who in 1991 attended special religious services together with his fellow citizens (and TV cameramen), in order to invoke, together with the American "community", divine support for the Gulf War. In the same way at Athens, the sphere of private piety and the fear of gods, as individual emotional reactions to an outside danger, held a special position within a religion dominated by collective cult practice. This interdependence between the two areas is also described by Euthyphro who, in the discussion with Socrates, defines sacrifice and prayer as equally important, not only for each individual in the private sphere, but also in the community. ἐὰν μὲν κεχαρισμένα τις ἐπίστηται τοῖς θεοῖς λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν εὐχόμενός τε καὶ θύων, ταῦτ' ἔστι τὰ ὅσια καὶ σῴζει τὰ τοιαῦτα τούς τε ἰδίους οἴκους καὶ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν πόλεων.[99]

1.3 The Peloponnesian War as chronological frame

As we have just seen, there are important events in Athenian politics during the Peloponnesian War that clearly have an additional religious aspect. This observation encourages a likely connection between the experience of war and religious practice. Furthermore, this phase of Athenian history appears to have been existential, and the crisis that shattered the polis to the foundations seems to have entered the conscience of contemporaries, eclipsing the experiences of previous wars and preceding crises. In particular, we shall take note of the exceptional role of the effects of the plague at the beginning of the war, with its sky-high mortality rate that led, in addition to those fallen in battle, to a dramatic decrease in population.

An event with comparable demographic repercussions, if on a smaller scale, was the crushing defeat in Egypt in 454 BCE, when the Athenians unsuccessfully sent reinforcements led by the Libyan king Inaros against the Persians. By comparison, the Athenian reaction was logical and pragmatic when, after the loss of their fleet, the treasury of the Delian League was threatened by the Persians operating in the Aegean basin, and moved from Delos to Athens without any signs of panic or fear.[100] There is still no scholarly consensus regarding the number of the fallen, but judging by information supplied by Thucydides, it must have been rather large.[101] Despite heavy losses, the Athenians were little affected by this operation of the League, but the mysterious deaths of so many people during the epidemic gained in importance, since it only affected the Athenians within the city walls. Such death was rationally inexplicable for contemporaries, unlike a military defeat.

The possibility that the Peloponnesian War might be considered as a self-contained unit was first shown by Thucydides, who designated the two phases of the war as part of a unitary evolution, and who considered the interwar period between 421 and 415 not a peaceful interval, but more like a breathing space in the context of growing confrontation.[102]

Thucydides specialists are divided between "analysts" and "unitarians", who debate whether this dissection of the great historian really takes into account the situation of those times, or whether Thucydides – who could not have known at the beginning of the war how long it would last or how matters would turn out – has combined two designs. Perhaps after the conflict was reignited, during the events in Sicily, he improperly conflated struggles between the Delian League and the Peloponnesians, rather than treating them separately. This *Thukydidesfrage*, as it is often called, is a perfect example of a philological "Penelope's Loom",[103] and despite the view that one could never get the right answer, it has preoccupied generations of researchers, mostly within the German-speaking sphere.[104] It is certain that both contemporaries and those who lived after Thucydides took over his divided model.

Indeed, one can attribute the *Thukydidesfrage* to the exceptional influence of his work, which but a few talented imitators dared to oppose, as that situation could also be interpreted as a sustainable appreciation of his work.[105] The end of the war is not in question, since it was sealed when Athens capitulated and simultaneously lost its maritime empire, on which its power uniquely rested.

Another question is whether the military operations resumed after the cancellation of the thirty-year peace in 432/1 differ in any obvious manner from the earlier battles of the so-called first Peloponnesian War, or whether the entire period after the Persian wars, especially after 460, should be treated as a constant conflict between Sparta and Athens,[106] sometimes "hot" and other times "cold". The beginning of hostilities, related by Thucydides to the fact that the Peloponnesians believed the Athenians had violated the treaty, seems to have introduced a new dimension to the confrontation.

Overall, this war exceeded the previously known borders for regional conflicts, in that it extended first to the entire eastern Mediterranean, then the west, with

battles in Thrace and in the strategically important area of the Hellespont. This is especially the case if we take into account the disastrous losses and the geopolitical repercussions of the confrontation.[107]

Thus, from the perspective of time, space and ethics, the conflict developed beyond all imagining. Thucydides himself shows that his fellow historians, such as Herodotus or Hellanicus, did not view the period of growing Athenian influence after the Persian wars as a time of memorable events or important wars. This is why it would have been insufficiently researched or even absent from earlier literature.[108]

Although we should leave open the question as to whether the two events that Thucydides presents as a unified view of the Peloponnesian War represent a unit in reality, research on the period (both specialized and general) is significant for the purposes of this book. As we have just seen, exceptional historical-religious events, such as the acceptance of new gods or political events with a clear religious background, occur during the very period of the Peloponnesian War that Thucydides represents as a unity, as well as in its direct aftermath.

As stated earlier, this book is based on a clearly defined thesis, with a structured approach that guides the main questions, the "*Fragestellung*". The time of the Peloponnesian War is known as a period when religious aspects in many areas of domestic politics were decisive in determining action, and which made the Demos feel very unsafe, since the citizens assumed that the gods were no longer on their side. This state of anxiety was generated in particular by the experience of the plague and by the vicissitudes of war.

It is against this background that when significant events associated with a decisive religious moment are presented in what follows, there will be discussions of the internal political situation in the context of religious events, and perhaps more so than hitherto. With a clearly formulated thesis, however, our research is somewhat open to criticism. The broad synthesis and holistic approach to individual and specific heterogeneous phenomena inevitably bring a certain over-simplification in their wake.

Nevertheless, it should be stressed that we shall not be dealing with an Athens "wearing sackcloth and ashes". The perceptible moments of religious hysteria are related to specific situations, marked by immediate fears with a particular cause. The exceptional dimension of this κίνησις μεγίστη (major revolution) and the profound experience of the crisis, especially with the plague as a key moment, truly contributed to a general tendency to religious anxiety on the part of the Athenian population. Religiously motivated fear arose easily in this context. Thus, religion and religiosity should be considered a kind of seismograph of the crisis, and the citizens' desire to thank the gods for their protection and favours gains an exceptional importance.

In the same 420s BCE, however, the course of the war was sometimes favourable to the Athenians. Nevertheless, taking an overall view of the Peloponnesian War from a religious perspective, disparate events contribute through their religious significance to the creation of a unitary and coherent picture: events that might appear as isolated flash points when analysed separately. The Athens of the

Peloponnesian War seems to have been marked by religious fear and a general predisposition towards religious issues, which during the crisis had its fall-out in politics. Nestor, the wise old man in Homer, described this attitude, in a phrase applicable beyond the frontiers of their Greek culture: πάντες δὲ θεῶν χατέουσ' ἄνθρωποι.[109]

1.4 Structure and relevance of the book

The events and their consequences discussed here are mainly concerned with religious phenomena that arose during the Peloponnesian War, as well as with the internal political situation during the war. When focusing on such events, related as they are to the Athenians' religious scruples and fear of gods, significant events in domestic policy, such as the two oligarchic revolutions, can be treated only tangentially.

Two different ordering principles underlie the following chapters. Some sections focus on concrete events and on their religious implications, and are thus somewhat selective. Here, I analyse and describe significant cases and events as individual testimonies of an interdependent evolution. These include: the trials of the Sophists; the conflict caused by the mutilation of the Herms and the profanation of the Mysteries; the Arginusae trial; and the trial of Socrates. There are also, however, other chapters treated diachronically for objective reasons. Such chapters thus deal with important historical-religious phenomena that are present during the entire period under discussion, such as the unusual admittance of new deities and/or the development of places of worship during the war.

After an overview of the intellectual and historical situation at the end of the fifth century BCE, and after an initial venture into the issue of religious trials against philosophers, our research begins with the famous Plague of Athens. This was the key moment for the following period of the Peloponnesian War, marked as it was by religious fears. The repercussions of this epidemic on public morals and on the Athenian conscience perhaps provide the key for the better understanding of future events that were determined by religious scruples and by fear.

Athens, the cradle of democracy, does not appear as an exemplary "School of Hellas", at least during the Peloponnesian War, bearing in mind the religious trials of philosophers and the religiously inspired charges laid against political and military leaders (related to the mutilation of the Herms or the Arginusae trial). Besides all the great accomplishments of the Athenians that justly fill the handbooks, it must be stated unequivocally that the Athenians in the Assembly and in the Courts acted in conformity with the norms of 2,400 years ago when they sentenced to death those who had mutilated the Herms, or when they accused Socrates of impiety. Fifth-century BCE Athens was only the cradle, not the perfect fulfilment, of democracy.

This political system was not designed for the personal rights of the individual, but each citizen was a member and servant of democracy. By comparison with

our concepts of human and individual rights – the fruits of Christian ethics and modern philosophy – fifth-century Athenian society could not achieve much. The very prosecution of the genial and ironic Socrates, whom his disciples Xenophon and Plato sympathetically described as the innocent victim of a judicial assault, is still considered a mark of dishonour in the history of Athens. Nevertheless, Socrates would certainly have been among the first victims of the new order in his admirer and disciple Plato's ideal state.[110]

It is not that modern scholarship should still depend on idealistic views of Athenian democracy, nor that it should remain blind to negative aspects of the ancient state, as seen from the vantage point of our liberal and modern democratic views.[111] Naturally, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, it is still the prevalent view that Athenian democracy and the society it had promoted were essentially a good thing, and in fact the position is still dominant within classical scholarship.[112] This is why scholars find it easy to condemn as barbaric the harsh treatment meted out to profaners of religion; and yet in ancient terms, it was "the most natural thing in the world". It was as normal as the "treatment" – justly regarded as barbaric and condemned as such – suffered by an enemy city in antiquity; after a defeat, the male population would be killed, and the women (after being raped) sold together with their children into slavery. In this sense, J. T. Roberts is wholly correcct when she concludes: "By the standards of the late twentieth century, the Athenians were not very nice people."[113] Nor, by the same token, should these standards be applied to the Athenians who prosecuted Socrates.

Unpleasant feelings with regard to certain practices and convictions of the Athenians, stimulated by humanism and our current system of values, are probably responsible for the fact that even nowadays people want to recognize predominantly or solely political reasons for legal procedures or religiously motivated events, since they are easier to understand in the context of our experience in the modern world.[114]

2
Impiety trials against philosophers and Sophists

"Der Aberglaub', in dem wir aufgewachsen,
Verliert, auch wenn wir ihn erkennen, darum
Doch seine Macht nicht über uns".[1]

2.1 "Enlightenment" and religion: the challenge of Sophistic philosophy

2.1.1 The historical evolution of Sophistic thought

The fact that the intellectuals we call Sophists eventually found themselves on the wrong side of the law on account of their beliefs at the end of the fifth century requires a brief overview of the evolution of intellectual history during Athens' "golden era". This will help us understand how and why the Sophists who were known for their critical views on religion came to earn public criticism.

Towards the beginning of the sixth century in Ionia, innovating thinkers succeeded in explaining natural phenomena rationally, by attributing them to laws of nature governing the universe. These natural philosophers, from Thales to Anaxagoras, cleared the way for the thinkers of the fifth century by applying novel research methods that thus emancipated them from inherited concepts of nature and the gods. The latter were the Sophists, as they were called by contemporaries, and it was by this name that they participated in the European history of ideas.[2]

By stating that all perceptible phenomena can be explained by inherent natural processes and underlying laws of nature (e.g. that the movement of stars is calculable, and that they are not necessarily guided by gods), the Presocratics who dealt in natural philosophy prepared a new emphasis.[3] In fact, such preoccupations led to a change of focus among philosophers from natural phenomena to the conditions of everyday human life and to people's actions. The Sophists were preoccupied by such questions in the middle decades of the fifth century, mostly in Periclean Athens, and were the main promoters of this change.[4]

Considering the difficulty of reducing the different preoccupations and activities of various personalities (labelled "Sophists") to a common denominator, it is not an easy matter to define quite what a Sophist was and what he did. In the first

place, there is a problem not unlike that of the early natural philosophers, in that the surviving testimonia relating to the Sophists are few and far between. Not one complete *opus* has survived; there are scattered fragments at best.[5] To make things worse, our main source of information about these thinkers is Plato, who was their most bitter adversary.[6]

Nevertheless, two defining characteristics of the Sophistic movement can be determined. The first relates to their occupation as teachers of oratory in Athens; for a fee, they taught their students how they might successfully achieve certain political ends in the Assembly. In this way, they fully met social and political needs, and ultimately the practical requirements of Athens that arose after a radical democracy was introduced in 462 BCE. This came about because a political career depended, from that moment on, in large part upon an ability to speak freely and persuasively before the Assembly, which decided all the important issues.[7]

On the other hand – and this is the second criterion – the Sophists, given their quality as thinkers, as philosophers, also had a tendency to reject the likelihood of an eternally valid reality behind the social facts of human societies. In other words, they denied the existence of a universal divine law in favour of a consistent relativism and subjectivism.[8] Despite this tendentious change of interests, which led to a certain distancing from the natural philosophy studied earlier by the Ionians, and despite their preference for rhetoric, the philosophers called "Sophists" never completely lost interest in traditional philosophical fields, such as natural phenomena and their explanation.[9]

Nevertheless, this relativism of Sophistic teaching seems to be the binding element that gave cohesion to Sophistic thought, with regard to its philosophical content. A significant example for the principle of relativity of human perception that makes final judgements impossible is Protagoras' concept of taste-related impressions: a dish that one finds sweet, another may find bitter.[10] This only creates a problem when one adds the genuine Sophistic idea that there is no mandatory definition for sweetness or bitterness that would allow individual opinions on sweetness or bitterness to be assessed or corrected. Consequently, such consistent relativity also targets twin concepts such as truth and lies, justice and injustice, good and evil, and so on, crucial for life in society.

After discovering and describing foreign peoples and their customs, the view of an overriding mandatory, irrevocable, divinely inspired law of human collective life (previously accepted as *nomos*) becomes obsolete. Sophists thus defined customs as the product of human conventions, which made regulations and laws subject to change on account of their human origin. The natural world order, which is not subject to human influence, was referred to by Sophists from the mid-fifth century as the concept of *physis*, and constitutes the antithesis to *nomos,* as defined by convention and tradition.[11]

In consequence, Sophists applied the *nomos–physis* antithesis to politics and the law. Gorgias, for example, postulated the natural legitimacy of the strong

dominating the weak.[12] Archelaus, one of Anaxagoras' disciples, who also assumed that moral considerations were the result of human convention, clearly stated the opposition between *nomos* and *physis*: τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν οὐ φύσει, ἀλλὰ νόμῳ.[13] This evolution from a still "innocent" investigation of natural phenomena to general scepticism, questioning authority and the validity of social values, as illustrated by the antithesis between tradition and nature, would have long-term consequences.

On the one hand, it led to the creation of a philosophical religion (already propagated by the natural philosophers) that opposed a pantheist version of the transcendent to the anthropomorphic deities of myth. On the other hand – and this is very important – the issue of religion as such, and consequently of belief in the gods of mythological tradition, became central to the research. As Jaeger stated:

> any type of thinking that derives all existence from nature and any type of thinking that derives all existence from nature and its characteristic law and order must come to the point of regarding even belief in God as a product of human nature in interaction with the world that surrounds it, and therefore as something natural in itself.[14]

Acknowledging that *nomos* (custom) does not reflect immutable law or the divine regulation of human life, but clearly has its origins in the human imagination, and is perceived differently in various cultures, led to a criticism of tradition and to a growing disregard for the laws of the state.[15] Inherited belief in the gods of the Homeric pantheon, and in the moral and law-enforcing divinities depicted by Hesiod and Solon – divinities who were said to supervise comformity to *nomos*, and who guaranteed the punishment of offenders – was, if not fully rejected, at least questioned and subjected to critical examination.[16] An explanation of man's moral behaviour as presented by the captain in Büchner's *Woyzeck* – "Morality, that's when one is moral" – was no longer enough for the critical spirit of the age of the Sophists.[17]

2.1.2 Criticism of religion by natural philosophers and Sophists

The evolution just described from the development of knowledge regarding the philosophy of nature, and which questioned the vision of the essence of nature that had been valid until then, to the transfer of this knowledge to social phenomena, occurred gradually and far from the public eye. More than 150 years passed between the questioning of mythological tradition by Milesian natural philosophers and the formulation of radical doubt regarding the very existence of the gods. The controversies concerning the traditional content of Greek belief had their origins in criticism of the concept of anthropomorphic gods (as depicted by Homer and Hesiod), who were represented in myth with a set of human feelings.

Xenophanes expressed a critical attitude towards a simplified concept of human-like gods by means of well-known aphorism, according to which, if horses

could paint like humans, then their gods would look like horses.[18] Xenophanes' doctrine, which considers a god to be very different from human beings, physically and spiritually, is related to this criticism of the anthropomorphizing of the Greek gods.[19]

In keeping with Xenophanes, other representatives of Presocratic philosophy expressed their disregard for the mythical tradition of morally questionable gods, or else they relativized the significance of religious practices. These thinkers fundamentally questioned, and then abandoned, the simple, even naïve belief in the divine animation of nature, expressed through spring nymphs, river deities and spirits of the woods.[20] On the other hand, early critics of religion did not at all question the existence of a divine power that guarantees human *nomos* as an ultimate authority. They did not reject myth, but they corrected it, by eliminating its unbelievable elements, and by rationally remodelling it.[21]

Because of this way of thinking, intellectuals, who are numbered among the Sophists in Athens during the second half of the fifth century BCE, developed an agnostic view of the transcendent. Protagoras' view is typical. He states that his limited human perception could not allow him to judge whether gods existed or not: περὶ μὲν θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω εἰδέναι, οὔθ' ὁποῖοί τινες ἰδέαν· πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κωλύοντα εἰδέναι ἥ τ' ἀδηλότης καὶ βραχὺς ὢν ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.[22]

This attitude did not correspond to an atheism with no illusions, but to a Sophistic doubt in the universal validity of human knowledge, most obvious in the famous *homo mensura* rule, according to which human beings and their ability to make judgements are "the measure of all things"; consequently, their limited perception is the principle of any knowledge.[23] Gods are thus not perceptible (or, if so, only indirectly) and so we can no longer make statements about them. In the same way, Thrasymachus doubted that the gods could have any influence upon the destiny and deeds of mortals.[24]

Proper behaviour towards the gods (εὐσεβεῖν – the correct observation of matters of cult and custom), was no longer entirely exempt from relativizing doubt, and was intensified by Greek contacts with members of other cultures. This is clear from a passage of Herodotus: King Darius summoned some Greeks and asked them if they would consent to eat the remains of their dead fathers in exchange for a royal reward. Each of them turned down the proposal. Then, he offered the same reward to a tribe of Indians named Kallatiai, if they would agree to burn their fathers, as the Greeks did. The Kallatiai rejected the mere mention of such words of impiety, since, according to Herodotus, they usually ate the bodies of their parents.[25] *Nomos* was not universal, and comparative analysis shows it to be a customary convention within a culturally defined social community.

Against this background, the Sophist Prodicus of Ceos, who had come to Athens as a *rhetor* at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, developed a rational explanation of the origins of religion, according to which forefathers accounted as gods the sun, moon or water, because they needed them. They then invoked Demeter and Dionysus, venerable symbols of bread and wine. Only common

people saw these forces as gods, given that Prodicus had himself rejected these popular beliefs.[26]

Critias, who is often associated with the Sophists,[27] took matters a step further. With his opinions on the origins of religion, he marked the climax of criticism of religion during the fifth century. He developed a thoroughly "atheistic" view of the gods, considering them to be merely the invention of a cunning and clever man (πυκνός τις καὶ σοφὸς ἀνήρ). He claimed that the "bogeyman" called "fear of gods" only serves to sanction the laws that were after all made by humans, with the empty threat of divine punishment if broken. It was only meant to scare the multitude in order to ensure domination over those who feared the gods. There is no guiding divinity behind human order (the *nomos*), since gods are a creation of man, and thus human laws cannot have a mandatory character. These were the ideas of Critias, who not only ended up as the accursed leader of the Thirty Tyrants, but who also seems to have expressed himself as dramatist; a fragment of the satyr play *Sisyphus* was first attributed to him by Wilamowitz.[28]

2.1.3 The philosophy of nature and the Sophistic movement as an "Enlightenment"

The "*révolution intellectuelle*"[29] of the fifth century has often been called an "Enlightenment" and has been seen to have something in common with the European Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, often thought to be an era of similar historical and spiritual change. "And as the Germans would scarcely have had a Kant without the Age of Enlightenment, so the Greeks would scarcely have had a Socrates and a Socratic philosophy without the Sophists."[30] The first Enlightenment – the ancient one – and the second – that of the eighteenth century – are spoken of as though the Sophists had been the encyclopaedists of the Periclean age.[31] It was for their critical views on religion that consensus made the Sophists into true Illuminists. "The liberation from superstition is called Enlightenment."[32] Sophistic philosophy could also be explained in this Kantian sense.

J. Burnet is the first to have expressed his doubts on putting the two currents in European intellectual history in the same box, beginning with the fundamental difference between the very individualistic Greek thinkers, and noting that it is difficult to find, in the absence of a homogenous "Sophist School", anything approaching a medium of a "Greek Enlightenment". Such a comparison seems hazardous, considering that the completely different premises and circumstances of the "Greek Enlightenment", and those of the eighteenth century Enlightenment, were totally ignored.[33]

In addition, the so-called "Greek Enlightenment" did not come into prominence through a growing popular movement, as was the case with its modern counterpart (which prepared the way for a widespread and unprecedented secularization).[34] On the contrary, the term had to be employed exclusively in its technical meaning: Enlightenment as the expression of rationalist thinkers and philosophers who were as impartial as possible, as the quest for knowledge, prepared, beyond

the traditional concepts of "god and world", to discover the true composition of things and of their causes.

This constant preoccupation with questioning everything that had been settled before, through a quasi-"scientific" method, thus generating novel theories and fresh opinions is, in principle, the characteristic sign of all "Illuminists". Apart from the Sophists, the early natural philosophers, Thales and Anaxagoras, were also part of an "ancient Enlightenment". In the same way, in the purely technical sense, we might also view Francis Bacon as a representative of the modern Enlightenment, as well as protagonists such as Voltaire or Diderot.

2.1.4 The Sophists and the polis: disseminating and receiving Sophistic ideas

"You are, and always will be a liar and a sophist."[35] The unfavourable image that Goethe's Doctor Faustus clearly still holds of the ancient teachers of oratory, when he insults Mephistopheles by calling him a Sophist economical with the truth, largely corresponds to the image that the contemporaries of Protagoras and Gorgias had of them. The bad name of the Sophists, perpetuated over time, was derived in part from their questioning attitude towards the supernatural, but mostly from their activities.

On the one hand, they were accused of accepting payment for their lessons as teachers of rhetoric, thus becoming "prostitutes of knowledge", since they sold knowledge to anyone who paid for it.[36] Hippocrates, Socrates' young interlocutor in the dialogue *Protagoras*, was obsessed with Sophistical teaching, but blushes in shame when Socrates suggests that he, Hippocrates, would probably like to become a Sophist himself.[37] On the other hand, the Sophists were not highly regarded by traditionally minded Athenians, on account of their teaching (influenced by the philosophy of nature) about the relativity of habitual and moral values, which they transmitted to the young of the best families.[38]

Thus, the politician Anytus, later to be an accuser of Socrates, affirms in Plato's *Meno* that the Sophists are a manifest cause of ruin and unhappiness for their pupils. He feels obliged to begin a befuddled tirade on the Sophists' evil influence on youth, but has to agree with Socrates' reproach that he is only expressing a prejudice, since he does not know any Sophists personally and he could not know whether what they do is good or bad.[39] From Plato, we learn that the Sophists were apparently greedy hunters of rich young men for the most part: νέων καὶ πλουσίων ἔμμισθος θηρευτής.[40] By their easy-going and flexible attitude to morals, they would teach the young how to use oratory in order to make the weaker argument the stronger one: τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω.[41]

The fact that the reproaches laid against philosophers or Sophists were not harmless comments in a free, democratic and "open" society, indebted to the principle of *isegoria* or political equality, becomes clear with the legal persecution of philosophers, of which there is much more to be said (see Chapter 2.2.). Protagoras explicitly expresses the Sophists' fear of admitting their "profession" in the eponymous Platonic dialogue: because of their unpopularity, the Sophists lived in constant fear.

Being exposed to generous hostility – they were considered capable of anything – the Sophists hid their true profession by declaring other official "jobs", such as that of musician.[42] In the first instance – and the point is worth emphasizing – they were teachers of oratory, thus serving an important purpose for the political culture of direct democracy in Athens. Their pupils were mainly rich young men of noble origin.

The Sophists were often accused, as already stated, of earning their living by teaching, since they charged rich pupils for their lessons, sometimes exorbitantly.[43] The Sophists were much in demand, as indicated by their success, but the phenomenon was essentially elitist, and did not have much real influence. There were home visits, or else those eager for knowledge gathered in the houses of rich benefactors, who provided the necessary space, such as the teaching arrangements at the houses of Callias (for Protagoras) and of Callicles (for Gorgias).[44]

Hence, in order to benefit from Sophistic lessons (a true higher education), one had to be wealthy. Even if we take into account the significant differences between the fees charged by the teachers, it is obvious that a day labourer could never attend even the cheapest lecture presented for publicity purposes.[45]

Ordinary people's image of the teaching and style of the Sophists was based mainly on hearsay, which led to preconceived opinions. The fact that a play such as Aristophanes' *Clouds* was actually presented before an Athenian public implies that Athens was familiar with the presence and, through parodies, the philosophical preoccupations of these special teachers. Since only elite groups had real access to the Sophists' teaching, the Demos had, of course, a distorted image of the Sophists, in part based on xenophobic prejudice against the profession of the foreign teachers, who were generally not native Athenians. Plato and Plutarch shared such opinions in their observations on the general unpopularity of these representatives of the new thinking.[46]

Such anti-Sophistic bias appears mainly in Old Comedy, and the common prejudice of the Demos was employed by writers of comedy as a basic ingredient of humour and satire.[47] The many malicious allusions in comedy to the natural philosophers and to the Sophists, as well as to intellectuals in general, present them as a group with no morals, as money chasers, with no faith in the gods and wholly expendable so far as the city was concerned.

Thus Eupolis describes Protagoras as one talking outrageously about heavenly things, but at the same time eating the fruits of the earth: ὃς ἀλαζονεύεται μὲν ἀλιτήριος περὶ τῶν μετεώρων, τὰ δὲ χαμᾶθεν ἐσθίει.[48] Comedy also attacked Antiphon, accusing him of selling legal speeches for high prices to litigants who by rights should have lost their cases.[49] In *Birds*, Aristophanes quotes a decree offering rewards for killing Diagoras of Melos, who was famous for not fearing the gods. In the same play, Meton the astronomer is beaten up, to show that people like him are not welcome in the city of the Clouds.[50] Aristophanes also describes Prodicus of Ceos as having a very bad influence upon public manners: τοῦτον τὸν ἄνδρ' ἢ βιβλίον διέφορεν ἢ Πρόδικος ἢ τῶν ἀδολεσχῶν εἷς γέ τις.[51]

Prejudices become apparent in Aristophanes' *Clouds*, in the distorted lampoon of the "Sophist" Socrates: "Popular fears of impiety are here displayed, much more fully and clearly than in any other source."[52] Socrates appears as an amalgam of the features generally attributed to Sophists and those attributed, without any reflection, to certain "intellectuals" and natural philosophers.[53]

Socrates, who, together with his pupils, lays the foundations of a φροντιστήριον ("Thinkery"), is only presented as a professional teacher of oratory here. Not only does he teach Strepsiades to use oratory to drive away his creditors, but he also subscribes to a mixture of various theories relating to the "natural sciences".[54] In the *phrontisterion*, the traditionally worshipped gods do not mean a thing; it is to them that Strepsiades, Socrates' rustic new pupil, refers: Στ. μισθὸν δ' ὄντιν' ἂν πράττῃ μ' ὀμοῦμαι σοι καταθήσειν τοὺς θεούς. Σω. ποίους θεοὺς ὀμεῖ σύ; πρῶτον γὰρ θεοὶ ἡμῖν νόμισμ' οὐκ ἔστι.[55] In Socrates' "Thinkery", only the Clouds are worshipped, the gods of the Sophists (σοφισταί), of certain diviners of Thurii (Θουριομάντεις) and charlatans (ἰατροτέχναι).[56]

Taking into consideration the obvious differences between the Sophists and the historical figure of Socrates, as described by Plato and Xenophon – an individual who did not charge his audience and who did not show any interest in the natural sciences or worship strange gods' idols – it becomes clear that the famous philosopher is employed here only as a cover. The purpose of this cover is to orchestrate a general rant against intellectuals, who were famous for their unusual opinions on "everything under the sun".[57] Such a common and widespread prejudice was based on a fund of actual (if perhaps crude and superficial) popular assumptions about Sophistic philosophies and natural science research, available for Aristophanes to work with.

To meet a Sophist, one did not have to attend their talks in elite circles, for they were also active publicly, and occasionally spoke before larger and more varied audiences. These public outings and demonstrations (ἐπιδείξεις), mostly in places where young people met, were a vital means of recruiting new pupils from among the aristocrats.[58] Thus, it is said that Gorgias offered to speak in the theatre at Athens on any given theme. He also seemed to have lectured in the Agora.[59] Some say that Prodicus gave public lectures at the Lyceum, or that Hippias appeared at the school of a certain Pheidostratus (ἐν τῷ Φειδοστράτου διδασκαλείῳ).[60]

Outside Athens, Sophists appeared in public at the Olympic or at the Pythian Games, where they attended the oratory competition.[61] Nevertheless, they could only transmit the content of their philosophical doctrine by means of lessons taught in smaller circles.[62] Some Sophists were, without any doubt, extremely famous, and they made themselves known well beyond their usual field of activity. Thus, Protagoras had a political reputation, because he created the constitution of Thurii, together with Pericles.[63] Gorgias of Leontini played the role of ambassador for his city, as did Hippias of Elis.[64]

By the same token, Athenians could observe a growing number of speakers in the Assembly who not only used practical arguments in the rational sense of the

Sophists, but, by means of their mode of argument, disseminated the influence of their teachers.[65] Citizens viewed oratory, for the most part, as the "art of persuading". It is important to make a distinction, however: only the pupils of the Sophists actually received philosophical training, while the rest of the citizens were left to imagine, in a rather hit-or-miss fashion, what kind of philosophical theses were articulated by the teachers of rhetoric.

The Demos did not have access, apart from displays by speakers in the Assembly, to the core message of the philosophy of the Sophists or their agnostic concept of religion.[66] No source has yet been discovered showing that the representatives of the new thinking might have had admirers or even real pupils among the Demos.[67] This is why J. K. Davies rightly stresses that the special importance for the history of European ideas, of these small and unorganized groups of innovating thinkers, should not make us exaggerate their influence on contemporaries.[68]

It is the case, however, that some scholars believe sophistry did not just have a "technical" influence on the Athenian Demos, by perfecting the art of speaking among politicians of the younger generation who had been instructed in a Sophistic spirit. Some suggest that, as a result of the critical religious views of some teachers of rhetoric, Sophistic thinking also undermined the traditional religion that was shared by the majority of the population. Thus indoctrinated, the Athenians would have ceased to take seriously the gods transmitted by tradition, and the crises at the end of the fifth century would have been not only political with some religious implications, but would have been a fundamental crisis of belief in general, and of the religious system as a whole. Following this school, one might speak of a decline in traditional religion under the influence of Sophistic scepticism. The gradual "Sophistication" of society would supposedly have affected only an instructed but influential elite, as Euripides' tragedies and comedies towards the end of the fifth century might suggest.[69]

The application of views to the contemporary theatre is problematical not only in practical terms, as a glance at the religious continuity of the fourth century shows,[70] but it is debatable from a methodological perspective as well. The scandalous appearance – to a modern observer – of the "god of the theatre" in Aristophanes' *Frogs* as a frightened and impotent individual, who even soils his costume in fear, has been seen as proof of a lack of respect towards traditional religion, and as a symbol of its decline.[71] Such disrespectful attitudes, it is thought, could only have been amusing in the eyes of a public no longer familiar with a traditional presentation of the gods. Nilsson believes that Aristophanes would not have taken such liberties unless his public was more or less influenced by the same beliefs.[72]

Similar conclusions about the public's attitudes were formulated as a result of the way in which the amoral gods were presented in Euripides' tragedies. When the *dramatis personae* in his tragedies express their doubts about the powers of the gods or indeed their very existence, this has been interpreted as a reflection of opinions widespread among the public. On this view, by mounting plays with such shattering implications for the Athenians, Euripides played the role of a "herald of

the Greek enlightenment" (in Nestle's words), using the stage as a marketplace for new Sophistic-inspired ideas.[73] In the opinion of one critic:

> If nowhere else, the average Athenian could encounter novel ideas, attitudes, and values in the theatre. If Euripides was aware of the intellectual developments of his day (and no one, so far as I am aware, asserts that he was not), he was transmitting in his plays ... ideas, attitudes, and values which were not "popular", but must surely sometimes have influenced his audiences.[74]

When the reality of the stage is thus considered to be a mirror of social data, or when dramatic representations are viewed as authorial didacticism to further an author's political ends, the social meaning, or the value of comedy and tragedy as historical sources, becomes overrated.[75] Such evaluations overestimate the possibility for us today to work out from the texts, the social meaning of ancient drama, considering that no ancient author explains it.

The introduction of gods in comedies – and not always in circumstances to their credit – can have a rich flavour only from the point of view of a modern commentator, influenced by concepts of transcendent divinity. Greek gods were "at the centre of life", and they were originally part of life as really experienced, as deities of nature. For understandable reasons, A. Lesky favours an understating of a Greek religiosity that emphasizes its essential divergences, as opposed to modern assumptions. He asserts that mocking the gods in comedy is a far from destructive critique, and that it is rather a sign of intimate and familiar proximity to these beings.[76]

The burlesque mockery of the gods during the festival of Dionysus also had a traditional function, as a celebration of the "world upside down". For example, during the Anthesteria (also part of the Dionysiac cult), there was a reversal of the social order, with slaves enjoying temporary freedom, a feature of great importance for the renewal and support of this social order.[77]

The ritualized and temporary "lack of order", role reversal and the like consolidate the social "order", strengthened by clear rules and hierarchies. This gives comedy, together with proximity to gods through burlesque, a true "liberty of manners", with almost no limitations and sanctioned by the rules of the Dionysiac festivities.[78] As Auffarth has shown, by invoking the example of *Birds*, where an upside-down world with upside-down gods is outlined, the view that Aristophanes and the Athenians abandoned traditional religion by mocking it is inadmissible.[79]

As for tragedy, it is even less susceptible to a substantial social interpretation than comedy; at least the latter originates in Athenian daily life, even if (much to the regret of historians) this life is unrealistically altered through comic contortions. In the case of comedies, which are by definition political, there is the danger of reading too many "facts" into it, resulting from exaggerated satirical comments on Attic politics. As for the analysis of tragedy, with its setting in a distant past, there is the danger of endowing it with too much meaning that has nothing to do with the dramatic context. The fact that the plots go back to mythical times,

typical for tragedy, makes the attempt to identify current political allusions a very delicate business.[80]

It is mostly the tragedies of Euripides – "the most enigmatic and controversial of the three Attic tragedians"[81] – that have been often unconditionally understood in the sense of an ephemeral zeitgeist. The playwright has been called a "poet of the enlightenment", and he has been endowed with the role of mediator and successful teacher of the new morals and religious values, induced by the Sophists.[82]

There have been frequent attempts using this writer's plays, to assess the degree to which Athenian society was contaminated with Sophistic ideas, especially with respect to manners and religion. Euripides, no doubt, brought to the stage characters who doubted the gods and introduced Sophistic arguments through their elevated words, thus admitting, "Euripides is evidently caught up in the Sophistic movement".[83]

Such a view of the matter is, however, completely wrong, and objections can be made, mostly from a methodical perspective. This holds good for the historical dimension in general, and for Euripides' plays in particular.[84] The hypothesis that Sophistic ideas were diffused through his plays is false, in the light of what little we know of the social relevance of the subject matter of the plays, separated from the audience in space and time. As more recent research has shown, Euripides was neither an agnostic nor an atheist. In addition, he was neither a "herald of the enlightenment"[85] nor a destroyer of traditional religion.

Euripides was probably the most profound of ancient tragic poets. At the same time, he was no philosopher, still less a politician using tragedy to transmit a doctrine or political line: "Like all true tragedians, Euripides wrote not to advocate reforms or to advance theories, but to present under its tragic aspect an incident from human life."[86] Furthermore, Euripides avoids categories such as "rational"/"irrational", political, patriotic, pacifist and so on, that some scholars have seen in his work. One should perhaps consider him to have been a theatrical experimenter who cannot easily be fitted into a particular category, an experimenter who used psychologically endowed characters on stage and new dramatic techniques.[87]

The stubborn intent of looking in Euripdes' plays for something beyond the conflicts and shattering human destinies he puts on stage, and of turning him into the propagator of political knowledge, philosophical teachings or complicated views of Attic society does an injustice to the most profound playwright of antiquity, demoting him to the status of an "instructor" of the Athenians.[88]

Such an emphasis on an aspect of the varied and complex topic of ancient tragedy has no serious foundation for Euripides, nor for his two famous contemporaries. Attic tragedy should perhaps be explained rather in an Aristotelian key, focusing on the main ideas.[89] In this mode, the well-known French actor and director Louis Jouvet once proposed a witty and Aristotelian explanation of the theatre: "*Condamnés à expliquer le mystère de leur vie, les hommes ont inventé le théâtre.*"[90]

2.1.5 Sophistic philosophy and society: a summary

The elitist phenomenon of the Sophistic movement stimulated intellectual life at the end of the fifth century in important ways that have left traces to our day, and which have contributed to the history of Western ideas.[91] In the first instance, new conceptions of morality characterized by relativism, and a critical view of the divine, caught the interest of a new political generation, attracted by the power of rhetoric. This generation learned new theories during their lessons in oratory. The new attitudes brought to the forefront not just conservative political circles, but also the Demos, influenced by popular religion, and prejudiced and sceptical when it came to new ideas – which they had only heard of. It was not so much the new relativist ideas about religion and morals that attracted the elite to the side of the Sophists, but their claim to turn the young and ambitious generation of politicians into skilled orators.

The philosophical content of Sophistic thinking had little influence on the people. The Demos had become more or less familiarized with the oratory of the aristocratic pupils who had benefited from Sophistic teaching, and it confronted a phenomenon whereby a "weaker argument" sometimes succeeded in becoming "the stronger one". In their ignorance, the Athenians could only balance dogmas of the itinerant pedagogues on the relativity of perception, on their sceptical approach to knowledge, or on their critical views on religion, with their collective prejudice.[92]

Nevertheless, the Sophists had no influence on general religious conceptions or on common religious practice. This was emphasized by N. Robertson: "Nothing that we know of public or private religion at Athens in the late fifth century and the early fourth, including new cults and festivals, suggests that any very intellectual influence was at work."[93] Besides, a clear distinction must be made between, on the one hand, a rational, thinking elite that did not have a collective intellectual development (as evidenced by the case of Nicias, of whom more later) and, on the other hand, the tradition-bound Demos, many of them simple rustics.[94]

In the culturally important age of Pericles, the Sophists naturally had little to fear, apart from public mistrust resulting from their bold beliefs, their unsavoury reputation and their charging fees for instruction. Democracy needed teachers of oratory. Apart from comments on the Sophists' teaching "impiety" expressed in comedy, in Plato and Xenophon, that led von Fritz to the conclusion that the Sophists received "bad publicity",[95] the sources do not mention any other measure taken against the representatives of the new thinking.

Beginning around 450 BCE, the philosophers and Sophists successfully operated without restriction in the city, prejudice notwithstanding, attracted by the liberal climate of Periclean Athens, by the "School of Hellas".[96] In this context, the hints in the sources, which point to a substantial change in the situation, should cause no little surprise.

2.2 Persecution for religious offences: impiety trials in Athens

We hear of the legal prosecution of philosophers, natural philosophers and Sophists, who had attracted attention by criticizing religion from 430.[97] We thus know of the prosecution and trial for impiety – called ἀσέβεια – brought against the natural philosopher Anaxagoras, who believed the sun to be not a god, but a fiery mass of red-hot metal. The Athenians also put on trial the famous Sophist Protagoras for impiety; he uttered the famous sentence, which we have already discussed: "as to the gods, I have no means of knowing either that they exist or that they do not exist."[98] As for the poet Diagoras of Melos, notorious for criticizing the Eleusinian Mysteries – he later acquired the nickname ὁ ἄθεος – a reward was even offered for killing him, while Diogenes of Apollonia escaped his prosecutors at the last moment, and Prodicus of Ceos was seemingly executed. The Athenians appear also to have put on trial Aspasia, Pericles' mistress, and even Euripides, on impiety charges.[99]

In this context, the legal background and a specific law enacted at the beginning of the wave of prosecution, stipulating the punishment for those who did not believe in gods, was more important than these isolated cases, when intellectuals could face exile or the death penalty. This was the decree of Diopeithes, a soothsayer and thus a member of the religious "establishment". On his initiative, the people enacted a decree to impeach, with a trial of εἰσαγγελία, anyone who did not acknowledge the gods or who taught theories relating to celestial phenomena: καὶ ψήφισμα Διοπείθης ἔγραψεν εἰσαγγέλλεσθαι τοὺς τὰ θεῖα μὴ νομίζοντας ἢ λόγους περὶ τῶν μεταρσίων διδάσκοντας.[100]

This provided a solid foundation whereby measures could be taken against persons who publicly defied traditional beliefs in the gods within the polis religion. As emphasized by most scholars, an entirely new situation arose from the publication of the decree against those who chose to distance themselves publicly from the gods of tradition, as well as from the subsequent trials of philosophers and poets. It represented a striking change in the Athenians' attitude towards critics of religion and towards intellectuals.[101]

Although intellectuals were not greatly appreciated from the very beginning of their arrival at Athens, such a lack of popularity reached a completely new level through the charges of religious transgression. Clearly, the Athenians were admitting at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War that the philosophers and Sophists whom they had been tolerating were a serious threat to the polis. In what follows, we shall examine the reasons why they changed their minds about the many scholars living in the city. It should be noted, incidentally, that the impiety trials represent a purely Attic phenomenon, since there is no evidence for similar religiously based prosecutions of philosophers in other parts of Greece.

In the next section, we shall see first whether Athenians did really consider certain cases of *asebeia* or atheism as a threat to their community, and what kind of punitive measures were to hand in those particular cases. As was noted in the Introduction, traditional cults were essential for the city's welfare in the context of

polis religion. From the general and common character of religion, it is possible to extract a set of minimum beliefs that any individual had to observe in order to avoid endangering the entire community. Whoever stood against these minimal religious requirements, regarded as a kind of "civic duty", or said or did something that conflicted with the unifying beliefs of society, not only reduced respect for religious principles, but also rose against the entire community of the polis. Such individual behaviour could endanger the entire community, stirring the wrath and revenge of the gods. It was precisely at times of crisis that discontented citizens were especially outraged at such unorthodoxy.[102] A lack of respect for traditional religion was thus also an indication of disloyalty towards the polis,[103] therefore serving as the starting point for the persecution of those "who did not believe in the gods venerated by the city", as the accusation against Socrates literally put it.[104]

Against this background, it becomes clear that the Athenians, their views reinforced by the crisis, believed that to question fundamental religious conventions, such as the universal view that gods existed and that they were responsible for the city's welfare, meant endangering the urban community.[105] As Fustel de Coulanges noted long ago, in a discussion of the importance of religious practice for good or evil for the city-state, the Greeks of the classical period had no concept of religious tolerance when the polis religion was threatened.[106]

The city had to protect its gods, since gods protected the city; modern views of religious tolerance practised in Athens are, by contrast, the relics of a "romantic view" in Classics.[107] The legal institutions of Athens corresponded to the commonly held views of the Demos, when religious critics, or philosophers charged with disrespecting the gods or even atheism, were put on trial.

2.3 Atheism and impiety in fifth-century Athens

2.3.1 Atheism: limits and definition

Within the study of religion and philosophy, the precise definition of atheism is highly disputed. Definitions are frequently rather different, not surprisingly, since "to decide precisely what constitutes atheism depends on just what conception of God is assumed".[108] When the concept of atheism is analysed in the tradition of the great monotheistic religions, with their dogmas and doctrines marked by church structures, the results must be very different from any notion of atheism in the context of ancient Greek religion.

Polytheism for the Greeks was characterized by a lack of dogmatic structures and the relative insignificance of expert priests, and they could only arrive at a concept of atheism that did not include agnosticism, pantheism or deism, since these can only be treated as forms of atheism within a monotheistic profession of faith. Scholarship has barely acknowledged this, however, and the term "atheism", with connotations greatly influenced by Christianity, is still widely used, often in a way that is altogether unclear and imprecise.[109]

Such being the case, the question arises as to whether the term "atheism", only created with its modern meaning in the sixteenth century, but which classicists extended to antiquity, can ever really be employed for classical Athens.[110] The definition proposed by M. Winiarczyk (according to whom atheism denies any divine essence, or the existence of gods, or any supernatural powers) is acceptable here, as the lowest common denominator to create a concept of atheism that is also valid for classical Greece.[111]

The term ἄθεος, in the sense "he who denies the existence of gods", is not attested before Plato; earlier usages by Bacchylides, Pindar, Aeschylus and Sophocles had other meanings, such as "godless", or, later, "sinful", "heinous".[112]

The question is still open as to whether the Greek concept encompassed, at one extreme, the idea of simple sceptical agnosticism, and at the other, radical atheism defined by the denial of any supernatural powers. Starting from the concept of polis religion,[113] and emphasizing the strong relationship between cult and public life, any "atheism" that exceeded agnostic scepticism would appear to be altogether unimaginable for classical Greece. Religion was an essential part of everyday life. The calendar of religious holidays guiding the life of the city was also an indispensable element of daily religious life, as were the rites of passage occasioned by important events within the private sphere.[114]

In a study of "ancient atheism" (conceptually different from forms that emerged in later periods), Winiarczyk plausibly stated that Greeks' relationship with their religion changed only gradually. This is why the temporal dimension is essential, when answering the question as to whether we can talk of atheism among ancient Greeks. The beginning of this transformation is to be placed in the second half of the fifth century, when the theories of the Sophists emerged; at the end of this evolution, a radical atheism was expressed, in the sense mentioned above: "It was only at the crossroads between the fifth and the fourth centuries that people started learning from these theories, when they questioned not only the folk religion, but also the existence of the supernatural powers in the Universe."[115] It is not easy to determine whether there were atheists in the strict sense of the word as early as the fifth century. We know, however, from Plato's late *Laws* that he was involved in intense controversies with such people, and so the atheism phenomenon was around at Athens from at least the first half of the fourth century.[116] Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that atheism, a concept so easy to explain and to understand for post-Enlightenment moderns, is alien to most pre-modern societies and, in the truest sense of the word, "unthinkable". We should recall once more the episode of the Eskimo chief, who was puzzled when asked if he believed in the gods. In classical Athens, one could believe in gods that were not acknowledged by the polis, one could introduce new deities, but one could not believe in nothing at all.

We should, however, be cautious when using the "atheist" label, because our sources do not mention by name other thinkers, such as those who rejected forms of folk religion.[117] The catalogues of famous ἄθεοι date from the Hellenistic period or later, and they only mention the *hommes célèbres* who were considered to be

atheists in those times.[118] But the sources conspire to suggest that philosophers and Sophists could be prosecuted in the second half of the fifth century, not because they made people talk about them as ἄθεοι, but because they were accused of impiety (ἀσεβείας ἕνεκα). Hence, the accusation of atheism has only a social, not a legal relevance, in contrast with *asebeia*.

2.3.2. Impiety in general linguistic usage and as statutory offence

From Aristotle, we learn that *asebeia* is misconduct in the context of gods and demons, or the dead, or parents, or country: ἀσέβεια μὲν ἡ περὶ δαίμονας ἢ καὶ περὶ τοὺς κατοιχομένους καὶ περὶ γονεῖς καὶ περὶ πατρίδα.[119] Plato explains it in a simpler manner: impiety is what is displeasing to the gods.[120] *Asebeia* is thus mainly a religious offence, and is often translated as "godlessness" or "sacrilege". The semantic field of the term ἀσέβεια is very wide, and naturally includes atheism, since any ἄθεος is also ἀσεβής.[121] Since ancient attempts to define it are unhelpful, given their imprecise and general character, scholars long ago concluded that the term ἀσέβεια and related accusations were highly unclear and flexible.[122]

Considering the imprecision of the concept, the legal term ἀσέβεια can only with difficulty be separated from the linguistic usage of the word.[123] While lack of respect for parents was generally considered ἀσέβεια, it was not a legal issue. A broken promise or a lie could also be seen as ἀσέβεια without being punished as an impiety-related offence.[124] Euthyphro's relatives considered him ἀσεβής, because he had accused his own father of killing a slave.

Nor is the orators' inflationary usage of the word useful in determining the legal connotations of the term.[125] Any damage to sacred olive trees was an impiety, to be tried before the Areopagus, and the decree of Diopeithes, which proscribed a very different form of ἀσέβεια, condemned the guilty parties through εἰσαγγελία.[126] In 415 BCE, the mutilators of the Herms and the profaners of the Mysteries also went through an *eisangelia* trial, but not according to the decree of Diopeithes, because their offences were obviously different from what that *psephisma* stipulated.[127] The hierophant Archias was tried for *asebeia*, because he had conducted an improper sacrifice, in a way that went against inherited tradition.[128] Socrates, moreover, was tried through a γραφὴ ἀσεβείας, and he was condemned before a *dikasterion* of 501 jurors.

In view of the many ways of juridically attacking ἀσεβοῦντες, and considering the sources, we must conclude that the legal term ἀσέβεια comprised such a variety of offences and methods of operating that it is impossible to offer a clear-cut definition of the offence. Hence, in Athens, there was no unequivocal legislation. This imprecision is also reflected in an observation attributed to Pericles by Lysias: in cases of *asebeia*, one also had to invoke the unwritten laws.[129] Scholars have always considered this to be a fundamental shortcoming of Attic law.[130]

D. Cohen, however, has noted that we should not see this situation as a shortcoming of Attic law, but as one of its essential characteristics, a common feature of Athenian and many other pre-modern societies.[131]

There were many and various legal regulations at Athens. Attic law and justice were characterized by prescriptions for legal procedures in case of offences; Athenians gave them all consideration, seeing them as supporting pillars of democracy.[132] Attic law does not, however, formulate definitions of offences. The court orders for theft invoked by Demosthenes show this clearly: εἰ μέν τις μεθ' ἡμέραν ὑπὲρ πεντήκοντα δραχμὰς κλέπτοι, ἀπαγωγὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἕνδεκ' εἶναι, εἰ δέ τις νύκτωρ ὁτιοῦν κλέπτοι, τοῦτον ἐξεῖναι καὶ ἀποκτεῖναι καὶ τρῶσαι διώκοντα καὶ ἀπαγεῖν τοῖς ἕνδεκ', εἰ βούλοιτο.[133] Precise rules of punishment are laid down, but Attic criminal law had no exact definition of theft (this remained undecided), which led to many individual laws. By contrast, modern German law gives an exact definition of theft: namely, anyone who takes away any movable thing not being his own from another, with the intent of unlawfully appropriating it.[134]

Since there were no actual jurists in Athens, and the law was in the hands of jurors, these non-professional "judges" defined theft during their "trials", and they decided whether the offence was applicable to the case: "In short, the only applicable definitions of offences were those residing in the collective consciousness of the community, as manifested through the 500 or more citizens who happened to be sitting on a particular day to hear a particular case."[135] And ἀσέβεια was treated similarly: impiety was what the juror considered it to be when he was part of the trial jury or, more frequently, of the *ekklesia* to debate a particular case.[136] Concepts established through moral categories are, however, hard to define in general, and especially in an exact legal manner. This did not apply only to classical Athens, where no such clear definition was possible because of the legal system. In the German Federal Republic at the end of the 1960s, one could face up to three years in prison (§166 *StGB*) for "blasphemy in public", when it included an "offensive statement". Now, however, after a revision of the so-called "paragraphs on blasphemy", only insults against religious societies (and similar associations) are included, if the blasphemy leads to "a disturbance".[137]

Concepts such as ἀσέβεια or "public offence" are established through social consensus, and it can change rapidly in both pre-modern and modern societies. This perspective is very important for the analysis of the Peloponnesian War period. The influence of historical circumstances, mainly determined by military failure and by the plague, was mostly reflected in the attitude of public opinion towards ἀσεβοῦντες, or those considered as such. This is why there was not *one* rule to sanction the offences related to impiety, but a multitude of regulations, depending on the various types of procedures and on the several penalties, which emphasizes the surprising lack of precision in the case of *asebeia*.

It is important, moreover, to stress that, contrary to earlier views stating that the ἀσεβής was only the one who sinned against religious prescriptions, or who actively misbehaved against a cult or sanctuaries (by e.g. robbing temples or damaging cult-related paintings), blasphemy could also be a criminal offence.[138] In the speech against Andocides, it is clear that the accusation of *asebeia* targeted both the person who did something (ἔργῳ) against the law, and the person who said

something against it (λόγῳ).[139] In this sense, I agree with M.-M. Mactoux, who states that the public expression of religious criticism through words or in writing constituted the main factor for the criminal character of the offence.[140]

The decree of Diopeithes was probably the most important regulation regarding *asebeia*, and the first of its type preserved as a text. If Ostwald is correct, then the relevant *psephisma* represents the first law of this kind.[141]

It is very interesting to determine the precise moment when the institutions of the polis decided, for the first time, to challenge those who doubted the existence or achievements of the gods. We have already made a case for the extraordinary importance of the plague, with its historical and religious meanings, which should not be forgotten in this context. There is, as we shall see, a direct link between the outbreak of the plague and the decree of Diopeithes.

Anaxagoras and other intellectuals, such as teachers of rhetoric, had got themselves noticed much earlier in Athens.[142] In Ionia, the rationalist critique of the gods had a much longer tradition, through Xenophanes. Nevertheless, the impiety offences described began to be punished only after the law proposed by Diopeithes. This law has generally been dated to 433/2 or, more recently, to 438/7. There are, however, arguments to support publication of the *psephisma*, after the Assembly's approval, as late as 430. The reason for the decision would then lie with the outbreak of the plague and the vicissitudes of war. If we accept this date, the attack against previously tolerated philosophers would make rather more sense, in view of the pressure exerted by the crisis of the period. In what follows, we shall judge the merits of the case for dating the decree of Diopeithes to 430.

2.4 The decree of Diopeithes and its consequences

In view of the largely late and often uncertain transmission of the information concerning impiety trials examined above, it is difficult not to question the credibility of the sources. Concerning the measures taken against Anaxagoras and Protagoras, we have information from sources dating to the fourth century (Ephorus, Aristotle); for Diagoras of Miletus, there are even contemporary references (Aristophanes, Lysias). The decree of Diopeithes, cited by Plutarch, and constituting the grounds for the charges against Anaxagoras, comes from a collection of decrees of the Assembly. The Macedonian Craterus copied this collection in the fourth century, from the state archive at Athens. This collection of documents, a great source of inspiration for Plutarch, is a priceless original source, as F. Jacoby and P. Stadter have shown.[143]

On the prosecution of Prodicus of Ceos (to note the most relevant example), we only find details in the Suda, where earlier testimonia were gathered together almost 1,400 years after the event.[144] In addition, the *Vita* of Euripides, where we are informed that the playwright is being prosecuted on grounds of *asebeia*, is generally thought to be implausible, on the grounds that the Hellenistic author

derived his inspiration from Euripides' dramas and from comedy, which he apparently treated as historical sources.[145] The tradition relating the accusations brought against Aspasia, the mistress of Pericles, was perhaps only derived from various misogynistic literary allusions.[146] This is why the long list of possible impiety trials against intellectuals continues to be examined critically by scholars.

K. J. Dover vehemently rejected the entire tradition as implausible. His critical objections against the sources are sometimes valid (which is why they are taken into account here), mostly when he questioned the credibility of the later records. It is too much to say, however, that the entire tradition of the impiety trials is a mostly Hellenistic invention, and other scholars have rejected his harsh criticism.[147]

The "master of *ars dubitandi*"[148] questions the very authenticity of Diopeithes' legislative proposal. The core of his *argumentum e silentio* is that Plutarch placed his trust in a ridiculous observation from an unknown comedy. Hellenistic scribes somehow massaged this fictitious decree into historical fact, which is how Plutarch presents it.

In order to show *e silentio* that the law cited by Plutarch is an invention derived from comedy, it is necessary to provide two things: convincing evidence and a motive we can attribute to the "inventor"; neither, however, was provided.[149] The possibility that most information on prosecution for impiety at Athens, transmitted by tradition as it was, might be based only on misunderstandings, or even inventions, is acceptable only if there was a reasonable motive to invent tales of such religious repression. There are, of course, partial transformations of information derived from comedy into historical sources (Satyrus), but enmity between Hellenistic philosophers, the important influence of Socrates on the later generations, and the anti-democratic attitude of many philosophers, are not enough to encourage out-and-out lies, not to mention the tendency of late biographers to "enhance" their stories with doubtful data transmitted by tradition.[150] In what follows, it will be argued that the situation is exactly the opposite and that the reaction of public opinion in Athens, which had the effect of worsening the lot of philosophers and teachers of rhetoric, should be seen as the attempt of the tormented population to find scapegoats.

In order to analyse these "heresy trials" at the end of the fifth century, we must take into account some of Dover's reasonable objections concerning the credibility of certain details of tradition. Nevertheless, following M. Ostwald, and after a truly critical view of the sources in the tradition of German source criticism, it would appear that the credibility of the tradition related to Anaxagoras, Protagoras and Diagoras, as well as to the decree of Diopeithes, is the very least that can be agreed upon.[151]

We shall not discuss here details that would be impossible to establish for certain, such as whether there really was a trial against Protagoras, or whether he managed to leave Athens in time. Moreover, we will not discuss here what exactly happened to Anaxagoras, since the only thing the sources agree upon is that he was put on trial for impiety. Because of the contradictory information, we cannot

say for certain what the penalty was, or whether he managed to escape justice.[152] Nevertheless, his contemporary Plato, as well as Aristotle and Plutarch, mention the dangerous situation faced by Sophists in the city.[153] The number of trials against intellectuals is not so important, but the essential question of the situation is: what were the underlying causes of impiety trials, and what conclusions can we draw for an understanding of the situation in Athens during the Peloponnesian War? An attempt will be made in what follows to analyse these questions, beginning with the trial of Anaxagoras.

2.5 The trial of Anaxagoras and its dating

Judging by the excerpts Diodorus made from Ephorus, and Plutarch's *Life* of Pericles, the trials of the sculptor Phidias, of Anaxagoras, Aspasia and Pericles himself belong in the period around the outbreak of the war. Apart from outlining the accusations, Plutarch offers additional documentary material, where he introduces, in addition to the decree of Diopeithes, the Dracontides decree, which allowed the trial of Pericles, as well as the *ateleia* decree of Meno, which honoured Phidias' accuser.[154] The principal target of these accusations, as Diodorus and Plutarch state, was Pericles, whose enemies wished to discredit him politically by attacking members of his circle.[155]

Scholars largely agree that behind these attacks, expressed through accusations of impiety brought against Anaxagoras and Aspasia, there was an opposition movement against the statesman.[156] According to the ancient sources, these charges encouraged Pericles to adopt pro-war politics, and to impose the Megarian decree, in order to distract the public from domestic political difficulties.[157]

Plutarch describes how matters developed. In his version, Meno, a worker in Phidias' workshop, was hired by unspecified "enemies" of Pericles to accuse the sculptor of having embezzled temple funds. As *epistates*, Pericles was responsible for monitoring the building process, while his friend Phidias worked on the statue of Athena; the accusation was in effect aimed at Pericles himself.[158] Ephorus even states that Pericles was put on trial in the context of this investigation charged with "theft from the temple" (ἱεροσυλία).[159] At an undetermined moment, after the scandal related to the construction of the statue had cooled down – Plutarch is very vague on this issue: περὶ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον – Aspasia was prosecuted for impiety and procurement.[160] Then (unclear chronologically, only based on the conjunction καί), Diopeithes brought his proposal before the Assembly, to prosecute Anaxagoras, with the ultimate purpose of maligning the philosopher's friend, Pericles. In view of the fact that in Ephorus and Plutarch, the trials are thematically linked with descriptions of domestic political confrontations on the eve of the war, 433/2 has generally been accepted as the most likely date for the accusations.[161]

Plutarch's relative chronology is unusable, and the same goes for that of Ephorus, which is characterized by "the worst confusion" and does not throw any light on

the issues at hand.[162] It is difficult now to put things in order, since only two events can be dated at all accurately. However, unlike the impression we receive from the ancient authors, they are far apart chronologically and could not have taken place περὶ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον.

Based on a fragment of Philochorus, and the accounts for the construction of the Parthenon, there used to be voices that argued for 438/7 as the date of the trial of Phidias. The discovery of Phidias' workshop at Olympia, however, made it clear that the sculptor was still active in Elis at the beginning of the 430s BCE; Attic justice could not therefore have tried him a little before the war. In this way, an early date can be seen as "finally secured".[163]

Moreover, Pericles was forced to resign, and condemned to pay a fine for misuse of public funds. These impeachment proceedings certainly occurred in the catastrophic year 430.[164] Moreover, Ephorus' observation that Pericles was put on trial because of the charges brought against Phidias for ἱεροσυλία made things even more confusing. Plutarch, however, mentions only one trial of Pericles, empowered by a popular decree proposed by Dracontides; furthermore, he only mentions it after speaking of the accusations made against Aspasia and Anaxagoras.

If we carefully sift the evidence for the procedures imposed by the decree of Dracontides, calling upon Pericles to deposit with the *prytaneis* an account of his use of public money (ὅπως οἱ λόγοι τῶν χρημάτων ὑπὸ Περικλέους εἰς τοὺς Πρυτάνεις ἀποτεθεῖεν), with the process surely dated in 430, an inexplicable discrepancy of at least seven years emerges.[165] Nevertheless, if we are to conclude, with Frost and Mansfeld, that the decree of Dracontides does not date from 430, then we must also admit the existence of two prosecutions of Athens' πρῶτος ἀνήρ. The first trial would have been reflected in the accusation of temple robbing, only mentioned by Diodorus, and in the decree of Dracontides.[166] But only the impeachment proceedings and the trial of 430 had any consequences for Pericles, since up to that point he had been elected as general uninterruptedly.[167] If anyone considered it a historical fact, the earlier temple robbing accusation could only be connected with the statue of Athena Parthenos, whose construction Pericles, as *epistates*, supervised. It is clear that this accusation had no consequences for him.[168]

This leads to two attested poles in the line of events: one for 438/7 (the date of Phidias' incrimination and, indirectly, of Pericles as *epistates*); the other with a fixed date, because of the impeachment – Pericles' downfall – after 430, when he presented an account of the public expenses.[169] The scholars who use the scanty data provided by Plutarch to support a date of 433/2 for the wave of trials against Pericles' friends indicate possible opposition movements against the statesman, which would have triggered the avalanche of trials against him. Diodorus and Plutarch assure us, moreover, that Pericles' political adversaries (without any names given) were, in fact, behind the accusations and the decree of Diopeithes.[170]

It is impossible to identify the members of this obscure opposition movement at the end of the 430s; it clearly had had no success to date, in that, until his deposition in 430, Pericles had been elected to the highest office for fifteen years in a

row. Somewhat abruptly, later authors identify Thucydides, son of Melesias and Pericles' old adversary, or Cleon as being behind the attacks.[171] Scholars have, in any case, often argued for anonymous "oligarchic circles", probably led by the son of Melesias, having been responsible for the trials. The view that Pericles' old bitter enemy, who had undermined the urban planning schedule in the 440s, had been ostracized in 443, was politically active again in 433, after a ten-year exile, *could* be a plausible explanation for the traditional dating, but it is purely guesswork.[172]

The sources do not say anything about the period after the son of Milesias was ostracized, or about his return to Athens. There is even less information about his political activities; this is remarkable if we are talking about the rather prominent Thucydides, the hypothesis for whose return is highly questionable.[173]

Frost's proposition, based on an observation by Sotion of Alexandria, that the radical democrats, led by Cleon, were seen as the intriguers, and that the legal action bears all marks of the demagogue, is problematic, considering that Cleon was only really active politically after Pericles' death.[174] In this sense, A. Rosenberg, in a lesser-known study, stated that the story of strong opposition to Pericles on the eve of the war was only a "fairytale".[175] Such a view is based only on the (probably inexact) chronology of Diodorus and Plutarch.

We hence get to choose between two alternatives in the question of the impiety trials. Only one of the proposed historical dates indicating the existence of a possible opposition to Pericles can correspond to the documents, and to reports on the impiety trials that Plutarch presents in a rather sketchy way: either 438/7 (the trial of Phidias) or 430 (the trial of Pericles).

The answer would appear to lie in which date is the more plausible, and easier to relate to internal politics. In a very influential book, J. Mansfeld discusses the chronology of the Anaxagoras affair. He believes that Anaxagoras must have left Athens as early as 437, since there was no way a trial against him could have occurred after that year, and Mansfeld thus definitely chooses the earlier date.[176] Given that the procedure against Anaxagoras and the decree of Diopeithes have an obvious religious background, scholars have often assumed that there was a popular conservative movement, founded in the 430s, behind the opposition's new, legally based religious bias against Pericles. His adversaries would have taken advantage of its existence. According to this hypothesis, the people would have risen against the corrupting influence of the Sophists' "Illuminist" teaching only after a twenty-year experience of foreign Sophists and philosophers.[177]

There is only Diodorus' note, according to which Pericles (elected without interruption down to 430) had to defend himself on account of the ἱεροσυλία regarding Phidias' statue of Athena. There are also the somewhat strained attempts to date to 437 the decree of Dracontides (according to which Pericles would have been put on trial). Nevertheless, apart from the two points just mentioned, there is no reason to argue for an early date, in a period lacking opposition. It is not at all easy to conclude, therefore, that the issuing of a clearly religious-based law at the beginning of the 430s would have been the reaction of a conservative Demos to the challenges

of Sophists and philosophers, whose doctrines most people only knew by hearsay. This remains a substantial problem for proponents of an early date.

The philosophers had been teaching freely in Athens for almost twenty years, although they were spoken ill of and were unpopular in the eyes of the Demos.[178] There are rather more data in support of 430, as a year that saw fundamental changes in the internal politics of Athens. It goes without saying that after a deplorable first year of war, the citizens who remained inside the city walls and who watched helplessly as their crops in the fields and their olive trees were destroyed, rose against the man who had dragged them into the war.[179]

Only the social effects of the dreadful plague that had descended on Athens in the early summer of 430 could be critical for the indisputably religious dimension of the attacks. The feeling of total dependence on supernatural forces whose favours the Athenians had lost, being now reduced in numbers by at least 25 per cent, led to a state of mind that allowed representatives of the religious "establishment", such as Diopeithes, to rise against those whom the Demos blamed for impious relationships with the gods. They rose, for example, against the philosophers who had earlier freely delivered their theories to the gilded youth, and who had opened to discussion valuable ideas accepted as true. Diopeithes clearly managed to get most of the Assembly to vote for his decree; it is difficult to believe, in this case, that behind the people only the interests of a limited group prevailed. It is much more likely that the decree was based on a broad consensus. It is thus anything but surprising that the scapegoats were those who people whispered about, because of their lack of interest in the values of polis religion.

Adcock, Gomme and, more recently, Horstmanshoff have proposed dating the first religious trials to the second year of the war.[180] The advantage of such a position is that, unlike other explanatory models, everything fits. Apart from Plutarch's bibliographical method, where events are ordered thematically rather than chronologically,[181] there is thus no need for a very elaborate explanation for 430 as the actual date of these events. The reasons are obvious why the Demos, full of religious hysteria at this precise moment, but also attracted by Diopeithes who, as oracle monger, diviner and prophet, proposed a new law against impiety in the *ekklesia*, acted in the way they did: it was imperative to improve the damaged relationships with the gods.[182]

Accordingly, the first to be put on trial was Anaxagoras, since the natural philosopher considered the sun to be but a fiery hot stone (διότι τὸν ἥλιον μύδρον ἔλεγε διάπυρον).[183] Except for the impiety trial as such, there is very little information about the subsequent fate of the philosopher. All agree that there was a trial, but then the testimonia become contradictory.[184] According to the most likely version in the earliest sources, Anaxagoras withdrew from Athens in time, and died honourably in peace at Lampsacus.[185] In summary, one can say that an impiety charge, based on the decree of Diopeithes, was formulated against a natural philosopher who was considered to mock traditional religious belief. By using the *eisangelia* procedure, the accusation τὰ θεῖα μὴ νομίζειν became a state offence. At this

point, a new road in the history of Attic law opened, since from that moment onwards, a *délit d'opinion* was declared a crime.

Modern scholarship is in full agreement with Ephorus and Plutarch, that behind the religion-related incriminations, we should definitely look for political reasons. The accusation did not refer to Anaxagoras and to his lack of respect for the gods; he was only charged in order to burden his friend and disciple Pericles, whose adversaries attacked him by slandering members of his entourage. H. Yunis has, however, questioned this widely held opinion. He argues that Diopeithes and his guild of oracle mongers, soothsayers and prophets must have felt threatened, both in their beliefs and as to whether they could continue in their profession freely and profitably. They must thus have had every reason to oust Anaxagoras. On this view, the new legislation would in fact have targeted Anaxagoras and other philosophers with a similar rationalist orientation.[186] This would make not Pericles, who had only a limited connection with the new Sophistic education,[187] but Anaxagoras himself the true (and not the pretended) target of the attacks. The professional prophets might have initiated the attack, precisely because, as specialists in religious affairs, they felt professionally obliged to defend religious tradition. The implications of the incrimination probably become clearer, however, for anyone who considers more thoroughly the person who proposed the decree, and the influential group of prophets and oracle interpreters (χρησμολόγοι), represented by Diopeithes.

2.6 Diopeithes the prophet: the person and the class

Diopeithes the soothsayer and interpreter of oracles not only appears as the orator who, according to Plutarch, proposed a decree before the Assembly, but also he is known as the butt of jokes in comedy. In addition, there is an inscription that presents him as the one who proposed the first decree concerning the city of Methone.[188] The question arises in this connection: what was the role of this *chresmologos* in the political life of the city? Plutarch says nothing about Diopeithes' reasons for proposing a religiously motivated decree against the "meteorologists". Aristophanes, in whose comedies there are many references to Diopeithes, presents him, on the one hand, in a comic distortion as a money-grabber,[189] and, on the other, in *Birds*, as ὁ μέγας Διοπείθης.[190]

The role played by Diopeithes in public life is not at all easy to determine. Even his personal relationship with Nicias (ἦν δὲ καὶ Νικίου ἑταῖρος), attributed to the *chresmologos* by a scholiast, offers little insight into the hidden political motivations of the prophet.[191] For a long time, scholars assumed that Diopeithes, in his capacity of *hetairos* with respect to the conservative Nicias, was a member of an oligarchic circle, since the *chresmologoi* are generally thought to have oligarchal loyalties.[192] Indeed, it is not at all clear whether ἑταῖρος can technically mean "belonging to a noble club", which would have provided factual information regarding the political

loyalties of the prophet, or whether this concept should be understood in its usual meaning.[193]

Because of the unknown hidden political motives of the *chresmologos*, the Diopeithes who appears in the Methone decree was often identified as another person, since the decree concerning the regulation of the tribute imposed on the Macedonian city is marked by a democratic mindset, and has little in common with a conservative oligarch as the proponent of the decree. Diopeithes, however, as Connor justly noted, was not a very common name, and for this reason, it would be logical to identify this Diopeithes with the Diopeithes involved in the decree concerning *asebeia*.[194] Connor's opinion has prevailed, and we must regard Diopeithes as more of a political opportunist than a very zealous conservative who, apart from the well-known decree against the "meteorologists", proposed another, regulating the payment of tribute by the city of Methone, characterized by the interests of the Delian league.[195]

In view of the paucity of information, it is difficult to say very much about Diopeithes. On his public activity in Athens, or anywhere else for that matter, we can only say that he appears to have proposed decrees in the Assembly, as described above. He was probably identical with a *chresmologos* of the same name, who appeared after the death of Agesilaos in Sparta and was involved in 400 in the dispute between Leotychidas and Agesilaus, by referring to old oracles.[196] In the scholia to Aristophanes, he is named as the proposer of decrees in the Assembly, Διοπείθης ὁ ῥήτωρ.[197]

So, there is too little reliable information on Diopeithes for him to be considered, as has often been the case, as a member of an oligarchic group who somehow opposed Pericles. Given the scanty data on Diopeithes himself, it might be more profitable to analyse the role of his guild. This professional category often brought together those called *chresmologoi* and *manteis* (χρησμολόγοι καὶ μάντεις). If we can determine their role and function in Athens, we have more chance of explaining how a representative of the establishment, and, at the same time, a well-known figure in political life, took it upon himself to propose a decree against "those persons who did not believe in the gods or taught doctrines regarding celestial phenomena".[198]

In the first place, what is really surprising is the terminological uncertainty in the use of the two words, in that the sources seem hardly able to distinguish between *chresmologos* and *mantis*. Even though these groups of persons performed related activities, the chief task of *chresmologoi* consisted mostly in gathering, rendering and interpreting oracles. These occupations are usually ascribed to mythical soothsayers such as Bakis or Orpheus, while the *manteis* acted as interpreters of divine signs and miracles.[199] From the first written testimonia, prophets already played a special role in Greek communities, as shown in the way in which soothsayers are presented in the Homeric epics.[200] The *chresmologoi* seem to have been especially well supported during the reign of the Peisistratids, since it was then that the *chresmologos* Onomacritus created an official collection of oracles, transmitted by

tradition on the Acropolis. This reveals the tyrants' intention to legitimate their reign through oracles and to monopolize access to old prophecies.[201]

We also hear about *chresmologoi* and *manteis* in the classical period. These revealed their professional knowledge at the request of the polis; according to Aristotle, the *manteis* assisted the *hieropoioi* in monitoring the sacrifices. They also advised private individuals, but at a price.[202] R. Garland has well determined their sphere of activity: "The task of the seer ... seems to have been twofold: firstly, to provide *chresmoi*; and secondly, to supervise sacred ceremonies in accordance with them. The *techne* of the *chresmologoi/mantis* was extensive, ranging from haruspicy to augury, from celestial phenomena to sneezes ..."[203] Some of these experts acquired political influence in high places, not least because of their religious function.[204]

In this context, the example of Lampon is highly relevant. As *chresmologos*, he acquired unprecedented prestige, and as part of Pericles' circle, he played a decisive role in the foundation of Thurii: on the one hand, as political founder; on the other, in his quality of *mantis*/*chresmologos*.[205] Apart from his dominant role as founder of the Panhellenic colony, he was mainly appreciated as a specialist in cult-related issues, as demonstrated by the regulations adopted, at his initiative, for the first fruits offerings at Eleusis.[206] His exceptional position in Athenian public life is documented in the most impressive way by the fact that he is named the first signatory of the Peace of Nicias, and thus appears in the protocol before Nicias himself. The seer was even granted the great honour of eating in the Prytaneum.[207] As for honour and glory, important seers of the classical period were as much appreciated as great generals or Olympic victors.[208]

Despite, or precisely because of, the growing importance of the *chresmologoi* and *manteis*, exemplified by the cases of Diopeithes and Lampon, they are a favourite target of Aristophanes' mockery. In his comedies, they are represented as money-grabbers who offer false oracles as good ones, in order to gain an advantage.[209] As Smith and Lateiner correctly emphasize, the negative appearance of the mumbling prophets and charlatans in comedy does not mean that the poet generally disapproved of the mantic practice and the essence of oracles. On the contrary, it shows a critical attitude towards the abusive use of prediction for political purposes, and the possible influence of predictions ascribed to divine powers.[210]

We must not neglect the political manipulation of widespread traditional beliefs in the divine origin and the importance of oracles. Thucydides himself, who rejects mantic practice, reminds us of the social importance of divine signs and their interpretation.[211] In the same way, Alcibiades, the great supporter of the expedition to Sicily, meets the complaints of the priests (τῶν ἱερέων) against the Sicilian campaign by producing his own soothsayers (ἔχων μάντεις ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης), who predict success in Sicily based on old oracles.[212] Against this background, we must also understand the passages in Aristophanes' *Knights*, where Cleon wants to keep under control and manipulate the personified Demos, by using a collection of oracles ascribed to Bakis.[213]

The hilarious presentation of *manteis*/*chresmologoi*, and of their collections of oracles in Old Comedy, only confirms the fact, already present in the Homeric epics, and even clearer from Herodotus to Xenophon,[214] that, although soothsayers were sometimes high-ranking members of society, this did not make their words law. On the one hand, they could be wrong; on the other, they might be charlatans, and were consequently treated with scepticism. People listened and appreciated their advice as valuable; nevertheless, they did not have the last word. This becomes clear from a dispute about the strategy the Athenians should adopt against the Persian invasion: even though the *chresmologoi* interpreted an oracle about the island of Salamis as an omen of the Athenians' defeat should they risk a naval battle there, Themistocles managed to persuade his fellow citizens to interpret the prophecy as a bad sign for the enemy instead.[215]

Xenophon, a good client of seers and a specialist in the mantic field himself, did not trust seers and really just wanted to monitor them, since he had more faith in his own knowledge of the field.[216] Nevertheless, there was an evident tendency to use the mediating skills of religious specialists, mostly in times of "urgent calamity" as Burkert called the crisis of those times.[217]

To summarize, it is clear that *chresmologoi* and *manteis* were important specialists, solicited by both private individuals and the polis – during times of war, for example[218] – in order to guarantee exchanges established with the gods. They had a significant influence, of course, and the political success of Lampon or Diopeithes must also have depended on their skills and prestige, as interpreters of divine signs.[219]

It is indisputable that there was a market demand for their skills, mostly in hard times, when, as Thucydides tells us, seers were especially popular. This helps us understand how Diopeithes and Lampon left clear traces in history notably during the Peloponnesian War.[220] It is no coincidence that precisely during periods of significant crisis for the Athenian state, historians wrote much more about the growing activity of soothsayers. Such was the case for the Persian invasion in 480, for the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, and for the plague of 431/30. Another example is that of the most important military campaign of the Athenians, the Sicilian expedition of 415.[221] This leads to the conclusion that prophets made an enormous contribution in the preparation of the Athenian expedition to Sicily, as well as on the actual conduct of the campaign, and their predictions had a decisive influence on the rulings of the Assembly and of the presiding magistrates.[222] As we have already seen, it is highly unlikely that the "great" Diopeithes was a "stooge" of the oligarchs, in instigating the Assembly against Anaxagoras and Pericles, taking advantage of his religious prestige. No serious reconstruction attempt can determine whether he had any connection with political groups; thus, we do not know for sure whether he had any connection with Cleon, who started his public career at the beginning of the war. There is no doubt, however, that Diopeithes was very active towards 430; there was not only his well-known decree, but another concerning privileges for the allied city of Methone, necessary as an operational base

in the north.[223] As a mantic specialist, Diopeithes could make himself heard by the Demos at a period of crisis, and he could impose his own political views through the votes of the Assembly. Though his motivation is still hazy because of the fragmentary nature of the testimonia, it is nevertheless clear that the soothsayer relied on the compliant ears of the Demos for his legislative initiatives.

In the end, it is impossible to explain clearly what the political implications were of the charge against Anaxagoras, or possible instigators among the group of Pericles' supposed adversaries. This is less important in this context, but it is often discussed by scholars. Nevertheless, it is wholly remarkable that the Assembly was persuaded to approve a religiously motivated law against those who spread "heretical" ideas and which made *asebeia* a state crime. It is worth noting, incidentally, that this law was initiated by a specialist in religious issues.

This fact persuades one that the background of the trial was, initially, more of a religious and less of a political nature. This needs further explanation. We have to ask ourselves whether we can explain such rigid legislation as the result of the crisis. The legislation was, after all, passed by the Assembly in that period as the most appropriate in the circumstances, and was repealed after the reintroduction of the democracy, when the ancestral laws were revised, after the war. We must also consider whether we can explain this legislation by reference to the plague. The background here is the widespread belief at Athens that serious crimes or sacrilege were always followed by divine punishment, and so it is worth briefly analysing this aspect. Divine revenge does not necessarily only touch the guilty, but it can also bring to ruin those related to the wrongdoers. A. Powell has expressed this view as "the notion that the divine punishment of a guilty person might fall also on those around him, even when the latter were innocent".[224] Living with the impression that they were powerless before the direct influence of divine punishment, and that they were at the mercy of the gods and their wrath, the Athenians started looking for a scapegoat. J. Burckhardt believes that such a reaction was the cause of all religious persecution in human history.

> As regards the rise of persecutions, we may first note an initial stage concerning the punishment of blasphemy; it is feared that the blasphemies of the enemies of God will provoke the punishment of God, and the blasphemer must therefore be delivered up to it, so that nobody else shall suffer with him.[225]

In the following chapter, I will analyse the connection between this insight of Burckhardt's and the epidemic known in history as the Athenian Plague.

3
The Plague, Pericles and the Peloponnesian War

Adversae res admonuerunt religionum.[1]

3.1 Introduction: Thucydides and the Plague of Athens

In the second book of his history, Thucydides offers many details concerning the effects of the great epidemic that hit the inhabitants of Athens in the early summer of 430. Besides analysing the symptoms in detail and presenting the terrible repercussions of the disease, the historian also refers to the dreadful consequences of so many deaths for the conduct of the war. According to the data provided by the author, these results came about because the plague – which did not really stop until its second and last outbreak in 427/6 BCE – took the life of 4,400 hoplites, 300 *hippeis* (mounted warriors) and an unknown number of ordinary citizens. The historian believes that this bloody tribute was one of the main causes of Athens' defeat.[2]

The detailed narrative of the terrible Plague follows directly and with almost no interruption the famous *epitaphios logos* that Thucydides ascribes to Pericles, occasioned by the burial of the first war victims. If this speech bestows high praise on the city as a cultural centre, in what follows, Thucydides must face a plague-stricken Athens. This dramatic rupture is also indicated by the description of the city's public order in decline, where a state of "anomie" reigns and a *Decameron*-like atmosphere prevails.

Thucydides expended much care on the description of these circumstances. After a first phase, involving a fervent appeal to the gods for help, lethargy in the face of death spread among the Athenians. Religious rules and obligations regarding the cult of the dead were abandoned, and the corpses of those who had succumbed to the illness were left unburied, even in sanctuaries. In short: "many resorted to shameless modes of burial because so many members of their households had already died that they lacked the proper funeral materials" (καὶ πολλοὶ ἐς ἀναισχύντους θήκας

ἐτράποντο σπάνει τῶν ἐπιτηδείων διὰ τὸ συχνοὺς ἤδη προτεθνάναι σφίσιν).[3] Compared to the glamorous picture of Athens that dominates the funerary discourse, the plague-stricken city appears like a topsy-turvy world:

> θεῶν δὲ φόβος ἢ ἀνθρώπων νόμος οὐδεὶς ἀπεῖργε, τὸ μὲν κρίνοντες ἐν ὁ μοίῳ καὶ μὴ ἐκ τοῦ πάντας ὁρᾶν ἐν ἴσῳ ἀπολλυμένος, τῶν δὲ ἁμαρτημάτων οὐδεὶς ἐλπίζων μέχρι τοῦ δίκην γενέσθαι βιοὺς ἂν τὴν τιμωρίαν ἀντιδοῦναι, πολὺ δὲ μείζω τὴν ἤδη κατεψηφισμένην σφῶν ἐπικρεμασθῆναι.
> No fear of gods or law of men acted as a restraint; for, on the one hand, seeing that all men were perishing alike, they judged that piety and impiety came to the same thing, and, on the other, no one expected that he would live to be called to account and pay the penalty for his misdeeds. On the contrary, they believed that the penalty already decreed against them, and now hanging over their heads, was a far heavier one.[4]

Possible exaggeration notwithstanding, the dramatic perspective of the narrative on the Plague – as a counterweight to the discourse of those fallen on the battlefield – clearly shows the huge abyss that had suddenly opened before the fierce and strong leaders of the Delian league.[5]

Even considering the limitations arising from the fact that the description of a world turned on its head is influenced by the author's creative desire to exploit the story in a dramatic way as a deliberate contrast to the solemn funeral oration (on which see further Chapter 3.3), the description of the situation in Athens while the city was in the grip of the Plague reflects the ways in which the pestilence had the most sinister influence, strikingly similar to the atmosphere that prevails in the *Decameron*. Influenced by the sight of the corpses laid one upon another, of dying people rolling about in the streets and near fountains, those infected became desperate as they realized they were going to be overwhelmed by the disease.[6] Fear and cowardice increased on a daily basis, and depression, as Thucydides notes,[7] was perhaps the most negative consequence of the pestilence. The excessive mortality rate made people lose hope of escaping death.[8] The dreadful epidemic that dramatically reduced the population of Attica – just as the Black Death would decrease the number of inhabitants of Central Europe in the fourteenth century[9] – struck the city in the heart and, in the weeks that witnessed its severest fury, it paralysed public life over a long period.[10]

This terrible catastrophe hit the Athenians right at the beginning of the great war. The question consequently arises: to what extent did the Athenians connect the controversial war[11] – that Pericles had dragged them into – with the pestilence, and how did they react to the existential threat of the dreadful disease? Our chief task is to clarify the extent to which the Athenian population used religious explanations to make something of the misfortune that had overtaken their city, and also to consider why Thucydides only notes this fact in a tangential manner.

3.2 The pestilence as divine punishment

The Greeks' general view of the character and causes of the epidemic corresponds to Pericles' vision of the Plague. In the consolation speech, as narrated by Thucydides, the strategist speaks of the pestilence as δαιμόνιον (φέρειν δὲ χρὴ τά τε δαιμόνια ἀναγκαίως).[12] Like many other pre-modern cultures, the Greeks commonly believed that serious diseases and especially epidemics were sent as punishment by the divine powers.[13] This is a typical perception, as many examples from all over the world indicate. Pre-modern societies do interpret disease, especially epidemic disease, as caused by supernatural intervention.[14] Pestilences are a form of divine penalty like other catastrophes, such as earthquakes, for example.[15] Cultures that have no idea of invisible micro-parasites and disease transmission ascribe the causes of epidemics to supernatural powers.[16] The implications of impiety towards the gods on the part of one or more individuals – impiety that could trigger the wrath of divine powers – plays an important role here, so long as the fury of the gods could be expressed as a pestilence.

W. Burkert used several examples from around the world to describe the determinative principles underlying the causes of epidemics; he also stated that it was similar to biology-based programmes. It would perhaps be going too far to discuss parallels with other ancient or pre-modern cultures or with modern Africa.[17] It is sufficient, however, to remain within the Greek tradition, which clearly attributes divine intervention provoked by human offences as a unique cause of plague. Even Homer and Hesiod believed that disease and pestilence were sent by a supernatural force.[18] Thus, Homer speaks of the Plague within the Achaean camp having resulted from Agamemnon's having kidnapped the daughter of Chryses, the priest of Apollo. Apollo subsequently inflicted a plague as divine punishment; first, a plague of arrows killed the animals within the camp, and then the arrows started killing people. The Greeks suffered as a result from the dreadful epidemics until Chryses' wrath subsided and he asked Apollo to end the punishment.[19] In the same way, Hesiod (in *Works and Days*) concludes that even a whole city often suffers for the wicked man who sins and devises terrible deeds, with everyone perishing from famine and plague together.[20] Sophocles also shows in *Oedipus Tyrannus* that an unexpiated bloody sin – the death of Laius – was the cause of the epidemic besetting Oedipus' Thebans, as the Delphic oracle had stated.[21]

These passages, few as they are, clearly illustrate that the Athenians must have believed that the disease spread so alarmingly because it had been sent by the gods.[22] Such a dreadful and unprecedented pestilence (οὐ μέντοι τοσοῦτός γε λοιμὸς οὐδὲ φθορὰ οὕτως ἀνθρώπων οὐδαμοῦ ἐμνημονεύετο γενέσθαι), limited moreover within Greece to Athens alone (apart from Lemnos, where the plague did not strike as forcefully),[23] could be only a divine punishment, from an Athenian viewpoint. And it would not be going too far to speculate that even a poor and illiterate peasant from the deme of Acharnae knew about Apollo's arrows.

The idea of a divine origin of a catastrophe or plague – whose cause must be sought for in an act of impiety towards the divine power – naturally corresponds to a total abandonment to the forces of nature. "The commonest religious explanation for public disaster is sacrilege."[24] It is only our age, imbued with Enlightenment ideas and a secular and scientific knowledge of nature, that has been free from such a view. For an individual living in the fifth century BCE, such a dreadful plague would naturally be interpreted as divine punishment alone.[25] A rationalist or medical explanatory model of the kind familiar to us would presuppose modernist thought, and would contradict the character of the pre-bacteriological medicine of those times. Such a vision would have been alien to the standpoint and imagination of a practitioner of Hippocratic medicine.[26]

Some of Thucydides' observations on the danger of contamination created by the epidemic indicate, of course (though rather vaguely), that the historian was aware how contagious this disease was; as he observed, the plague mainly attacked those who took care of the sick.[27] Unlike the empirical observations of the historian, the Hippocratic medicine of the times could not develop a concept of contamination risk, "but it explained the disease called 'plague' by the fact that the air was contaminated because of the μιάσματα (infection)".[28] Thucydides' observations also confirm the widely held view of the disease as a *miasma* affecting those who committed a serious crime, and usually striking the people close to the wrongdoer.[29] In this vein, R. J. Hankinson rightly believes that the historian's account of the danger of contracting the disease is not an early discovery of the phenomenon of contamination. On the contrary, he believes that it is an acknowledgement of the *miasma* concept – corresponding more or less to a bad "aura" (hence also affecting the sick person's environment) – as a "primitive folk-concept of medical infection and contagion".[30] Girolamo Fracastoro was the one who developed ideas regarding the danger of contamination determined by contact with a pathogenic agent, but this was to be much later, in the sixteenth century.[31]

The fact that doctors tried to attack the disease using not only strictly medical methods, but also magical practices beyond rational medicine, is shown by the example of the physician Akron, who used, during the great plague, the power of fire against the miasmic disease (known through different purification rituals).[32] In the same way, Christian writers, much later and after many generations of Greek and Roman healers, believed divine punishment to be the *fons et origo* of a major epidemic. An impressive example is "the plague" described by Procopius during the reign of Justinian (CE 542).[33] The Athenians still understood little of contagious disease, despite their empirical experience. This is also shown by the danger of contamination to the troops involved in the siege of Potidaea, after Hagnon carelessly led his plague-infected army towards healthy troops.[34]

It is vital to establish here the fact that tradition offered the Athenians concrete representations of pestilences and of their causes: generally, such an epidemic was usually accompanied by other plagues, as punishment of a god, usually Apollo. The punishment, with consequences for the entire community, relates to (often

individual) lawlessness. It clearly did not matter whether the wrongdoer acted with malice aforethought, or if he was unaware of his guilt.

3.3 Thucydides' silence

Another cause that makes it difficult to assess the events in the year of the Plague (430 BCE) is the fact that Thucydides stubbornly neglects any kind of religious motivation or implications, a fact that clearly differentiates him from his predecessor, Herodotus. Religion as an agency for political action does not exist within his work.[35] While Herodotus is firmly of the view that human destiny is subject to divine caprice or influence, Thucydides eliminates divine influence from his explanation of historical causality.[36] Religion, however, plays an exceptional role within the historical picture created by Herodotus, and much the same is true of Xenophon later.[37]

"The Father of History" brings into discussion not only the influence of divine powers on the fate of humans, but also the religious customs of the nations he describes.[38] Nevertheless, Thucydides writes a "political" history of the Peloponnesian War, and he plausibly appears to have consciously decided to consider religious reasons for the action as irrelevant, or even "superstitious", and to ignore them in his historical work.

Because of this strong tendency not to consider (and consequently to underestimate) the religious dimension within his purely political historical description, Thucydides totally ignores any religious explanation for the outbreak of the plague at this significant moment. The Plague simply hit the city, but the historian does not mention its causes. Thucydides presents the epidemic taking over the city as a stroke of fate, and he appreciates its impact on both demography and the subsequent evolution of the polis, without taking into account the direct influence of divine power.[39] Only Pericles' observation that the pestilence would be δαιμόνιον hints at the possible influence of supernatural forces, but the one speaking here is Pericles. Taking this into consideration, M. Marshall has rightly concluded that Thucydides' description of the Plague has a certain function related to the picture of Pericles presented by the historian. He describes the Plague as an incalculable and unpredictable event, as a sombre incident that the calculated statesman could not take into account in his plans and visions. In Marshall's view, the way Thucydides presented the issue would have excused Pericles for his lack of perspicacity, and for not having considered the Plague in his calculations with regard to the unfolding of the war. The reason given by Thucydides for his detailed description of the symptoms, so that it would be possible to identify a fresh outbreak of the same pestilence, underlines the fact that it was a serious but, at the same time, common disease, above all unpredictable, hence with no religious background.[40] Thucydides' rationalist view emerges from the overall Plague narrative and, as Demont noted, the historian consciously describes the obvious neglect of

the Athenians with regard to their burial customs as a consequence of the disease, while tradition always indicated that such religious offences brought punishment (see above).

By describing things the way he did, Thucydides tried to eliminate the magic aura that surrounded the Plague.[41] This is the reason why we should critically interpret Thucydides' observations with regard to the negligent attitude of the Athenians towards religion, when the Plague was at its height. The dramatic presentation of the "anomic" situation, directly following Pericles' passionate Funeral Speech, demonstrates the writer's great creative skill. The description of the Plague is afterwards marked by a passage that has a creative intention that is essential for the literary "architecture" of the work.[42]

This passage marks somehow the hinge which connects the Funeral Speech – which it refers to, if only by contrast – and the dreadful circumstances during the στάσις on the island of Kerkyra, a narrative that is conceptually prepared by the plague narrative.[43] The topsy-turvy inversion of values – decisive for Thucydides' concept of *stasis*, as it appears in the presentation of the events on Kerkyra and in the Melian dialogue – is to the fore in the Plague description, in the insistence placed on the neglect of traditional burial customs, and on the state of anomie and of an upside-down world in general. The sombre evocation of the excesses during the pestilence underlines the inversion – so important in Thucydides – of the traditional order as feature of a general downfall, which turns out to be a literary strategy.[44] The archaeological evidence discussed in Chapter 3.5 makes it even clearer that Thucydides should be corrected here.

Though the historian clearly intends to describe the decline of public order, he speaks of the preventative measures taken by the Athenians (for all that they were unsuccessful, as Thucydides emphasizes): "the supplications made at sanctuaries, or appeals to oracles and the like" (ὅσα τε πρὸς ἱεροῖς ἱκέτευσαν ἢ μαντείοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐχρήσαντο, πάντα ἀνωφελῆ ἦν).[45] In this way, the citizens tried to drive the danger away and to get answers from oracles on how they should fight the plague. This was the natural and typical reaction of the Athenians to the threat, regardless of how hard Thucydides tried to make it seem less important.[46]

In such a menacing situation, the kind of universally valid behaviour patterns described by Burkert were displayed: in having to face a catastrophe such as an epidemic that had no apparent rational explanation, the people affected, convinced that human wrongdoing was to blame, looked to those with special knowledge, such as an oracle or a prophet. These could then point towards possible ways of restoring relations with the divine through certain rituals, offerings and so on.

This "almost universal pattern of behaviour", attested "in very different periods and cultures", has nothing "primitive" about it, as a modern approach might conclude. The rituals employed may seem improper and "superstitious" to us, but they are also ways to produce sense.[47] Before, Achaeans had used soothsaying to understand the cause of a dreadful plague, just as King Oedipus in Sophocles sends Creon to Delphi to ask Apollo for an explanation of an epidemic's causes and for a

solution to end it, because "whoever sent the disease can also make it stop".[48] In this way, the Athenians first followed the path generally used in case of a catastrophe in order to put an end to it.[49]

Thucydides' silence and a modern misunderstanding of such supposedly "primitive" means of fighting the crisis have often made it more difficult to clarify a dark chapter in Athenian history. In this context, we must admit that Thucydides' account of the Plague becomes very suspicious. In both content and intent, this narrative is really extraordinary in comparison with other reports from antiquity (e.g. Procopius) or the perception of disease in other pre-modern cultures.[50] In the following sections, we will examine whether the Athenians really did "surrender" completely to resignation, and if they really did fall into a state of prolonged anomie, as Thucydides tirelessly asserts.

3.4 The oracles correlated with the Plague

Despite his sceptical attitude towards oracles, in presenting the tense situation on the eve of the great war, Thucydides also describes people's tendency to use prophecies and oracle-mongers: καὶ πολλὰ μὲν λόγια ἐλέγετο, πολλὰ δὲ χρησμολόγοι ᾖδον ἔν τε τοῖς μέλλουσι πολεμήσειν καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν.[51] In the year of the Plague, older prophecies with respect to current circumstances began to come out. First, in this context, three oracles were cited that were intended to provide further evidence to the Athenians that the pestilence could be regarded as a punishment for breaking a divine commandment. Surprisingly, Thucydides mentions all three of them, and even though his thinking was based on political categories alone, he notes the impression of these prophecies on the Demos, but gives a personal interpretation of the event.[52]

Undoubtedly the most important prophecy is the one foretelling an epidemic as the consequence of a "Dorian war", and which the Athenians would remember during the plague: ἥξει Δωριακὸς πόλεμος καὶ λοιμὸς ἅμ᾽ αὐτῷ. Thucydides then describes a dispute concerning the exact text of the oracle, with the Athenians interpreting the word of the prophecy as either pestilence or famine (λοιμός or λιμός), as the words are easily confused. Nevertheless, when struck by the disease, people tended to believe that the right word was indeed pestilence. Thucydides observes that people's memory conformed to their sufferings (οἱ γάρ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς ἃ ἔπασχον τὴν μνήμην ἐποιοῦντο), and that if another Dorian war should occur in the future, accompanied by a famine, they would probably agree with the term λιμός.[53] N. Marinatos justly acknowledged that this observation of Thucydides the "rational" reflects only his view of human nature, and does not question the institution of oracle-seeking.[54] But Thucydides' critical observation is significant in that it shows that many would have remembered this prophecy during hard times, and interpreted the current situation in its light; in this context, it does not matter whether the Athenians interpreted the verse in the right or in the wrong way, as

the oracle was a religious reality. In this way, religious fears are confirmed by an old prophecy that the Athenians brought to light in difficult times. We must therefore be grateful to Thucydides' illuminist interest for transmitting this important event; he in fact wanted to denounce the behaviour of the Demos that he described as irrational superstition.

The Plague broke out immediately after the war began but the Peloponnese was not touched to any extent by the Plague.[55] This is why the Athenians believed that a prophecy of the Delphic oracle, promising Apollo's support to the Spartans in a war against the Athenians,[56] was confirmed by events. And since people believed that the god who had sent the disease could also cure it, such an assessment of the situation by the frightened populace is perfectly explicable.[57] In relating this episode, Thucydides again confirms the assumption that the Athenians very much insisted on a religious explanation for the misfortune that had hit them. The few clues regarding religious explanatory models of human action that Thucydides offers to his readers – more often encountered in contemporary forensic speeches – should be appreciated all the more, since they contrast with his concept of history, and are mentioned only incidentally.[58] The few observations and allusions made by Thucydides, who cannot be considered in this context to have been a typical spokesman for commonly held religious views, point towards a religious basis for political decisions and social developments, as demonstrated by the impact of the Plague.[59]

There is a similar situation when Thucydides tells of the evacuation of Attica; the city sanctuaries, including the so-called Pelargicum at the foot of the Acropolis, were occupied by refugees looking for shelter. This sacred place was, as Thucydides tells us, under a curse that forbade its use for residential purposes, since a verse of an oracle had stated that the "Pelargicum is better left unused" (τὸ Πελαργικὸν ἀργὸν ἄμεινον).[60] From this prophecy, the population understood that because of the unlawful occupation of the place (διὰ τὴν παράνομον ἐοίκησιν), "unhappy events" (αἱ ξυμφοραί) took place and the city was visited by calamity.[61] This time too, Thucydides offers a rationalistic explanation, in addition to the popular version of the Demos: contrary to general opinion, he shows that the oracle foresaw (προῆδε) the necessity of an evacuation,[62] and that it only prophesied that the Pelargicum would not be a suitable place for people to dwell. In conclusion, the dreadful fate of the city would not have as a cause the unlawful occupation in question (οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὴν παράνομον ἐοίκησιν). What lurks behind the imprecise term αἱ ξυμφοραί? A. W. Gomme assumed that by this expression, Thucydides alludes to the war in general.[63] He thought that by using the plural, Thucydides is making a special reference to the Plague, suggesting the right direction.[64] It appears, however, that the historian wanted to remain intentionally vague, because, had he meant to refer only to the war, he would have called it by that name. But Thucydides clearly refers here to all the vicissitudes caused by the war (waves of refugees, many dead, *stasis*, earthquakes, famine and plague), which he describes for his readers in another passage.[65]

In the context of this description, the Plague has an exceptional place (at the end, as a highlight): καὶ ἡ οὐχ ἥκιστα βλάψασα καὶ μέρος τι φθείρασα ἡ λοιμώδης νόσος; thus, just as in the case of the prophecy on the "Dorian war" and of Apollo's partiality, the Athenians related the oracle regarding prohibition of residence in the Pelargicum and its ambivalent meaning to the negative effects of the war in general, and to the Plague in particular.[66]

In contrast with Thucydides' slightly forced rational explanation, there was another opinion concerning the ancient Pelargicum, proposed by Lampon the seer, and shared by the majority of the Assembly. On the prophet's proposal, the *ekklesia* decided to make a special addition to the First Fruits Decree, dated to approximately 422 BCE. It declared the absolute inviolability of the Pelargicum, since altars had been moved there before without consent, and even stones and earth had been taken away from the sacred place. In case of violations, the wrongdoer would be charged with an *eisangelia*, a procedure reserved mostly for very serious offences.[67]

The special protection of the Pelargicum definitely provides hints as to the meaning of the oracle belittled by Thucydides, but which the Athenians related to their misfortune after the outbreak of the Plague. Consequently, they could consider that the populating of the sacred area had also been partly responsible for their fate.[68] Speaking of this, Lampon's attack can relate to the problematic occupation of the area during the evacuation of the rural demes. This supplement to the decree was meant to prevent any future profanation.

Pausanias tells of another oracle referring to a pestilence that relates to a statue of Apollo Alexikakos in the Agora. The sculptor Calamis was given the task of executing it, as a defence against the Plague on the advice of the Delphic oracle.[69] Pausanias' rather late testimony might raise doubts about its authenticity in some quarters, and some would see the reference as an allusion to another plague that had beset the city even before the Peloponnesian War, on the grounds that the works of Calamis ought to be dated to the first half of the fifth century. In this case, Pausanias would have been a victim of his unreliable anonymous (λέγουσιν) sources, which wrongly connected the monument by Calamis with the famous Plague of 430.[70] This interpretation is not entirely persuasive, since Dörig was able to show that the earliest works of Calamis dated to 466, thus making it perfectly possible for him still to have been active in Athens long after 430.[71] Dörig demonstrates, moreover, that we cannot be sure that the statues so far attributed to Calamis (i.e. distinctive works of the famous sculptor made in the first half of the fifth century) are really by him.[72] Dörig also believes that Calamis was a practitioner of the Severe Style, basing his arguments on a study of several contemporary sculptors;[73] he presents the plausible argument that Calamis was born around 490, and in *c.* 430 he had as an apprentice the sculptor Praxias, who was given the task of creating a pediment for the Temple of Apollo in Delphi in 373.[74]

Seen from this perspective, Pausanias' information becomes more reliable; the likelihood that the statue was brought as offering at the oracle's command can probably be regarded as one of the religiously motivated measures – so rarely mentioned

by Thucydides – that the Athenians undertook as a result of the Plague. In similar fashion, we might take note of a scholion to Aristophanes, according to which the plague-struck Athenians commissioned from the sculptor Ageladas a votive statue of Heracles Alexikakos for the deme of Melite.[75] Since the hero was also worshipped at Epidaurus under the same epithet of "averter of evil", and since this epithet was widespread, we can clearly see a healing function behind the name. Again, the epidemic of 430 may be considered to be the reason for the dedication.[76] Demonstrating an attitude similar to that of the Athenians, the inhabitants of Phigalia tried to protect themselves from the pestilence by dedicating a temple to Apollo Epikourios on the site of an older sanctuary. This is the Temple of Apollo at Bassae, famous for its Corinthian architecture. According to Pausanias, the epithet "bringer of help" corresponded to the Athenian Apollo Alexikakos, and the god would have also been considered to have saved the Phigalians from the 430 epidemic.[77] Against this background, the temple, whose architecture looks towards archaic models, might be considered to be stylistically indebted to an older religious tradition. The builders probably wanted to recall, by means of a "pious gesture" – namely the capitals in an archaic style – the reason for erecting the temple: to escape the Plague.[78]

3.5 The archaeological record

Although Thucydides preserves a discreet silence in the matter, the literary record shows that the Athenians immediately took decisive religious decisions against the pestilence. Archaeological research provides the same picture: recent excavations in the Agora revealed that two small sanctuaries, long neglected and attributed to protecting cults on account of their position at the north-west and south-west entrances, had new honours in the years immediately following 430.

The place of worship in front of the south-west entrance, like its counterpart at the north-west entrance, had originally been a *heroon*, and is related to nearby necropoleis of the Early Iron Age. Discoveries of votive offerings indicate that the Athenians now focused their attention on long-neglected city centre shrines dedicated to heroes.[79] The fountain sanctuary in the north-west can be identified, with even more certainty, thanks to the rich offerings that have survived, as a "Leokorion", or a sanctuary to honour the three daughters of Leos. According to the mythological tradition, they were sacrificed to Apollo in exchange for protection against a pestilence.[80] Thompson explains the growing interest in this sanctuary after 430, confirmed by the ceramic material, as an indication of the Plague: "When the city was again assailed by a disastrous scourge in 430 BCE, we can readily visualize the citizens turning again to the girls for help."[81] In the same way, the Altar of the Twelve Gods was substantially restored between 430 and 420.[82] The most important monumental cult buildings erected after 430 will be discussed in Chapter 7.[83]

The increasing luxury of graves after 430, evident from splendid funerary reliefs, points in the same direction.[84] Before the Peloponnesian War, democratic Athens

had strict laws against funerary luxury. These acted as a kind of social control, in that they were aimed at aristocratic aspiration. The resurgence of tomb luxury was presumably determined by a decisive event that concerned the community of citizens as a whole, and which clearly had an impact on the religious views of many citizens. Such a change could have been caused by events such as the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War and the experience of mass mortality in Athens (during the first years of the war, not least because of the epidemic).[85] It is against this background that Fuchs argued for the pestilence having been the reason behind the change in burial customs: only a catastrophe could revive the neglected Athenian custom of funerary stelai decorated in relief. The funerary stele also has the function of a monument "intended to make peace with the almighty gods who sent a dreadful disease".[86] F. Hildebrandt recently confirmed this view, by stating that the revitalizing of this old tradition directly after 430 indicates a "change in mentality" and that it was a response to the disease.[87] Thucydides drew attention to the catastrophic losses caused by the Plague, ranking it as one of the causes of the decisive fall of Athens, even before military defeats.[88]

It is clear that this experience had a profound influence on those who lived through it, and there are vestiges in religious practice. The cult statue of Athena Hygieia – erected by Pericles at the beginning of the war, according to Plutarch – is related to the Plague through its archaeological context, even though Plutarch says that it was erected because a workman died during the construction of the Propylaea.[89] The dedication of the statue, whose base is preserved, would constitute further evidence of the various measures taken to fight against the pestilence through religious provision.[90] These observations are not limited to Athens – to which most sources refer – but are also relevant for other regions of Greece affected by the Plague. J. M. Camp has thus drawn attention to the fact that temples were built in other locations as a reaction to the Plague.[91]

The decline of public life and the moral deviancy described by Thucydides must have occurred in a relatively short, limited period. This grave development must have happened when the pestilence hit the hardest, unless the historian's presentation was mainly intended to serve as artistic preparation for his digression on Kerkyra. This is confirmed by other literary records, as well as by the archaeological record. Apart from the very peak of the pestilence, people never really abandoned the hope of saving themselves with the help of divine forces; they never gave up traditional practices to obtain salvation, as they never stopped respecting burial customs.[92]

It is interesting to note that in the 1990s new archaeological evidence linked directly to the Plague was found in excavations associated with the construction of the Athenian Metro. Archaeologists found a mass grave of about 150 individuals who had been hastily buried in the Kerameikos area.[93] Even though these presumed victims of the Plague received only a very poor burial, the existence of fragments of some thirty vases (datable to *c.* 430, thus implying that the dead were victims of the Plague) showed that even during the apogee of the epidemic, basic funeral rites were respected.

Furthermore, C. L. Lawton has recently examined Attic votive reliefs and has concluded that there was an obvious increase in production during the 420s, which she associates with the Plague, since many of the reliefs are dedications to Asclepius.[94] She also suggests that the growth of votive and building activity at the sanctuary of Artemis at Brauron should also be viewed in connection with the Plague, since Apollo and his sister Artemis "had long been associated with plague, and some sources name plague as an *aition* for the *arkteia* or bear-ritual performed by young girls at Brauron".[95]

As the archaeological record suggests, in the period of the existential threat caused by the Plague, most Athenians did not react like nihilists to the Apocalypse, but more like their fellow sufferers in other pre-modern societies: they tried to re-establish, by means of religious practices, their clearly damaged accord with the gods and to earn their favours again. "Believing societies seem in fact normally to respond to huge natural catastrophes not by loss of faith but with such reactions as anger against 'the authorities', search of scapegoats, and above all, forms of self-blame and mutual accusation that confirm existing religious assumptions."[96] That the "authorities" felt the anger of the citizens also in Athens came about as a result of the circumstances in which Pericles fell from power.

3.6 Pericles and the Plague

In 430 BCE, the year of the Plague, Pericles was put on trial, condemned to pay a fine and then deposed.[97] This was the fall of a great politician; re-elected *strategos* fifteen times in a row, he had been the uncontested leader of the Athenians for so long that, in Thucydides' words, Athens was nominally a democracy, but in fact it operated under government by the first citizen.[98]

With regard to the trial itself and its outcome, the sources provide only a few contradictory facts;[99] nevertheless, they are unanimous in describing a change for the worse for the son of Xanthippus. Thucydides gives the general reasons for the Demos disgracing him, but more precisely, he states that the Athenians rose against Pericles because the upper classes had lost their country estates, and, above all, on account of the war (τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, πόλεμον ἀντ᾽ εἰρήνης ἔχοντες).[100] Diodorus writes of the way in which the Athenians revolted after their fields and crops had been destroyed, and of how they had been affected by the Plague; he says that they rose against Pericles, whom they blamed for the war.[101] Plutarch also blames the Plague for Pericles losing his "lucky star" (ἀπέτυχε διὰ τὴν νόσον).[102]

Clearly, the expedition to the Argolid had to be abandoned because the army fell ill; the great *strategos* thus lost his luck in war. Thucydides suggests that this was indeed the case; he includes the Plague among the multiple causes that determined the fall of the great statesman. He notes war and disease as reasons for the discontent towards Pericles; the Athenians blamed him for persuading them to go to war and considered him responsible for "the misfortunes which had befallen them": οἱ

Ἀθήναιοι, ὡς ἥ τε γῆ αὐτῶν ἐτέτμητο τὸ δεύτερον καὶ ἡ νόσος ἐπέκειτο ἅμα καὶ ὁ πόλεμος, ἠλλοίωντο τὰς γνώμας, καὶ τὸν μὲν Περικλέα ἐν αἰτίᾳ εἶχον ὡς πείσαντα σφᾶς πολεμεῖν καὶ δι᾽ ἐκείνον ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς περιπεπτωκότες.[103]

This passage again includes the vague term αἱ ξυμφοραί, which can encompass the totality of the misfortunes that had beset the Athenians, among which, in Thucydides' view, the most harm was done by the pestilence.[104] The last speech of Pericles shows that he was aware that people had changed and that the atmosphere was different, especially because of the Plague; in his opinion: δουλοῖ γὰρ φρόνημα τὸ αἰφνίδιον καὶ ἀπροσδόκητον καὶ τὸ πλείστῳ παραλόγῳ ξυμβαῖνον ὃ ἡμῖν πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις οὐχ ἥκιστα καὶ κατὰ τὴν νόσον,[105] Pericles advises his fellow citizens. Nevertheless, he was suspended not long afterwards. What could have been the cause of such a downfall?

Explanations have been put forward, according to which the failed expedition to the Argolid, and the consequent lack of any victories resulting from Pericles' inadequate leadership, were to blame for the change in the atmosphere.[106] The exasperation caused by losing all their property in Attica – which they had to surrender to the enemy – must have also been a contributory factor in the Athenians' determined opposition, for it was Pericles who had proposed the strategic evacuation.[107] On the other hand, the scanty sources allow for discussions on war and disease in general, or even only on the war that Pericles was held responsible for,[108] as well as war-weariness as the cause of the *strategos'* fall from power.[109]

It is important to bear in mind, however, that lack of medical knowledge meant that contemporaries were incapable of making a connection between Pericles' strategy of collecting the citizens within the city walls, and the outbreak of the plague as the result of these insalubrious conditions. "Contemporaries did not make the causal connection – obvious to late authors such as Diodorus and Plutarch, as well as to modern readers – between the city becoming crowded and the outbreak of the Plague."[110] Moreover, the Plague and its religious implications should be given more prominence in the context of the downfall of the statesman at the significant moment when he had been leading Athens for fifteen years. Before the first year of the Plague, the accusations that would cause him grief later on turned out to be ineffectual.[111]

For all that the Argolid campaign was unsuccessful, the strategic situation for Athens was far from distressing. Pericles' tactics worked in principle, since the destruction of farmland did not touch an Athenian vital nerve, because the city was impervious thanks to maritime trade and the income from the League. From an Athenian point of view, the essential elements were a full public treasury and an operational fleet.[112] For the change in the atmosphere, the decisive aspect must have been the unbearable situation in the city, for which Pericles was held responsible. A general war-weariness on the part of the Athenians, or discontent regarding the tactical vision that they had themselves supported at the outbreak of the war, seem unfounded, especially if one takes into account the military and economic potential. The Plague and its catastrophic consequences for the population, crowded

in on itself, must have determined the Athenians to send peace envoys to Sparta against the will of its former "first citizen", and even before removing him from office. However, neither the contents of the failed peace proposal nor the Spartans' reply have survived.[113]

In this context, a question naturally arises. Did the desire for peace correspond to a rational belief relating to the chances and risks of continuing the war (such as losing troops to the pestilence), or was there an irrational, religious motivation behind the deposition of Pericles and the desire for peace? The wish to end the war probably came not from the fact that Athens had a bad moment as one of the belligerents, but because people believed, after the outbreak of the Plague, that the war was an action against the divine will. They interpreted the epidemic as an expression of this divine will, which led to the idea that they could not win the war.[114] Were the circumstances in which Pericles opposed this peace, and the accusations that it was his warlike policies that were responsible for the ongoing war (clearly against the divine will, as the prophecies attested), really the only reasons for the trial the *strategos* had to undergo?

Thucydides tells us that during the diplomatic harassment preceding the war, the Spartans had spread rumours, for propagandistic reasons, about the "Cylonian murder" committed by Pericles' Alcmaeonid ancestors on his mother's side.[115] The Alcmaeonid Megacles, as archon at the end of the seventh century, unlawfully and sacrilegiously killed Cylon and his partisans on the sacred ground of the Acropolis (after promising those who had sought refuge there that they would not be harmed). Cylon attempted to become tyrant and, after a failed *coup d'état*, sought refuge on the Acropolis, together with members of his circle.

This sacrilege, a religious pollution, stuck to and haunted the cruel archon, who was immediately banished from the city, as were his descendants.[116] Thucydides explains that the Spartan diplomatic offensive was aimed at Pericles, who was a distant descendant of the cursed family, and that the banishment of the son of Agariste was a distinct possibility: τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ἄγος οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐκέλευον ἐλαύνειν ἦθεν τοῖς θεοῖς πρῶτον τιμωροῦντες, εἰδότες δὲ Περικλέα τὸν Ξανθίππου προσεχόμενον αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν μητέρα καὶ νομίζοντες ἐκπεσόντες αὐτοῦ ῥᾷον σφίσι προχωρεῖν τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων.[117] The historian mocks the alleged reasons of the Spartans, however, by saying that they had no real religious motivation for their attack, and that their only purpose was to undermine Pericles' popularity. Nevertheless, the question arises: how could a serious religious crime be employed for propagandistic purposes some 200 years after it was committed? Plutarch is the first to note that the Spartan attack would have brought about the opposite result to the one intended, in that it would have made people trust Pericles even more.[118] In any case, the fact that the Lacedaemonians dragged this skeleton out of the cupboard proves that the family curse, from which the Alcmaeonids were never absolved, could have had a propagandistic impact in this special context.

In Pericles' last speech – "the consolation speech" – Thucydides shows that people in 430 wanted to make Pericles pay personally, and not only for his

belligerent politics. Pericles advised his fellow citizens not to listen to those who came to ask for peace, and also to cease from their anger against him (μήτε ἐμὲ δι᾽ ὀργῆς ἔχετε), since their distress was primarily caused by the pestilence: καὶ δι᾽ αὐτὴν [τὴν νόσον] οἰδ᾽ ὅτι μέρος τι μᾶλλον ἔτι μισοῦμαι, οὐ δικαίως, εἰ μὴ καὶ ὅταν παρὰ λόγον τι εὖ παράξητε ἐμοὶ ἀναθήσετε. This passage, too, shows that Pericles was held personally responsible for the outbreak of the Plague. Against such a charge, the accused defends himself by arguing that, in the case of the epidemic, nobody could have predicted it (παρὰ λόγον), and that he was as little to blame for it as for chance successes. Things turned out exactly the opposite for the *strategos*, however, and he was blamed personally for the misfortune.[119]

People blamed Pericles not only for pushing for open confrontation with the Lacedaemonians, but also for the Cylonian affair as publicized by the Spartans; the second accusation was formulated under the influence of the epidemic. There was another story, too, that not long after Megacles' crime, a pestilence had broken out (in the Forty-sixth Olympiad, in 596/3 BCE). The Delphic oracle cited the Cylonian affair as the cause of this "plague", and commanded the Athenians to call upon the sage Epimenides to perform a ritual purification in order to halt the pestilence.[120] The powerful Alcmaeonidae were banished from the city in perpetuity after the murder, and the mortal remains of the family members were exhumed and flung beyond the frontiers. The exiles later returned, but were mindful of their curse, their "original sin", as offerings at Delphi indicate.[121] Parker has produced an impressive series of examples to illustrate the effective power of such an ἄγος over generations.[122] In particular, the memory of the Alcmaeonid curse remained fixed in people's minds. One can thus follow this thread from the first expulsion of the cursed family, through Peisistratus, who, though married to a daughter of the Alcmaeonid Megacles, did not want to have children by her, to the Spartan military intervention in favour of Isagoras (508/7). After this intervention, the Alcmaeonidae once again had briefly to flee their native city.[123]

A fragment of broken pottery has been preserved from the ostracism of 484, when Pericles' father, Xanthippus, was sent into exile; besides the name of the *ostracisé*, one can also read the word "accursed" (ἀλειτερόν [for: ἀλιτηρός]), a term that clearly alludes to the Alcmaeonid curse.[124]

Megacles, Pericles' grandfather on his mother's side and ostracized in 487/6, is also denigrated as ἀλειτερός and Κυλονε<ί>ος on the most recently published *ostraca*.[125] As Smertenko and Dover have noted, there is another allusion to the well-known sacrilege in Aeschylus' *Eumenides* (produced in 458), which shows that an event that had happened long ago had never left the conscience of the Athenian public.[126] In Aeschylus' drama, there is an explicit passage on the fact that μίασμα, thought to have been expiated, was in fact only "asleep" (βρίζω) up to that moment. Herodotus, too, uses the metaphor of an accursed crime asleep that could "wake up" (ἐπεγείρω) again, after a long time.[127]

Even if the Spartan envoy who asked for the curse to be expiated did not find a sympathetic audience among the Athenians before the war started, one can easily

imagine that the latter, threatened by the epidemic in 430, the year of the Plague, will have remembered the unexpiated curse that beset Pericles' family, as they recalled old oracles that they adapted to the actual situation. The blame invoked by the Lacedaemonians was indeed present in Athenian public opinion, as is indicated by an allusion in Aristophanes' *Knights*, where Cleon tells the Sausage-seller that he is of the kin of the "evildoers against the goddess" (ἐκ τῶν ἀλιτηρίων σέ φημι γεγονέναι τῶν τῆς θεοῦ).[128]

Taking these arguments into account, the view according to which Pericles was disgraced and suspended by his fellow citizens because of the military situation requires a religious addendum: there are good reasons for there having been a considerable religious element in Pericles' fall. The opinion of the Demos about the *strategos* changed, because the people certainly considered the Plague to be divine punishment.

The citizens were deeply concerned at the predictions that made it appear the catastrophe was the result of going to war against the will of the gods, and they once again recalled the Cylonian affair that they associated with Pericles. As a result, no one wanted this man to lead them any more; he was held responsible not only for the passive defence strategy, but also for the war that he had persuaded the Assembly to wage: the very reason why Athens had been punished with the dreadful Plague.

3.7 The ritual purification of the island of Delos and the Plague of Athens

The ritual purification of the island of Delos, carried out by the Athenians in 426 at the insistence of an oracle, when the epidemic ravaged Athens for the second time, should be seen as a direct response to the pestilence.[129] On this occasion, they moved the dead buried on sacred Delos to graves prepared on the small nearby island of Rhenaia, and they decided that, for reasons of purity, no one should be born or die on Apollo's island in the future. At the same time, they revived the *Délia*, an old Ionic cult festival, celebrated with gymnastic and musical competitions.[130] The main initiator of this revival was the *strategos* Nicias, known for his fear of the gods. He led the solemn procession during these expensive celebrations.[131] It was no coincidence that, after the disastrous events at the beginning of the war, the Athenians adopted as the *de facto* successor of Pericles a god-fearing politician, whose deep religiosity could turn into superstitious fear in decisive situations.[132] Because of his religious attitude and conservative leadership, however, this was the man who seemed to guarantee a re-establishment of the broken rapports between the polis and the traditional gods.

Powell correctly assumes that Nicias' strategic successes during the Archidamian War made Athenian public opinion believe that Nicias would be a favourite of the gods, and that his religiosity would be rewarded by the divine powers. Plutarch says

that, as initiator of the Peace in the year 421, Nicias was honoured by his fellow citizens as θεοφιλής.[133]

While Thucydides, in his account of the purification of the island of Delos, does not give reasons for the measure (apart from a vague reference to an oracle), Ephorus clearly points to the second outbreak of the "plague" as motivation. The Athenians believed that Apollo's sacred island had been "defiled" by the burials (δοκοῦσαι μεμιάνθαι).[134] The ritual purification of the island, the removal of the graves and the revival of the festival are rightly interpreted as a concrete attempt by the Athenians to find resolution of the catastrophic situation by means of religious measures. These provisions for the native island of the god clearly reflect efforts to get the support of the "plague god", Apollo, against the pestilence.[135] This moment also marks the beginning of construction of a new temple that the Athenians dedicated to Apollo.[136]

In 422, the Athenians went so far as to totally evacuate the island, and simply moved all its inhabitants elsewhere because of some "old guilt" (κατὰ παλαιάν τινα αἰτίαν), which remained unexpiated even after the purification performed a few years previously. After the Athenians' military failures, the Delians were repatriated in the same year, at the insistence of the Delphic god. This time, Thucydides himself invokes religious reasons for both measures carried out by the Athenians; Dover comments as follows: "The Athenians are nearly as superstitious as the Spartans."[137] The very fact of the purification of a strategically insignificant island, and of its inhabitants at the command of an oracle, underlines the exceptional importance of the Plague and its long-term effects on the Athenian population during the Archidamian War.[138]

3.8 The importance of the Plague for the Peloponnesian War: summary

Taking everything into account, the catastrophic year of 430 appears as a landmark in Athenian domestic policy. Without any doubt, the Plague marks a key moment in Athenian history. The events of this year, and religious fears stimulated by the Plague and the alarming state of the war, had a long-term influence on political life. As we have already seen, the *psephisma* of Diopeithes, probably passed in that year under the influence of the crisis, began for the first time a persecution of intellectuals who were thought to have a problematic attitude with regard to the norms and duties of polis religion. Pericles, to whom was attributed the responsibility for this troubling situation, paid with his job for the change in atmosphere, not only because he did not manage the war well, but also because of religious objections and concerns related to his person, his intellectual friends and his ancestry.

On the one hand, the pestilence had serious and irreversible demographic consequences, notably a decrease in the size of the population fit for military service, a problem accentuated by additional losses through military operations. This is why Thucydides says that the epidemic, with a second outbreak in 427/6, was the

decisive factor in the long-term decline of Athens, beyond any military defeats.[139] On the other hand, the experience of the Plague, interpreted as divine punishment, left a long-term impression in the Athenians' collective memory, since from that moment on, they allowed the politicians to play the "religious card" in order to get their way in the Assembly. This was clearly the Athenian experience, and I am firmly convinced that the Plague is *the* key to understanding Athenian politics in subsequent years. The fact that there were ever fewer individuals participating in the citizens' collective reminded the Athenians on a daily basis of the long-term consequences of the disease; in 415, its effects were still present in political debates.[140] R. Mitchell-Boyask recently drew attention to Attic drama after the plague and pointed out that the discourse of disease and healing was a central element of Athenian dramatic production after 430, since, for example, the word "*nosos*" (disease) occurs very often in drama after 430. He concludes that the Plague was on people's minds at particular historical moments,[141] and that that the discourse of the Athenian theatre centred at this period on "healing, initiation and scapegoating".[142] *Oedipus Tyrannus*, probably staged in 425 or shortly after,[143] is the most important indication of such a view. From the beginning of this drama, the Athenians are reminded of the terrible "plague" that kept the city under siege for some four years. Huber has demonstrated convincingly that the first scene of the play already displays typical rituals against calamity.[144] The Plague was thus omnipresent during the last quarter of the fifth century. The expulsion of the polluter in *Oedipus Tyrannus*, the impeachment of Pericles, the punishment of those who defiled the Herms and profaned the Mysteries (see Chapter 5), and the condemnation of intellectuals, are all examples of the Athenians' belief that scapegoating was a proper response to inconvenience. Plato's Euthyphro was thus correct to say that the Athenians at that period were more and more inclined to listen to calumniators, and to accusations of crimes against religion.[145]

4
Other prosecutions for impiety

Religious persecution may shield itself under the guise of a mistaken and over-zealous piety.[1]

4.1 Protagoras of Abdera

Protagoras of Abdera, the most famous of the Sophists, came to Athens early, in 450 BCE or even earlier, to be a teacher of rhetoric and philosophy. The most important events in his life, apart from two lengthy sojourns in Athens for teaching purposes, were the constitution of the colony of Thurii, for which he seems to have been responsible,[2] and the impiety charge apparently brought against him for his treatise Περὶ θεῶν.[3] We have little information concerning details of his life, but the most plausible reconstructions of his biography place the birth of the philosopher towards 490 and his death towards 420.[4]

As in the case of his Sophist contemporaries, it is very hard to trace the sources of Protagoras' philosophical ideas. Scholarly attempts to recover even a general picture of the topics he taught have been mostly based on data derived from Plato, the main adversary of the Sophists, whose honesty and reliability remain questionable.[5] Cautious and balanced interpretations show that the first and the oldest of the Sophists was very likely an innovative thinker. Besides teaching oratory, he also dealt with the issue of the relativeness of human perception, embraced in the famous dictum that "man is the measure of all things".[6]

As a teacher of rhetoric, Protagoras was preoccupied with improving his pupils' dexterity in argument, to enable them to become skilful orators on the political stage. Aristotle thus cites him as the inventor of the well-known sophistic promise to turn the weaker argument into the stronger (τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν).[7] Other information on his social or political theories depends largely on the interpretation of Protagoras' anthropological myth (as related by Plato), and should consequently be considered as unreliable.[8]

The several accounts of the Sophist's trial for impiety refer mainly to his Περὶ θεῶν, a text that seems to lie behind the common assumption that he did not

believe in gods. Here he speculated about the existence of the gods, wondering whether man would be able, on an epistemological level, to acknowledge their existence or non-existence.[9]

The distinction between religion as social reality and the completely different issue of the existence or non-existence of gods, which C. W. Müller claims that Protagoras probably made, cannot be used as an argument against the assumed negative impact of his treatise on the Athenian population. If one stresses, correctly, Protagoras' mainly epistemological interest, clearly expressed in his agnostic statement on the gods, then one ignores the stirring effect of the theorem, though the phrase implies that it is possible that divine powers do not exist. The fact that Protagoras, judging by his myth in Plato, was probably aware of the positive effect of religious belief as a factor for social cohesion, and as an important basis for society, did little to assuage the heated spirits of those who feared that the very grounds of religious tradition had been shattered. After all, even Protagoras' presumably positive attitude towards religion is irrelevant, when we consider that, in his opinion, religion was just a social phenomenon, belonging to the *nomos*. If this argument is taken to its extreme, Protagoras comes closer to the cynical view of Critias, who said that religion was invented in order to tame and discipline the crowd, a view that implies the non-existence of divine powers. Protagoras' views differ only to the extent that he does not pay any attention to the question of whether gods exist or not. So long as people believe in divine powers, it does not matter if they exist or not. This quasi "innocent" idea, induced by an epistemological problem, could easily whip up controversy among Athenians afflicted by pestilence and war, as scholars have rightly acknowledged.[10]

The judgement of Diogenes of Oenoanda chimed with Protagoras' contemporaries, when he stated: "saying that one does not know whether the gods exist or not actually means that one does not believe in the existence of gods."[11] In consequence, Protagoras was also discredited in Athens as ἀλιτήριος περὶ τῶν μετεώρων, and his attitude towards the gods was criticized even during his lifetime.[12] He was blamed for his doubtful attitude towards traditional religious beliefs that held that the gods guaranteed the protection of the polis (for so long as the citizens worshipped them). And in times of crisis, his thoughts were interpreted as a disintegrating attack on public morals and religion. He was put on trial for impiety[13] and – perhaps – his writings were collected and set on fire in public. If we believe the tradition, the *autodafé* of Protagoras' work was the first case of book-burning in Western history.[14] After the impiety trial, the philosopher would have been exiled,[15] though there is another version suggesting that Protagoras fled Athens before his trial; the same version has it that he died in a shipwreck on the way to Sicily.[16]

Taking into account the traditional biographical data on Protagoras and an observation of Eupolis (in a play performed after 421 BCE), the trial took place in 420 or soon afterwards; we cannot be more precise, in view of the lack of relevant testimonia.[17] The reliability of this textual tradition, whose beginnings can

be found in the fourth century with Aristotle and Timon, has always been questioned because of a passage in Plato. In the *Meno*, Socrates brings up the example of Protagoras in the dialogue with his enemy and future accuser, Anytus, who invokes the harmful influence of Socrates and of the Sophists upon the young. Protagoras, despite a forty-year activity as a teacher of rhetoric all over Greece (until his death, aged nearly seventy), was still appreciated all over Greece until the days when Socrates and Anytus had their argument in Plato's *Meno*.[18] Critics believe that this testimony shows that Protagoras could not have been accused of impiety, on the grounds that other contemporary sources say nothing about such a trial.[19] Against this assumption, L. Piccirilli argues that the assertion according to which Protagoras was still much appreciated, ascribed to Socrates by Plato, had nothing to do with the issue of the trial for impiety, and that it would not call into question the reliability of the testimonia relating to the trial.[20] E. R. Dodds is the first to have drawn attention to the fact that Plato appeals here to the international fame of the teacher of rhetoric, which had nothing to do with his trial at Athens. In the same sense, Guthrie rightly notes that Plato (who here defends the only Sophist he appreciates) would have said much the same about the importance and fame of his own teacher Socrates, who, as a matter of fact, lost his life as the result of a trial for impiety.[21] As the number of testimonia increases during the fourth century, the case becomes clearer. All the sources confirm the tendency of the Demos to rise *en masse* against potential innovators and critics of traditional religion – amongst whom Protagoras, the ἀλιτήριος περὶ τῶν μετεώρων was numbered – because of the political and demographic effects of the war and the epidemic. This tendency is documented in the wording of the decree of Diopeithes.

It remains disputable whether the *psephisma* of the interpreter of oracles, abolished with the legislative reforms after the reinstallation of democracy, was used again in this case, because the authors of our sources do not seem to place much importance on legal procedure. We cannot therefore rule out the assumption, often proposed by scholars, that this decree which was directed explicitly against those who spread theories about heavenly matters, περὶ τῶν μεταρσίων, would be used again.[22]

The burning of Protagoras' texts is even more disputed than the impiety trial. More recent scholarship refuses, almost unanimously, to believe the tales – based on the testimony of Timon of Phlius – according to which a herald announced the collection and public burning of Protagoras' works in the Agora. Critics are suspicious, not only because of the rather late testimony, but also because public book-burnings that are reliably attested for the Hellenistic and Roman world only begin in the second century.

All observations related to burning the philosophical works come from Hellenistic authors and became a *topos*, which is why the information regarding the burning of Protagoras' works has fallen victim to "*Quellenkritik*".[23] As a matter of fact, Timon only says that the Athenians intended (ἔθελον) to set fire to the Sophist's books, once he had fled the city.[24] Piccirilli has, however, criticized the

overcritical tendency in more recent scholarship to dismiss all later testimony without analysing the historical circumstances, thus creating an exaggerated critical assessment of the sources.[25]

In a society predominantly characterized by oral communication, as is assumed for fifth-century Athens, the written word was definitely limited to a small circle of intellectuals.[26] It would be an anachronism to imagine a silent, self-taught "reader", occupied with reading manuscripts in his library in the fifth century; in fact, neither Socrates nor Damon left a single written word. It is inadmissible, however, to regard the primary function of written texts as manuscripts for public lectures in a society marked by orality, as an argument against the plausibility of the first acts of book-burning.[27]

It is precisely therefore the public utterance of Protagoras' thoughts on the gods (περὶ θεῶν) in the context of a lecture that could have determined the measures taken against him, as well physically against his writings: "*leggere o far leggere un'opera letteraria era la maniera antica di darne la massima diffusione*."[28] According to several sources employed by Diogenes Laertius, the book was presented during a reading, probably in the Lyceum, by his pupil Archagoras, not by the master himself.[29] The dissemination of Protagoras' views before a large audience could have especially stimulated discontent in the city and alerted people to the potential danger of the new "godless" teachings. Furthermore, Piccirilli argues convincingly that in order to prevent someone's unwelcome ideas from being disseminated, it was not enough to send the responsible individual into exile or have him killed, if their writing – "*per quanto limitata*" – was still in circulation, since their friends and pupils could have read and disseminated it. Burning unwelcome texts appears to be the logical consequence of a wish to "wipe them off the face of the Earth" in the truest sense of the word.[30] In the field of legal practice, it was usual, for example, for revoked decrees to be completely destroyed, meaning not only erasing inscriptions, but also eliminating all copies and related evidence.[31]

Hence, the tales told of the burning of Protagoras' work should be treated with circumspection, and should not be regarded as belonging utterly in the "realm of impossibility", even though the picture of democratic Athens would thereby acquire somewhat "barbaric" features. Most modern critics concur with the opinion of the German poet Heinrich Heine that "where books are burned, in the end there will be burned also people", but moral indignation is not enough for judging the Athenians.[32]

One could moreover assume that the burnings perhaps indicate a symbolic or magical act, especially as all the examples of book-burning in antiquity concern writings with a religious content.[33] In Greek cultic practice, fire had a special importance in purification rituals.[34] Burning books was probably not primarily an act of censorship or of uncultured barbarism, as modern observers would often have it, but an attempt to render their contents "unwritten", hence non-existent and thus condemning the author to a *damnatio memoriae*. Mactoux is thus probably correct in admitting that by burning Protagoras' books in the marketplace,

the polis "*réinstaure, sous une forme spectaculaire et purificatrice son pouvoir politico-judiciaire*".[35]

In conclusion, we can be sure that Protagoras came into conflict with the authorities, in all probability on account of his book *On the Gods* that was detested by Athenian public opinion; he either left the city after 420 but before the threatened trial, or else was later sent into exile (the evidence is uncertain). During an uncertain peace, marked by worry about the future and by the repercussions of the Archidamian War, from which people had barely begun to recover, by a period characterized by proxy wars fought via allies, and by confrontations of a domestic nature, the controversial philosopher was banished from the city because people believed that someone who did not fear the gods was a danger to the polis, and to its religious integrity.

4.2 Diagoras of Melos

In contrast with other imperfectly attested impiety trials against philosophers and intellectuals, the trial of the poet of Melos, probably caused by his discrediting the Eleusinian Mysteries, is the least contested.[36] Diagoras thus shares with Socrates the doubtful reputation of having been a victim of a prosecution for impiety. But, unlike Socrates, Diagoras managed to escape the death penalty, although a huge reward was offered for his capture. Scholars only differ with regard to the date and the circumstances of his condemnation, most probably pronounced in 415.[37]

There is little information on the life and work of the poet, sometimes seen as a philosopher, though there are no serious reasons for such identification.[38] According to Winiarczyk, in the case of the Melian, we are talking about a second- or third-rate poet, whom posterity remembers mostly for his bad name (he mocked the gods in dithyrambic poems),[39] and not for the quality of his works. The alleged atheistic attitude of the poet, who was categorized in later atheistic catalogues as ἄθεος κατ᾽ ἐξοχήν, cannot be demonstrated without reservation.[40]

It seems that only later authors ascribe a radical atheism to Diagoras, and mostly because he was tried for impiety.[41] Though the poet entered public consciousness as θεομάχος[42] early on, long before his condemnation (as is shown by the references in comedy), there is no evidence that he might have contributed to the promotion of a theoretically founded atheism or even agnosticism. There is no evidence that he would have approached, even at a rudimentary level, the abstraction of relevant texts by Protagoras or Critias.[43]

The testimonia relating to the Diagoras' trial for impiety all agree that he was not tried because of his "atheism" or profane writings, which were ascribed to the poet later on, but because he had revealed and discredited the Eleusinian Mysteries. According to this information, Diagoras must have divulged and denigrated the Mysteries, and must have tried to prevent others from being initiated.[44] The Attidographers Melanthius and Craterus were invoked by the Scholiasts (Aristoph.

Av. 1073) as reliable sources for the decree against the Melian, which is also mentioned by Aristophanes. In his work on the Eleusinian Mysteries, Melanthius cited the *psephisma*, accessible to him as an inscription on a bronze stele, word for word. The huge sum of a talent was announced as the reward for killing, and two talents for capturing, the runaway poet, who had fled to the enemy city of Pellene.[45]

This document led to the suspicion that the charges of impiety against the poet should probably be related to the scandal of the Mysteries that occurred in 415. In this case, the reference to the Assembly's decision in Aristophanes' play, produced in 414, would be an actual allusion. In the play, there is a jocular reference to the *psephisma*, as well as to the reward, mentioning ironically a decree promising a similar prize for the killing of the (already dead) tyrants of Athens. Aristophanes used this joke to refer to the escape of the Melian to live in exile. In this way, just like the long-dead tyrants, he was outside Attic jurisdiction.[46] Moreover, Diodorus and the Arab historian Al-Mubashir Ibn Fatik (based on a Greek source, probably Apollodorus) agree that Charias was archon (415/4) when the trial took place.[47]

The correlation of these testimonies makes it possible to date the condemnation of Diagoras to 415 BCE, and it allows a connection with the profanation of the Mysteries. Clearly, the earlier statements of Diagoras relating to the Mysteries were picked up in the context of the better-known scandal concerning the profanation (to be analysed in more detail in the next chapter). This happened in the context of the public hysteria that accompanied the prosecutions.[48] Diagoras managed to flee in time to Pellene, associated with the Peloponnesian League, where he was sure that he could not be extradited to Athens, considering that that city was particularly hostile towards the Athenians.[49]

The second scholion to the passage of Aristophanes' *Birds* mentioned above makes a vague allusion to the fact that the decree against the poet was moved somewhere around the time (μάλιστα) that the island of Melos was conquered (416/5 BCE). This is somewhat in agreement with the information in Diodorus and Al-Mubashir, but could also have been earlier. On these grounds, therefore, some scholars have denied a connection with the profanation of the Mysteries and the date of 415/4.[50]

F. Jacoby proposed an earlier date and made a connection between the trial of the poet and the decree of Diopeithes. Dating the trial in 415 would be, in his opinion, an ancient attempt at synchronization with the profanation of the Mysteries, independent of the Melian's case, but better known. As the testimonies of Craterus and Melanthius were transmitted only in fragments, and the scholiasts to Aristophanes do not offer an exact date for the condemnation, the decree on which it is based could not be dated with the name of the archon. The sources on which the accounts of Al-Mubashir and Diodorus are based (Apollodorus) would have later placed the date in 415, because of the exceptional situation caused by the profanation of the Herms and of the Mysteries, the year in which Charias was in fact archon.[51]

In his complicated reconstruction, F. Jacoby refuses to accept Diodorus' dates and considers that the obvious connection with the Eleusinian Mysteries is insignificant;

he had thus to interpret the reference to the decree against Diagoras (in *Birds*) as an allusion to a document adopted sometime in the past (or renewed more recently). This clumsy historical reconstruction has been frequently disputed, and in view of the work of Woodbury and Winiarczyk, it can be regarded as outdated.[52]

The indications in the sources do not suggest an absolute date, and, taking into account that in 415 (and not only then) there was definitely an "intense religious excitement" in Athens – as Jacoby rightly states[53] – there could thus have easily been a connection between Diagoras' case and the decree of Diopeithes. It is, however, more probable to relate the decree against the second-rate poet to the profanation of the Mysteries by Alcibiades and his friends in 415 BCE, though Diagoras (not being part of Alcibiades' group) could hardly be involved directly in this affair, so long as he was not on the list of those affected by the scandal.[54]

It is clear that Diagoras was only associated with the Eleusinian cult on account of his critical observations, and he had no close connections with Pericles (which could have been fatal to him, as they were to Anaxagoras in 430). This is why it is far more plausible to assume that the poet, who was in the Peloponnese during the 420s, was only put on trial at the time of the scandal of the Mysteries. There was not enough interest to put him on trial any earlier, before the striking event of 415, even though the situation in the city was indeed tense on account of the war and the Plague. Unlike Anaxagoras or Protagoras, Diagoras not only lacked any connection with high circles, but, being a second- or third-rate artist, he was not fully in the public eye. It was not because of his work, but through his attack on the Eleusinian Mysteries that he became notorious. Socrates, whose questionable attitude towards the gods had already contributed to Aristophanes' *Clouds* in 423, would face the same charge of impiety later. Perhaps a denunciation lay behind the critical remarks that Diagoras made earlier, forgotten while he was away from Athens, but revived again in 415, exposing him to danger.[55]

The decree that described a large reward for catching or killing him suggests that the polis considered the poet's attacks on the Mysteries, in the context of the offences of 415, as an intolerable danger. Because the inhabitants of the city of Pellene refused to extradite the refugee, the Athenians decided to take measures against this Peloponnesian city that offered asylum to the fugitive. Behind these unspecified measures, one could very probably find the reason for the exclusion of the inhabitants of Pellene from participation in the Eleusinian Mysteries.[56] Moreover, the profanation of the Mysteries and the prosecution of the profaners occurred at a period when the Athenians were attempting to use the Eleusinian Mysteries as a political instrument in the context of the Delian League.[57] In this way, the Diagoras affair became an affair of state.

4.3 The impiety trials as reaction to the crisis: summary

The prosecutions for impiety, to which Anaxagoras, Protagoras and Diagoras certainly fell victim, indicate a clear tendency of the Athenian Demos: to banish from the city those suspected of questioning the beliefs on which religion, morals and political consensus were based. They were seen as a danger to a community that closed ranks at the moment of crisis, because they attacked common beliefs in the area of polis religion. The Athenians were convinced that a traditional and unquestioning observation of the mandatory cults of polis religion guaranteed wealth and the protection of the gods for the polis and its enterprises. Furthermore, the critics of religion, who could until then speculate about natural explanations for heavenly phenomena, could now be used as scapegoats. Their teachings were thought to mock the gods and to lead to the corruption of the *jeunesse dorée* of Athens, who listened to these itinerant teachers. They were thus held responsible for the dreadful misfortunes that had befallen the city since the outbreak of the war.[58] In the opinion of I. S. Mark, the Demos well knew how to get rid of something that it feared or did not understand.[59]

These correlations were neglected not only by nineteenth-century scholars – adherents of the classic ideal, according to which the "noble Greeks" were incapable of such irrationality – but they continue to be ignored or zealously disputed until today.[60] As M. I. Finley admits, this could be simply the consequence of "the most successful illusionist trick in history". Plato performed this trick "when he persuaded posterity that the trial of Socrates was unique among prosecutions under the law of Diopeithes, indeed among all events in Athenian history".[61] In order to present the trial of Socrates for impiety as judicial murder, Plato had to avoid precedents for the case against his teacher, because the condemnation of Socrates would otherwise be perceived as the result of Athenian common law in action. His concept of impiety, as presented in the *Laws*, is far more rigid than Athenian practice attested in the trials during the Peloponnesian War or that of Socrates, and his teacher would perhaps have been the first to be tried without mercy, if Plato's utopia had been put into practice.[62]

If one imagines the catastrophic evolution of the first years of the war and the traumatizing influence of the pestilence, then the situation acquires a different complexion and speaks for itself. Furthermore, in the general context of this period the accounts of other banishments or prosecutions for impiety, not taken seriously by scholars because of the late testimonia, gain probability.

The late testimonia are certainly a critical point for the analysis of the impiety trials. Nevertheless, one can conclude, together with R. Garland, that the long-term obstacles to the Athenians' earning the favour of the gods could have led to a "collective paranoia", easily understandable against this background.[63] In similar situations, societies tend generally to look for scapegoats, whether individuals or groups, who can be held responsible for any calamity, as Girard demonstrated.[64] As for the actual historical situation, and bearing in mind the heightened sensitivity of

the citizens, who sought a way out of the exceptional situation that faced them, one should not exclude the possibility that the ancient sources did not invent chimeras and lies, but that they give an account of a dark chapter within the history of the "school of Hellas". Dodds is probably right when he says that the surviving records presumably present only the tip of the iceberg; many other less famous victims could have fallen to the Athenians' prosecutions caused by religious hysteria, which Finley defined as an "atmosphere of religious dread, tinged with patriotic fervour". It is probable that more intellectuals fell victim first to the religious wrath of the Athenians and then to the selective transmission of information by the sources.[65]

We should not be surprised that the first victims were philosophers from abroad, who did not benefit from the protection of citizenship and were not related to the polis by tradition or origin. These foreigners expressed opinions not only on the issues that (from the viewpoint of the Athenians) were none of their business, and should have concerned only the Athenians, but even worse, they "corrupted" the youth of the city with their teachings. This youth generally belonged to the leading circles, and tended to forget more and more the ideals and moral views of the older generation.[66] Not only did xenophobia play an obvious role in the persecution of intellectuals, but foreigners, who did not even benefit from the minor legal protection that metics enjoyed, were much more vulnerable, and could be prosecuted much more easily.[67] They could be easily condemned or banished; testimony could even be obtained from the ξένοι by means of torture.[68] The decisive circumstances that eventually proved fatal to these intellectuals were their fame, on the one hand, and their proximity to politics, on the other.

If the innovating thinkers of the Sophistic movement had conducted their criticism only in private, then nobody would have been particularly upset. But once their theories on the supernatural were made public and thus taught to pupils, reaching the ears and minds of rich boys of the upper classes and then percolating (probably in a blurred and distorted fashion) to the ears of the Demos, the city was forced to react in order to control what Mactoux has called the "*discours religieux*", and to defend traditional beliefs during this "*phase de vigilence idéologique*".[69] The problem was not that Protagoras expressed his beliefs on the epistemological irrelevance of the existence of divine powers, but that he did so in public, sharing them with his pupils and organizing public readings of his work.

Protagoras was also caught in the limelight of public criticism as a prominent personality, having, like Anaxagoras, close contacts in high circles. The condemnation and exile of certain ἀσεβοῦντες by the Assembly or the courts (depending on the legal procedure adopted), in venues where a large number of active citizens expressed their will, should be seen as self-affirmation of the community and of its religious identity.[70] The course of action marked by the prosecution of intellectuals by the Demos can thus be understood as an attempt at "*la centralisation du pouvoir religieux*".[71]

It should also be pointed out that, regardless of whether these trials were manipulated by over-zealous individuals or by powerful and calculating "Machiavellian"

politicians,[72] or if the impulse came from the Demos itself, the decisions were taken by the people. Everything, from the decree of Diopeithes, the deposition of Pericles, the banishment and condemnation of Anaxagoras and Protagoras, up to the *psephisma* for the capture of Diagoras, was adopted or judged by the people in the *ekklesia* or in the courts, by a representative cross-section of Athenians. These decisions were thus made by civic institutions which represent the unpredictability, as well the susceptibility to manipulation, of the legislative body. The foolish decision to undertake the Sicilian adventure, or the fact that the Athenians punished the victorious generals of Arginusae, are good examples of such fickleness. Both these short-sighted decisions contributed to the reduction in the powers of the Assembly after the reform of 403 BCE. With the prosecutions of the philosophers, the "superstitious terror"[73] had not yet reached its climax, as the affair of the Herms and of the Mysteries in 415 demonstrates, where both suspects and those who were truly guilty were the victims of a real "witch hunt".

5
The mutilation of the Herms and the profanation of the Mysteries
Religious and political implications

Arastis impietatem, iniquitatem messuistis.[1]

5.1 Introduction

One summer morning in 415, immediately before the departure of the fleet on the ultimately tragic expedition to Sicily, the Athenians found that almost all the statues of the god Hermes set up throughout the city had been mutilated.[2] Searching for the wrongdoers became a priority, and many labelled it a "witch hunt".[3] This portent for the impending campaign made people worry excessively, and believe any allegation or accusation that might be made. If we are to believe Thucydides, an anti-democratic plot lay behind the irregular nocturnal activities. Later evidence, however, showed that innocent people with no connection to the conspiracy were over-zealously tried and executed. In fact, it was never discovered who was really responsible for the mutilations.

During the investigations, another religious offence became known: a slave revealed that during a private festivity, Alcibiades and his friends profaned the Eleusinian Mysteries. An impious coterie supposedly imitated the sacred rituals before an audience of uninitiated individuals. In this case, it was clear who the perpetrator was. Alcibiades was the most capable general of his time, and a commander of the Sicilian expedition, but he was charged with impiety and recalled from the front. After correctly assessing the heated atmosphere within his native city, Alcibiades chose to fight for the Spartans and plot the destruction of Athens, instead of returning home and facing his own ruin. Athens' most gifted leader thus passed over to the side of the enemy.

This chapter is concerned with the religious crimes that troubled the public life of Athens in the early summer of 415 BCE and brought the citizenry to a state of high tension and anxiety, as well as the consequences of the sacrileges for the subsequent fate of the city. The question also arises as to why Athenian public opinion

was so concerned; the particularly violent reaction of the Demos to what had happened is especially interesting. The "witch hunt", targeting both the real and alleged malefactors, must be correlated with the important religious issues at the end of the fifth century.

5.2 Domestic and foreign political developments before 415

The mutilation of the Herms and the profanation of the Mysteries affected the Athenians deeply. They were struggling to recover from both the Archidamian War and the consequences of the epidemic, as they prepared for new actions in the highly tense period of a "dishonest peace", marked by proxy wars conducted via their allies. A little earlier, a chance event had put them in a favourable position for negotiations. The capture by the Athenians of some 120 Spartan hoplites on the island of Sphacteria at Pylus caused the Spartans to be disposed to make concessions. They could ill afford the loss of so many citizens, and the Spartans, who wanted to save the prisoners at all costs, were soon disposed to concessions.[4] However, a peace agreement was only signed in 421, after other military confrontations. It was the so-called Peace of Nicias, negotiated under the aegis of the eponymous conservative politician.[5]

The following years were a period of only relative peace at best, for the Athenians, who still tried to enforce their own interests aggressively by means of proxy wars, after a short period of co-existence with their onetime deadly foe. More and more under the influence of Alcibiades, the "hawk", the Athenians began to support the city of Argos in their struggle against Sparta.[6]

The period after 421 was also dominated by a heated dispute in domestic policy, since, after the death of Cleon in 422, the political stage welcomed a new generation of ambitious politicians, "demagogues", who struggled fiercely for supremacy in the *ekklesia*[7] (together with Nicias, Cleon had decisively influenced the fate of the city, after Pericles' [mostly] uncontested leadership).

Cleon already belonged to the new generation of politicians (who no longer belonged to the most reputable families in Athens), and claimed to lead the Demos.[8] Together with Nicias, who remained equally active and whose conciliating conservative policy earned him the admiration of Thucydides, the ambitious Alcibiades, avid for fame, came to the fore. Elected *strategos* for the first time in 420, Alcibiades began to have more and more influence on the political life of Athens.

The fundamental issue that was hotly debated at this time was how future relations with Sparta might be conducted. Alcibiades advocated a warlike policy in the imperial tradition of the Delian League, with no concessions made. Disputes eventually led to domestic friction, and even a demagogical competition between the two political leaders as to who was to rule the polis.[9] The debates related to the city's political orientation acquired a new aspect once the foreign policy agenda

changed in favour of Sparta after the Battle of Mantinea in 418. The Argives, who did not get sufficient support from the Athenians, were defeated by the reinvigorated Peloponnesian League and because Corinth had separated from Argos. Sparta's prestige, shattered after the events at Pylus, was restored.[10] The policy to ensure Athenian influence in the Peloponnese that Alcibiades had advocated thus failed.

Accounts by Thucydides, Xenophon and Plato, and in the biography of Plutarch, provide a fair amount of information about the stormy life of Alcibiades, and we can create a fairly complete picture of this mercurial character.[11] The character of the young nobleman thus combined selfishness without scruple and endless ambition with brilliant intellectual skills and a winning personality, all of which brought him the admiration of the Demos. They also supplied the ingredients for a "ticking time bomb" for Athens. Nicias, lacking such personal skills, was in a difficult position with respect to this spirited orator.[12]

This is how matters stood within the city when the Sicilian polis of Egesta, an ally of Athens, asked for help.[13] Thucydides describes the heated debate that took place in the Assembly where the opponents and supporters of a campaign to support Egesta presented their different arguments. People believed that such an operation would benefit Athens, both economically and politically. Alcibiades promised the Athenians glory, increased influence and rich booty as the result of the proposed expedition. By constrast, the cautious Nicias pointed out the risks of such an expedition into the unknown, since there was little information on the political and economic situation in Sicily.

Led by a renewed spirit of adventure and thinking of rich booty, the Athenians decided, after a ferocious debate, to take the risk and get involved in a local conflict between Egesta and the city of Selinus, an ally of Syracuse, in the hope of weakening this Dorian city.[14] Shortly before the expeditionary force set sail, however, the act of impiety occurred, and most of the city's Herms were mutilated. We lack detailed information about these events, and can only speculate on the precise chronology of what happened in the early summer of 415, between the debate in the Assembly, the nocturnal profanation of the Herms and the moment the fleet left.[15]

5.3 The events of 415: a survey

The various sources relating to the events of 415 present just a few solid data.[16] The only coherent accounts are those of Thucydides and Andocides, to which information in Plutarch may be added.[17]

After the discovery of the mutilation of most of the Herms, the city was really inflamed; an investigative committee was immediately appointed and a reward was offered for information.[18] By offering immunity from prosecution, the Athenians wanted to encourage key witnesses to come forward with their testimony. Understandably enough, the citizens interpreted the attack on the statues

of Hermes as a bad omen for the dubious adventure that was about to get underway. Later on, there were voices maintaining that the sacrilegious act had been an attempt to overthrow the democracy.[19]

At first, the authorities were groping in the dark and acted in a hit-and-miss fashion, since nobody knew who had perpetrated the nocturnal crime.[20] Little tangible evidence came to light, apart from information about previous profanations of other statues of gods by drunken youngsters. Uncertainty about the motives for the deed only contributed to an increase in general worry, until it turned into a kind of panic.[21]

If, initially, little information was obtained about the mutilation of the Herms, subsequent investigations led to the discovery of another sacrilege. The testimony of the slave Andromachus stated that Alcibiades and his cronies imitated the rites of the Eleusinian Mysteries, ἐφ' ὕβρει, in a private setting.[22] Although he wanted to account for his alleged deeds immediately, the *strategos* was forced, on the proposal of his enemies, to go ahead with leading the army to Sicily and to be put on some kind of trial when the investigations were more advanced. Thucydides leads us to believe that Alcibiades' adversaries used such a manoeuvre because the Assembly might have acquitted him, by means of the votes of the citizen soldiers still present in favour of their popular general. It was more likely that Alcibiades might receive a negative verdict later on, when the army was away from Athens.[23]

After the departure of the fleet, Andromachus' testimony was followed by a series of similar statements that led to a wave of arrests and executions (if the accused did not manage to escape in time) in a city now dominated by true hysteria. In the speech for his defence, delivered about fifteen years after these events, Andocides reminded his jurors of the innocent Athenians who deliberately avoided the Agora because they were afraid of being arrested. Thucydides tells us that this occurred because any informer who made a denunciation was believed immediately, even if he was of ill repute.[24]

The statements of the metic Teucer, of Agariste (a woman from a respected family), and of the slave Lydus led to the imprisonment of profaners of the Mysteries. Moreover, Teucer produced the first information about the mutilators of the Herms, and he named eighteen guilty persons, some of whom fled and others executed.[25] After the denunciations of these three informers (which probably occurred in a rapid sequence after the departure of the fleet), a certain Diocleides – as Andocides narrates – came before the Council with some incredible accusations, according to which he saw from behind a bush approximately 300 men in the Theatre of Dionysus on the night of the attack on the Herms and that he had recognized their faces. The day after, on finding out about the sacrilege, Diocleides put two and two together and thought that he had witnessed a nocturnal gathering of the mutilators of the Herms. He was able to report forty-two perpetrators to the Council, among whom were two members of the Council itself and the orator Andocides. Diocleides' testimony came so late because he had presented himself before the investigative committee only after a blackmail attempt on the alleged

profaners; he came before the Court purely in order to denounce the victims of an attempt that had failed.[26]

This testimony caused the members of the Council great concern, and, taken together with alarming news of movements of enemy troops at the border, the large number of nocturnal evildoers acquired an extremely dangerous aspect, not helped by the radical democrat Peisander's inflaming spirits in the Council. In view of the latest news, a state of alert was ordered within the city, and fear of a conspiracy gained ground. Meanwhile, the blackmailer Diocleides received the highest civic honours.[27]

Andocides, whose participation (i.e. connivance) in the mutilation of the Herms cannot be denied, decided, on the advice of a relative, to make a statement while in prison. His testimony essentially coincided with that of Teucer, but it contradicted that of Diocleides. He showed that only the members of his circle of friends, his *hetairia*, led by Euphiletus, committed the excess, which they planned during a banquet. He professed, however, to have dissociated himself from the plot and claimed that everything happened without his knowledge or consent, since he was bed-ridden because of illness.[28] During a new interrogation, Diocleides began to contradict himself and admitted that he had been hired to give testimony; in this way, the honoured guest in the Prytaneum ended up in the same situation as those who had been condemned because of his denunciation.[29]

In the *hetairia* of Euphiletus, a group with barely twenty members who could not be compared to the powerful group of Hermokopidae, made up of 300 men that Diocleides claimed to have seen, people finally found the guilty parties.[30] The panic provoked by the mutilation of the Herms, which had previously dominated the city, dissipated after the statement of Andocides. The Athenians could rest assured that justice had been done in this case.[31]

The investigations into the profanation of the Mysteries, considered to be equally serious, could now continue with renewed intensity, and the accused general, together with other suspects within the army, was recalled from Sicily on the basis of new information that had been placed before the Council.[32] Alcibiades' adversaries added fuel to the fire and exaggerated everything to increase the size of the scandal, and to use it against him. From the moment people found out about the lampooning of the Mysteries in which Alcibiades had taken part, they tried to make others believe that the mutilation of the Herms and the profanation of the Mysteries were part of a single conspiracy, having as its purpose the overthrow of the rule of the Demos. They spoke of a conspiracy with Alcibiades as its leader, an Alcibiades who wanted to make himself tyrant.[33]

Aware of the hostile atmosphere in Athens, Alcibiades, and other persons who had been charged, took the opportunity to escape from their captors at Thurii and thus evaded his judges, who, in consequence, sentenced him to death *in absentia*.[34]

5.4 The events of 415 in the light of scholarship

This was, in general terms, the series of events related to profanation and sacrilege that kept Athens under pressure in the summer of 415. These events are rather well documented, despite all the difficulties involved in establishing a precise chronology. However, as regards who precisely were the guilty parties and what was their rationale – and this is the burning issue in this context – there is not enough information. Much, however, has been written in the hope of throwing light on the real implications of this shady business. In general, since the profanation of the Mysteries was an activity conducted in private, it has tended to be dismissed as high jinks by drunken lads from good families, while research has concentrated on the mutilation of the Herms. This is mainly because that deed took place in the public arena, a fact that was conducive to the launching of a "witch hunt".

Plutarch gives three explanations that circulated in Athens after the mutilation, including the view that the crime was planned by the inhabitants of Corinth, in order to prevent the departure of the fleet in the interests of their colony, Syracuse. Apart from this highly improbable suggestion, and the suspicion expressed by Thucydides regarding an oligarchic plot, there was also the view that the mutilation of the Herms was not really all that important, since it was just the prank of rowdy and dissolute youths.[35]

Earlier scholarship took this hypothesis seriously, and saw the impiety in terms of a drunken lark. More recent studies tend to see, in the events of 415 BCE, and mostly in the attack on the Herms, an organized plot by certain groups (*hetairiai*) with an oligarchic background who wished to overthrow the democracy or, at the very least, to halt the expedition to Sicily and to discredit its leader, Alcibiades.[36] This approach emphasizes a supposed distinction between oligarchs and democrats, and probably treats the events too much in terms of modern politics. It analyses confrontations in Athenian domestic politics by analogy with modern political parties that represent certain policies and ideologies. In what follows, it will be suggested that it is difficult to make any assumptions at all regarding the political purposes of the perpetrators based on the sources.

It is better, perhaps, to read the sources more in terms of the response of the panic-stricken Athenians, leading to a pogrom-like atmosphere in the city, marked by anxiety and consternation. Since the motivation of the offenders remains obscure, in view of the absence of any evidence about their designs, the city's reaction offers the only solid evidence for the events of 415. Scholars have often interpreted the prosecution of the offenders as the understandable response of a militant democracy capable of defending the constitution against the intrigues of its enemies. Here, however, there will be less emphasis on the political implications of the "witch hunt" of 415, and more focus on religious aspects.[37]

It is a fact that the accused were charged not with high treason, but with impiety, which ought immediately to alert us as to the religious aspect of the crime.[38] The correct approach was established as early as the mid-nineteenth century by

G. Grote. He supplied the useful analogy to the unprecedented agitation in Athens with the likely commotion in a Spanish or Italian city of his time, if all the statues of the Virgin suffered a fate similar to that of the Herms in Athens.[39]

From the start, we should note that, so far as the mutilation of the Herms and the profanation of Mysteries are concerned, we are dealing with two offences that are entirely different in nature and content, intention and execution. Moreover, they lack any common features in terms of the personnel involved or in the methods employed to carry them out. The rites of the Eleusinian Mysteries, imitated on several occasions by Alcibiades' circle of friends, were, unlike the mutilation of the Herms, not intended to be known outside the private space within which they occurred. Some scholars approach the two crimes as a unity, since political troublemakers – notably Alcibiades' enemies – attempted to pin the mutilation of the Herms on the general, who was in reality only a suspect in the case of the Mysteries. The chronological proximity, as well as the similar effects on the public of these sacrilegious actions against two important cults, later led to a blurring of the two offences.[40] In what follows, however, the two crimes will be treated separately.

5.5 The mutilation of the Herms

5.5.1 The importance of the Herms in Athens

In order to arrive at a correct assessment of the shock experienced by the Athenians once they discovered that the statues of Hermes had been mutilated, it might be useful in the first place to study their meaning, and their importance in the context of the religious life of the city.[41] These pillars, square in section and set up in many places throughout the city, had manifold functions. In the first instance, the cult statues that had been popularized in Attica by the tyrant Hipparchus naturally represented the god Hermes as the protector of envoys or travellers, and as the mediator between Olympus and the rest of the world.[42] As is often the case with cult statues, offerings to the god were placed in front of the Herms, or else people put crowns on the Herms' heads, as shown by representations on vases.

Unlike other statues of gods, the Herms were placed out of doors, and were often to be found by the roadside outside the city. This is why, in the scenes represented on vases, the dedicators are often hunters or travellers. The square-cut statues, typical of Attica, thus served as a kind of boundary marker for the roads between the centre of the polis and the demes, functioning also as signs of divine protection for travellers, rather like Christian wayside crosses.[43]

From the perspective of this book, it is the Herms within the city alone that Thucydides says were mutilated, and which are particularly important. As *hermai propylaioi* (or *prothyrai*), the boundary pillars offered protection, mostly in public places and sanctuaries (generally at entrances), such as at the entrance to the Acropolis or at the southern city gate of Aegeus. Many Herms seem to have been placed in the Agora.[44] Besides these, the Herms were often seen in the doorways of private houses.[45]

The Agora sheltered an entire set of important Herms, consecrated by public officers or private individuals. The best-known group was that of the so-called "Herms of Kimon", dedicated (without mentioning his name) on the initiative of the famous general with the agreement of the Assembly, after he had defeated the Persians at Eion in 476/5.[46] Placed mostly at entrances and on the streets leading to the marketplace, they had the same function as roadside markers or boundary pillars, since they marked the entrance to the Agora, underlining its role as the centre of the polis. At the same time, the statues served (as did their fellows on the roads leading to the demes) as a means of venerating the cult of the god they represented.[47]

There is a wide range of scholarly opinion regarding the importance of these cult statues, as to their relevance for the religious and public life of the city, and consequently to the religious impact of their mutilation. The Herms have recently tended to be understood not only from the perspective of their traditional function as apotropaic boundary markers, and of their importance for the cult of Hermes, but also as "monuments of the democratic state, of its institutions and of their supporters".[48] In particular, Osborne and Rückert consider the Herms as specific representations of Athenian democracy.

Rückert's belief that the Herms were "*mnemata* of the intact political order", being set up in the Agora where the most important buildings of democratic Athens were to be found, and thus possessing a special importance as symbols of the power of the state and of the democratic order, is acceptable, but with certain conditions.[49] It is better, perhaps, to concur with Hornblower's scepticism: "So what was specially democratic about Herms? Perhaps not very much."[50] Osborne, however, goes too far with his interpretation. His belief in the communicative aspect of the god and to the role of the Herms as representations of the mediator between people and gods may contain a grain of truth, but his reading of the Herms as self-portraits of individual citizens is far from convincing, couched as it is in poststructuralist jargon. He envisages the citizens meeting "themselves" and "the other" in the Herm.[51] In this view, the mutilation of the Herms could be understood as an attack against each individual Athenian ("it is that the face of the Herm was the face of every Athenian") and, by extension, as an aggression against democracy as represented by the Herms.[52]

Those who endorse a "political" interpretation of the statues and of their function do not, however, manage to explain why exactly these statues, introduced by the tyrant Hipparchus, should acquire the symbolic character of the democratic constitution. They also fail to explain why exactly the Herms appear to be "more democratic" than, say, the tribal heroes or Athena Polias, statues that had escaped the attentions of the mutilators of the Herms.[53]

The cult of Hermes does not figure large in the official calendar of Athenian festivals. There can be no doubt, however, that the god, who is in a prominent position on the western pediment of the Parthenon as a celestial messenger at Athena's side, had an important role in public life. In addition, the ubiquity of the statues made the deity "the most familiar divine presence in the streets of Athens".[54] É. Will rightly warns against exaggerating the social importance of the

Herms as representative of the democracy: "*ce symbolisme démocratique … est le fruit d'hypothèses modernes*."[55]

The mutilators planned their deed during a banquet,[56] and the Herms might well have been an attractive target, not through any debatable democratic significance, but because they were to be found all over the place, and perhaps because their form lent itself to mischievous mutilation, for their prominent features (*phalloi* and noses) were readily vulnerable.[57] The organized desecration of the statues can hardly be viewed as a lads' night out, as earlier scholars assumed, but this does not necessarily mean, as scholars have more recently tended to believe, that the perpetrators had some sort of *coup d'état* in mind. It is equally debatable whether they were really capable of such a thing when they set out on their nocturnal adventure.

The fact that the Athenians were seriously irritated makes much more sense if we consider the decisive factor for the widespread panic within the city to have been not the fear of tyranny, but fear of the gods. The attacks of the demagogues – who saw their time coming and who manipulated the religious fears of the citizens against their own enemies – definitely also contributed to the tense atmosphere. In the following sections, I will study the reasons that could have determined the mutilators of the Herms and, particularly, the motivations of the Athenians to stage a "witch hunt", that should be looked for in the area of religious emotion.

5.5.2 Religion and politics: the causes and impact of the mutilation of the Herms

5.5.2.1 Possible motivations of the mutilators

As we have already seen, most recent studies interpret the mutilation of the Herms as an assault by discontented oligarchs against democracy or, at least, as a deliberate provocation to democratic institutions and their supporters. Thucydides is the first to have suggested such an interpretation, in alluding to the growing fear of the citizens during the investigation, that the affair might be an attack on democracy.

Most modern reconstructions place the mutilation of the Herms and the "witch hunt" against a definite political background, inspired mostly by Thucydides, who mentions a possible conspiracy to overthrow the democracy.[58] The resulting fear, modern commentaries imply, would have led to a general state of panic, and it would have deeply disturbed public opinion. Only the fear of tyranny or of an oligarchic *coup d'état* – with or without a basis in fact – seems likely to many modern scholars; the rationale is that the exaggerated reaction might thus be perceived as reasonable. Such a reaction could be justified in modern eyes as an appropriate or at least understandable answer on the part of of a militant democracy capable, if necessary, of rising in arms.[59]

But this is perhaps to misinterpret Thucydides, for he invokes *in the first place* the religious fear of the Athenians, who perceived the sacrilege as a bad omen for the forthcoming Sicilian expedition. This aspect seems to be neglected, or, at most, touched on tangentially by modern scholars who try to make sense of the events of 415.[60] The fact that Thucydides immediately goes on to speak of the supposed plots

comes about as the result of the preliminary character of the relevant chapter. In the context, the author makes a brief effort to present the most important aspects right at the beginning of his short narrative. We should also bear in mind that Thucydides was writing with a good deal of hindsight, after 404, and having witnessed two oligarchic revolutions. It is highly doubtful that anyone feared an oligarchic coup in 415.

From other information provided by the historian, augmented by passages of Andocides (in a speech delivered in the presence of witnesses of the events of 415), it would appear that talk of a conspiracy only arose in the context of the later disturbances, and only after the first depositions of the informers. After discovering the mutilation of the Herms, as Thucydides states clearly, no one had any idea who the perpetrators had been: καὶ τοὺς δράσαντες ᾔδει οὐδείς.[61]

It is understandable, in this situation, that the citizens thought above all of the religious consequences of such a sacrilege, fearing the wrath of the god whose statues had been dishonoured in the most shameful way.[62] A strict investigation was instituted as a result. In this context, the important role played by every kind of divination in Athenian public and private life must be considered, and the extraordinary role of the oracles and prophecies, during the epidemics of 430/29 and 427, are also relevant. Prophecies, and especially the interpretation of omens, played a decisive role in the planning and tragic failure of the expedition to Sicily.[63] Even though Thucydides famously does not mention diviners in connection with the affair of the Herms, we should naturally expect the citizens to have called upon the services of prophets and diviners at just this time.[64]

As soon as the other religious offences involving men from the city's higher circles, including Alcibiades, were revealed, and after the initial information about the mutilators of the Herms was presented (through the statement of Teucer), the propaganda of the so-called radical democrats, such as Peisander, Charicles and Androcles, began.[65] They decided to use against their adversaries the Demos' fear of divine punishment, together with the already traditional fear of tyranny.[66] Peisander and Charicles were part of the investigating commission, and they brought to the discussion the idea that the sacrilege could have been the work not of a small group, but of a large organization that proposed to overthrow the democracy.[67] As soon as Diocleides, in whom people had total faith at this point, gave false testimony that there were, alarmingly, 300 plotters, the discontent took wing: "*un vent de panique se mit aussitôt à souffler sur la ville*", as J. de Rommilly pertinently observed.[68]

Scholarly attention has also been drawn to Andocides' observation, according to which the nocturnal action was a case of πίστις, an oath of mutual allegiance, a pledge within a *hetairia*, whose cohesion would have been strengthened by a crime committed in common.[69] In fact, the reason invoked by Andocides himself throws light on the implications of the sacrilege, given that other sources do not provide such a comprehensible motivation for the actions of the Hermokopidai.[70] In fact, a collective crime can strengthen the relationships within a *hetairia*, and it can make its members mutually dependent, along the lines of "in for a penny, in for a pound".

During the Peloponnesian War, outrageous deeds committed in common to ensure mutual trust, were a distinctive sign of oligarchic groups in Kerkyra, and the gang that planned a *coup d'état* on Samos chose as its πίστις the collective murder of Hyperbolus.[71]

This has led some scholars to ask why Euphiletus' *hetairia* might have taken such an oath of allegiance, since, given its nature, πίστις should have had another criminal target. G. A. Lehmann provides a clear answer: the profanation of the Herms seems to have been "only the *beginning* of a future conspiracy, with the final purpose of overthrowing the democracy".[72] Although, in the eyes of the Athenians, the mutilation of the Herms was a grave sacrilege, which endangered the entire city, it was not comparable to murder. The fact that other cult statues had, in the past, been intentionally damaged by young men as a drunken jape should give rise to caution.[73] Significantly, Euphiletus shared the idea of mutilating the Herms with his drinking companions during a banquet, as Andocides shows;[74] both Andocides and his companions definitely belonged to aristocratic circles; the orator himself probably had oligarchic inclinations.[75] Still, it remains debatable whether the pranks of the *jeunesse dorée* automatically led to the idea of an oligarchic coup. This would require a common desire for power, as well as the means to form a well-organized and homogenous group. It is difficult to see such criteria met as early as 415. It will thus be necessary to study whether it was even theoretically possible to form an opposition from within certain *hetairiai* to plot against the democracy before the Sicilian disaster, and to examine critically more recent studies, which see the scandal of the Herms as the act of a functional anti-democratic resistance. In pursuing these ideas, it will become clear that the pledge of allegiance of the *hetairiai* should be interpreted in a less sinister context.

There has, of course, been much speculation as to the specific intentions of the perpetrators. In keeping with the modern belief that public anger at the outrage could be explained rationally, as the effect of a real fear of a "tyrannical" or "oligarchic" *coup*, the sacrilege has been interpreted as, above all, a premeditated political act. If we reject the notion that the nocturnal activities were such, then we should give more credit to the interpretation that takes account of the moment that the perpetrators chose and sees them as belonging to a group that was fiercely opposed to the expedition.[76] This would explain why they concentrated on statues of the god who was the protector of travellers.

So far as the departure of the fleet was concerned, the outrage could be considered a disruptive action aimed at the expedition leader.[77] The fact that the career of the ambitious Alcibiades was soon interrupted by the revelation of this profanation points in this direction. O. Aurenche's view is thus typical of a strong tendency in modern scholarship: *"[la mutilation] visait deux buts: empêcher le départ de l'expédition et provoquer la partie démocratique de la population athénienne."*[78]

G. A. Lehmann pleaded vehemently for an oligarchic dimension to the affair. In a highly regarded article, he includes the mutilation of the Herms within the broader framework of Athenian domestic policy, beginning in the 420s. He believes that

the profanation of the Herms was part of a movement of anti-democratic *hetairiai*, already notorious before 415, and which was now preparing a *coup* to overthrow the democracy. Behind the crime committed by Euphiletus' group, it is necessary to recognize that the real intention was to shock and irritate the community by means of this well-aimed provocation.[79] The fact that in domestic politics, the "new politicians" of the 420s were increasingly intractable is explained by Lehmann as a consequence of the elimination of ostracism, which was, until the mid-fifth century, a means of achieving clear-cut decisions. After the scandalous ostracism of Hyperbolus (417/6), it ceased to be used, although it was never officially abolished.[80] The expulsion of Hyperbolus seems to have been manipulated by Alcibiades and Nicias, who collaborated for a short time, despite their political quarrels, and orchestrated their *hetairiai*, with the result that it was not Alcibiades, but Hyperbolus, who had actually requested the ostracism, who was banished from Athens.

We should therefore seek the roots of the anti-democratic movement that took the lead in 411, and whose emergence is often understood as a consequence of the failure of the Sicilian expedition and the resulting loss of Athenian supremacy, in the internal conflicts of the 420s.[81] Lehmann wants to see, in the scandalous ostracism of Hyperbolus achieved by the *hetairiai*, evidence for the extremely dangerous evolution of the secret associations. In Lehmann's opinion, these associations must have had a considerable influence on the voting procedure, because 6,000 votes were necessary for the ostracism of a single candidate.[82]

Many works that see politics behind mutilation of the Herms are as interested as Lehmann in the significance of the *hetairiai*, the aristocratic clubs that had a decisive involvement in the oligarchic putsch of 411, and whose role in disturbances in other cities should not be underestimated.[83]

It was the group around Euphiletus and Andocides that was identified as the main culprit of the affair of the Herms. In the light of the events of 411 and the frequent disturbances in other states, especially Kerkyra, it is likely that already in the events of 415, we can catch a glimpse of the future actions of the *hetairiai* in Athens, at this stage detectable only in broad outlines.

C. Mann has recently argued vehemently, and keeping with Lehmann, for a political interpretation of the events of 415. The main purpose of his book is to prove that the death of Pericles did not mean such an abrupt break in the political life of Athens, as some had believed.[84] The "new politicians" began to emerge in only about 415, and it seems that there was a good deal of continuity. The affair of 415 thus marks, in Mann's view, the "awakening of the *hetairiai*". This is highly probable, because we do not hear much about these aristocratic clubs before 415. The mutilation of the Herms would be – and here he subscribes to Murray's interpretation – a pledge or a πίστις of the *hetairia*.

At the same time, Mann rejects my interpretation that reaction to the affair was dominated by religious aspects.[85] He maintains that one cannot separate a "religious" from a "political system" at Athens, because of the well-known interlocking nature of these realms, of cultic and political action, in classical Athens. Thus, the

reaction of the Athenians could not take place in a "religious system outside politics".[86] It is correct, up to a point, that the ancients did not differentiate between these spheres, but we do so today, and in order to describe these events, we have to employ modern terminology in order to make sense of what happened. On the other hand, labelling the reaction as political points up the same problem; the criterion ought to be the strong and inextricable link between cult and politics. The assumption that the mutilation of the Herms would have been seen by the Athenians as "a human and not as a divine sign" is scarcely comprehensible, if even Thucydides tells us that the deed was perceived as a bad omen. It was thus taken "very seriously", and people were convinced that relations between them and the gods would be affected by the outrage against representations of a mediator between the human and divine worlds.[87] The fact that the Athenians fiercely attempted to arrest the guilty (or those they believed to be guilty) is by no means an indication that the Athenians handled the deed merely as "a matter between different groups of human beings and not at all as a matter between humans and the gods". The opposite is true. The reaction of the Athenians allows not the slightest doubt. The deed was regarded as a bad omen; those who were perceived to be guilty were caught in a "witch hunt", tried and, though many were innocent, put to death. This was the typical procedure for seeking out scapegoats: "Thucydides hints that what can turn Athens to civic stability is, literally, an arbitrarily chosen scapegoat, for the operative attitude among the Athenians is *hyposia*, 'suspicion', a word that runs throughout the episode."[88] After the suspects had been arrested and convicted on the basis of these suspicions, Thucydides remarks: "And it was unclear whether those who suffered had been punished unjustly, but the rest of the city clearly benefited at that time."[89] What the motivations of the mutilators really were is hard to tell, but the response to it was certainly "religious", if one is still allowed to use this suspicious term. And the guilty as well as the innocent were tried and put to death for impiety, *asebeia*.

5.5.2.2 The significance of the hetairiai[90]

Peisander, who was involved to a great extent in capturing those who committed the sacrilege of 415, during preparations for the oligarchic putsch of 411, coordinated the actions of the clubs that previously had had as their *raisons d'être* mutual support in legal matters and acting as pressure groups.[91] The information given by Thucydides shows that these *synomosiai* or *hetairiai* were founded as associations or cooperatives, to support their members in trials or to promote them at elections. Because of their focus on public activity, earlier scholarship had considered the *hetairiai* in particular as the Athenian equivalent of our political parties, preoccupied mainly with acquiring more political influence and belonging ideologically to a political orientation that might be described as "oligarchic".[92]

More recent works, however, such as the contributions of Connor, Aurenche, Gehrke and Hölkeskamp, outline a differentiated picture of these associations. Initially they had a private character, and personal friendship, kinship and a similar social background were more important for group cohesion than were political

programmes.[93] As for recruiting criteria, the associations were very homogeneous, with membership depending strictly on birth, or at least on wealth. In this way, these aristocratic clubs gathered the cream of society, mostly young noblemen.

The unofficial character of these societies becomes apparent mostly because of the multiplicity of their preoccupations: people gathered in private houses for banquets and they were concerned, above all, with having a good time. This setting naturally also led to political conversations during the banquets (*symposia*).

Hetairiai belonging to the aristocratic milieu, the members of which were related through friendship and common origin, thus formed the background of the leading men from the beginning of the democratic experiment at Athens. In this sense, the associations provided support for democracy. In the context of *hetairiai*, it should also be emphasized how important was the striking degree to which politics in Athens were personalized, with no room for fundamental "party" programmes or long-term political aims, or even "quasi"-ideological groups, independent of charismatic persons.

The clubs in Athens generally had at least ten members and rarely exceeded thirty; they possessed a convivial character and were characterized by their dependence on certain leading individuals. It did not necessarily follow that the leading figures of the clubs held a prominent position in the public life of the polis, dependent on a certain political conviction or "ideology". More recent studies have accordingly stressed that the *hetairiai* were somewhat disorganized, and that they often passed from one "coalition" to another.[94] Small groups might succeed in the Assembly, not so much through their own votes, but through coordinated attempts to influence public opinion.[95] These rather "innocent" preoccupations of the Attic *hetairiai*, which were nevertheless clearly involved in the later oligarchic revolutions, give rise to the question whether, and to what extent, there might have been a well-organized oligarchic opposition based on the *hetairiai* before 412/11.

5.5.2.3 The possibilities of oligarchic opposition

From the time when there were confrontations between aristocratic groups, right after Cleisthenes introduced *isonomia*, we do not find any trace of opposition to democracy seriously pushing an alternative political concept.[96] The critical comments on politicians in Aristophanes, in fact a critique made within the democratic framework, have to be separated from an uncompromising opposition to democracy as a form of government, that only arose after the failure of Athens' foreign policy.[97] Even vehement critics of the political circumstances, such as the "Old Oligarch" who, in his pamphlet on the Athenian state, describes government by the Demos as the unjust rule of the crowd, became accustomed to democracy and accepted the situation. There are, within the ranks of the nobility, signs of "resignation".[98] Aristocrats had bent long ago before the rule of the Demos, and everyone loyally accepted the democratic framework.[99] There had, of course, been those who were opposed to democracy at Athens, who rejected on principle decisions made by the uneducated, the unreasonable or the poor. However, there was no organized

opposition that propagated an alternative political concept (such as an oligarchy on the Spartan model) before 413.[100] Such a well-organized opposition, in a democratic context, was simply alien to Athenian democracy, and it would have been necessary to regularize such a phenomenon by law, as Wolff rightly noted. For the period before 413 BCE, the sources do not indicate the existence of an opposition to democracy as a form of government.[101] Afterwards, more and more people, revealingly led by Peisander, who had formerly been an "exemplary democrat" and who had not previously shown any inclination for oligarchy, became discontented.

With the disastrous defeat in Sicily, the Athenians lost their courage and faith in their political order, proved by the selection of a board of *probouloi* immediately after news of the disaster reached the city. As supervisors with special prerogatives, the *probouloi* outranked the Assembly.[102] The oligarchic putsch of 411 "was possible only because of the desperate political situation which seemed to blame democracy",[103] and it only succeeded because the fleet (whose oarsmen were the backbone of democracy) was at Samos. The *hetairiai* are thus totally ruled out as "organizations of an opposition against the Athenian democracy", since they remained, in general, small-scale secret associations.[104]

Thucydides and Andocides accordingly relate that the oligarchic putsch was the idea of a few instigators.[105] The *hetairiai* were unified by Peisander in an alliance against democracy as late as in 412/11. "In consequence, the Athenians did not know who the plotters were when they enforced their terror-based regime, and they overestimated their number and potential."[106] Only now, as a consequence of hardship and crisis, did the latent opposition, which had until this point been reconciled with the successful democracy, manage to develop into an active conspiracy, in accord with the wish of the Demos to put the blame on someone else.[107]

The research of D. Lenfant on the comedy of Aristophanes confirms that there had been no earlier significant oligarchic plot. Clearly, the comic poet did not consider the affairs of 415 to have been oligarchic manoeuvres: his plays indicate that the typical panic-mongering of the demagogues, who in the 420s were discrediting their adversaries as potential tyrants, was lampooned even after 415 in *Birds*. The events of 411, however, wiped the grin off Aristophanes' face, since such shenanigans do not occur in his comedies after 411.[108] Lenfant concludes, from this, that the agitation of 415 does not allow any conclusion to be drawn with regard to any potential oligarchic danger.[109]

Unlike the special circumstances after the defeat in Sicily, in 415, very different conditions prevailed, and they were highly unlikely to result in a *coup*. If the mutilation of the Herms was a cover for a serious attempt at a putsch, as the Athenians tended to believe under the influence of the tirades of Peisander, Charicles and Androcles, the conspirators could justly be called (in Beloch's words) "foolish".[110] A small group, such as the *synomosia* to which Andocides belonged, can hardly have been in a position to pursue subversive objectives seriously. Organized aristocratic opposition planning a common action against the Demos is consequently highly unlikely for the period before the Sicilian catastrophe.

5.5.2.4 Komos *and the profanation of the Herms*

These results make it clear that the modern view, that the principal background to the scandal of the Herms was political, cannot be considered in any way certain.[111] Only the testimony of Andocides himself, when he refers to the sacrilege as some kind of loyalty pledge designed to strengthen bonds among the *hetairíai*, offers a sure reference point when it comes to determining the reason for the crime. We can justifiably conclude that such a dare, intended to strengthen community spirit and viewed as a means to improve the discipline of the members,[112] might be understood as preliminary training of the group for revolutionary purposes. That this training was inevitably supposed to be followed by anti-democratic action is only a guess, but not impossible.[113]

If one examines types of dares as practised at all times among young people with high peer pressure, it becomes eminently clear that any planned violation of the social norms, coupled with a tendency to gather in small groups of "hooligans", as distinct from the "establishment", expresses a need for those people to dissociate themselves from the social values of an earlier generation.[114] The sacrilege would probably thus have been carried out in order to express a distancing from the established civic order of the older generation.[115] As is generally known, the 420s witnessed an outbreak of conflict between generations in Athens.[116] At the end of the fifth century, the group of κακοδαιμονισταί, led by the poet Cinesias, had a particularly bad reputation;[117] this club gathered monthly to mock the gods.[118]

O. Murray argues that in 415, Andocides clearly managed to persuade the investigating commission of the apolitical character of the sacrilege committed by a small group. He thus proposes to interpret the mutilation of the Herms against the background of the sympotic culture characteristic of *hetairiai*, and to understand it indeed as a collective dare or pledge, as a *pistis*, since the behaviour of the aristocratic vandals would correspond to the way "*komasts*" acted after drinking.[119] His suggestion deserves some credit, given that scandals and outrage caused by the young noblemen during their nocturnal procession (called *komos* and usually related to a *symposion*) belonged to the normal phenomena of Athenian social life.[120]

Thucydides even notes, in connection with the outrage of 415, that there had been mutilations of other statues perpetrated by young men in drunken sport.[121] In addition, scholars have not paid sufficient attention to a vase representation showing a satyr with an axe, about to attack a toppled Herm.[122] The *pelike*, dated around 470, seems to suggest that the mutilation of Herms in a sympotic setting was not all that unfamiliar.[123] This seems very likely, since satyrs are frequently on vases with sympotic themes, especially in contexts of *komoi*, where they are usually represented committing all sorts of excesses.[124] The early testimony of the *pelike*, only paralleled, so far as I know, on a vase with a similar representation,[125] should not be overestimated. Taken together with the information provided by Thucydides about statues having been mutilated earlier by drunken youths, it allows the assumption of a possible connection with the frequent nocturnal rampages in the context of the *komos*. Another relevant clue is the appearance of Alcibiades as a *komast* in

Plato's *Symposium*. The dramatic date of the dialogue is 416, and is thus highly pertinent in the context of the mutilation of the Herms, for Alcibiades was accused of this as well. In the dialogue, a procession of drunken aristocrats rowdily enters the house of Agathon.[126] Since Plato presents a group made up of violent party goers, we could easily assume that the Herms were mutilated during a similar nocturnal revel.[127]

The profanation of the Herms can thus be understood in the context of the sympotic habits of young aristocrats as an unusual test of courage to generate a sense of greater cohesion among the members of a *hetairía*. The choice of Herms as a target of their nocturnal vandalism can be understood as a kind of snobbery characteristic of the *jeunesse dorée*, opposing the traditions of their fathers under the influence of Sophistic ideas.[128] General discontent on the part of these young gentlemen with the prevailing social situation seems to have played a role in the planning and commission of the deed. They perhaps reckoned that their provocation would have generated a certain shock effect; but if so, they underestimated the stir caused by their systematic mutilation. Since the deed was intended to be a secret pledge of loyalty, the authors were, of course, supposed to remain anonymous. The intense and harshly executed investigations by the scandalized citizenry inevitably led to the discovery of the identity of the perpetrators. The political manoeuvres and obscure intrigues that accompanied the hysteria suggest, however, that this sacrilege was used as a cover for disputes over domestic policy. Thanks to evidently false accusations, the innocent also suffered.[129] Such exploitation of the crime for political purposes will account for the fact that Thucydides mentions the danger of an oligarchic revolution as a second possible reason for the hysteria of the Demos. Thucydides moreover wrote about the Herms and Mysteries with full knowledge of later oligarchic *coups*. This could have enriched his account with a certain degree of hindsight. In the next section, I will try to throw light on the causes of the hysterical reaction.

5.5.2.5 The Athenians' reaction as an obvious sign of religious fear

Thucydides focuses on people's fear of tyranny and oligarchy, and some scholars have believed that the behaviour of the Demos can be accounted for by a well-founded fear of an oligarchic coup. Through its direct reaction, the Demos "would have better understood, however, the political core of the events ... as a calculated 'warning' to renounce the Sicilian expedition or as a disruptive action aimed directly against Alcibiades".[130] The real reasons for the striking behaviour of the Demos after the news of the sacrilege spread probably lie elsewhere. Forde rightly observes that the religious concerns of the Athenians became apparent through their reaction to the mutilation of the Herms.[131]

The generally peaceful, disaster-free, period between the mid-420s and the Sicilian expedition in 415 was a phase of relative prosperity and regeneration for Athens. The main task of the city that dominated her allies in a "tyrannical" way was to keep the Delian League together.[132] Oppressive actions, such as the subjugation

of Melos or the indirect involvement in events in the Peloponnese, were intended to consolidate the situation, and ensure the imperial supremacy of the Athenians for the future. They had not forgotten, however, what they had to endure during the Archidamian War. The measures taken in memory of the Plague on Delos, the island of Apollo, bear witness to this.[133] Nicias drew the attention of the Assembly, when arrogant plans were being discussed, to the fact that they were still suffering from the consequences of the pestilence.

The city had only lately recovered, a new generation of young people had grown up and the treasury was full again, thanks to the truce.[134] Athens had been more distressed by the epidemic than by any other misfortune and, as Thucydides notes, the demographic consequences were enormous.[135] The years following the Plague, as well as the period of this short and unstable peace, were very much marked by a focus on religion. This attention included, apart from the ritual purification of Apollo's island in order to cleanse it of the Plague, efforts to introduce new deities during the war, as well as the prosecution of intellectuals, accused of impiety, that began after the outbreak of the pestilence.[136] The fact that the ambitious plans for constructing new temples, begun by Pericles, were resumed is more testimony in this sense.[137] That said, we can explain why most citizens, on discovering the fate of the Herms, evidently interpreted the outrage as an act of blasphemy, capable of endangering the whole community. It was only much later, as we have seen, that accusations were made against oligarchic circles.[138]

The immediate shock generated by the mutilation of the Herms, and its interpretation as a sign of ill-omen, as Thucydides mentions, seem explicable.[139] The Athenians prepared, after a long period of inactivity, for the most complex military operation in their history, for which it was absolutely necessary to have the protection of the gods (who were, it seems, not always favourable to Athens). In this way, oracles were more and more frequently consulted, and the *manteis* and *chresmologoi* exerted their full authority. After the defeat, people also turned their rage against them, because they raised the hopes of the Demos for a successful military campaign with their prophecies, and managed to convince them to vote in favour of the expedition.[140] The oracles, prophecies and utterances of the soothsayers were probably extremely important in decision making, because there was no reliable factual information concerning conditions on the island to be conquered.[141]

Shortly before the departure of the fleet, it was precisely the statues of the protecting god of travellers that were attacked. This allowed the scholarly view that the mutilators of the Herms wanted to bring the Sicilian adventure to a halt, before it was too late.[142]

Recently, Furley has offered a promising explanation as to why the religious aspect of the affair was very important, and why the frightened Athenians reacted to the sacrilege with all the means at their disposal. According to his thesis, much importance was attached to the function of Hermes as a mediator between mortals and the Olympic and chthonic deities.[143] In this sense, the Herms would have had a decisive mediating function in all the cultic rituals of the Athenians, so long as

they facilitated the transmission of prayers and offerings to other gods.[144] The fact that there were many Herms and that they were often placed in front of sanctuaries – where there was also an altar for the offerings brought to the relevant deities – could be explained by Hermes' mediating function. He was – together with his images, placed at the entrances of houses and sanctuaries – a kind of bridge between the human world and the world of the gods.[145] In this way, the mutilation of the Herms would not only have been directed against the god of travellers, but it would have also had long-term consequences for the entire communication system between humans and gods (as perceived by the ancients). Based on this explanation of Hermes' function, Furley concludes that the profanation of the Herms not only touched the statues of the god, but that it shattered the entire Olympian order.[146]

Even if this perhaps over-enthusiastic interpretation overestimates the importance of the Herms, it is clear that the violation of so many statues would have been reason enough to hunt down the perpetrators as soon as possible and to punish them, given the religious sensitivity of the Athenians in this period. As the impiety trials against intellectuals had proved, sacrilege and blasphemy were not matters to be treated casually. The community was even more angered when the suspicion arose that besides the already serious charge of impiety, those responsible were actually the opponents of democracy. R. Parker justly criticizes some articles that take into account the political perspective alone: "It will not do, therefore, to deny a given incident all religious content simply because political factors also intrude."[147]

It is perhaps necessary to recall that charges brought against the perpetrators were of *asebeia* and not high treason, for which there would have been a proper procedure laid down. As early as Solon perhaps, but certainly by the establishment of the democracy, there was a law against tyranny, as well as the institution of ostracism.[148] If the Athenians had detected, in the case of those guilty of mutilating the Herms, any clear intention of revolution, they would certainly have adopted the procedure for high treason known as *eisangelia*.[149] By contrast, the situation regarding the profanation of the Eleusinian Mysteries was very different, since its political relevance was mainly determined by the attested participation of Alcibiades.

5.6 The profanation of the Eleusinian Mysteries

5.6.1 The sacrilege against the Mysteries

When investigating the crime against the Herms, it became known that, on different occasions, and with the all-important participation of Alcibiades, the Mysteries of the Eleusinian cults were being performed in private houses, presumably in mockery.[150] Some of the attendants behaved like the actual officials, acting as the priests that took part in the regular celebrations of the Eleusinian Mysteries, thus performing the roles of *hierophant*, *dadouchos* and *keryx*.[151] Since the details of such events only came to light after the departure of the fleet, and since Alcibiades' enemies had not yet agreed on the precise charges to bring before he left for Sicily,

it was only after Andocides' testimony in the Herms-related trial that a ship was sent to arrest the general and to bring him and others to Athens, where they would be put on trial for the profanation of the Mysteries.[152]

Alcibiades had been accused of "having sinned (*adikein*) against the Eleusinian goddesses" and of having acted against the laws of the Eleusinian sanctuary, by revealing the Mysteries in private in the presence of individuals who were not initiated in this cult.[153] Together with his companions, he jumped ship near Thurii and escaped to Sparta, thus avoiding Athenian public opinion that was far from friendly. Once the sacrilege was revealed, Alcibiades' political adversaries created a hostile atmosphere and used his absence to turn public opinion against him even more.[154]

The central importance of the Eleusinian Mysteries in Athenian religion is sufficient explanation as to why the Athenians believed that dishonouring the cult of Demeter and Kore was scandalous.[155] The fact that the Athenians took the event extremely seriously is also shown by the circumstances of Alcibiades' return to Athens in 407 BCE. The stele on which his guilt had been inscribed was ceremonially thrown in the sea, and the curse of the Eleusinian priests, with which he had been inflicted, was officially revoked as the result of a popular vote. The repentant sinner additionally met the religious expectations of his fellow citizens by waiting with his army until the celebrations of the Mysteries were at an end. He thus ensured the proper conduct of the festival, since Eleusis was threatened at the time by enemy attacks; it was only later that he left to fight the enemy.[156]

In keeping with the special importance of, and the attention paid to, the cult of the Mysteries, those found guilty in 415 awaited a severe punishment. Those who did not manage to flee were executed, while all their property was confiscated and auctioned off.[157] Apart from the possible parodying of the sacred rituals, the decisive and particularly shameful moment in the scandal seems to have been the fact that the private festivity also included secret cult rituals, of a kind that were "forbidden to tell" (*aporrhetha*) before those guests at the symposion who had not been initiated in the Mysteries.[158]

There was a strict obligation to keep silent, always observed by initiates; there are consequently no reliable accounts of the principal content of the Eleusinian ritual, and ancient writers only allude to it at best.[159] This fact, of itself, indicates what a very serious matter it was to keep the details of important rituals secret. Although the exact content of the secrets of the Eleusinian rituals will never be known, it is clear that the reaction of the Athenians, when the *aporrhetha* were revealed in this offensive manner, is of considerable significance; it underlines the central importance to Athenians of the cult of the Mysteries.[160] At about the same time as the discovery of the profanation, Diagoras of Melos was sentenced to death for revealing or mocking the Eleusinian secrets and, since he could not be arrested, a huge reward was set for his capture.[161] Only citizens who were themselves initiated took part in the investigation of these events, and the members of the jury to decide in Andocides' case were chosen from the same group.[162]

5.6.2 The motivation of the profaners

There have been almost as many assumptions made with regard to why Alcibiades and his companions behaved as they did as there are about the intentions of the mutilators of the Herms. In the case of the mutilators who acted in public, a "political" interpretation seems at least possible. When, however, it comes to establishing the reasons that motivated the profaners of the Mysteries – who acted in secrecy and were blamed only as a by-product of the investigation into the Herms – we should start from a very different position.

The simplest explanation is that of K. J. Dover who, by representing the parodistic performance as in all probability "exceedingly funny",[163] believes that the Mysteries were performed just for fun. According to this interpretation, the show would have been simply innocent, private pleasure in the context of a symposion, an occasion that would have engendered a more relaxed attitude towards traditional religion on the part of the participants.[164] J. Bremmer crucially asks whether the pleasure certainly enjoyed by the participants was really all that innocent. In his opinion, although the profaners clearly wanted to express their disregard for traditional religion, there was another factor at work. In view of the fact that, throughout the fifth century, the Eleusinian Mysteries had increasingly played an important role as a marker of Athenian civic identity, being employed more and more in the propaganda of the Delian League, the lawless profaners would have intended to show their contempt for the political beliefs of the Athenian democrats.[165] As Bremmer correctly noted, in addition to any political implications, the parodying of the Mysteries had an elitist side to it: in transgressing socially admissible limits in a private setting and vulgarizing the most important religious secrets, the participants defied the values and beliefs of most Athenian citizens, and were probably even proud of what they had done.[166]

Murray judges the events of 415 in a totally unconventional manner: he rejects the assumption that the profanation of the Mysteries included a parody of the sacred rituals, but he views the private ceremony as a genuine celebration of the Mystery cult, but that the wrong people celebrated it at the wrong time. However, as he rightly observes, it would not have made much difference, for the consequences would have been the same, since even a liturgically correct celebration – with no elements of parody – would still have been considered sacrilegious, and a conscious profanation of the Mysteries.[167]

Murray takes into account the various indecencies committed by representatives of the *jeunesse dorée* at Athens, such as the impious meetings of the *kakodaimonistai*, led by Cinesias, and makes the point that Athenian public opinion must have been more shocked by the revelation of the Eleusinian Mysteries than by previous sacrileges. For Murray, however, it is clear that the frequent profanation of the Mysteries should not be considered an isolated phenomenon but, just like the mutilation of Herms and other cases of impiety, a phenomenon belonging to a "recognized style of aristocratic behaviour".[168] In keeping with the general view, Murray also stresses the fundamentally apolitical character of the secret and private

celebrations, in which the Athenians could scarcely have suspected an attack on the state and the constitution, as some thought was the case with the profanation of the Herms.[169]

Although it seemed logical to interpret the original character of the profanation of the Mysteries as blasphemous, and after it was associated with the mutilation of the Herms, it stimulated efforts to catch the perpetrators, as is indicated by the anger of the Demos that had a religious basis; once Alcibiades was involved, however, the profanation acquired an entirely political dimension. The fact that it was Alcibiades – known and criticized for his libertine lifestyle and for his unconventional manners – who became the principal actor of the scandalous event presented his adversaries with both the opportunity and motivation to begin a political campaign.[170] This is why the implications of the event are properly understood with reference to Alcibiades' lifestyle and political ambitions, suspected by the Athenians of aiming far too high.

5.6.3 Alcibiades' role

The well-known aristocratic *bon viveur* was, on the one hand, respected by the Demos for his many-sided qualities and, on the other, suspected of tyrannical intentions, an accusation that was frequently brought by his adversaries against the young hero, who stood out from most citizens, even those of the same social class.[171] His flamboyantly luxurious lifestyle and his ostentatious behaviour, which included expensive liturgies and legendary victories in the Olympic chariot event, only drew attention to his exceptional social position.[172] On account of his ambition and vanity, through his "desire to win and come first",[173] he was considered to be a potential danger, an antisocial presence in democratic Athens. The power-hungry politician had, it would appear, no concrete plans for evolution, but his involvement in the profanation of the Mysteries and his unusual lifestyle led to his fall. "If men believe that Alcibiades wants to be tyrant, it is because he acts as if he were tyrant already."[174]

While Thucydides might give Alcibiades a generally positive assessment, his παρανομία, obvious in his bohemian conduct, made the crowd fear that he would want to be tyrant. In fact, as elected general, he only made wise decisions for the city.[175] His adversaries knew very well how to play the παρανομία card effectively, when they elided the profanation of the Herms with that of the Mysteries, in order to have the most powerful weapon against the successful *strategos*.[176] One can easily assume that had Alcibiades not been involved in the affair of the Mysteries, it would not have caused such a stir. As M. Ostwald justly concluded, the issue became political only after people found out about Alcibiades' involvement in the religious crime.[177]

The blasphemous character of the affair was, however, the focus of the legal investigation, since, despite the existence of clear laws against tyranny, Alcibiades was accused not of conspiracy, but of sacrilege against the "two goddesses".[178] This is also confirmed by the fact that Alcibiades was not the only one to be included in the legal investigation; common soldiers were also investigated (ἄλλους τινὰς

τῶν στρατιωτῶν). Thucydides only mentions that some soldiers had been recalled from the Sicilian expedition at the same time as the *strategos*, also suspected of having been involved in the crimes against the Herms or the Mysteries.[179] The assertions were thus ingeniously confused, and both sacrileges, distinct in nature and intention, had, as their alleged common purpose, a tyrannical conspiracy under the aegis of Alcibiades. In the light of his questionable reputation, these charges were thought by the Athenians to have the ring of truth.[180] Alcibiades' meteoric (not to say vertiginous) rise in Athenian political life was thus suddenly interrupted, thanks to his careless attitude towards traditional religious values.

With good reason, scholars have asked what made the *strategos* reveal his disregard of religious tradition (which probably contained an element of sophistic snobbery), by mocking the Eleusinian Mysteries.[181] The assumption was made that this should be seen in the context of the religio-political importance of the cult. B. Smarczyk drew persuasive attention to the important role of the First Fruits Decree, through which the Athenians forced the members of the League, and invited other cities, to provide offerings of first fruits to the Eleusinian goddesses. According to Smarczyk's explanation, with which many scholars agree, one might find behind the demand of these offerings of first fruits the desire of the Athenians to consolidate and demonstrate their supremacy over their allies, as deriving from the myth of Demeter.[182] In myth, this "natural" supremacy of the Athenians was expressed by the fact that the goddess had revealed the secret of grain cultivation and agriculture to the Athenians before anyone else.[183]

In the Periclean era, the Eleusinian sanctuary had already been enlarged and promoted. These actions had, among other purposes, the object of "increasing the fame of Demeter in order to raise Athens' prestige to the rank of a Panhellenic cultic centre".[184] In Smarczyk's view, the reason why Athenian public opinion was so scandalized, once the sacrilege was revealed, was that it was considered to be an attack on the Eleusinian "religion", extraordinarily important and central to Athenian identity and self-image.[185] The repeated profanations of the Eleusinian cult would have undermined Athenian propaganda, and, by extension, the authority of the requirements of the First Fruits Decree.[186] Along the same lines, Furley, also with the First Fruits Decree in mind, associated the profanation of the Mysteries with the Panhellenic religio-political claims of the Athenians. He tried to demonstrate that between 423 and 415, the Eleusinian cult became a symbol of peace, and that the Decree (which he dates to the same year, 415) would have been a "deliberate political move to promote the cause of peace and to thwart Alcibiades". The profanation that occurred within Alcibiades' entourage would thus be explained by his hostile attitude towards the promoters of this peace policy, whom Furley vaguely names "the priests".[187]

If the assumption is accurate, that the Eleusinian cult became a central Panhellenic institution at this time, between 423 and 415, then the role in these events of Nicias, known for his religiosity, must be part of the explanation. There are many references to the fact that he was the one responsible for religious policy

at this time.[188] Thus, Alcibiades' parody performances (ἐφ' ὕβρει) in the guise of a hierophant could have been a strike against his political adversaries, especially Nicias. In this scenario, Alcibiades would have mocked his righteous enemies with the circle of his political friends as an audience.[189]

5.7 The importance of the affairs of the year 415: summary

Despite all the attempts to shed light on the events of 415, many aspects are still unclear, and drawing any definite conclusions about the motivations of those who participated in the mutilation of the Herms and the profanation of the Mysteries is an insuperable problem. Matters are different, however, when it comes to assessing the response to the impieties of the Athenian populace: fear and loathing were the hallmarks of the reaction of the Athenians once they discovered the mutilation of the Herms.

On learning of the sacrilege, the citizens must have considered the mutilation as a major act of impiety against the god represented in the cult statues that endangered the entire polis, and especially the military campaign that was about to begin. Regardless of whether the perpetrators had any political purpose in mutilating the Herms, or if they simply wanted to express their discontent with the situation by means of a foolish violent act, or if it was only a mutual pledge among young rich people who thought of themselves as "the bogeymen of the middle classes", the reaction of the community to this insolent act was highly eloquent in a religious sense.

The tense situation before the reckless Sicilian expedition that would decide the fate of the city, the earlier defeats, the many losses caused by the war and the plague (the horror of which was still very much present in the collective memory) all contributed to the deep uncertainty that pervaded a city that was still recovering from recent calamities. In brief, the "*inquiétude religieuse*"[190] that held the city in its grip could reasonably explain the speedy and violent reaction of the angry citizens. The atmosphere became even more tense once the ambitious prosecutors took advantage of the occasion, shouting "revolution" and attempting to eliminate their adversaries, all the while jumping on the bandwagon in a pogrom-like atmosphere. By exploiting the common grief and fear of the gods' revenge, ruthless politicians, such as Peisander, were able to reduce their adversaries through accusations of impiety.[191]

The affairs of 415 are thus marked by a two-stage reaction on the part of the Athenian community. If, at the beginning, people understood the mutilation of the Herms for what it really was – namely an ominous sacrilege – once Alcibiades was involved in the profanation of the Mysteries, the situation took a very different turn. Since Alcibiades' enemies fused both crimes into one weapon against their adversary, the focus shifted to the political aspect of the religious crime, and thus onto the guilt of Alcibiades. Though unfounded, the fear of tyranny that was still widespread, and to some extent fostered by the institutions of the polis, found a concrete object in this ambitious politician. The sacrilege acquired a political

dimension only after he was in the picture, and the agitation of his enemies began accordingly.

After the crushing defeat at Syracuse, the Athenians became persuaded – in the most dreadful way – that the Sicilian expedition had really been undertaken under an unlucky star. In the army, great despair reached a climax. The brief words of Nicias, meant to encourage his men, that if they had aroused the jealousy of the gods with their expedition, the wrath of the gods should now, after this defeat, be calmed, showed that he accepted a fate written by the gods.[192]

6
Tradition and innovation
The new gods

L'homme est bien insensé. Il ne sçauroit forger un ciron,
et forge des Dieux à douzaines.[1]

6.1 Introduction

"All the great crises that leave men helpless even when united may be interpreted" – as W. Burkert writes – "as caused by the wrath of the Stronger Ones, gods and heroes." In order to overcome such crises, different measures can concomitantly be taken in the religious field: "Existing cults can be intensified on these occasions, new cults can be installed."[2] The Athenian method corresponded exactly with these strategies of preventing the *adversae res* caused by, and specific to, the war.

As we have already seen, at the end of the fifth century, the norms of religious tradition were highly valorized. Critics of religion were persecuted, and cases of religious offence were rigorously punished. In addition, with the popularization and the partial acceptance of new cults, a growing tendency to experiment with new concepts and possibilities in the religious field can be observed at Athens. Oriental cults, in part characterized by ecstatic rites, enjoyed increasing popularity at the end of the fifth century.[3] Beginning in 430, new cults were introduced: the Thracian goddess Bendis, the healing god Asclepius,[4] the Mother of the Gods (the Oriental goddess Cybele) and, for private worship, Sabazius and Adonis. Scholars have assessed the importance of this historico-religious evolution in different ways. The emergence of the new cults (some of them ecstatic) has been related to a growing desire on the part of the population to find individual salvation, and the process has been seen as a profound change in Greek religion.[5]

In this context, the "foreign character" of the new divinities was particularly apparent.[6] The Oriental cults probably offered a field of expression for sectarian groups who looked for enthusiastic and ecstatic rituals.[7] In any case, the new trend, related to the "foreign" Oriental cults, would have clashed with religious tradition and its resistance to innovation, as shown by regulations against importing cults,

thus clearly showing "*la tendence conservatrice originelle des Athéniens en religion*".[8] Another view would have it that the acceptance of new cults and their integration into the pantheon represents a daily phenomenon of Greek polytheism, and the "foreign character" of these cults, often stressed by others, was insignificant. The fact that we are much better informed about these new cults in the last third of the fifth century can be explained by the nature of the sources. It was only in this period that the sources began mentioning these cults, which had probably been accepted and spread throughout the city much earlier.[9] The import of new divinities would have had purely religious causes only in exceptional cases, and would have been "conservative and pragmatic" by nature. For such an evolution, the political and economic – but not the emotional – aspects of the Peloponnesian War would have been responsible.[10] These different and sometimes contradictory pieces of information set the scene for a more flexible view of developments and changes during the Peloponnesian War.

In what follows, it will be argued that the "foreign character" of new cults – so often invoked – does not prove that the Athenian population felt the need to escape from reality by appealing to mystery religions. At the same time, the fact that they accepted new deities does not mean that they deliberately turned their backs on tradition. Nor should the remarkable widespread changes indicated by the sources especially for the period of the Peloponnesian War be seen as a customary phenomenon of polytheistic religion, divorced from the experience of the Plague and the horrors of war as witnessed between 431 and 404. In this spirit, there will be a concentration on the importance of these developments at the end of the fifth century, taking into account the mood of crisis in Athens during the Peloponnesian War.

Some scholars already saw an evident connection between, on the one hand, the new cults of the healing god Asclepius, the Thracian goddess Bendis, Cybele, the Mother of the Gods from Asia Minor, whose cult probably was introduced about 430 BCE, and, on the other hand, the Plague.[11] It will be shown in this chapter that although the new cults imported during the war cannot be interpreted as symptoms of a general crisis of religion, or as signs of decline, they instead represent the specific reaction of the Athenians, who had to respond to the obvious crisis within the limits of the polytheistic framework of Greek religion.[12]

6.2 Polytheism and the new gods

The fact that new gods occasionally gain admission to already evolved pantheons, or that established cults lose some of their importance from time to time, is a wholly natural phenomenon within the framework of an ever-changing polytheistic system.[13] Such an evolution that might include the diffusion of new cults is characteristic of polytheistic religions, and does of itself not imply a general crisis of religion, and thus of the entire religious system, as is often assumed.[14] Nevertheless,

adding certain divinities to a polytheistic pantheon or returning to previously unknown or marginalized deities can indicate a real crisis, which stimulates, in its turn, the idea of seeking the help of new divinities.[15]

The need to ask for help from a certain deity, when the believers think that they did not get the support they had asked for from another god they had been invoking, is one important (and undeniable) option from those provided by polytheism.[16] The fact that Croesus checked out the Greek oracles systematically – to give just one example – allows us to understand that the relationship with the gods and with their specific "skills" was marked, at least partially, by utilitarian considerations.[17] This polytheism-specific mindset also dominated the beginnings of Christianity. The followers of the new Saviour, in asking him for help, sometimes also venerated gods of the pagan tradition, such as Asclepius (also invoked in his quality of Σωτήρ) as some kind of insurance.[18] A principle that was generally observed in antiquity was for humans to seek out those gods who had proved more useful, or more reliable, in offering their help.

Despite the fundamental openness of Greek polytheism, the inclusion of new deities, especially the "foreign" ones, was subject to limitation by law, and thus implied official agreement or at least toleration on the part of the polis.[19] In the famous charge laid against Socrates, he is blamed for not acknowledging the gods whom the polis acknowledges, but "unofficial" gods instead (οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων). Moreover, he introduced, in a most reprehensible fashion, new *daimonia* (ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσηγούμενος).[20] The circumstances of Socrates' trial, the trial of Nicomachus (who had clearly gone beyond the letter of his duties in elaborating a new Attic cult calendar) and some observations in late authors have contributed to the view that religious innovations were not always accepted without resistance. This position also includes the notion that the institutions of the polis played a central role in accepting new cults.[21] This is why Derenne concludes that Athens must have had a law formally prohibiting the inclusion of new gods.[22] He argues that legal prosecutions only took place in isolated cases, and this can be explained by the peculiarities of the Attic legal system, which did not have public prosecutors, and consequently required private initiative before a prosecution could be brought. Hence, many private cults of foreign gods (as practised by the Athenians) would have passed unnoticed or would simply have been tolerated.[23]

These ambivalences are already apparent in the tension between the "open system" of polytheism, on the one hand, and the strict observance of inherited tradition, on the other. This tension may well have determined the Athenians' attitude towards the new cults in the last third of the fifth century BCE.

For most scholars, the key to the question as to why such a highly significant evolution occurred at Athens at the end of the fifth century rests in the manifestly "foreign character" of the new cults imported from "barbarian" lands, many of them evidently characterized by ecstatic cult rituals.[24] Some scholars believe that once the traditional cults of the polis had become less attractive (viewed as having

degenerated on account of their minimal ritual), people would have felt a greater need for individual communication, and, through ecstasy, direct communication with the divine. The fact that the cult of the Thracian goddess Bendis, which had features similar to that of Artemis, and in whose cult there are no records of "barbarian" ecstasy, was accepted only emphasizes the irrelevance of the supposed "foreign nature" of the new cults. The foreign character has often been invoked in order to explain the wave of new introductions that clearly took place at the end of the fifth century. The acceptance of the cult of Bendis also suggests that people were content with the "novelty" of the cults.[25]

6.3 Bendis in Athens

The Thracian goddess Bendis seems to have been introduced to Athens shortly before 429/8 BCE. In an inscription dating after that year, her cult is mentioned in a financial report on "other deities" presented by the *tamiai*.[26] The new goddess was granted special honours; there is an impressive account at the beginning of Plato's *Republic*. At the beginning of the dialogue, Socrates describes a visit to Piraeus, where he assisted in the inaugural festivities in honour of Bendis, whose climax was a solemn procession of equestrian torch-bearers.[27] The festive crowd clearly began the procession from the hearth of the Prytaneum,[28] with Athenians and Thracians marching in separate ranks. Besides Plato's evocations, we have the accounts presented by the *tamiai* in the fourth century, listing the revenues from selling the skins of sacrificial animals. These give us an idea of the kind of expenditure on offerings for the *Bendideia*, compared with other festivities. This shows once again the special importance given to the cult of the Thracian goddess.[29] The revenues from selling the skins were topped only by those produced during the festivals of the Dionysia and the Olympia.[30] In this context, the privileges obtained by the Thracian community – allowing them to buy land for the goddess in order to build a sanctuary – were extraordinary.[31] A decree dated between 432/1 and 411 reveals other details, including statues for the new state cult and the nocturnal celebration (παννυχίς) that Plato describes.[32]

The special importance of the Thracian goddess, and her inclusion in the Athenian pantheon, made scholars pay special attention to the phenomenon. The assimilation of the cult (which R. Parker called "the most puzzling coming of a god to Athens") has had two principal explanations, both of which are, broadly speaking, still influential today.[33] M. P. Nilsson opted for a very plausible political explanation of the new cult, relating official acceptance of the goddess to Athenian foreign policy. In 431, the Athenians were very interested in supporting the Thracian nation of the Odrysians under their king, Sitalces.[34] The Thracian prince Sadocus was granted citizenship, for reasons related to foreign policy objectives.[35] This view has been challenged by those who argue that the Thracian alliance could have been achieved by granting privileges to the Thracians in Athens,

while the promotion of the cult of Bendis, which was still being lavishly celebrated a century later, requires another explanation.[36] Together with Parker, we can only wonder whether the official incorporation of the deity at Athens could have made much of an impression in the eyes of Thracian kings.[37]

W. S. Ferguson produced another explanation, relating the inclusion of the cult of Bendis among the official cults of the state to the Plague of 430.[38] The date the new cult was introduced, fixed thanks to calendar calculations in 430/29, reflects (according to Ferguson) attempts on the Athenians' part to do anything to stop the Plague.[39] Apart from the significant date, another argument in favour of this view is the fact that the cult was introduced on the advice of the oracle of Zeus at Dodona, preserved in a fourth-century inscription as a dedication made by *orgeones*, members of a cult association of Bendis.[40]

The association with the Plague – entirely reasonable considering the date – suffered the same fate as Nilsson's political interpretation, clashing as it did with an interpretation focused on the religious function of the divinity. Although there is very little information about what Bendis was supposed to do, she does not seem to have really been a healing goddess.[41] She was, however, introduced together with the Thracian healing-hero Deloptes, who was closely connected with her cult, which made Planeaux think that this would be a reasonable connection with the Plague: "Thus, the appeal of Bendis during the great plague would not so much have been through Bendis herself but rather through her hero-companion: an Asklepios-like figure, a Thracian healing-hero."[42] On the other hand, archaeological discoveries have shown that the Plague provided the Athenians with the occasion to revive certain cults that had been somewhat neglected for a long period, and which were unrelated to specific deities or healing gods.[43] This is also the context for the construction at Rhamnous between 430 and 420 of the temple of the goddess Nemesis, associated by M. M. Miles with the vicissitudes created by the epidemic.[44] It is impossible to come up with a definite reason for the inclusion of Bendis in the state cult, for there are too many unknown factors. The moment when it was admitted seems relevant, however: during the fifty years since the Persian wars, there is no record of any new god achieving recognition among the gods "worshipped by the city".[45] We support Ferguson's view, recently fostered by Planeaux, according to which the official inclusion of Bendis in the pantheon was related to the Athenians' uncertainty and to the consequences of the plague at the beginning of the war.[46]

6.4 The healing god Asclepius and the Plague

While the reasons why Bendis was accepted to the pantheon as a "state divinity" cannot be explained very clearly, scholars have agreed – unanimously and with good reason – that the introduction of the healing god Asclepius was an obvious reaction to the Plague.[47] The inclusion of the god, represented by his statue, took

place during the celebration of the Great Mysteries in 420, on the private initiative of a certain Telemachus. This event is well-documented because of an important inscription (the so-called monument of Telemachus).[48] He had erected, at his own expense, a shrine for the important healing god from Epidaurus. However, things did not go smoothly because, two years after the introduction of the cult, the Eleusinian *kerykes* requested the land at the foot of the Acropolis.[49] The legal problems, the precise nature of which remain unknown, were clearly soon resolved, and the cult practised in the Asclepieum soon became very popular at Athens.[50]

In this context, the close connection between the cult of Asclepius and that of the two goddesses – which did not seem to have suffered from the land dispute – appears striking.[51] The god was introduced during the celebration of the Mysteries and this is why the *Epidauria*, celebrated in honour of Asclepius to recall his solemn entrance at Athens on 17 or 18 Boedromion, was observed at the same time as the Mysteries. Moreover, the statue of the healing god was ostentatiously kept in the Eleusinion for a while, immediately after its arrival.[52]

If the admission to the Athenian pantheon of the Thracian goddess Bendis was probably related to issues of foreign policy, there were no political reasons for the acceptance of the god Asclepius.[53] The Plague, with a second outbreak in 427/6 BCE, made it appear that Apollo was irreconcilable, and made the Athenians very interested in a new healing cult that was in the ascendency. Given the terrible experience that the Athenians had to undergo between 430 and 426, the cult, which was very popular in Epidaurus, gained ground quickly after 420, in the city marked by the ghost of the Plague. The introduction of the cult in the city six years after the end of the Plague, and not already in 430, was probably due to the fact that the Peace of Nicias offered the possibility of making an agreement with the city of Epidaurus, the ally of Sparta.[54] There has been considerable discussion arising from the fact that before he was introduced into the city, the god apparently had a sanctuary in the harbour-quarter of Zea at Piraeus, since that is whence Telemachus had brought the cult.[55] Moreover, the 430 campaign against the city of Epidaurus (during the Plague) might have not had strategic or military objectives, but was probably intended to ensure "access to or control of the healing deity" before anything else.[56]

Unlike the cult of the goddess Bendis, organized under the aegis of the state, the new healing cult was probably run by a private administration for between fifty and seventy years, coming under state control only towards the middle of the fourth century. It is not impossible that expenses relating to sacrifices were taken over by the polis earlier, towards the end of the fifth century.[57] Nevertheless, all this did not reduce in any way the importance or popularity of the new cult; furthermore, Sophocles himself was associated with the new god and Socrates' famous last words were that a cock should be offered to Asclepius.[58]

The embedding of the cult in an existing festival calendar, plus the temporary *synoikia* (cohabitation) in the Eleusinion together with the two goddesses, as well as the possible involvement of an oracle in the acceptance process, present the event

as a polis-specific reaction to the crisis, and imply the collaboration of the institutions of the state.[59] The fact that the sanctuary of the god Asclepius in Athens did not aim at international recognition clearly shows that this locally important branch of the Epidaurus cult played a special role: unlike all the other sanctuaries of the healing god (especially that of Epidaurus, where a real pilgrimage industry flourished), the sanctuary of the Athenians had only local importance.[60] This particularity is also explained by the circumstances of the new cult's inclusion, since it was really a "genuine crisis cult", as C. Auffarth urgently put matters. This is why, after the Peace of 421, the Athenians made sure that they would have the support of the god in future hard times.[61] The Romans displayed a similar attitude 120 years later, when – again on account of a pestilence that beset the city – they brought Asclepius from Epidaurus in 291 BCE.[62]

The cult of Amphiaraus at Oropus was probably part of the same picture.[63] A shrine was built for the healing god in the north-east border area between Attica and Boeotia, sometime before 414 (when Aristophanes' lost play *Amphiaraus* was produced),[64] and it later became an important healing centre.[65] Thucydides mentions that the territory around Oropus had become subject to Athens in 430.[66] This information fits Strabo's observation on the transfer of the healing god from Cnopia to Oropus in accordance with an oracle,[67] and with archaeologists dating the sanctuary to the last quarter of the fifth century, Parker could assume that Amphiaraus, just like Asclepius, was brought to Attica in similar circumstances and that his inclusion was also related to the "plague".[68]

6.5 Other new cults and deities in Athens

The fact that the Athenians tended to seek additional divine support by introducing new cults is also suggested by the adoption of new deities related to ecstatic cult rituals, on account of their Oriental origin; hence, they could be viewed as "barbarian" and "foreign" *numina*. What follows is but a general overview of the "importations" of the Oriental deities, such as Cybele, Adonis and Sabazius, which are notoriously difficult to date. The Mother of the Gods, Cybele, admitted among the state cults as Μήτηρ Θεῶν, had the most important role within this group. This Oriental divinity, with origins in Asia Minor and Early Iron Age Mesopotamia, found her way to the Greeks through Phrygia and Ionia.[69] The goddess was probably introduced at Athens in the fifth century and was worshipped in the Metroon, a temple dedicated to this deity. The precise time of the official arrival of the goddess in Athens, and the date of her first temple, are still controversial issues.[70]

With the American excavations of the Athenian Agora, the decisive element for the date of the introduction of the cult of the Mother was the archaeological record on which H. A. Thompson based his reconstruction of the problematic history of the construction of the Metroon and the Bouleuterion.[71] More precisely, Thompson speaks of three construction stages for the building in the Agora

identified as Metroon. Near the Tholos, where the *prytaneis* gathered, there was the Old Bouleuterion, built as the result of Cleisthenes' reforms, and where the new Council of the 500 met. Around the same time, south of the old Bouleuterion, a small building was erected; Thompson identified it with a temple he believed to be the sanctuary of the Mother of the Gods. Destroyed by the Persians in 480/79, it was quite clearly never rebuilt.[72] In Thompson's view, the goddess would have then been sheltered in the Old Bouleuterion and, when it became clear that this building was no longer fit for purpose, a new Council building was erected, west of the old one. On this view, the cult of the goddess remained in the old building, called the Metroon,[73] and it continued to be used (probably beginning with the legislative reorganization of 410/09) as a state archive.[74]

If we accept such a reconstruction, Cybele was introduced at Athens rather early, but this finds no support in the literary sources, since they only mention this goddess towards 430.[75] Although the archaeological finds are not nearly enough to allow such important conclusions,[76] Thompson's identification of the few vestiges of a small archaic temple with the vestiges of the sanctuary belonging to the Mother of the Gods regrettably acquired a paradigmatic status, and most students of the history of religion have connected it with the cult of Cybele. The French archaeologist C. Picard rightly questioned the identification from the start, but a scientific consensus has nevertheless succeeded in imposing itself on the study of religious aspects of the cult of Cybele, thanks in large part to the influential Agora reports.[77]

Nevertheless, some specialists have favoured some late antique and Byzantine testimonia that refer to a foundation myth related to the Athenian Plague, and criticized Thompson's speculative explanation of the barely preserved remains.[78] Both Julian and the *Lexicon* of Photius tell, in broadly the same terms, how the Athenians either stoned a priest (*metragyrtes* or *gallos*) and threw him down the *barathron* (the execution pit), or at the very least banished him from Athens, because he wanted to introduce the cult of Cybele (the Mother of the Gods) and initiate women. Afterwards, a pestilence supposedly struck the city, and the Athenians, on the advice of an oracle, stopped it by building a shrine of the Μήτηρ Θεῶν, where they also buried the individual they had killed.[79] More recent research has shown these testimonia, often called into question, to be essentially reliable.[80] Thus, G. Cerri (for the most part) stresses the importance of a scholion to Aeschines, ascribed to a fourth-century historiographic source (Anaximenes or Theopompus)[81] that describes how the Athenians turned part of the Bouleuterion into the Metroon, διὰ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐκείνου τοῦ Φρυγός.[82] A reference to "that Phrygian" has supported the view (once shared by Nilsson) that the tradition transmitted through late sources had a basis in historical fact.[83] It does not, therefore, seem excessive to place the establishment of the cult, characterized as it was by ecstatic features, after 430 as a reaction to the Plague.

That fact that the state cults admitted to their number a downright "barbarian" goddess, whose cult, though milder in its Greek variant, nevertheless appears full of excesses, indicates that an exceptional event must have caused it.[84] Hence, Cerri

sees a double purpose in the building activity in the eastern part of the Athenian Agora in the last quarter of the fifth century. Because of the growing "mountain of files" issued by the democratic institutions, the old Council chamber was no longer suitable, and the decision was consequently taken to erect a new building. The old one ceased to function as an archive, and, on the advice of an oracle, was turned into a shrine for the newly introduced deity.[85] The information we have that Phidias, or more likely his apprentice Agoracritus, made a cult statue of the Mother of the Gods (Μήτηρ Θεῶν) also suggests a foundation date closer to the end of the century.[86] The late tradition, however, is open to question, and its adherents have been criticized.[87] Nevertheless, there has been a recent trend for those who take the archaeological finds as their starting point to deny an early entry of the cult to Athens.

Beginning in the 1980s, a critical approach to the archaeological material has undercut Thompson's position, and new arguments have been brought against an early date for the introduction of the cult of Cybele at Athens. As N. Frapiccini, for example, has noted, an early date is not in keeping with either the literary sources or the archaeological record.[88] Beginning from some construction remains discovered more recently, S. G. Miller and T. L. Shear, Jr. have questioned earlier dates proposed by their Agora colleagues, and more recent students of the Agora, J. M. Camp and M. Korres, agree with them. Miller, indeed, follows Picard and concludes that the scanty remains could not have belonged to a single edifice.[89]

Shear's observations have been even more revealing. Although he rejects Miller's opinions concerning the Old Bouleuterion, he agrees that buildings on the west side of the Agora are extremely debatable. He also regrets the widespread acceptance of Thompson's speculative interpretations.[90] Taking into account the literary evidence, Shear concludes that the building remains do not allow for their identification as a temple, because there was neither the space needed for a cult statue, nor were there any traces of an altar to the east.[91]

The state of the sources is less than satisfying and can only allow arguments from probability. In view of the doubts that have arisen with regard to the late testimonia, and the uncertainty surrounding the identifications of the constructions,[92] it is difficult to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion. Versnel shares this view and supports an early date with much hesitation.[93] Taking the most recent estimates into account, based as they are on the results of archaeological discoveries that suggest that an early date is highly improbable, a date after 430 seems more plausible, mostly because the disputed foundation legend is already attested in the fourth century.[94] In this case, Phrygian Cybele would fall into the category of the new divinities that arrived in Athens during the last third of the fifth century, amplifying the traditional pantheon at a time when the citizens no longer felt they received enough support from the older gods.

It cannot be emphasized too often that the extension of the pantheon does not, in itself, reflect a significant trend towards individualization, but it enhanced what was on offer within the limits of traditional religion. This increase in the range or possibilities at Athens also included the cults of the "mortal god" Adonis

and of Sabazius, who also had an Oriental origin. We have very little information concerning their entry and status at Athens. The private celebrations of Adonis, when the dying god was ritually mourned and which were naturally in the charge of women, are attested for the first time in 415. There seems to be a connection with the Sicilian expedition, since both Aristophanes and Plutarch mention the Adonia being celebrated just before the departure of the fleet; Plutarch considered the private festival of women a mark of ill omen.[95] In Aristophanes, the wailing women beat their breasts in grief for the death of Aphrodite's young lover, precisely when the Assembly were discussing the expedition. Although it was a cult only for women, it demonstrates – if we can judge from the evidence that the only cult became prominent at the end of the fifth century – that there was a growing interest in new ways of religious self-expression and in ritual mourning, with women empathizing with Aphrodite in her grief.[96]

Sabazius, a Phrygian variant of Zeus (associated often with Dionysos, because of ritual similarities), also naturalized in Thrace, was worshipped by women within orgiastic celebrations. As in the case of Adonis, it is impossible to determine the exact moment when Sabazius began to be worshipped in Athens; he must have been introduced in the last third of the fifth century, at the latest.[97] Since women were the only or the main worshippers of the god, these cults were indisputably merely tolerated as marginal and insignificant rituals, with no official recognition or public celebration, unlike the more important cults such as the Mother of the Gods, Bendis and, later, Asclepius.[98] The integration of Sabazius' cult does not appear to have occurred without incident given that, in the middle of the fourth century, a priestess of the cult, called Nino, was put on trial for impiety; she was accused of having initiated women in the mysteries of Sabazius without permission.[99] It does seem that the cult of Sabazius remained suspicious, especially to male citizens.

These features suggest that such unofficial cults that were uncontrolled by the polis, and about which Aristophanes did not have a good opinion, were not tolerated without reserve, and that sometimes they could be regulated by the state. Since they did not benefit from official recognition, however, we have very little information regarding the size and diffusion of these cults. E. R. Dodds concluded from the few references to foreign gods and cults in comedy that there was an evident and widespread interest among the Demos.[100]

6.6 The religion in crisis or religion against the crisis?

The fact that during the Peloponnesian War, many new gods made their entry to Athens (some of them admitted among the state cults), requires an explanation beyond the fundamental receptivity of Greek polytheism. In the brief period we have been discussing, Athenians began to worship new gods, some with an Oriental background. This frequently led to the view that from the end of the fifth century,

there was a dissolution of the traditional religion of the polis, as well as a tendency to individualize religious belief.[101] This position was long popular among scholars, and is still present to a certain extent.[102]

In the cult of Asclepius, as practised by the Athenians, Wilamowitz wanted to see the outlines of a religion of salvation, and the healing god as a predecessor of the Saviour.[103] In a similar context, the Greek Mysteries have long been commented upon, with everyone wanting to interpret them as precursors of a tendency towards ideas of individual salvation, that had been apparent since the classical period.[104]

The variety and multiplicity of the Mystery cults, some with soteriological aspects and others without, make an unambiguous assessment impossible. Of course, the cult of Demeter at Eleusis had been satisfying the emotional and individual needs of initiates from the archaic period, while the cult was concerned with central questions of death and its defeat.[105] As an option within the polytheistic system, the ancient Mysteries had no greater significance than that of the pilgrimage to Santiago de Compostela within the Christian medieval system.[106] In the Hellenistic period the Eleusinian Mysteries still preserved their character as a undisputed part of the state cult.[107] In interpreting the evolution with regard to the entry of new gods, we should abandon assumptions about the search for individual salvation, but not of the search for salvation in general.

Thus, behind the innovations during the last third of the fifth century, we should not see a process of dissolution of the polis religion, since its continuity in the fourth century does not support such an view, and there is no reliable evidence that the religious novelties were caused by a search for individual salvation.[108] The innovations are much more likely to have been an acknowledgement of the citizens' desire to make use of the options offered by polytheism at a time when it was legitimate to conclude that the traditional deities did not provide sufficient support in the context of the crisis.[109] In the case of the innovations, we might well speak of "cult[s] of crisis"[110] understood as a reaction to the "social chaos"[111] of the Peloponnesian War.

The Athenians looked to the possibility of enhancing their pantheon without departing from their religious traditions, and, as we have seen, the state played an important role here. For the best known and the most important of the new gods, the state acted as patron and organized festivals. The introduction of new cults seems thus to have occurred smoothly and to have been a process in which the city took a special interest. While the polis could exert a minimum control, many private cults had always existed side by side with the official ones, and were doubtless also tolerated once they had been shown to be harmless to public order and not to challenge the traditional divinities. This was possible because innovation within Greek polytheism had nothing to do with neglecting tradition, as the trials for impiety indicate. The case of Socrates is relevant here, since he was accused of including new gods without permission and of not worshipping the old gods properly. The case of Nino, the priestess of Sabazius (whose cult was clearly seen as suspect, being only unofficially tolerated) is equally significant.

The indisputable parallelism between the great religious innovations on one side, and the conscious and natural conservation of the main traditional cults on the other, shows the acceptance of new divinities in Athens as a normal process within polytheism, though not always without tensions. It is in fact two sides of the same coin. Since, though, so many innovations occurred within a given period, the process should be interpreted as specific to that period. The trial of Nicomachus who, beginning in 410/9, was a member of the commission in charge of revising the Solonian calendar of holidays (considered to be out of date), provides a good example of the tense relationship between tradition and innovation.[112] He was accused of having introduced cult innovations without permission and with sacrilegious intent. The oft-invoked opposition between the clear, "conservative" tendency of political institutions, on the one hand, and religious innovations promoted by citizens in search of individual salvation, on the other, seems somewhat aprioristic and inadequate for this period.

At the end of the fifth century, there was no real confrontation between tradition and innovation, but they complemented each other in the context of Athenian strategy for dealing with the crisis. During the crisis, both citizens as private individuals and the polis institutions tried to improve their chances for the future within the prescribed but flexible limits of the traditional polytheistic religion. In this sense, the determining factor in the admission of new cults was not their "foreign character" or their real or imagined ecstatic characteristics, but the way in which they might complement traditional cults. In the current situation, marked by the experiences of the epidemic and of the war, the protecting deities who were usually ready to help, and who had supported the almost continuous and incredible growth of the Athenian Empire,[113] did not seem that protective any more. Thus, without engaging in a Judgement of Paris situation and having to make exclusive choices, people continued to worship the old gods in the same way, the gods whose honour (τιμή) they defended in trials against critics of religion. At the same time, however, they also "tested" the new gods.

7
Building for the gods
Sacred architecture during the Peloponnesian War

Un excellent architecte avec qui j'avais voyagé avait coutume de me dire que, pour lui, la vérité des dieux était en proportion de la beauté solide des temples qu'on leur a élevés.[1]

7.1 Introduction

"The Erechtheum, just like the temple of the goddess Nike, can be understood as a response of the conservatives to the radical democrats erecting the Parthenon and the Propylaea." The "conservatives", desirous of returning to tradition and to civic religiosity, in erecting this temple, turned away from the "rather profane tendency", perceptible in the construction policy of the previous decades;[2] thus L. Schneider and C. Höcker. Their judgement with regard to the two outstanding cult buildings on the Acropolis starts from the widely prevalent idea regarding the special importance of the characteristics of architectural styles; that is, the fundamental belief that political, religious and social evolution, as well as historical and spiritual trends, are reflected in the sculpture and architecture of their times: artistic form serves as historical testimony. From the early 1960s into the 1970s, this way of viewing ancient art and architecture in their historical and social contexts had a great influence in the fields of archaeology and ancient history.[3] It was a favourite topic in studies of the Periclean building programme as a reflection of the political agenda of Athenian democracy, and of its imperial policy as leader of the Delian League. Within the disciplines of Archaeology and Classics, the correlation and interdependence of architecture and sculpture on the one hand, and policy, ideology and society on the other (usually in the very context of Pericles' building policy), became the common coin of criticism.[4] The architecture of public buildings, mainly of the great sacred buildings on the Acropolis, served the purposes of the times, and the religious prestige of the buildings was used for imperial policy within the Delian League. This has often been stressed and there are many detailed discussions in recent scholarship.[5] The essence of the argument is that formal and stylistic elements were both influenced by, and reflected, political concepts and actual cultural trends.

It is precisely during the last third of the fifth century BCE (i.e. the period covered in this book) that archaeological scholarship has seen in sculpture and in architecture, a tendency towards creative expression that requires explanation. It appears to have been a conscious step backwards, that we call "archaism", a gesture towards older, traditional forms, which seem "old-fashioned" from the perspective of spiritual evolution.[6] O. Palagia recently said of the archaistic sculptures on the Acropolis produced during the Peloponnesian War that: "they were very likely visual manifestations of a conservative trend in contemporary Athenian society and may have aimed to provide reassurance in a time of crisis",[7] the argument being that formal and stylistic elements were highly influenced by political concepts and actual cultural ideas. This tendency is not only formally important, but carries a significant message. In a lengthy study, A. Leibundgut has discussed the evolution of styles after the Periclean period. She begins from the idea that this trend underlines the political and social dimension of artistic form, and concludes that "the great spectre of the different political groups within and outside the democratic institutions, the disputes between political currents, but also the divergences between the various orientations of Attic intellectuals", specific to the period, would be mirrored in a certain "Stilpluralismus" (pluralism of styles), which would also include an archaizing appeal to older forms.[8] This (perhaps slightly exaggerated) thesis also reveals, apart from important knowledge obtained based on stylistic interpretations (provided by archaeologists who are specialized in sculptural styles), the limits of stylistic analysis and the precariousness of any historical knowledge based on stylistic research.[9] Criticism was formulated on the concept of style as a useful criterion for analysis, using the most distinctive stylistic features within a given period as pegs on which to hang the argument (Leibundgut is not alone in arguing this position).[10]

The problem is rarely discussed, but the main difficulty with interpretations that focus on stylistic features and which purport to see a close link between style (representing an artistic, creative drive) and the socio-political context of the last third of the fifth century, lies in the following: there are three separate factors in Athenian public works, but from lack of evidence, they cannot be discussed in relation to each other. It is thus impossible to make any concrete statements about the influence the Assembly may have had on public works, nor can we speak with any confidence about the role of major politicians or of public officers (such as the *epistatai*), nor even on the extent to which there may have been freedom of expression and creativity where artists and architects were concerned. These three forces (the Demos, the ruling class and artists) constitute a field of action whose centre is very hard to establish.[11] This is why approaches that try to demonstrate interdependence between stylistic features and politics are on unsure ground.

There are also different views regarding the influence exerted by each of these three groups who were involved in the building activity, in overall planning and in the detailed execution of the buildings. The classical buildings on the Acropolis, and the master-plan for the mythological programme of the decorative architectural

sculpture, can thus be justly seen as the initiative of Pericles, assuming that he wanted to support his political objectives with an iconographic programme.[12] Since many scholars have seen his building programme as a thoroughly "secular" exercise, the buildings erected after his death and their "meaning" are often interpreted as the direct reaction of "conservative circles" drawing on an explicitly religious background.[13] This hypothesis focuses on the notion that there was a direct influence on the part of the elite on the stylistic expression of monumental art, as Leibundgut argues even for the period after Pericles' death. In the interval after 429 BCE, the political confrontations between the various groups might manifest themselves in a certain "stylistic pluralism" in the area of building policy.[14]

If, however, we admit the relative autonomy of the artist in creating details – as other scholars do – then we are quickly in the area of artistic originality, with a subsequent focus on the "genius" of the exceptional individual.[15] On the other hand, the epigraphic evidence allows us to assume that the Demos did not only take decisions concerning the projects, leaving everything else in the hands of specialists, but that decisions could be made to change building plans at any given moment, which suggests an exceptional role played by the people in the field of public works.[16] From a methodological point of view, these imponderables make it very difficult to set out any firm hypotheses regarding the meaning of sacred buildings in the period after the death of Pericles, which are mainly based on the stylistic features of the architecture and architectural sculpture.

It is a complicated matter to classify the various types of monumental and relief sculpture of this period and to associate the art works with political and social tendencies, even though this kind of style-oriented archaeology (closely linked to the History of Art) has been a special domain of German archaeology since the days of Furtwängler.[17]

When, despite the reservations just expressed, details of the sacred buildings constructed in time of war are interpreted as an expression of a "conservative trend", whose main characteristic was a return to earlier religious and cult traditions, research must focus not just on stylistic analysis, but also on the functional aspects of sacred buildings. The Erechtheum, for example, was built where it was and with such an unusual shape because earlier sanctuaries, such as the grave of Cecrops, had to be integrated in the new plan. Stylistic arguments will, however, only be considered in this context if they confirm information transmitted by other, parallel routes (such as literary sources or archaeological/architectural features), or if in default of other data, only stylistic analysis can deliver clues about dating issues.[18] Nevertheless, the focus remains on the architectural features, while the detailed stylistic analysis of architectural sculpture, such as the friezes, can be taken into account only tangentially.

In what follows, therefore, an attempt will be made against the background of the archaeology to sort and classify, from a historical point of view, the great sacred buildings erected during the Peloponnesian War. We shall assess the meaning and importance, the religious content and the function of the sacred buildings, which

are evidence for an abundant building activity, despite all the difficulties caused by the war.[19] If one merely takes into account the effort represented by this genuine "outburst of building activity"[20] in the field of sacred architecture, which took place after 421 for the most part, and bearing in mind that the treasury had been cleaned out by the war, we can draw certain conclusions. If the building policy of the period is not approached in isolation, but the work of renovation on the sanctuaries and on new buildings are related to the religious developments and events we have been discussing, then we can definitely conclude that the Athenians were very much aware of what they owed to their own gods.

The Erechtheum occupies the centre of this chapter. This is the building on the northern edge of the Acropolis, considered to be an "archaeological enigma" on account of its highly unusual and atypical shape.[21] For "the most curious of all the Greek temples",[22] we must examine how cult functions and religious expression were transposed architecturally after 430, that is, after the profound changes that had occurred in the conduct of public life at Athens on account of the Plague and the war. Together with stylistically comparable temples erected in this period, the Erechtheum marks a clear tendency in the configuration and expression of contemporary sacred architecture. The buildings erected after 421 "seem to have sprung from a particular mental climate, a traditional religious sentiment, which led the Athenians to concern themselves with the old Attic cults and sanctuaries", as J. S. Boersma rightly observed.[23] This "mental climate" has already been analysed above, by means of other sources, but it remains to be assessed here on the basis of the archaeological data and architectural features.[24]

Such an approach inevitably leads to a circular argument: the debatable archaeological context is interpreted against the background of a hypothesis that the war witnessed an increase in the importance attached to religion, and that this hypothesis is sustained by the archaeological record. Such an interpretation, emphasizing the religious aspects of cult architecture during the war, can claim some credibility, however, if the substantial evidence elsewhere for the exceptional role played by religion during the crisis is taken into consideration. This is what Michael Vickers, following K. Hopkins, has called a "wigwam argument". Each pole would fall down by itself, but together the poles stand up, by leaning on each other.[25] Like the Native American structure and its supporting poles, our historical narrative gains stability by juxtaposing arguments for the growing relevance of religion during the Peloponnesian War.

7.2 The Erechtheum with the Caryatid porch

7.2.1 The general plan of the building

The Erechtheum has almost none of the features we associate with the standard Greek temple.[26] The asymmetric porches to north and south create the impression that we are concerned with entirely different buildings, while the west wall,

delimiting a single high chamber, was built on two levels. In reality, the building is divided by an internal blind wall into two separate parts: east and west.[27] Apart from the absence of the customary external colonnade, another original element is the fact that the building appears to have several ground levels (the north and west walls are 3 m lower than those to the east and south; the latter has different floor levels on each side of the building).[28] In brief, "the building looks surprisingly different from every angle".[29] It includes construction elements belonging to different architectural traditions: the megaron, the tomb and the monopteros.[30] This impressive building, with its rarely encountered configuration, was erected in the Ionic style (between perhaps *c.* 421 and 409–6), and has received such modern reactions as "stubborn", "unusual", "curious" and "weird".[31]

Scholars have long debated why the building differs so from contemporary models. Dörpfeld and Elderkin believed that there would have been an initial symmetrical plan. Later, through major war-induced alterations, the plan would have simply not been brought to completion, rather as in the case of the Propylaea.[32] Others think that the difficult terrain was responsible for the unusual execution of the building. A more promising (and widely accepted) view is that the irregular proportions of the building were related to the religious function of the temple, which sheltered, in addition to the primary cult of Athena Polias, a large number of venerable hero cults. Its name notwithstanding (derived from the mythical king Erechtheus, probably worshipped in the western part), the building was first and foremost the "successor" of the temple of Athena, destroyed by the Persians, which had hosted the venerable wooden cult statue of the goddess and whose foundations lay near the Erechtheum.[33] The explanation as to why the new building was not designed to overlie the earlier temple (as in the case of the Parthenon) may lie in the conspicuous efforts of those responsible to integrate into the project the old, smaller sanctuaries that stood nearby (to be discussed below).[34] The religious concepts behind this effort, as well as the origins of these ideas, must be discussed here.

First, however, we must consider the identification of the building. This has proved to be open to debate, in the context of both who the architects were and the date of the building that clearly has nothing to do with Pericles' building plan. Pausanias' imprecision in describing his Acropolis itinerary, as well as the fact that the word "Erechtheum" occurs only twice in antiquity,[35] caused K. Jeppesen to reassess both the written sources and the archaeological record. He concluded that the building called the Erechtheum could only be identified with the new building, the successor of the old temple of Athena, while the Erechtheum described by Pausanias as the home of several chthonic cults was the structure called the "Arrephorion", which must have stood nearby.[36] Although Jeppesen's interpretation can only be supported with difficulty, and has been convincingly rejected,[37] it did show that there are real difficulties in the exact determination of the various parts of the building, thanks to Pausanias' hazy account. In an attempt at a new interpretation, J. Travlos again questioned which cult was venerated in each part of the building.[38]

By a happy coincidence, inscriptions survive with detailed building records of the structure known to contemporaries as "the temple with the old statue" (of Athena) or simply "the old temple" (in contrast to other cult buildings discussed here). The Erechtheum can, moreover, be accurately dated, or at least we know when it was finished.[39] The *communis opinio* is that the building process was interrupted by the war (plausibly linked by many scholars with the difficult situation that prevailed after the failure of the Sicilian campaign in 413); work was resumed in 409 and completed in 406.[40]

The beginning of the construction as such is usually placed at the end of the 420s, probably after the Peace of Nicias of 421. More recently, the debate has started up again, and the suggestion has been made that the preparations and planning took place even before the outbreak of the war.[41] A difficult but important question is whether plans to start construction were elaborated much earlier. If so, the temple would belong to the great architectural projects of the Periclean period. Since the date on which the foundation stone was laid is still a mystery, we can only speculate. For those who believe that the plans for the constructions were made in the Periclean period, it is necessary, as Hurwit emphasizes, "to split some hairs".[42]

The Erechtheum (or the "old temple") is not mentioned in the "decree of Callias" of 434/3 (a decree that consolidated the budget, and included decisions made regarding the funding of the cults of Athena and the other gods, and for the rapid completion of the unfinished building projects on the Acropolis).[43] The temple is not mentioned in Plutarch's enumeration of the building projects begun under Pericles, either. The strangely shaped shrine seems thus not to have been part of the original concept of Pericles' building plan.[44]

We can only speculate as to who the architects may have been. Similarities of both construction method and style link the Erechtheum with the Nike temple and the temple of the Athenians on Delos, and they may well have been the work of the same construction team.[45] Going further, there have been attempts to identify the anonymous architect with the few active in the last third of the fifth century whose names are known. The architect has thus been identified as Mnesicles, who was charge of work on the Propylaea, or Callicrates (who worked with Ictinus on the construction of the Parthenon and who elaborated the plan of the temple of Athena Nike).[46] We only know the names of the two building supervisors who directed the final stage of the building: Philocles of Acharnae and Archilochus of Agrylae. According to the records of the architectural commission, they began their mission of completing executing the almost finished construction in 409–6, succeeding each other as annual public officers.[47] They were, however, mainly concerned with the roof, and for this reason they are thought to have been subordinate and unimportant construction engineers. Also, unlike their famous colleagues Mnesicles, Ictinus or Callicrates, they are not mentioned in the literary record. We thus have to be very cautious in ascribing the temple to a "master's hand", in so far as we can do so at all.

The brief presentation of the history of research should not, however, hide the fact that the "mysterious Erechtheum",[48] unlike other monumental buildings on

the Acropolis, leads only a shadowy existence, as stated in a research report published in 1993.[49] After a discussion of the date and history of the complex, we must examine more closely the venerable heroic cults worshipped in the Erechtheum, apart from Athena Polias, as well as their importance for Athenian religion.

The rocky area to the north of the citadel always had a special religious importance; later legends placed the dispute between Poseidon and Athena for supremacy over Attica in this very spot.[50] The results of this confrontation – the sacred olive tree of Athena and the traces left by Poseidon in the shape of the "salt well" and the trident mark – were fenced off, of course, like smaller *temene*, ever since the archaic period. They were, however, integrated in the architecture of the new building for Athena's temple, just like the shrines for Butes, Erechtheus and the mythical king Cecrops, over whose grave the Caryatid porch was placed.[51] Since Pausanias' description of his itinerary is very imprecise, there are still disputes over which cults precisely were worshipped in the complex and where, since it was divided into two internally (east and west) by means of an intermediary blind wall. It is highly likely, however, that the higher eastern room was the location of Athena's shrine, in addition to a wooden statue of Hermes.[52]

On the west side, situated at a lower level, as in the northern gallery, one might find the shrines of Butes, Erechtheus, Poseidon and Hephaestus, while beneath the Caryatid porch was the grave of Cecrops. In the yard to the west of the Erechtheum could be found the sacred olive tree of Athena and a sanctuary of Cecrops' daughter, Pandrosos.[53] Apart from the grave of Cecrops, situated between the west door and the Caryatid porch (to be discussed in detail below), archaeologists discovered, in the south-east corner of the northern gallery, a quadrangular opening in the floor with a definite cult significance. It was probably the "salt well" (θάλλασσα) of Poseidon or the mark left by Poseidon's trident, showing where Erechtheus had ascended to the gods.[54] The location of the other shrines within the temple is still a mystery, and any attempts to resolve the problem do not affect the overall importance of the complex or the religious expression that it represents. The decisive factor for the interpretation of the building and for its religious function remains the simple fact that all the cults enshrined there were of venerable antiquity, with long traditions in common. This also holds good for the hero cult to the mythical being with snake-like legs, Cecrops; over his grave, the impressive Caryatid porch was built.[55]

7.2.2 The Caryatid porch of the Erechtheum

The maidens of the Erechtheum, six supporting pillars in the form of women – often imitated even in antiquity, and which have given their name to the small southern gallery – have been called the "patron saints of philhellenism".[56] The charm of these famous sculptures, now a "veritable code for 'classicism'",[57] coupled with the mystery of their meaning, has stimulated a long series of studies, among which the most recent have perhaps contributed to a solution of the mystery.[58] Thanks to the inscriptions with the construction accounts, and to archaeological investigations in the south-western corner of the Erechtheum, it has become increasingly

obvious that the Caryatid porch should be understood as a part of the Cecropeion (ἡ πρόστασις ἡ πρὸς τῷ Κεκροπίῳ). The structure that was integrated with great reverence while building the Erechtheum is a Mycenaean grave, later interpreted as the grave of Cecrops, and subsequently transformed into a hero cult.[59]

A. Scholl considers this architectural interplay as the starting point for an interpretation of the columnar maidens; he finds them rather strange in the context of a funerary cult. There have been various attempts in the past to explain these six columns (it is not necessary to describe them here)[60] in terms of the cult significance of their position. They have thus been interpreted as the daughters of Cecrops, who play an important role in the myth of Erechtheus (one of them, Pandrosos, had a cult in the Erechtheum).[61] Given, however, that Cecrops apparently had only three daughters, this interpretation falls down, since there are six maidens.[62] The Caryatids have also been identified as representations of *arrephoroi*.[63] But considering that these girls, who were charged with the production of Athena's *peplos*, always appeared in pairs, this explanation seems equally irrelevant. Their shape, moreover, which is distinctly female, and adult at that, makes it difficult to identify them with the *arrephoroi*, who were at most eleven years old.[64] The most daring interpretation is that of Vickers, who has studied the Porch of the Caryatids in a historical and political context.[65] He believes that Caryatids' old-fashioned hairstyle bears out Vitruvius' explanation that such figures evoked Peloponnesian women sold into slavery. Vitruvius believes that the explanation for architectural features in the form of women is that the small town of Caryae in the Peloponnese had defected to the enemy during the Persian wars. The Greeks then made war on the city of Caryae, and killed the men after their victory, leading the matrons away into captivity, but did not allow them to lay aside their robes or matronly ornaments (*stolas neque ornatus matronales deponere*). The Greeks' intention was not to lead them on one occasion in a triumph, but to ensure that they exhibited a permanent picture of slavery (*aeterno servitutis exemplo*).[66] In Vickers' view, the Peloponnesian matrons reflected propaganda against the Spartans who, in 412 BCE (the date at which he believes the Erechtheum was begun), were negotiating with the Persians. Scholl called this attempt to justify Vitruvius "a downright forced interpretation".[67] Vickers has recently added further arguments, but it is difficult to prove his political interpretation, tempting as it is. If correct, it would provide visual propaganda of Sparta's scandalous collaboration with the arch-enemy.

Scholl interprets the Caryatid porch differently, by trying to understand the meaning of the *korai* in their cult context. His detailed analysis involves the copies in the *Villa Hadriana*. Each of these, unlike the originals, crucially holds sacrificial *phialai* in their right hand. Scholl concludes that the maidens are, from a functional perspective, girls who carry the typical libatory offerings within a funerary cult.[68] This interpretation is easy to understand, granted that the offering-bearers were placed above the tomb of Cecrops, and their snake bracelets, best visible on the copies, but also attested on the Acropolis, might suggest a connection with the

burial of the primordial being with snake-like legs.[69] In Scholl's view, we should see the *korai* as young Athenian women shown bringing offerings to the tomb, as χοηφόροι, directly related to the cult of the Cecropion. In this way, not only the foundations underneath, but the entire Caryatid porch, proves to be a:

> monumental funerary complex of the venerable primordial king Cecrops .... The *korai* are ready to make a libation and carry out, in the name of Athens, the "permanent" funerary cult, thus underlying the continuity of the polis that was struggling with a domestic and foreign crisis when they were erected.[70]

But despite its superficial attraction, this explanation is not entirely convincing. E. Simon rightly showed that the over-life-sized Caryatids cannot be spoken of in terms of the representation of mortals.[71] She proposes that the so-called Caryatids in the Erechtheum are not "Caryatids" in the Vitruvian sense, but nymphs, since they were often referred to simply as *korai*.[72] As such, they appear in the building accounts relating to the Erechtheum, and neatly combining the two interpretations, nymphs are associated with offerings made to heroes.[73] This, together with the chthonic dimension typical for nymphs, supports the hypothesis, not least because it would help to explain the combination of the Villa Adriana copies with silenuses, given that nymphs and silenuses were often depicted together.

The common feature of the two explanations is a focus on the archaizing character of the statues, as well as on their cult and historico-religious meaning.[74] The famous South Porch thus ceases to be merely an architectural and typological curiosity, but its religious function fits perfectly with the overall architectonic conception of the building.[75] By compartmentalizing many different traditions, the concept was meant to incorporate and reactivate older cults of gods and heroes in a single sacred complex in the northern part of the Acropolis.

7.2.3 The historical and religious importance of the Erechtheum

This functional ordering of the Caryatid porch, often viewed just in aesthetic terms, and the religious impact of the building, thus bear upon the historical and religious importance of the entire construction. Because of its architectural meaning, the building can be associated with the circumstances of the Peloponnesian War. As we have seen, the building seems to have been strongly influenced by Athenian mythology through the location of the shrines of gods and heroes. The unusual configuration of the temple takes into account the ancient sacred places, for which reason it was not possible to level the area, and consequently the foundations are not those of a "classical" temple. In both form and concept, the building thus displays a retrospective view of religious tradition. A clear effort to create a respectable, but unconventional centre for the older traditions, by reviving hitherto neglected heroic cults, recalls similar features attested in the Agora after 430.[76] Apart from the archaizing elements, the Ionic stylistic features that have been identified in various parts of the building clearly evoke Ion, the primordial father of the Ionians

and a relative of king Erechtheus; these can only be considered to be part of this religious programme, and as reminiscences of a venerable religious tradition.[77] In the light of its unusual plan and significance, the Erechtheum has been seen as some kind of counterweight to the magnificent buildings of the Periclean era, such as the Parthenon or the Propylaea; the latter have often been considered "profane" by comparison with the Erechtheum, with all its cult features. In general terms, this oft-invoked contrast between the secular or "enlightened" architectural concepts of the Periclean age and their religious or "retrograde" equivalents of the post-Periclean period seems somewhat exaggerated.[78] However, the "multi-purpose"[79] temple built during the war attests to the Athenians' need to bring the old cults back to the centre of the religious life of the community.[80]

This raises the question of the "paternity" of the architectural concept, a question with multiple answers, depending on the role ascribed to elites in the planning of public works. Some have maintained that a "conservative reaction" lay behind the religiously motivated features; their backward-looking character has also been related to the archaizing stylistic features. Apart from Nicias, whose role is widely acknowledged, some scholars speak of a "conservative priesthood" as the initiators of the construction.[81] B. Wesenberg has expressed the view, however, that such an idea (which finds no support in the sources) should be sent to the "land of archaeological fairy tales".[82] He is not alone, for recent scholarship has adopted a clear position against the invention of an influential priesthood behind the underlying programme of the cult arrangements, thus removing from the debate their alleged – albeit intangible – influence.[83]

The significance of the functional inclusion of the old heroic cults in the new construction of Athena's temple can only be understood as the result of a decision of the Assembly. It is difficult to use the architectural layout or sculptural decoration of the Erechtheum to argue for influences exerted by certain social and political groups such as the alleged "circle of Nicias" or a certain "priesthood".[84] Rather, the concept of the Erechtheum, obviously imbued with profound religiosity and piety, should be ascribed to the "common sense" of the Athenians: anybody coming up in the *ekklesia*, with such proposition regarding the expensive and unusual shape of the temple, would have obtained the majority's approval.[85] The desire to acknowledge the religious tradition, as documented by the architectural concept of the Erechtheum, fully corresponds to the imperatives of the zeitgeist. Transposing traditional religiosity into a stone monument fully corresponded to the demands of the current crisis, and many people held this view. Of this period, hauntingly described by Thucydides, it has been said: "nothing was more important at the end of one of the darkest periods in Athenian history than opposing to one's own incertitude the value of venerable traditions and ideals, above all religious".[86] In what follows, we will present other cult buildings and shrines that embody – on a larger scale – this tendency in public urban planning during the war.

7.3 Observations on the architecture of temples during the Peloponnesian War

7.3.1 The temple of Athena Nike and the Propylaea

The bastion in front of the imposing Propylaea is crowned by an Ionic amphiprostyle[87] temple, with a rather modest function within the splendid entrance, namely, the sanctuary of Athena Nike.[88] The bastion, erected on a Mycenaean defensive wall in the extreme south-western corner of the citadel, had contained, since the mid-sixth century, a shrine of Athena Nike, but only received a proper temple in the 420s. Recently restored, it is still an extraordinary sight for the twenty-first-century visitor to the Acropolis. Many have seen in the small Pentelic marble temple a contrast with the prominent Propylaea, with its totally different architectural conception.[89] In what follows, we shall mainly discuss the historical and religious importance of the temple, including a consideration of its date. In brief, we shall see whether the temple of Athena Nike can be studied in a religious context similar to that of the Erechtheum.

Until recently, an early date for the inscription that records the decision to build the temple of Athena Nike seemed beyond question. The decree that appointed Callicrates as architect of the new construction, appointed a priestess for the cult of Athena Nike, and provided for the construction of a door in the existing shrine, had been almost unanimously dated before 445, widely held to be the date after which such letter-forms as three-bar *sigmas* and tailed *rhos* were held not to exist.[90] If this were indeed the case, building could only have started some twenty years after the decision, as the archaeological evidence indicates. Some scholars have accepted this idea, though they were aware that such a long break makes such a hypothesis improbable.[91] Such a delay, otherwise unique in Athenian building practice, was explained by the existence of the Propylaea, the construction of which had begun at the beginning of the 430s BCE. In view of the lack of space, it was impossible for "both architectural projects to have been executed at the same time".[92] The fact that the building process was completely interrupted (a situation traditionally related to the outbreak of the Archidamian War) was invoked as a reason when it was necessary to explain why the project (planned long before) was executed only in the 420s.[93] The modernizing work on the shrine of the goddess Nike, begun before the outbreak of the war, would have thus been suddenly interrupted.[94] Only H. B. Mattingly, with the voice of one crying in the wilderness, proposed a late date for the decree, in the period before 430, but others disagreed.[95] More recently, however, reservations have been expressed about the practice of dating by letter-forms, and it can now be safely dismissed. New information achieved by objective physical observation has shown how inaccurate the traditional dating methods were, and has indicated that the three-bar *sigma* was in use until 418 (the Egesta decree) if not later.[96] This new research (which was, in 2000, still slowly percolating into the consciousness of archaeologists) provides the basis of a new consensus, and thus strongly suggests that an early date

of 445 for the construction decree, based as it was on the three-bar *sigma* alone, is no longer certain.[97] Instead, we should take seriously the later date proposed by Mattingly, and integrate the decree in the historical context in a rather more satisfactory manner.[98]

The chronology is not the only issue regarding this inscription. I. S. Mark argued that the building decree referred not to the small temple of the goddess Athena Nike (begun around 420; Stage IV according to his scheme), but to the previous construction (his Stage III). He concludes that the project and construction process for the small Ionic building began only in 424/3, with no connection whatsoever with the decree.[99] This explanation, though slightly forced, had the advantage of explaining the twenty-year gap between the planning and the execution of the building, at a time when an early date for the inscription was dogma.[100] Now, however, an early date for the project is far from certain. Mark's views regarding a late modernization of the sanctuary, based on the surviving architectural features, seem plausible if the relevant inscription *IG* I^3 35 (the Nike temple decree) is no longer to be associated with an early stage of construction, but can be associated with a date of *c.* 424/3.[101] The well-dated inscription relating to the salary of the priestess (*IG* I^3 36) can be seen as "a delayed rider to the first measure" (*IG* I^3 35), dated by Mattingly to 425.[102]

Relying on the terms of the regulations mentioned in the Nike temple decree, B. Wesenberg tried to argue that an earlier date (before 437) should be favoured, regardless of the date of the inscription. In his view, the plans for the Propylaea already take the later Athena Nike temple into account.[103] According to him, different circumstances seem to have governed the order of building. Thus *poletai* were invited to pay for building the door in the design (possibly to gain access to the *temenos*),[104] while the new building (the responsibility of the architect Callicrates) involved no reference to any financial authority. This led Wesenberg to believe that it is possible to make a distinction between an urgent measure (the door), which was related to the already existing sanctuary (Mark's Stage III), and a prospective action (the new building of the temple) with no immediate deadline.[105] Such a distinction is not very plausible, however, since Hestiaios' additional proposal at the end of the same decree envisages measures that do not allow the conclusion that the new construction should be delayed.

The project would thus involve collaboration between the architect Callicrates and three members of the Council (τούτος δὲ μετ[ὰ] Καλλικρά/[το]ν χσυνγγράφσαντας); these individuals would have to report to the Council in order to commission construction work (καθ' ὅ τι ἀπομ[ισθοθέσεται). These details strongly suggest that building began very soon afterwards.[106] Since the rest of the inscription is not preserved, there is no way of knowing whether or not a financial authority was mentioned.

In order to explain an early date for the decree and for the new temple construction, it was often stressed that the architect Mnesicles would have taken into account the proposed new Nike temple when planning and executing the

Propylaea (437–2). Thus, construction work for the two buildings would have been coordinated.[107] This involved only the modernization work for the tower, revetted with rectangular blocks so as to reach the same level as the formal entry to the Acropolis. The Propylaea and the modernization of the bastion do not imply, however, a complete reorganization of the *temenos*, or even the construction of a new temple.[108] On the other hand, the bulwark on which the Nike temple stands is definitely related to the Propylaea, since the northern part of the tower, as opposed to the later orientation of the temple, is oriented in accordance with the construction of the gatehouse.[109] Recently, moreover, doubts have been expressed regarding the notion that the asymmetrical form of the Propylaea, as built, represents a modification of what was intended to be a totally symmetrical building. This was Dörpfeld's hypothesis,[110] according to which the apparent change of plan was an expedient that came about because of the outbreak of the war. Travlos, however, has drawn attention to the fact that a symmetrical configuration of the original project is unlikely, since the north and south wings served different purposes.

The south-west wing, often regarded as being somewhat unharmonious, served in the first place as a means of access to the sanctuary of Athena Nike, while the so-called Pinacotheca might have been a room where meals were served during the solemn sacrifice, or a relaxation room for the pilgrims to the Acropolis.[111] New metrological investigations have allowed J. de Waele to claim that the construction of the south-west wing of the Propylaea, often regarded as a mutilation of the initial building project, was "in complete accord with the original design".[112] Along much the same lines, there has been a proposal to see the Propylaea not as a construction with a unitary initial plan, but as a "modular" building, employed to position the gatehouse. On this view, faced with the complexity of the monumental building, and in keeping with the technical level of the times, Mnesicles decided to carry the work forward in sections: employing "separate rectangles".[113] We can thus conclude that the functional need to construct the Propylaea did not conflict with that of the Nike sanctuary. The two projects, so different in conception and function, did not inconvenience each other – at least from the planning or spatial point of view – and a twenty-year delay in the construction of the temple consequently appears highly improbable.[114]

The only certain conclusion that we can draw is that in view of the plethora of different proposals, it is impossible to make a definitive statement with regard to the chronological relationship of the two buildings. On the one hand, the stone blocks may have begun to be set in place as early as *c.* 432 (when work on the unfinished buildings of the Propylaea was suspended), and, if we accept Wesenberg's views on the relative chronology of the column bases, the same might apply to the erection of the tower and the new temple building. On the other hand, the specific modelling of the south-west wing of the Propylaea could have been carried out later, in the 420s, at the same time as the construction of a new temple.[115]

As in the case of the Erechtheum, the dating issue is of special importance, precisely because it is the key to proving or excluding the possibility that the temple of

Athena Nike was included in Pericles' building programme (even though there is not a scrap of relevant written evidence for relating the temple to Pericles' plan).[116] In the end, it is simply a matter of judgement whether the modest Ionic temple (which is somehow lost within the massive entrance building) can be ascribed to the ambitious Acropolis project of the Parthenon period, or whether it should be included (perhaps more plausibly, from a historical point of view) in the post-Periclean period of Athenian building policy. The recent doubts, now become a certainty, concerning the reliability of the traditional dates of inscriptions assist a preference for a later date, and this can now be easily assumed.

The construction of the temple, as such, has been convincingly (and unanimously) dated to the 420s, on the basis of the epigraphic evidence and of stylistic and architectural features.[117] The dating by Mark of the architectural sculpture within the sanctuary to 420–18 (the frieze), and 416–3 (the parapet), probably goes beyond the evidence, as Wesenberg cogently observed.[118] An approximate date for the beginning of construction of the mid- or late 420s permits certain conclusions regarding the historical context for the erection of the temple. For if the building is related to the 420s, and if both the proposal and the decision to build it occurred within the same period,[119] then the modest temple of Athena Nike, like the Erechtheum, can be seen as a product of the war period and can be viewed in the same historical perspective.

The temple would thus have been erected after the outbreak of the war, when the Athenians were beset by the Plague, and when their lands were subject to periodic destruction at the hands of the Spartans. As a consequence, there may well be a connection between a temple dedicated to Athena (as one who brings victory) and the unexpected success of the Pylos campaign in 425.[120] The fact that Spartan citizens – Spartiates no less – had been taken prisoners on Sphacteria provided the opportunity to negotiate the Peace of Nicias of 421, and the direct consequence of this was the immediate cessation of the Spartans' annual invasions.[121] A temple of victory might well have been erected in the context of this rush of civic pride, when the Athenians, instead of more prudently concluding a peace treaty, forced the hand of destiny and, with Cleon as their leader, insistently promoted the war.

The contrast between this modest building, on the one hand, and the monumental constructions of the period before the war, on the other – in particular, the Parthenon and the Propylaea – could scarcely be more impressive.[122] If the Περικλέους ἔργα majestically dominate the famous panorama of the Acropolis through their grandiose monumentality, the gracious Ionic building on the bastion provides an elegant counterpoint in the eyes of the visitor.[123] The view towards the east reveals the shrine of Athena Nike as a footnote to the towering Parthenon and the nearby Propylaea. The visitor sees, on the one hand, self-conscious power, and on the other hand, the modest gratitude of the Athenians to the goddess who, after the atrocities during the first years of the war, gave the Athenians hope for a better future.

What have been called "peculiar archaic elements", manifested in relief in the case of the small building, allude (as in the case of the Nike temple) to archaizing stylistic features in their form and in the volute-capitals.[124] This archaizing aspect of the building, intended to recall earlier architecture, and which appears to have been deliberate, offers – according to Knell – clues to the "venerable place of worship ... where Athena Nike had been venerated since the earliest times".[125] There have been many attempts to explain the striking differences, in both form and expression, between the two buildings in close proximity to each other – the Propylaea and the Nike temple – as well as certain features of the Erechtheum "with a retrospective orientation", by referring to our old friends the "conservative priesthood".[126] The initial plan of the Propylaea, as proposed by Dörpfeld and others, would have been built, if not actually on top of the existing Nike sanctuary dedicated to Nike, then at least in such a way as to overshadow it. On this view, Pericles imposed a magnificent symmetrical entrance to the Acropolis, while the conservatives endorsed and finally enforced the execution of a small temple after his death.

This kind of explanation, which has progressively fewer adherents, is both forced and unreasonable. The modesty of the Ionic sanctuary, clear from a comparison with the Parthenon and the Propylaea, can be seen as an expression of a particular religious reflection or consciousness developed during the harsh years of the Archidamian War; at least, it can be if we accept with Mattingly and Mark a late date for the entire architectural project. The Nike temple, like the Erechtheum, highlights a revival of older religious traditions, not necessarily associated with supposedly "conservative circles", but the products – as we have seen – of the general situation, and characteristic of many areas of public life. In the specific case of the temple of Athena Nike, we should be very cautious in attributing such a commission to the activities of certain "conservatives". Since its date remains uncertain and the natural conditions of the place do not allow a monumental building, we cannot single out the Nike temple as the product of a heightened religious conscience. Such an interpretation becomes more probable, however, if we consider the Erechtheum and other architectural projects of the period, including the Nike temple as a whole (employing the "wigwam argument"). We need to investigate most religious building projects of the post-Periclean period in this light. In an assessment of later building activity, involving mostly the Erechtheum, J. D. Mikalson rightly characterized the role of the new Nike temple, whose construction he dates about 425 BCE, as follows: "The beginning of the Athena Nike temple heralds an outburst of state construction or rebuilding of sacred structures."[127] The brief outline that follows deals with precisely these "sacred structures".

7.3.2 Building for the gods: the temple of Nemesis at Rhamnous, the temple of Apollo on Delos and the sanctuary of Artemis at Brauron

Some years ago, M. M. Miles made a detailed study of the temple of Nemesis in the deme of Rhamnous; the results were surprising. After a critical analysis of its style, the author concludes that the building of the temple should be dated to a

late period, namely the decade between 430 and 420, earlier opinions notwithstanding.[128] Taken in conjunction with similar results obtained from a study of the temple on the Ilissus,[129] Miles' conclusions call into question the chronology of public buildings at Athens.

The prevalent view, for a long time, was that the onset of war and the beginning of military operations not only brought about a slow-down of building activity, but actually stopped it altogether.[130] According to Miles' reconstruction of Attic architectural policy, the main factor in the reduction of urban planning activity was the lack of public funds; the Peloponnesian War was only an indirect cause. Building activity, in fact, never really stopped, and was resumed with new energy after about 425. The unfinished condition of the Propylaea is often invoked in support of the old view that war would have brought about an immediate reduction in building activity.

T. E. Kalpaxis attempted to prove that architectural details, once interpreted as indications of the unfinished character of the Propylaea, should be understood as intentional decorative forms.[131] Thanks to new discoveries in the Agora that point to the renovation of smaller shrines, beginning in 430,[132] and to the vast building works the Athenians carried out on Delos (from *c.* 425), at the sanctuary of Artemis at Brauron, or finishing touches made to the Hephaisteion (between 420 and 416),[133] many reservations arise regarding the way in which these monuments have been traditionally dated. It is becoming increasingly clear that the Peloponnesian War, despite the huge burdens it placed on the state, did not lead to a lessening of activity related to the construction or renovation of sanctuaries.

The older, canonical view, according to which there was scarcely any building activity before 421, was rightly called into question by the new chronology proposed by Miles for the temple by the Ilissus and for that of Nemesis at Rhamnous.[134] Referring to these new findings, J. Hurwit concluded:

> For despite plague and disaster, despite interruptions necessitated by the costs of military campaigns and the vicissitudes of politics, the Acropolis continued to be adorned with splendid buildings, sculptures, and dedications during and even after the Peloponnesian War, as it had been before, in the brief age of Perikles himself.[135]

Such uninterrupted public construction activity, dedicated exclusively to places of worship, can only be understood in a religious context.

Miles includes the sanctuary of Nemesis at Rhamnous in such a religious context. The goddess of revenge had assisted the Athenians at Marathon and from that moment on she became very important to them.[136] The Doric temple has not been fully excavated, and in the absence of diagnostic pottery, it can only be dated based on architectural stylistic features. It has a compact stylobate with a columniation of only six by twelve columns. Although the building did have sculpted metopes, they have not survived, and so an iconographical study is impossible.[137]

The stairs and walls lacked finishing traces, and, together with the absence of fluting on the columns, this indicates that the building was not completed. The proportions of the capitals, columns and stylobate indicate that it is later than the Propylaea (437–2), and they display similarities with buildings erected in the 420s: the portico of the sanctuary at Brauron and the temple of Apollo on the island of Delos. This is why Miles dates the beginning of construction of the temple of Nemesis to the period after the outbreak of war, and why she dates the building to between 430 and 420.[138] Consequently, she includes the sanctuary of Nemesis among the architectural creations of the 420s. Just as when the cult of Asclepius was introduced to Athens, or when the temple of Apollo was erected on the island of Delos, the significant experience of the Plague would have determined construction of a temple for Nemesis. In Miles' words:

> Nemesis, although not specifically a "plague" goddess, nonetheless could have been perceived as kin to the others, as the goddess of balance and rightful outcome in human affairs; furthermore, she had already assisted the Athenians at Marathon and would surely help them against other threats to the inhabitants.[139]

B. Knittelmayer, in her survey of the cult statue of Nemesis, was able to show that the goddess played an important role in the religious life of the Athenians, and was not only viewed in her capacity of the goddess of revenge. She is depicted in the epic tradition and by Herodotus as a goddess who can influence the behaviour of men. In the later fifth century, and in the context of the Peloponnesian War, she can be seen as a reminder of moderate behaviour. Since such a temperate rule of behaviour was relevant not only in private contexts, but also in public life, her veneration during a war marked by extremes made sense.[140]

The temple of Apollo, built by the Athenians on Delos towards the mid-420s, as detailed above, is directly related to the pestilence, whose last visitation occurred at the very time building began. The documentary sources and the direct historical context allow the expensive construction of the temple to be dated, with relative certainty, to between 425 and 417.[141] From a stylistic point of view, the temple can be ascribed to the same team of workers who undertook the temple of Nike and the Erechtheum. Callicrates himself is assumed to be the architect of this Doric interplay between an earlier temple of Athena (surrounded by two galleries of columns) and a *Peripteros*. According to the decree relating to the temple of Nike, he was also in charge of erecting the Ionic building in the south-west corner of the Acropolis.[142]

As indicated in the chapter on the Plague at Athens, the second outbreak of the epidemic could have served as the reason for erecting the building. While we do not know when the decision to build the temple was taken, it is clear that this temple, dedicated to the plague god Apollo, and probably inaugurated by Nicias in 417, was built either to regain the favours of the deity or to show gratitude for the end of the pestilence. "Hence, the Apollo temple would be one of the rare buildings

from the entire period under discussion which was undertaken primarily for religious motives," states Boersma.[143]

Boersma's belief notwithstanding, the main reasons for building temples have – surely – always been of a religious nature. It is against the background of special religious reasons that we should view the erection of the temple of Apollo, an event generated by the particular circumstances of war. We should also, however, consider similar reasons for the expensive restoration work carried out on the temple of Artemis at Brauron, as well as the new construction of an oversized portico at the same sanctuary.[144] Situated on the eastern coast of Attica, the shrine was dedicated to the important cult of the "goddess from outside",[145] whose importance can be deduced from the magnificent appearance of the sanctuary. Besides a temple, the shrine included buildings with a special purpose, such as stables and what was probably a two storied hall-complex; together with rooms for symposia nearby, these reveal the sanctuary as an important local cult centre. Based on a comparative study of the capitals, archaeologists have convincingly dated the erection of the Π-shaped portico to the decade 430–20.[146]

Another dating criterion is provided by an inscription of 416/5, which constitutes a *terminus ante quem* for the building.[147] In the hall-complex there were also rooms for the ἄρκτοι, the "she-bears", girls in the service of the goddess, who played a very important role in her cult. The bear masks found in the sanctuary and the representations on vases clearly indicate an initiation cult.[148] Artemis was, of course, worshipped not only as the goddess of the hunt, but was represented as a divinity celebrated in the circle of the nymphs and of her wild animals.[149] However, the goddess with her bows and arrows also had a dark and sinister side, like her twin brother Apollo. Her disease-carrying arrows could kill. Artemis, to a certain extent, was the feminine pendant to Apollo, since she shot mostly women with her arrows, and was called by Homer "a lioness to women".[150] "The god of healing is also the god of plague"; in the same way, Artemis could heal and, like her brother, she was celebrated by the Greeks for her healing skills (Σωτείρα).[151] Artemis was usually very popular during wars and periods of crisis: "Her help is invoked as saviour in critical situations, when a conflict concerns the existence of the polis which, as a whole, is threatened with destruction."[152] Hence, the goddess, mainly under the title of Φωσφόρος, light-bringer, appears as a divinity involved in decisive situations for the existence of the community. This why at Athens, Artemis, in her role of *Bouleia*, received together with Apollo *Prostaterios* the offerings brought by the *prytaneis*.[153]

Although very few inscriptions or literary testimonia throw light on the sanctuary at Brauron, scholars such as Mylonopoulos and Bubenheimer have used the archaeological evidence to demonstrate the status of the shrine (remarkable for a regional sanctuary). Through its new annexe with galleries, this building was equipped for important celebrations and processions: the Artemision was the only local sanctuary on the Acropolis with an annexe.[154]

The sanctuary is well preserved, but the excavations are, alas, still mainly unpublished; it is thus difficult to correlate the shrine with historical events. Nevertheless,

the Artemision at Brauron (like the Erechtheum or the Nike temple) can be related to the religious conscience of the Athenians modified by the Plague, and to the "traditional religious sentiment", to which Boersma drew attention.[155]

This explanation is all the more necessary when we consider that the temple, destroyed during the Persian attack, was renovated only five decades later, adding a portico of splendid and expensive columns, at a period when city finances were much more restricted, compared to the previous decades of Athenian supremacy.[156] In such a context, even more interesting is a decree of the *nomothetai* of the third century, which refers to necessary repair work on the sanctuary. The nomothetai explicitly state that the temple of the 420s, and the erection of the other buildings (τἆλλα πάντα), was a special offering of the polis to the goddess ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας τ[οῦ δ]ήμου Ἀθηναίων.[157] The fact that the temple was rebuilt just five decades after its destruction by the Persians – as gratitude for "saving the Athenian people" – can be explained only in the context of the extraordinary circumstances following the year 430. Bubenheimer and Mylonopoulos attributed these remarkable developments to "the historical conditions during the Peloponnesian War".[158] If, in addition, we invoke the traditional association of Artemis with death on the one hand and (in her role as *Soteira*) with salvation on the other, then the connection between the expensive building works carried out between 430 and 420, and the epidemic and the war in general, seems obvious. Bubenheimer and Mylonopoulos only speak in general terms about the war, but their historical interpretation of the architectural remains is spot-on: "In this period, people believed that the protection of the goddess was vital, which – one assumes – made the Athenians give a luxurious appearance to the sanctuary at Brauron, to earn the favours of the goddess."[159]

Clearly, the Athenian investment paid off, since, in 403, a pillar of fire sent by Artemis (in her role of *Phosphoros*) seems to have shown Thrasybulus and his fighters for democracy the road from Phyle to Athens.[160]

7.4 Religious building activity during the war: summary

The admittedly selective archaeological evidence, presented here to illustrate the building activity during the Peloponnesian War, is still eloquent. Despite the tense financial situation, there was a febrile building activity in Athens and Attica, related to temples and sanctuaries, and the importance of the matter cannot be underestimated. Though the finances for were the most part replaced on an even keel, thanks to the breathing-space presented by the Peace of Nicias, the financial authorities had much more serious demands and requirements, compared to the period before the war. This is why we should be impressed by the efforts to erect or repair the imposing monumental buildings, of which only some have been mentioned here.

Without going into detail over other sacred architectural projects carried out during the war (such as the extension of the sanctuary of Demeter at Eleusis,

the rebuilding of the Neleion, the completion of the Hephaisteion or the generous extension of the sanctuary of Poseidon at Sounion), they only confirm what has already been said about the religious and architectural policies of the times.[161] Uninterrupted building activity during the war shows very clearly that the Athenians did all they could not to allow shrines to be neglected, and that in difficult times, they were concerned with religious traditions.

Conservative stylistic tendencies, noted by archaeologists at sanctuaries built in this period, are another sign of this. The building of the Erechtheum (aimed, as it was, towards traditional cults), and the construction the small temple of Nike, indicate a traditional religiosity through intention and style, perfectly understandable in the light of the dreadful experiences of the Archidamian War. Although the literary sources, mainly created by representatives of the literate upper class, were sometimes less influenced by religious ideas, public architectural projects (which were under the control of the Assembly) show a continuous support, and even a growing need, for religious tradition and for protection from the divinities for whom the new sanctuaries were erected. This tendency is easy to see when we review the archaeological record, and it has been summarized by Knell as follows: "A society with an unstable self-conscience seems to be looking for a new, or rather, old fashioned stability."[162]

The "plague" did not make the Athenians reject their inherited religious conceptions and cult traditions, as Thucydides suggests, but it reminded them even more that they depended on the caprice of superior beings, who brought both protection and danger. Miles correctly assesses the situation from an archaeological point of view: "Religious feeling ... was surely the primary motive for dedications, embellishments of temples, and additions to sanctuaries. The effects of the Plague on the religious feelings of the people who survived it should not be underestimated."[163] The tragic experiences that the Athenians underwent during the war make it clear how much they also struggled, with the help of metal and marble, to earn the favour of the gods.[164]

8
The Arginusae trial

Silent enim leges inter arma.[1]

8.1 Introduction

With the disastrous result of the Athenian expedition to Sicily, Fate really turned against the Athenians. The failure of the leader of the Delian League caused many of the tributary states take the opportunity to leave the alliance. Thus, the Aegean islands and some important cities such as Miletus, Ephesus, Phocaea and Cyme, and the entire territory of the Hellespont, including Byzantium, exited the League. Byzantium was strategically very important, in particular for the control of the vitally important grain trade with the regions of the Pontus. To make matters worse, Alcibiades, now an ally of the Spartans, advised the latter to occupy Deceleia, a city on the Attic frontier. Athens was paralysed by domestic turbulence in 411 BCE, with power in the hands of an oligarchical junta, seized from a perplexed and helpless Assembly. The fleet stationed at Samos remained loyal to the democracy, but the Athenians proved incapable of holding together their failing maritime empire. The situation at Athens became critical.[2]

Because their financial reserves were used up and many allies had stopped paying the *phoros*, the Athenians imposed within the League a duty (a kind of VAT) of 5 per cent on all commodities imported or exported by sea, and in 412 they even spent the reserve fund, which had been created in 431 for the severest crises.[3] When the erstwhile traitor Alcibiades (who had regained the trust of the Athenians) reconquered the Hellespont in 410 for his native city, he was, like his fellow generals, preoccupied more with raising funds than with military operations.[4]

It is nevertheless apparent, as we have seen, that despite the difficult financial situation, building activity at important shrines was resumed or new buildings erected. During this period, the Nike temple and the Erechtheum were completed.[5] Meanwhile, "spoiled" again by success and the fortunes of war, which were at least

partly responsible for the restoration of democracy, the Athenians succeeded in regaining control again over the straits (after the battles of Cynossema and Abydus in 411, and Cyzicus in 410). Shortly after, however, they were endangered by the Peloponnesian fleet, ever readier for battle, and now under the command of Lysander, who was enriched with Persian gold.[6] The naval battle of Notion (407) put an end to the operations of the Athenian fleet in the east basin of the Aegean, and to any Athenian attempt to regain the Ionian cities. This battle also put an end to Alcibiades' political career. In the absence of the general, his luckless helmsman Antiochus, who was left in charge of the Athenian fleet, stood no chance against the clever tactician Lysander. The only option for the compromised general was to retire to his Thracian properties.[7]

Even after the loss of twenty-two ships in this battle, the fleet was not destroyed, since the Athenians still had 100 triremes.[8] A year later when, after losing thirty more ships, Conon only had forty triremes in readiness, the Spartan fleet under Lysander's capable successor Callicratidas cut him off in the harbour of Mytilene. The fate of the Athenian fleet (or what was left of it) was thus again on a knife's edge.[9] In such a situation, the Athenians decided to relieve the endangered general. At great expense, 110 ships were rapidly built, and manned as a desperate measure by not only citizens and metics, but by slaves.[10]

The decisive battle between the two fleets took place in the autumn of 406, near the Arginusae islands, off the coast of Lesbos.[11] After learning of the existence of a new Athenian fleet, Callicratidas with his 120 ships hurried to meet the enemy. His battle-hardened triremes were opposed to the 150 Athenian ships, which were manned by oarsmen and sailors with little experience, and who had been trained in haste. In view of the importance of the operation, the Athenian fleet was under the command of eight generals. The Spartans counted on the tactical inferiority of their adversaries, and arranged their ships in a battle formation usually employed by the Athenians, back when they had dominated the sea.[12]

After a long battle in which Callicratidas himself perished, the Athenians were victorious, and what was left of the Peloponnesian fleet fled. The defeated party lost seventy-seven ships in the battle, or 64 per cent of the entire fleet. The Athenians lost twenty-five ships (quite a significant loss), but they did crush their enemies in what Diodorus called the greatest naval battle between Greek fleets.[13] In what follows, we shall examine the question: how did the Athenians manage to turn this victory, significant from every point of view, into a catastrophic defeat?

8.2 The generals before the Assembly: problems and interpretations

When six of the victorious generals returned to Athens, instead of being welcomed with celebrations by their exuberant fellow citizens, the Assembly accused them of an abuse of power and of high treason.[14] The accusation was also laid against their absent comrades in arms, apart from Conon (he had been besieged at Mytilene during the

battle). As the generals concentrated on catching the fleeing enemy in order to inflict a final blow, they forgot, in the heat of battle, to save the shipwrecked and recover the bodies of the fallen. The charge against the generals is presented in very different terms by Xenophon and Diodorus, and it is thus very difficult to assess the trial objectively. Xenophon holds that the officers failed to save the shipwrecked, while the Sicilian historian maintains that the people rose against the generals because they had not gathered up the bodies of the fallen in battle (who had thus been left unburied). In assessing the trial, it is important to judge which of the two versions seems more reliable. This will be analysed in greater detail in what follows.

After the battle, a double strategy was agreed upon after a discussion: most of the fleet was to follow the fleeing enemy and relieve the city of Mytilene, while the rest (forty-seven ships), led by the experienced trierarchs and former generals, Theramenes and Thrasybulus, were to save the shipwrecked. In the event, however, neither operation succeeded, on account of a violent storm.[15] After the storm, which had forced the Athenians to go into port, they sailed to Mytilene to face the Peloponnesians. However, the Spartan fleet raised the siege as soon as they learned of the defeat.[16]

The generals were accused of neglecting their duties on account of their behaviour after the battle, and this led to a tense dispute in the *ekklesia*. It ended, after a delay for a second meeting, with a charge of *eisangelia*, and with a collective death sentence for the accused generals. The trial before the Assembly was accompanied by disturbances, and was probably not without procedural flaws.[17] Since the people were in a riotous mood, the *prytaneis* and the generals' defending counsel, a certain Euryptolemus (who is mentioned only by Xenophon), had great difficulty in holding a regular meeting.[18] Euryptolemus gave a long speech in favour of the generals before the angry Assembly, and proposed another trial procedure, according to which the accused should be tried individually, not collectively.[19] The Assembly did not, however, accept the proposal, and the Demos sentenced all the accused generals to death by a small majority; the responsible magistrates immediately seized the accused to have them executed.[20]

It is evident that Theramenes, who took part in the battle as a trierarch, played a less than honourable role: he was not only among the accusers, but he also seems to have been responsible for an intrigue against the generals. With his friends and people hired from among the relatives of those who had perished in battle, he sought to create an atmosphere in the Assembly that was hostile to the generals. In addition, he arranged for the demagogue Callixenus to bring before the council an accusation (*probuleuma*) against the accused.[21]

The procedure that unfolded in the presence of the rowdy Demos does not appear to have been entirely legal, as every ancient writer observes (though allowances should perhaps be made, since they all belonged to the anti-democratic camp).[22] As both Xenophon and Diodorus inform us, the Athenians soon realized that there had been a procedural flaw, and they put on trial the demagogues responsible for having misled the Demos.[23]

Scholars often regard this trial as judicial murder, as the greatest stain on the radical democracy at the end of the war, and label it a "scandalous trial". The inexorable dissent among the factions has often been invoked as responsible for the city's downfall. This is why the Arginusae trial has remained the classic example of the perversion of justice in democratic Athens.[24] And this is precisely the effect aimed at by Xenophon in his highly tendentious and anti-democratic presentation of the trial.[25]

The difficulties of this case, which have perpetuated scholarly interest in the Arginusae affair, derive in the first instance from the contradictory accounts of the trial provided by our two principal sources, Xenophon and Diodorus. It used to be the case that any historical reconstruction of the trial was based mainly on Xenophon's account. Greater historical credibility had been ascribed to this as he was an eyewitness, but papyrus discoveries made during the first half of the twentieth century have provided new insights.[26]

The *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* is preserved on two large papyrus fragments, and at first sight, it appeared that it belonged to a tradition independent of Xenophon. It transpired that Diodorus had used it in parallel to Xenophon as a source for his own account. This led to a general reassessment of the Sicilian historian, a change eventually reflected in more recent studies of the Arginusae trial. Although E. Schwarz's harsh dismissal of Diodorus as a "compiler" was to have a long-standing influence on research, scholars began to appreciate the value of Diodorus' *Bibliotheca historica*, precisely because of those passages that, via Ephorus, followed the reliable source now known as the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*.[27] This led to an assessment of the Arginusae trial: faced with the serious difficulties in Xenophon's account, scholars increasingly preferred Diodorus' version of the events. Xenophon's version, though ampler and more detailed, is illogical and, at times, contradictory.[28] This *Quellenkritik* had admirable outcomes,[29] and the details of the trial have been intensively discussed;[30] this makes it possible to focus here on the main aspects.[31]

The following questions are fundamental: were the generals guilty of the accusations brought against them, and what religious justification might there have been for pronouncing the sentence? In this context, we should pay special attention to the charge laid against the generals, since Xenophon and Diodorus contradict each other on this issue. Xenophon speaks twice of not picking up the shipwrecked sailors (ναυαγοί); later, he avoids this word and he only speaks of "the victors in the naval battle" (τοὺς νικήσαντας ἐν τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ), and of the "men who have proved themselves the bravest in the service for their country" (τοὺς ἀρίστους ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος γενομένους), or simply of "picking up" (ἀναίρεσις), without saying who was meant, that is, without referring to the physical condition of those who might have been picked up.[32] Diodorus, by contrast, always speaks of those who have fallen in battle (τοὺς τετελευτηκότας, οἱ νεκροί) and had not been recovered from the water, and who were consequently not buried.[33] To Xenophon, the generals – who were, in fact, prevented by the storm from saving the shipwrecked – appear as innocent and as victims of an intrigue plotted by Theramenes. On the other hand, if Diodorus is more credible, then regardless of whether there had been a procedural

flaw or not, the accused were justly condemned since, when the storm was over, they could have recovered the bodies. Through their negligence, they would have violated the obligation to bury the dead, an extremely important issue in the eyes of the ancients.[34] It would thus seem to be in order briefly to confront both accounts.

8.3 Xenophon or Diodorus? On the credibility of tradition

Unlike Diodorus' succinct account of the trial of the generals, Xenophon presents a full and detailed description of its unfolding. Alas, however, the greater volume of data does not in this case guarantee accuracy, still less a logical thread to the story. The historian provides much detailed information which does not appear in Diodorus' concise summary. There are, however, many strange inconsistencies in Xenophon's account.[35] For example, it is especially surprising that he omits the events that occurred in the interval between the naval victory and the return of the generals summoned to Athens to explain themselves. Clearly, the events created friction at Athens. A quarrel broke out between the trierarchs who had returned earlier and the generals still on duty (but who kept in contact with the city authorities); in this context, they started blaming each other for what happened after the battle. Xenophon just does not mention the quarrel;[36] he simply speaks of the demission of the generals after the naval battle, a statement that is apparently unmotivated and somewhat arbitrary to the reader who is unfamiliar with what follows. A. Andrewes was the first to suggest that Xenophon was deliberately misleading the reader, in order to suggest that the Athenians, incited by the demagogues, simply threatened the generals with the death sentence as soon as they came back, for no apparent reason.[37] This is not the only inaccuracy or contradiction in Xenophon's account.[38]

Diodorus' version has its flaws, too. First, unlike Xenophon, the brevity of his account does not allow us to draw any conclusions with regard to the subtleties of the legal procedure. Second, the principal limitations include tragic adornments, such as Thrasybulus' premonitory dream on the eve of the battle foretelling the death of the generals, or the words of Diomedon (one of the condemned), uttered in the Assembly, but influenced by the author's moralistic standpoint.[39] In these adornments, scholars rightly see narrative additions on the parts of Ephorus and Diodorus. It is difficult to believe that these insertions have anything to do with the historical event; they thus distort the narrative of the trial.[40]

When it comes to the role played by Theramenes, a figure who is depicted in very dark colours by Xenophon and who apparently plotted against the generals, attempting by the most unorthodox means to mobilize the Assembly against the accused, it seems that the account of his involvement in the affair is in accordance with the facts, although Diodorus does not comment on this in his succinct outline.[41] Some have found an explanation for this omission in the partiality of Diodorus' source, favourable to Theramenes and his cause, and concerned to justify his actions and to keep silent over his infamous role.[42] Clearly, the trierarch had good reason to

rise against the generals; for otherwise he would have had to defend himself, since, together with Thrasybulus, he had been in charge of recovery operations, and would have been responsible for abandoning the fallen. Adopting the policy that attack is the best defence, Theramenes (whose nickname was "Cothurnus", or Turncoat, for his dexterity in changing sides)[43] rose against the generals at just the right time, in order to save his own skin.[44] There may also have been personal reasons for his behaviour. His steep rise as a moderate politician had been halted during the oligarchic coup of 411/10, and he had been demoted from general to the rank of trierarch. The ambitious man was elected general in the year following the trial (when the victors at Arginusae self-evidently could not stand, having been executed), but he was rejected in the *dokimasia* as unworthy to hold office, which suggests that he did not cover himself with glory in the Arginusae business.[45]

It remains open to debate as to whether Theramenes inflamed passions in the *ekklesia* when, together with his comrades (*hetairoi*), he took pains to have the support of the relatives of those who had perished in the battle (who were in public mourning), and even of "fake" relatives paid in order to create a hostile atmosphere. The circumstances are controversial since, as Andrewes rightly noted, the manoeuvre could have turned against Theramenes himself, in that the position of the trierarch in charge of recovery operations was already endangered.[46] Although it is possible to doubt the reliability of both authors, it is Xenophon, as a contemporary (and probably even an eyewitness), who has been preferred to Diodorus, the latter not being always seen as a reliable source.

8.4 The accusation against the generals: shipwrecked or fallen in battle?

It was Xenophon's different presentation of the accusation against the generals on their return that used to be supported by many scholars, as opposed to the supposedly unreliable version of Diodorus based on the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, and the verdict was often in favour of the "eyewitness", Xenophon. How is it possible, we might ask, for a contemporary to stand so far from the truth? To favour the Diodorus tradition would mean, in effect, accusing Xenophon of telling blatant lies.[47] To postulate a scribal error, as has been proposed as the simplest way to solve the issue in the case of Diodorus, is impossible.[48]

Diodorus does not just speak consistently about the failure to pick up the dead, but he harks back to the idea in a subsequent passage: when, after a naval battle in 377 near Naxos, the Athenian general Chabrias was concerned with recovering the dead from the sea and with arranging for their funerals, he did so out of fear that he might share the fate of the generals in 406.[49] This allows us to assume that Ephorus' narrative (from which Diodorus got his inspiration) exclusively mentioned the dead.[50]

To make things even more difficult, neither of the two accounts receives clear support from other sources, something that would have made such a decision

easier. Thus, both Lysias and Plato are equally inaccurate in speaking vaguely of "those who were not picked up out of the water", or "those from the naval battle" (τοὺς ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης ἀνελέσθαι or τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας).[51] It is clear that we should look elsewhere for a solution.

A "synthetic" method, combining both versions employing criteria of plausibility, was rejected outright by Bleckmann, since both variants of the accusation (omitting to save the shipwrecked, and abandoning the bodies of those who had perished in the battle) would eliminate each other.[52] In what follows, an attempt will be made to show that this is not necessarily the case, and that the accusation evolved in two phases during the trial: in the first phase, the generals were accused of abandoning the shipwrecked, and in the second phase, after the accused convincingly pointed out that they had been prevented to do so by a storm, they were accused of not recovering the bodies.[53]

8.5 Burial and the cult of the dead: the importance of burying the dead at Athens

One of the most emotional scenes of the *Iliad*, perhaps the one with the greatest human touch in the whole of the epic, is the passage where Priam, a father burdened with grief, kneels before his son's killer and begs for the body of Hector, whatever the price.[54] The vengeful Achilles cannot resist this plea and he gives the body of the man who had slain his best friend, Patroclus, to his father, since Priam had knelt before him and kissed his hands: "the terrible, man-killing hands that have slaughtered many of his sons."[55] This impressive scene reflects, perhaps most convincingly, how important it was for the Greeks to bury their dead. Πανελλήνων νόμος, the tradition commonly practised by all Greeks, as Euripides called the generally binding custom, lay behind the ritualized behaviour of armies after battles.[56] In the Plataean oath, the various parties in the Greek coalition army make a mutual oath not to leave any fallen combatant unburied.[57] Any battle between enemy cities usually ended with the defeated party supplicating for permission to bury the dead, a demand which could not be denied by the victors. Moreover, the very act of sending messengers to ask to recover the fallen was regarded as official acknowledgement of defeat, while rejecting such a request was thought to be an infamous and impious act.[58] The very few known examples when this custom was violated are universally condemned.[59]

Sophocles' *Antigone* best illustrates the fact that beyond this unwritten law, there was a divine commandment to observe, in order to avoid menacing situations and the revenge of the gods. The play presents just such a conflict between the divine order and human laws, as well as state authority. The explanation given by the heroine, who, despite Creon's categorical command, secretly buries her brother, provides an impressive illustration of the fundamental religious importance of this burial duty. Antigone emphasizes that the command of Creon, a mere mortal, cannot override

the immutable unwritten laws of the gods (ἄγραπτα θεῶν νόμιμα). Furthermore, the divine norms were not created yesterday or today, but are of eternal validity and existed from earliest times, since nobody knows when they were laid down (οὐ γάρ τι νῦν γε κἀχθές, ἀλλ' ἀεί τοτε ζῇ ταῦτα κοὐδεὶς οἶδεν, ἐξ ὅτου φάνη).[60] The heroine thus expresses in poetical terms what Lysias later confirms in a speech in which he speaks of the iniquities of the Thirty Tyrants, who had also left the bodies of their enemies unburied. The orator interprets the deed as testimony of the tyrants' arrogance and hubris: in their arrogance, they firmly believed that they could escape the revenge of the gods. Thus, refusal of burial is seen as hubris, and the neglect of the burial rite was regarded as dishonouring behaviour.[61]

It is perhaps relevant to note that at Athens, a man whom his father had previously forced to become a male prostitute (thus releasing him from the duty of taking care of his father in his old age) was still obliged by law to fulfil the burial rituals for his father after he died.[62] Aelian even knows of an Athenian law to the effect that if a citizen found a dead body by accident, he was responsible for burying it.[63] The pious general Nicias was reluctant to leave two of his fallen soldiers unburied after his army had withdrawn from the shore near the village of Solygeia; he sent a messenger to the enemy camp, even though he knew that such a gesture would be interpreted as an acknowledgement of defeat.[64] The instructions in Onasander's military handbook are in keeping with Nicias' action. In his treatise *Strategikos*, the philosopher draws attention to the duty of army commanders to permit the lawful burial of those fallen in battle, even in the case of defeat, without ever considering any "factual constraints" that might prevent a commander from carrying out this sacred task (εὐσέβεια).[65] In cases where the body could not be found or recovered, there were burial rituals *in absentia*, and a funerary monument was erected above an empty grave (a cenotaph).[66]

The exceptional importance of burial duties in the fifth century BCE is not only explained through the long tradition of this custom, but also based on concrete religious ideas. E. R. Dodds thus speaks of the incomplete separation between the concepts of "soul" and "body", a separation that is familiar to us in our post-Cartesian world, but one that was only partially accomplished at the end of the fifth century. This makes the careful and ritually regulated attitude towards the bodies of the dead highly important.[67]

The burial of the dead, and consequently the veneration of the dead, was of exceptional importance. In the first place, it ensured a lawful withdrawal from the community of the living, and it had to be organized within a ritual.[68] The basic requirement for burial rites and the cult of the dead was the physical presence of the dead body; the abstract idea of a "day to commemorate the dead", with no relation to the gravesite where one should bring offerings to the dead, was unthinkable. The dead could pass to the world of shadows only after a correct burial and the lawful execution of the funerary rites.[69] Elpenor (the unfortunate companion of Odysseus), who died unnoticed by his comrades, appears to his captain during his *katabasis* as a soul restlessly wandering between the Underworld and the

world of the living, in order to draw Odysseus' attention on the need to bury his mortal remains, so that the son of Laertius should "not be touched by the gods' revenge".[70]

Euripides says more about those left unburied, and condemned to wander between the two worlds; such wandering can only be stopped through a lawful and ritual burial. In a later period, the restless souls of these *ataphoi* might be invoked for magical purposes.[71] The subliminal idea of a certain consubstantiality between body and soul, attested in the practices described, has still today a vestigial role, exemplified by collections made for elaborate funerals after accidents or natural catastrophes.[72]

The Greek conception was rather more concrete. It is present everywhere in the literary tradition, according to which the failure to accomplish burial rituals was followed by a divine punishment.[73] When a proposal was made that the traitor Ajax might lose his right to burial, because he had risen against the Atrides, Teucrus and the chorus in Sophocles' play draw attention to the punishment that might be anticipated if they offended the gods in such a manner.[74] The failure to bury a body brought about not only the revenge of the gods, but the dead could become dangerous too, since they could "survive" as revenants and ghosts.[75]

8.6 The religious dimension of the Arginusae trial

8.6.1 The importance of the unwritten norms of the Attic law

Diodorus' description of Athenian irritation on account of the dead not having been buried is entirely plausible. He explicitly draws attention to the influence of the many relatives of the dead shipmen, dressed in mourning clothes, who asked for justice in the Assembly because their relatives had not been properly buried.[76] In reality, the Demos were justified in considering the negligence of the generals to be a serious violation of customary law and careless of religious obligation, which could have dreadful consequences for the entire city, being represented by the generals as leaders. The loss of dear ones, and their relatives' fear that those who had fallen in battle with no grave or rituals performed could not properly pass to the other world, probably served to increase the anger of the citizens towards the negligent generals.[77]

The violation of a religious commandment, which might offend the gods and arouse their displeasure, could cause major public disquiet, especially in times of crisis marked by religious sensibility. Such an explanation would allow for clarity in the question of fault. At the same time, the prosecution of the generals – in Xenophon's version, downright arbitrary and unfair, since a storm had prevented them from rescuing the shipwrecked – would thus appear in a very different light. If the generals were, in fact, guilty as charged, then the condemnation would be wholly explicable, although punishment may seem to be exaggerated and overly harsh by comparison with modern legal norms.[78]

Against such an interpretation, and against the version we receive via Diodorus, arguments have been presented that the burial duties would be "only" a traditional custom; such issues and offences would consequently not have been actionable, and Diodorus was wrong here.[79] As the common law of the religious tradition, the duty of burial was of course important, but the generals could not have been punished only for overlooking this.[80] Such an assessment overestimates, however, the mandatory and exclusive character of positive law in fifth-century Athens. Clearly, juridical life in classical Athens was, in practice, highly influenced by basic legal procedures and an increasing appreciation for the rule of law.[81] The Attic legal system left enough room for the use of unwritten traditional norms, mostly in the religious field, because of its unsystematic structure that was characterized *inter alia* by the lack of clear definitions of offences.[82] The law cited in a passage of Andocides, promulgated in the context of the major revision of the laws in 403, and according to which the further use of unwritten norms was formally prohibited, implies that ἄγραφοι νόμοι would have been in force earlier and could be applied.[83] In the absence, moreover, of any clear regulation, arbitrary decisions taken *ad hoc* were a part of the legal order, as shown, for example, by the oath taken by judges in the fourth century, and thus in a period rightly considered as the beginning of "the rule of law".[84] In this oath, the jury members swore to judge, in the absence of unequivocal legal prescriptions, according to their conscience and a sense of justice.[85]

Unwritten laws in the religious sphere were considered, through their importance, to be above human regulation. Ἔθη, sacred through their venerable age, through their "immemorial character", were thus inviolable, and were considered "either as general moral norms, or as mandatory rules of positive law, without enforcing a clear distinction of these concepts or even feeling the need for such a dissociation".[86] Even Aristotle, in the late fourth century, considered the moral law of tradition to be more relevant than positive law.[87] The unwritten laws were seen as regulations imposed by gods, and their violation implied divine punishment.[88]

Despite the extraordinary importance of unwritten laws for Athenian morals, we can scarcely infer that in the case of the Arginusae generals, an abstraction of such unwritten laws, like "whoever ignores the duty of burial will be put to death", had been applied.[89] On the contrary, it is clear that the generals were accused of neglecting their duties to the detriment of the state: hence, they were charged of abuse of office and treason (*prodosia*). The question whether the ἄγραφοι νόμοι could also be considered in practice by courts of law or the Assembly, virtually *praeter legem*, remains less relevant.[90]

The unwritten laws, sanctioned through the divine will, do not offer, in this case, legal grounds for the trial, but, because of their unanimously acknowledged prestige and their religious dimension, they were responsible for the exacerbated indignation of the Demos. The moral law was responsible, after all, for the maximum penalty and for the tumultuous scenes within the *ekklesia*. The alternative proposals made by Euryptolemus, with respect to the trial procedure, show that the Assembly could choose between various possibilities for the conduct of the trial,

and consequently for the sentence. The accused could, in this way, have obtained a much milder punishment. Given the religious importance of the duty of burial, the enraged Assembly decided to take into account the extraordinary gravity of the crime.[91]

8.6.2 Xenophon and "historical truth"

The main problem that arises from this interpretation, which (rightly, in my view) privileges the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* tradition, is that it would imply that Xenophon the contemporary must have been telling lies. Mehl rather clumsily tries to explain that the historian omitted the essential part of the accusation (that was otherwise decisive for the trial) because of his Socratic education. On this view, the individualist religion preferred by philosophers like Socrates would not have attached much importance to the duty of burial, and this made Xenophon omit what he considered to be insignificant. Such an interpretation is called into question by the fact of the historian's well-known religiosity of a traditional kind. While it is possible to see in Xenophon, despite his traditional religiosity, an Illuminist outlook (that can be explained by his sometime membership of the Socratic circle), this very fact should have made him incline more towards condemnation of the "superstitions" of the Demos, exemplified by the case of the Arginusae.[92] Bleicken rightly criticized Mehl's view and attempted to defend Xenophon's credibility, arguing that it would have been impossible for him to have hidden such an important element of the accusation.[93]

In reality, it would be problematic to label Xenophon as a premeditated and shameless liar. His attitude towards reality is extremely questionable, however, as indicated by the tendentious manner in which he describes the Demos. The fact that he omitted the main aspect of the accusation in describing the trial appears, on closer examination, not to be a false assertion, but an equivocation. The historian does not actually tell an untruth, but simply omits a decisive detail. A reconstruction of the trial must show the reasons why the Athenian historian pretended not to know anything about those left unburied.

The constant attempt to denounce the Demos as a bunch of stupid peasants, a mob without any respect for the law, has been seen as a leitmotiv in Xenophon's report of the trial. The entire account is designed to make the reader believe that the democratic Assembly of the time represented the most degenerate state of political culture.[94] As a consequence, the author attempts to prove the tyrannical nature of the Demos and, as such, the serious decadence of the rule of the Athenian mob. He does so by labelling the trial a thorough perversion of justice, while presenting the accused generals as innocent, virtually sent like lambs to the slaughter. One should take this into account in reconstructing the events.

If the generals had been guilty as charged, and their condemnation had thus been just, with the whole procedure being explicable and justifiable, then it would be difficult to object to tumultuous scenes and the unruly attempts of the crowd to perturb the Assembly. Xenophon, however, modelled his narrative in a very subtle

way when, through the significant semantic mutation from τὸ πλῆθος to ὁ ὄχλος (from "crowd" to "mob") as an appellative for the Demos, he creates the impression "of increasing violence and illegality",[95] or when he omits to present what had happened before the trial, according to which it was not Theramenes, but the generals themselves who, far from being innocent, were the ones who started the dispute.[96]

Taking this into account, it becomes apparent that, even if the condemnation was only partly justified because the generals really neglected to pick up the bodies, the entire line of argumentation would compromise itself, and the violations of the law, so obvious in Xenophon's account, would appear, in the context, to be minor procedural flaws. Nevertheless, not even Mehl, who argued in favour of Diodorus' version, wants to admit that Xenophon "deliberately kept silence on the issue of neglecting burial duties, only to attack and denigrate the Athenian democracy".[97] This, however, is precisely what the historian, with his oligarchic inclinations, does. But it is useless to speak of pure arbitrariness, since Xenophon only omits the decisive detail that was responsible for the change in the accusation during the course of the trial.

8.6.3 A two-phase reconstruction of the trial

On their return, the generals had to face the manifest annoyance of the Athenians, in mourning because of their fallen relatives and fellow citizens who were left unburied. Fearing the displeasure of the gods, the demagogue Archedemus began hostilities by bringing Erasinides to justice for embezzlement and for the way in which he had carried out his generalship (περὶ τῆς στρατηγίας).[98] It is not at all unlikely that the first attack was directed against Erasinides, since he was the most vulnerable among the board of generals. The reason was probably that, as Xenophon states, he had objected to the rescue plan.[99] After Erasinides' arrest, the other five generals were also imprisoned, to be brought before the Demos for trial, after they had given their account before the Council of the way the battle unfolded, and of the proportions of the storm. Their story was deemed unsatisfactory.[100]

At the first meeting of the Assembly, the generals were accused, in the first instance, of not having saved the shipwrecked. In such a case, and if they had been responsible for the death of the seamen, the legal situation would have been clear, and sentence would have been pronounced rapidly and unequivocally.[101] But, when the generals denied the accusation, calling witnesses to the stand, it became clear that they could not be found guilty, since the storm had made any rescue mission impossible.[102] The expected acquittal did not occur only because it was too late to cast votes, since evening was already falling, and the meeting was postponed.[103]

The Apaturia festival took place between the two meetings of the Assembly, and, taking advantage of the fact, Theramenes began to plot in the most unsubtle manner. The strategy of the prosecution began to change, shifting the focus to the charge of not having had the bodies buried. This happened because the generals could no longer be considered guilty of not having saved the shipwrecked on

account of the violent storm, and especially because they had taken the decision to conduct a rescue before the storm hit.[104]

Once public opinion was swayed by the emergence of the mourners, whose relatives had only received a watery grave, Callixenus made the Council take a decision (*probuleuma*) according to which the guilt of the generals (who had already spoken about the issue in the previous meeting) would be voted upon, without granting them the opportunity to defend themselves further. By this proposal of the Council, quoted verbatim by Xenophon, together with the modalities of voting, the generals were accused of not picking up "the victors in the naval battle": οὐκ ἀνελόμενοι τοὺς νικήσαντας ἐν τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ.[105] In the subsequent description of the trial (apart from a passage within the defence speech of Euryptolemus), Xenophon still hesitates to name the shipwrecked as such, and he remains ambiguous even when citing the official text of the accusation. Apart from this, he says nothing of the physical state of "those who had won the battle". The verb ἀναιρέω also raises doubts about the way in which accusation was formulated. This is because apart from its principal meaning of "to pick up", the verb can be also translated as "to bury".

This also holds good for the frequently employed word ἀναίρεσις, which, besides meaning "picking up" (such as the wounded or shipwrecked), can also mean "burying".[106] Of course, the context indicates that here, perhaps, one should add τοὺς ναυαγούς, or τῶν ναυαγῶν, respectively. Granted these facts, and bearing in mind Diodorus' insistence in the matter, as well the arguments invoked above, Xenophon's ambiguity appears rather problematic. Although the accused could not have been found guilty for not saving the survivors, they certainly would have had the chance to pick up nearby floating bodies after the storm, just as they could have settled on part of the neighbouring shore in order to bury the bodies washed ashore.[107] In reality, the generals appear to have believed such an action to be futile, and since they could no longer rescue any survivors, they prioritized the military operation by advancing towards Mytilene to attack the rear of the Spartan fleet.[108]

The generals probably underestimated the religious feelings of their fellow citizens, or believed that an important military success, which would have convinced the by now fleetless Spartans perhaps to accept peace on any terms, would have rapidly silenced any criticism. They had pushed their luck much too far, however, because the Spartan Eteonicus had wisely, and rapidly, retreated with the Spartan fleet to Chios. After correctly assessing the importance to the Demos of religious issues, which had increased during the years of war, Theramenes and Callixenus, for various reasons, exploited the atmosphere in the Assembly and took advantage of the Demos' irritation (in the light of the flagrant violation of the religiously based moral law). In this way, they succeeded in having the generals convicted.

To begin with, Theramenes may have only tried to minimize and to camouflage his own role, and to put the blame exclusively on the generals; however, their political enemy, the demagogue Callixenus, wanted to overthrow the generals.[109] Although the storm rendered impossible the accusation of not rescuing the

survivors, Theramenes and Callixenus, after managing to get the generals accused of neglecting the burial customs, succeeded in making the Assembly convict them. The fact that they managed to do so (albeit with a small majority of votes) is related mainly to the religious consequences of the neglect of the proper burial of the dead. If this proposed reconstruction is correct, then we have to reconsider the religious issues, and see them as possessing considerable historical relevance. It is the religious factor again, just as it was with the impiety trials and the affair(s) of the Herms and the Mysteries in 415, that is symptomatic of the tense situation in the city during the war.

8.7 Assembly and religion: summary

If we recognize the great importance from a psychological point of view of the unexpected victory at Arginusae, then we can clearly see how much the Athenians harmed themselves by charging the generals with not recovering the fallen. By insisting on convicting the generals on charges of sacrilege, they lost the entire experienced high command, and thus turned the victory into a tremendous defeat. The amateurish behaviour that led to the crushing defeat of Athenian military forces at Aegospotami was the direct result of the leadership crisis caused by the Arginusae trial.

This shows, once again, the importance of the religious tradition for the Athenians, and how much they were ready to take action against violations of religious traditions and customs. If we take into account the realities of those times, Xenophon cannot be easily blamed for omitting a crucial point in the accusation, since his account follows its own internal logic, and shows his tendency to present the democracy as a less desirable and compromised form of rule. In fact, the Athenian democracy did not cover itself with glory by convicting the generals on a charge of failing to recover and bury the fallen. The moralizing judgement of Diodorus is well founded, in this case.

The conviction seems perfectly comprehensible – indeed fully justified – by the standards of those times, even though it was not a glorious event. The generals were clearly guilty of not fulfilling a religious obligation. This is confirmed by the fact that, despite the allegations of the two main sources (pursuing anti-democratic ideas), the Demos did not regret the decision afterwards. This leads to the conclusion that the generals were not innocent victims wrongly convicted for the deaths of the shipwrecked (who had, as a matter of fact, fallen victim to the storm).[110] The harsh judgement is not a prime example of a case of the perversion of justice, although the death sentence pronounced in the Assembly may seem to have been exaggerated.

Compared to the account of Xenophon, the behaviour of the Athenians is far from justified – as the more credible tradition of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* shows – but seems at least comprehensible and easy to accept in the light of the religious

disposition and feelings of the population. In this sense, the conviction was a direct result of the zeitgeist. Concerned about the fate of the fallen, and also frightened lest the impious incident should perturb the divine order, the Athenians involved themselves in a tense and emotional trial, following an exceptional victory. Irrational fears and religious feelings that, by modern standards, might be viewed as superstitious, prevailed over any rational political arguments and military requirements.[111]

The next chapter presents another supposed legal scandal, perhaps one of the most famous in history. The trial of Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus, became – in the Western tradition – a symbol of despotism and intolerance of the freedom of thought, and the Athenian philosopher himself became a kind of "founding father" of Enlightenment. We shall analyse in some detail whether the roles of "good" and "evil" were really played by Socrates on the one hand, and the Athenian jury on the other.

9
The trial of Socrates
An overview

Gott schuf den Menschen nach seinem Bilde, sagt die Bibel, die Philosophen machen es gerade umgekehrt, sie schaffen Gott nach dem ihrigen.[1]

9.1 Introduction

One of the best-known trials of antiquity is that of Socrates, who was tried before an Athenian court on charges of impiety in 399. The quasi-emblematic importance of the figure of Socrates for the history of European ideas, however, has led to certain distortions in modern perceptions of the trial and of the highly controversial sentence. The famous philosopher has often been considered the standard-bearer of an early Enlightenment, and this has caused some to consider the death sentence pronounced against the likeable son of Sophroniscus as a "judicial murder committed by those jurors who had no understanding for the dialectics of the philosopher".[2] When a retrial took place in Athens in 2012, before an international jury of experienced judges and jurists invited by the Onassis Foundation and the trial commented on by the world's media,[3] Socrates was this time acquitted and had his name cleared by his liberal, post-Enlightenment judges, since his defence counsel argued along the lines of Karl Popper's "Open Society". This verdict was, alas, a clear misjudgement. Only by applying modern standards, as was done by the 2012 jury, could Socrates have been acquitted. In fact, he was guilty as charged, the trial was perfectly correct, and no trace of the perversion of the course of justice can be found. In what follows, it will be argued that in the context of Athenian law and the general cultural background, neither the trial nor the death sentence were scandalous; still less did they represent "judicial murder".[4] If we analyse the case in the context of its religious implications and the tensions described above, it fits perfectly into the contemporary background. That this intellectual pioneer was perhaps way ahead of his time with some of his thoughts about gods and their nature is irrelevant here, even if it helps to explain the sorrow of modern commentators at the death of the notorious philosopher.

Though Socrates did not leave behind a single line of his philosophical thoughts, he nevertheless left the West the "Socratic problem", also known as the "Socratic question". This concerns the historical Socrates, his character and doctrine, on which thousands of pages have already been written. From antiquity to the present, a whole set of different interpretations of Socrates have made their way into the history of ideas. To the very different accounts of Plato and Xenophon, of Aristophanes in *Clouds* or of Aeschines of Sphettus, we must add the modern interpretations of Schleiermacher, Nietzsche, Taylor and Vlastos, to mention but a few.[5] Socrates thus appears to be not only the most interesting figure of antiquity, but also the most controversial.

Aristophanes, Xenophon and Plato are the most important ancient sources for Socrates. There is no scholarly consensus as to which of the very different accounts should be preferred. In the nineteenth century, Xenophon was considered the main witness. Then, at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, Socratic research prioritized, to varying extents, the testimonia in the early and late dialogues of Plato. Aristophanes has also been thought of as a reliable source, complementary to Plato.[6] Despite all the progress made in the "*Quellenkritik*" of the past hundred years or so, Socrates' personality is still controversial. It is worth mentioning here – by way of warning – the words of O. Gigon, who considered reconstructions of the doctrine and character of the philosopher as mere literary fiction, and who believed that any search for the "historical Socrates" lacked perspective.

> All we can be sure of is his origin and, perhaps, his father's profession; we know that he participated in several campaigns ..., and that he was involved as member of the council in the trial of the victorious generals of Arginusae (406 BCE), as well as in his own trial of 399 BCE. This is virtually everything that we know of Socrates.[7]

Apart from his personality, the exact circumstances and reasons for the trial are equally disputable; Plato apparently transmitted a credible report of the trial.[8] Space does not allow for a detailed analysis of the case, and such a task would prove virtually impossible in the light of the huge, relevant bibliography. An important recent work cites over 700 titles.[9] What follows consequently has the character of a summary and selective overall view, based on recent research.[10]

9.2 Preliminaries to the trial of Socrates

The central issue in the trial of Socrates is, briefly, the following: all would agree that he was put on trial and convicted of impiety because he held somewhat unconventional religious views. The written accusation that Meletus, the principal accuser, presented to the *basileus* as γραφή and preserved for us by Diogenes Laertius is very explicit: ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης, οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἕτερα

δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσηγούμενος ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων. τίμημα θάνατος.[11]

There is no doubt that a lack of respect for the gods of the polis, manifested (as we have seen) as disbelief, ignorance or even direct attacks on representations of such deities, was a chargeable offence at the time. So far, so good, but not all scholars are happy with this straightforward argument, and they consequently hunt through the sources in the hopes of finding the "real" and genuine causes of the conviction. This comes about because there are other factors in Socrates' case that cannot be disregarded. Socrates was not directly involved in the terror regime of the oligarchic revolutionaries in 404/3, since he had nothing to do with the rule of the Thirty. He may have even stood aloof from them in a conspicuous manner, without being necessarily a defender of democracy.[12] One almost gets the impression that these political events, so important in themselves for the city, would not have especially interested him. It is thus easy to understand how this attitude alone might make him unpopular after the restoration of democracy.

Even more questionable was Socrates' relationship with the members of the oligarchical putsch of 404; through their reign of terror, they brought much harm to the city. Some of them were considered to be pupils and confidantes of Socrates, and their beliefs appear to have been greatly influenced by the teachings of their master. This gave rise to the view that the elderly philosopher (*aet. c.* 70) was put on trial after the Peloponnesian War and subsequent civil war precisely because of his connection with the oligarchs.[13] The general view in recent scholarship is that the charge of impiety was merely a handle to bring the vexatious old fellow down. If he had been charged as a sophistic teacher, a free-thinker or a friend of the tyrants, he could not have been convicted, on account of the general amnesty decreed after the restoration of democracy.

A wise law decreed that "no evil should be remembered", in order to guarantee peace and friendship among the citizens in the future. Socrates could not have been simply arrested, and a "cunning plan" to invent an impiety trial was supposedly used to catch the alleged enemy of democracy; rather like Al Capone, condemned on a charge of tax evasion, since his other, far worse crimes could never be proved.

At first sight, this explanation seems plausible, since impiety-related accusations in the fourth century became a regular way to eliminate unpopular political adversaries, and were an effective weapon in political life.[14] On a more detailed look, however, such an interpretation is less than persuasive, as has been convincingly demonstrated by Brickhouse and Smith, whose arguments underlie what follows. According to them, the trial was religious.[15] Socrates was convicted of impiety, being guilty of such a charge, as we will show below, and was not the victim of an act of political revenge. We cannot, of course, exclude the possibility that political resentment against Socrates might have played a subliminal role in the trial, and that the newly restored democracy considered suspect the old man who had not gone to exile with the democrats. But Plato's *Apology* is silent on such issues.

This is the main thrust of this chapter. There is no need to paraphrase or analyse in detail the *Apology*. Nor shall we examine the reasons why Socrates behaved "socratically", so as to appear as an eccentric philosopher in his own special way. What we shall discuss, however, are the reasons why the jurors sentenced the elderly philosopher to death in the context of the religious evolutions that occurred throughout the Peloponnesian War.

It is almost irrelevant whether his fellow citizens (of whom 501 served as jurors in his trial) were also influenced by prejudices or wrong assessments. For a historical assessment of the trial, the most interesting question is why was Socrates, who had been mocking his fellow citizens with ironic questions for some forty years, only put on trial in 399? Since the charges laid against Socrates related entirely to the religious sphere (the third accusation, that he corrupted the youth, is somewhat subsidiary and derives from the other two: it was precisely because of his impiety that he was a danger to the youth who listened to him),[16] it seems best to examine first the religious views of the accused.

9.3 Socrates and religion

In discussing Socrates' religious views, it is once more evident that there are differences between Xenophon's and Plato's accounts. To the former, the accusation brought against his teacher is absurd, since his religious beliefs and his conduct in the civic context of religious celebration would not have differed from that of his fellow citizens.[17] Plato's Socrates, by contrast, "deviates radically from traditional religious belief", and he is "one of the great religious radicals of history", as G. Vlastos rightly noted.[18]

Much has been written on the connection between the most famous philosopher in the world and religion, but the few certain conclusions that can be drawn are limited to the observation that Socrates could not have been accused of a genuine "atheism", or that he did not believe in gods, as Meletus maintains in the *Apology*.[19] Socrates was definitely a religious man, of whose profound religiosity it has been said: "If we are to use Plato's and Xenophon's testimony about Socrates at all we must take it as a brute fact – as a premise fixed for us in history – that, far ahead of his time as Socrates is in many ways, in this part of his thought he is a man of his time".[20] A striking feature of Socrates' religious views is the understanding – always present in Plato's dialogues – that the gods by definition could do no harm.[21] This pure goodness of the gods clearly contradicts the entire mythical tradition, distinguished by the rivalry between the Olympians or by Herodotus: tales of the "envy of the gods". While the Ionian natural philosophers and the early critics of religion, such as Xenophanes, "mellowed" the gods to some extent as they looked for rational explanations for myths, Socrates submits the gods to the exigencies of reason and morality, equally valid for humans and gods.[22]

The American philosopher M. McPherran thinks that the moral critique of the *talion* is the most important of Socrates' innovations in the religious field. Greeks considered retaliation to be a generally valid ethical and moral imperative, a law that ruled relations between humans, between humans and gods, as well as between gods and their kind.[23] By contrast, Socrates states that one should not pay back evil with evil – human or divine.[24] The Socratic-Platonist philosophy seriously questioned the hitherto valid moral ideas and concepts of the Greeks, based on mutual retaliation.[25]

In the introductory chapter of this book, the fundamentals of polis religion and the imperatives of a normal religious life of a citizen, mainly based on a mutual *do-ut-des* relationship, are described in more detail. The principle of a mutual gift exchange between gods and humans was decisive in the religious views of the Greeks.[26] Current magical practices of curses, evil spells and any kind of "black" magic was based precisely on the fact that gods and demons were invoked by humans who wished that their adversary should "drop dead".[27] This is why the line between curse and prayer, strikingly, seems rather thin here.[28] The public sphere was no stranger to these practices. At the beginning of every session of the Council, a herald said a prayer that included a sacred curse against the enemies of the state: that they might suffer a terrible death, sent by the gods.[29] Similar curses were uttered at the beginning of the meetings held by the Assembly.[30] Plato speaks of itinerant soothsayers, promising to harm the enemies of their clients through offerings made to the gods, or to obtain some sort of "forgiveness" for the sins of those who paid for their services (a kind of indulgence).[31] According to the belief of the majority (οἱ πλεῖστοι), so long as the gods could be convinced through offerings and prayers, they would also be ready to help with the illegal acquisition of great riches and to absolve even the worst offenders of divine punishment (κατὰ πολλὰ ζημιῶν).[32] In this way, the Greek gods were "corruptible".[33] By contrast, Socrates' moral gods are of a significantly higher quality, and this is how the avant-garde philosopher ends up contradicting the religious customs of the others. As a consequence, this means that Socrates' gods, forced to do only good, cannot be influenced by offerings or magical practices.[34]

Another puzzling element of Socrates' religiosity is the famous *daimonion*, the inner voice so vibrant even since his childhood.[35] On the nature of this exclusive gift of a divine alarm system, always present at the right time, as a kind of a "hot line to the divine",[36] only a little can be said with certainty.[37] We can exclude the possibility that this feature was only a "disease of the ear", as Nietzsche suggested.[38] Socrates himself describes his inner voice as something "divine and supernatural" (θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον), and he explicitly shows that the accusation brought by Meletus would, in fact, have been directed against his inner voice.[39] Although it is highly unlikely that Socrates would have spoken of an ordinary divine being with anthropomorphic features, he holds the mystery of the origin and nature of his inner voice in suspense, since he does not even try to describe his *daimonion* as a normal phenomenon, similar to the mantic practices of soothsayers and *chresmologoi*.[40]

So much for the reconstruction of the religion that was specific to Socrates, and that differed from the current views of his time. But could these obvious differences from tradition be reason enough to regard an old man as a serious danger to the city and to charge him with a capital offence?

9.4 The trial

The development of the trial and the defence strategy of the accused have often been discussed – and they will be taken for granted here, so we can move on to details in the case.[41] We shall begin with a brief review of the main points of the accusation, and of the main arguments of Socrates' defence, since he had to defend himself against two different groups of accusers in the course of the trial. Apart from the "new accusers" (ὕστεροι κατήγοροι) who brought the case against him, the verdict of the jury seems to have been highly influenced by "earlier accusers" (πρῶτοι κατήγοροι) who had publicly calumniated him over the years.[42] The formal accusation included three charges laid before the *basileus* by Meletus and his accomplices, Anytus and Lykon: (1) Socrates does not recognize the gods that the state recognizes; (2) he introduces new divinities; and (3) he corrupts the youth.

Referring to the points of the accusation, to their importance and to the connection between them, it is necessary to determine the following (though even the conclusion may prove controversial): Socrates was accused of not observing certain *religious* norms. In the written complaint, he was charged not with atheism as such, but – and this needs to be emphasized – with insufficient respect for the accepted divinities of the state (οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεούς).[43] The accusation of θεοὺς μὴ νομίζειν obviously refers to the fact that Socrates did not respect the gods in the "normal" and mandatory way of his fellow citizens.[44] Instead of worshipping these divinities, he would introduce new ones without the obligatory approval of the polis (see Chapter 6 on "new gods"). This part of the accusation definitely refers to Socrates' *daimonion*, as is made especially clear by a passage of Plato, where a direct connection is made between the divine inner voice and Meletus' accusation.[45] The fact that Socrates seems to have introduced καινὰ δαιμόνια (that he preferred to the divinities of the polis) is a very vague formulation, deliberately devised – or so it would seem – to be ambiguous. In this way, the accusers could have drawn the jurors' attention to existing prejudices against Socrates, which were also doubtless equally non-specific and vague.[46] These prejudices and calumnies, as Socrates states in the *Apology*, were rumours spread by the "old accusers", who, apart from Aristophanes, remained anonymous.

One of the main purposes of the *Apology* is to contest these informal accusations. Aristophanes' *Clouds*, Socrates insists, would have stimulated the current misconceptions regarding his person.[47] As we had occasion to note (in dealing with the Sophists), Socrates appears in this comedy produced in 423 BCE as a caricature of contemporary intellectuals. Aristophanes elaborated the dramatic character

"Socrates" as a mixture of a charlatan-sophist, a natural philosopher, a partisan of new gods and the real Socrates. Because of the unsubtle mockery, it is difficult to determine the points in common between the stage Socrates and the real one. We could admit, with K. J. Dover, that the poet used the well-known figure of the philosopher in order to represent widespread preconceptions against intellectuals.[48] In so far as we can say anything about Socrates as a real historical person, despite his depiction in *Clouds*, he did not act as a paid teacher of sophistic rhetoric or as natural philosopher.[49]

Strikingly, Aristophanes did his best to present the dramatic character as a supporter of the new gods (the Clouds), for whom the traditional divinities of the polis did not mean anything any more.[50] The cult of the Clouds excludes all the traditional cults, and Aristophanes' pupil Strepsiades is forced by the dramatic character of Socrates to admit only three deities: Chaos, the Clouds and the Tongue.[51] This is precisely why the Socrates of the *Apology* considered these ancient and obviously unfounded calumnies as a greater danger than the new and concrete accusation.[52]

Socrates was able to assess the situation this way because practising natural philosophy was highly suspicious in Athenian eyes, and belonged – to them – in the same category as unconventional ideas about the gods.[53] These calumnies – augmented by rumours, and fostered by public appearances of the philosopher as someone "with a divine mission" – left Socrates at the mercy of the jurors, and probably had a decisive influence on the vote. Perhaps this is why he was seen as a natural philosopher, suspected of disbelief in the gods.[54] Accordingly, his defence strategy was oriented towards making the jurors compare the unfounded calumnies with what they actually knew about him as a person.[55]

9.5 Was Socrates guilty?

Before we study the question of guilt, it is necessary to note that it is entirely irrelevant that Socrates' religious ideas (such as the good and just gods, or his belief in an inner voice [*daimonion*]) are wholly acceptable to the modern observer, and also against the background of contemporary Greek religion, in so far as it is known to us.[56]

It is thus important to ask: "How was the philosopher appreciated and perceived by his fellow citizens?" If we take into account the moralizing view of Socrates, the way he interpreted the gods as good and just, then it becomes apparent that it was precisely this assessment that was opposed to unanimously accepted beliefs. The citizens worshipped the divinities of the polis, not because of their unconditional sense of justice, but, in the first place, because of their benefit for the community and their unconditional support obtained by observing cult practices and by bringing offerings. Such support might be against the will of other gods and "even contrary to justice".[57]

It is entirely uncertain whether all or only some of the jurors who sentenced Socrates to death were aware of these abstract philosophical differences between "Socratic religion" and the religious traditions of the majority.[58] They were probably won over more by the accusation that Socrates wanted to introduce new gods, a charge that could easily be related to his special *daimonion*.[59] Perhaps also the fact that just men no longer tolerated this vexatious individual played a tangential role in the conviction of Socrates, and they just wanted to get rid of him.[60] The old calumnies, constantly brought against the "adversary of the Sophists who argued using the sophistic technique",[61] and which he tried to combat most vociferously, seemed to have played an especially significant role in his conviction.

Because of his unusual view of the gods, Socrates acquired the role of a "reformer of religion", and thus could be perceived as danger to traditional religion.[62] To members of the Judeo-Christian tradition, the moral gods of Socrates' imagination do not sound especially revolutionary. "For those bred on Greek beliefs about the gods", however, "it would be shattering".[63] The ethical character of Socrates' metamorphosed gods meant, in fact, the abolition of the old gods of tradition and the creation of new deities: this was indeed the charge brought by the prosecution against the seventy-year-old man.[64] McPherran has described the repercussions of the Socratic religious philosophy on cult practice: "take away the conflicts of the myths and you defuse their psychological power, take away the expectations of particular *material* rewards and physical protections in cult, and you disconnect the religion of everyday life from its roots."[65] The fact that, to this day, the case, heard by a regular jury and without any procedural flaws, is often viewed by modern scholars as "judicial murder", and Exhibit A in the downfall of Athenian democracy, can be explained by the sentiments of members of modern liberal societies who consider the "good Gods" of Socrates to be somehow forerunners of Christian ideals. Their religious beliefs are very close to the "good gods" of Socrates, who seemingly – via Plato – anticipated some aspects of Christianity.

Although we have cautiously answered the question of guilt in the affirmative, it must be emphasized that this aspect is of secondary importance in the context of our brief outline. The important question is not the degree to which Socrates' religious beliefs and may have been "true", or to their social repercussions, but whether the jurors at that significant point in time (after the end of a long and unsuccessful war) believed, or could believe, that the philosopher was guilty of impiety.

Even when we set aside the philosophical subtleties of Socratic doubt concerning the ambiguous character of the mythical gods, and concentrate on his convictions as presented in the *Apology* and other Platonic dialogues, as well as in the writings of Xenophon,[66] only taking into account the impact of his beliefs on the judges, the condemnation for impiety appears to have been fully justified. This is all the more obvious if we consider the effect the charge had on the jurors, as well as the (somewhat striking) assumption of the plaintiff, who was said to hear an exclusive divine voice. As emphasized above, the vague terms in which the charge of impiety was couched made it easy to interpret the charge against the background of actual

beliefs; impiety was what the jurors considered to be such in a trial at a certain time.[67] Socrates' defence strategy thus seems not to have been effective enough to convince the jury of his innocence.

The philosopher defends himself vigorously against his bigoted adversary Meletus, who charges him with not believing in the gods at all. Socrates can refute this accusation with ease and, furthermore, succeeds in making his accuser look ridiculous. However, Socrates does not respond to the concrete charges brought by the accusers: the reproach that he did not recognize the gods of the city, and that he wanted to introduce new gods. Socrates does not mention even once the name of a god that he recognizes. That "the god", who issued instructions to Socrates, was in fact Delphic Apollo can only be deduced indirectly.[68]

It is here that Socrates is culpably negligent. He failed to convince the jurors that his opinions on the nature of the gods did not differ from traditional views and from the beliefs shared by most of his fellow citizens, and that these opinions would not endanger public order. The prevailing legal situation of the time allowed the condemnation of Socrates on a charge of impiety, in full conformity with the existing norms, as in other cases, such as the trials for impiety of philosophers and the mutilators of the Herms, discussed earlier in this book.

In this case, too, political reasons are mixed with religious. The jurors had two closely related motives to condemn Socrates. On the one hand, they could believe that the peculiar and deviant religious views of the accused, that could certainly be labelled "radical",[69] presented a real threat to the city, in such a way that toleration of these widely disseminated views might evoke the wrath of the gods.[70] On the other hand, the third charge, that Socrates had corrupted the youth, implied a political dimension that constituted the basis of the trial. The *public* action (perhaps even "ministry") of Socrates, even if he denies in the *Apology* that he acted as a teacher,[71] led to the impression that he might undermine public morals. He was known for his ability to make "mincemeat of traditional opinions" held by his interlocutors in discussions on the marketplace.[72]

Socrates, indeed, described his philosophical efforts as a "divine mission", which forced him – though he was mainly a moral philosopher – to comment on religious issues as well.[73] This publicly articulated dissent towards the gods of the polis makes it obvious that the jurors in 399 had every reason to stop Socrates. McPherran describes the situation before the court and, as such, the atmosphere of the post-war period, by means of neat comparison:

> After all, consider the position of a court packed with modern, pious Greek farmers who, in time of need, turn to the Blessed Virgin and/or personal name-saints. Informed by an intellectualist critic that the mother of Jesus was no virgin and that the name-saint is no miracle worker "as the stories say", our farmers would be entirely within their rights to hold that this critic does not recognize the existence of their divine helpers "under their description", a description that for them makes all the difference in the world.[74]

Against this background, the closing words of the accused, spoken before the jury voted, are particularly significant: he states that he does believe that there are gods, and "in a far higher sense than that in which any of my accusers believe in them" (νομίζω τε γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς οὐδεὶς τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων).[75] This sentence contains, in a nutshell, the decisive grounds for conviction. Socrates probably thought (in a somewhat arrogant way) that his view of divinity and his way of worshipping the gods were much superior. Consequently, this assertion confirms that his way of νομίζειν was fundamentally different from the practice of his fellow citizens. Perhaps this comment can be taken as a partial admission of guilt.[76] In any case, 281 of the 501 jurors disagreed with Socrates' view that he had a better religion.

9.6 The year 399 BCE

Why did the Athenians wait so long to put Socrates on trial? The comedy that had focused on his impiety was produced in 423. An answer to the question can only be given after a review of the general situation of Athens at the time. The situation of the city and the state of public morale in the post-war period, as well as the close connection between the political climate and the trial of Socrates, have been most adequately summarized by R. Parker: "the decision to prosecute an old man for saying and doing what he had been saying and doing unmolested for so many years must have been a response to the wounds of recent history: a lost war, a lost empire, an oligarchic *coup*".[77] In 399, Athens was no longer a place of free and open debate. It had become, through failure in war, a place far removed from the city that Pericles had lauded in the Funeral Speech of 430, renowned for its free and liberal atmosphere.[78] It was now a city characterized by mutual suspicion and religious paranoia. Fear and loathing kept Athens in their grip.

After the war, the once-proud leaders of the Delian League had to face the ruins of their imperialist policy. The loss of their maritime empire not only led to the loss of power and of international influence, but had also disastrous consequences for the self-confidence and assurance of the Athenians, which had until then permanently been in the ascendant since the Persian Wars. Having lost their fleet (the foundation of their power), and having had the long walls torn down, the city experienced a deep depression, accentuated by the excesses of the Thirty. Democracy was only reintroduced with the approval of the Spartan king Pausanias,[79] and once restored, it had not yet been consolidated, and the future was uncertain. But in 401, the oligarchs who still held Eleusis as a beachhead hired mercenaries to conquer the city by means of a surprise attack. The democrats were able to defeat their enemies without the intervention of the Spartans.[80] In 399, people were still suffering from old misfortunes and dangers recently survived, and they had no reason to be optimistic for the future.

In this situation, the fostering of religious tradition, about all that was left to the Athenians after their loss of political dominance, was of essential importance.

Just as in the former states of the socialist bloc after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, where religious needs, for a long time oppressed, were met by the revitalization of the Orthodox Church, or as in post-war Germany, where the survivors, left with no illusions, filled the churches, the Athenians returned to religion as a response to recent events.[81]

The moment of truth for Socrates, whose activities had not been punished earlier, occurred precisely in this post-war context. He was not the only one to undergo a trial in these circumstances. The same year of 399 saw the trial of Andocides, whose connection with the scandals of the Herms and Mysteries were dug out from old files, as well as the trial against Nicomachus, who had been in charge of revising the sacred law.[82] The latter was blamed for not having taken religious tradition into account, for being impious and for coming forward with forbidden innovations of the sacred laws and for the cult calendar.[83] The accuser develops an exacerbated religious rhetoric against the alleged sacrilege of Nicomachus. He draws the conclusion that the city could have developed and become strong only because their forefathers had made offerings in conformity with inherited custom. Thus, the jury would have to judge according to the ancient laws, since the innovations made by Nicomachus in his role of *anagrapheus* would have been against the interests of the city. Besides, the accused would have introduced into the calendar, without permission, expensive new celebrations and offerings, despite the difficult financial situation of the polis.[84] In these times, religious arguments prevailed, at least in the most important legal confrontations.

Against this background, we can easily see the connection between the first impiety trials (of the period when the Plague was most intense) and the trial against Socrates (when Athens displayed the worst political and moral decadence). The almost identical formulations of the decree of Diopeithes and of the accusation against Socrates clearly denotes the structural similarity between the trials and, as such, the fact that the religious aspects (manifested in the context of those trials) belonged to a coherent phase of Athenian history, influenced by a growing tendency towards religious conformity. On the basis of the religious trials in the period following the war, and even more of the impiety trial against Socrates, we can clearly observe the Athenian tendency to make a connection between current misfortune and divine punishment.[85] As a consequence, the three religious trials also appear to be signs of a growing vigilance against religious nonconformity and as some kind of "natural popular response" of the citizens to the events that led to Athens' defeat.[86] In this context, the trial of Socrates can, indeed, be seen as a "collective civic rite of purification and reincorporation: purifying the citizen body by purging it of a cancerous irreligious traitor, and reincorporating it on a renewed, democratic basis", as Cartledge recently concluded, drawing on the same arguments.[87]

Thus, we have come full circle. The attention paid by the Athenians to religious issues, and the harsh punishment of religious dissidents from Anaxagoras to Socrates prove to be distinct features of a time of successive crises, and they did not come to an end immediately with the fall of Athens. In the years following the

war, at a time when Sparta controlled politics in Greece, no one could foretell that Athens, after her dreadful fall, would once more play the role of *hegemon*, albeit with more limited powers, within a second Athenian League.[88]

9.7 An overview of the fourth century

An examination of the subsequent evolution of the polis shows that respect for traditional values, and the orientation towards religion brought about by the atrocities of the war, were only episodic in the religious history of Athens. The deep uncertainty of the last third of the fifth century BCE marked the Athenians profoundly, but it did not lead in any way to fundamental changes in the cultic sphere or in that of religious representation. With regard to religion and its practice, we can say that the post-war period caused things to come back to normal. The feasts and sacrifices organized by the state were held on a regular basis as usual; people brought offerings to the gods as in former times, and the prayers followed the custom. The profound traces left in Western thought by the Sophists and Socrates were accepted only by a few intellectuals of the period, and were but rarely adopted in later ancient philosophy.[89] The great importance of the Sophists for the European history of ideas, which can hardly be overestimated, should not hide the fact that their daring ideas about religion were ephemeral in their own time.[90] There is not even one surviving text from the Sophists, and we only know of Socrates' philosophy from the writings of his pupils.

The fourth century was a time when the politician Lycurgus, of the sacerdotal family of the Eteobutades, exerted a great influence, and we can observe a distinctly conservative religio-political trend. Under the influence of Lycurgus, there was at Athens an intense preoccupation with traditional religion, which he did much to initiate and promote.[91] As the forensic speeches of the fourth century show, religious arguments and references to religious issues and piety in everyday life were used all the time, showing the unabated relevance of the religious tradition. As Martin has recently underlined, religious arguments were routinely used, especially in public trials, and a major speech in a political trial without any references to the religious sphere "was in practice unthinkable in fourth-century Athens".[92]

In striking contrast to the religious "imports" during the Peloponnesian War, no foreign god (except for the Egyptian Ammon) was brought to Athens in the fourth century.[93] The few essential changes in the cultic sphere were mostly related to the omission of the imperial aspect of Attic religion,[94] which was the keystone of the religious policy of the Athenian Delian League.[95] There is another noticeable fact: towards the end of the fourth century, personified abstractions such as ἀγαθὴ τύχη, δημοκρατία or εἰρήνη gained cultic honours.[96] In the past, this evolution was seen as a "sign of decay, of the erosion of the old religion";[97] more recent scholarship has, however, shown that such cult personifications had a long tradition, traceable back to the archaic period.[98]

The substance and nature of religion as practised was not, however, touched by these innovations, of which people were only partially aware.[99] We can therefore determine, with good arguments, a striking level of consistency in the field of religion and cult in the case of Athens, at least for the fourth century. Changes in individual religiosity, mainly characteristic of the Hellenistic period, are not yet manifest. This is why we can safely conclude, in accord with J. D. Mikalson, that Athenian religion of the Hellenistic era was dominated by continuity with the classical period.[100]

Only in the later Hellenistic period can we distinguish changes that relate directly to people's religiosity, changes to which scholars have given the term "individualism". Only in the third century BCE, when the conquests of Alexander brought about major changes in the conception of the Greek world, now influenced by closer contacts with other cultures, did changes in the sphere of cult and people's religiosity came to pass.[101] Despite the so-called "decline of the polis" which, according to older views, would have been accompanied by a similar decline in traditional religion, religion was still focused on the universe of the polis, since the polis was still "the reference area, even in a radically larger world" for each individual.[102] The Greek Mystery cults, which originated in archaic times and which had their place in the normal religious life of the Greek polis, were complemented by new cults, mostly from recently conquered regions, and which are generally regarded as containing genuinely individualistic tendencies and aspects of a religion of redemption. Even these important innovations remain, however, structurally speaking, "more like a diversification of the older views than their transformation and alteration".[103]

In any case, the fourth century witnessed only superficial changes, with hardly any influence on the nature of religion and its structural dimension. This is why, in retrospect, the period of the Peloponnesian War appears to have been a time of great internal stress and tension, when the endangered citizens inclined towards religion with a particular devotion. Different strategies were used to fight the crisis. Apart from the need to find scapegoats, a need whose first targets were notorious critics of religion, this period was especially characterized by a concern for religious traditions, as well as by an increasing need to seek religious alternatives within the polytheistic system. Nevertheless, the very special circumstances of the war did not bring about entirely new views of the gods or sustainable changes in the cult practices.[104] The fourth century, and especially the Lycurgan period, was distinguished by a return to normal. It remains a matter of debate whether, as is often suggested, the Hellenistic era brought about important changes in the sphere of religion and religiosity, or whether Hellenistic religion differed fundamentally from that of the classical period. But that is another story.

APPENDIX I
Athenian democracy
Modern views and ancient realities

The ideal picture of the Athenian society outlined by Popper (1992) in 1945 – influenced by the Second World War – immediately met with opposition (e.g. Levinson 1953), and is discussed nowadays only from the perspective of the history of ideas (Frede 1996). New approaches of comparative studies to ancient and modern democracy, which have mainly focused in recent years on the similarities (e.g. Ober & Hedrick 1996; another view in Finley 1980), have benefited from favourable circumstances at the end of the twentieth century, notably from abundant funding as a result of the 2,500th "anniversary" of democracy.

An idealized image of Athens seems to dominate even the work of non-specialists, exemplified by Irving Stone's popular book (1988). The history of reception can be found in Näf (1999: col. 278–91), Münkler & Llanque (1999: col. 721–38) and Nippel (2010). On the one hand, there have been generally positive appreciations of the Athenian state, such as those expressed by Grote from a nineteenth-century liberal position, concentrating on "liberal" aspects, or by Wilamowitz (1901: 27–83), who focused on imperialist tendencies as well as on the constitutional principles of the Athenians. On the other hand, there has also been a strong anti-democratic tradition in the estimation of Athenian democracy that lasted until the twentieth century. This negative view was long predominant, but modern reassessment of the issue may give rise to the impression that reaction to Athenian democracy was always positive.

Nevertheless, many scholars in Western democracies, and especially German or Austrian refugees living as expatriates since the 1930s, mainly in England or the United States, identified themselves with Athenian democracy during the Nazi dictatorship and during the Second World War (e.g. Popper). A generally positive picture of Athenian democracy, with roots in this post-Second World War tradition, dominates (with few exceptions) modern views of ancient democracy. In

the United States for the most part, comparisons between Athenian and modern democracy found a favourable reception, and books appeared like mushrooms after heavy rain; witness the collections of essays in Euben *et al.* (1994), Ober & Hedrick (1996), and many others (listed and commented on by Nippel 2010: 324–50). A recent volume edited by Hernández (2010) has a collection of valuable essays and many references. An assessment by Roberts (1994: 295–305) concludes:

> Though academics are generally less facile in their judgements [sc. than journalists] and less sentimental in their attachments, it remains true, that particularly among English-speaking scholars, the last quarter of the twentieth century has on the whole been kind to the Athenians. This orientation arises in part from uncritical assumptions that continue to connect democracy with liberalism and the open society. (298)

In such a context, it is easy to explain attempts to reduce the importance of impiety trials in Athens, and to interpret them, when there is no escaping the fact of their existence, as dominated by political issues. Thus, Dover (1975) and Wallace (1994), followed by Hansen (1989, 2010), present the trial of Socrates as an exceptional "gaffe", and as a unique "infringement of the individual's freedom of expression" (Hansen 2010: 337). As a result, these scholars present all the other impiety trials as largely inventions of later "Hellenistic" scribes, who wrote under the spell of the condemnation of Socrates. Until recently, scholars have interpreted the trials of the mutilators of the Herms and the profaners of the Mysteries, as well as the trial of the generals at Arginusae, mostly from the perspective of their political importance.

A brilliant book by Hansen (1995a), written with an engaging and attractive enthusiasm for Athenian democracy, describes fourth-century Athens as a genuine constitutional state under the rule of law, broadly comparable with modern democratic states in the Western world, where the citizen was indeed protected against the arbitrary acts of the state (but see too the rarely cited article of Gschnitzer (1995), who discusses the main structural differences between ancient and modern democracy).

To the question asked in the title of a brief essay: "Was Athens a democracy?", Hansen (1989) gives an entirely positive answer. His brilliant arguments are presented in a highly plausible manner, and they are concisely summarized in Hansen (2010). Here he emphasizes the close connections between ancient and modern liberal democracies: "As a set of political ideals ancient *demokratia* is strikingly similar to modern liberal democracy" (Hansen 1989: 28; see too Ober 1989: 9: "the Athenian example has a good deal to tell the modern world about the nature and potential of democracy as a social and political organization"). This is a rather daring conclusion, and, in fact, a comparison with the Greek term for freedom (ἐλευθερία) does not stand close examination (Hansen 1989: 8–21; cf. Hansen 1995a: 75–82, and the exhaustive discussion in Hansen 2010). Hansen rightly stresses that one

should not make such issues as the participation of foreigners, women and slaves in the political life of the state into touchstones of democracy, since this is indeed irrelevant to the discussion, because in modern democracies too, only citizens have full rights, and women obtained the right to participate in some democracies only after the Second World War (in some regions of Switzerland, only in the 1970s, and in Liechtenstein, as late as 1984). The claim that *eleutheria* meant a licence to participate actively in politics unites ancient and modern ideas of liberty.

However, the idea that the ancient concept of freedom was closely related to our modern, liberal understanding of this issue is to go too far, and is hardly more than wishful thinking. Our modern concept of freedom is, apart from its "positive" aspect of the freedom "to live as one likes" (in Aristotle's words *Pol.* 1317b12–13) and to participate actively in the affairs of the state, also defined as "negative freedom", that is, freedom *from* something (on the classical division between positive and negative freedom, see the influential work of Berlin 1969, first published 1958). Negative freedom means, in concrete terms, the freedom from arbitrary acts of state authorities, and the freedom from political pressure on citizens, guaranteed by *individual rights*, today primarily human rights. To claim such "negative" freedom for the ancient Athenians is a deliberate misunderstanding of the reality of Athenians' legal practice and of their concept of the state. To put it bluntly: the citizens existed for the state, not the state for the citizens.

Modern democratic theory puts matters precisely the other way round, deriving from the individual. In Athens, "freedom meant the rule of law and participation in the decision-making process" (Finley 1993: 181). In this way, the powers of the state in theory had no limits, and the state could intervene in all spheres of human life (cf. Finley 1993: 181). In fact, the famous passage of Pericles' Funeral Speech on personal freedom (Thuc. 2, 37, 2, "we are not angry with our neighbour if he does what he likes") relates primarily to the idea of freedom from interference from other individuals, since Pericles continues in the same passage: "we obey the authorities and the laws."

To discuss another example in brief: Hansen claimed that plaintiffs protesting in court that their private house was violated, or that a private individual had arbitrarily sent the "police" (the Eleven) against an enemy owing money to the state, by getting him arrested, would prove by their testimony that there existed a concept of "negative freedom": in effect, the right of the physical integrity and privacy of your own property. But is not the mere fact that one had to file a lawsuit and to complain about such violations precisely the proof that such things normally happened, apparently without any consequences (see further Rubel 2012a: 46–50)? How to confront this issue? How can it be that, using the same evidence, two scholars can come to completely contradictory conclusions, both claiming that they are right, unless one of them is not very bright (and this is certainly not the case with Hansen)?

This is a controversial issue, because Popper's sympathetic 1945 book, when it touches on the question of democracy, only discusses voting; or if democracy

is defined, it is already characterized in ancient Athens by a set of values similar to our own. Thus, the members of Hansen's camp include: Raaflaub (1985, to some extent), Wallace (1996), Ober (2005), Liddel (2007) and Herman (2006). On the other side are: Finley (1975: 1–23, 1980, 1993), Mulgan (1984: 7–26), Sartori (1987), Rahe (1992) and Wood (1996: 121–37), who clearly distinguish the Greek concept of freedom from the modern. Do these two opposing camps discuss a question that can be given a yes or no answer?

The crucial point, as often, is in the eye of the beholder, and is associated with methodological and epistemological issues. Scholars who compare ancient democracies with their modern successors evidently think mostly of the influence of the ancient world on the modern: tradition, legacy, reception and so on. But perhaps the solution to the problem has more to do more with the influence of the modern on the ancient world. In the first chapter, I mentioned another Danish scholar, the ethnologist Knut Rasmussen, who asked an Eskimo whether he "believed" in gods. It was a question the latter could scarcely understand, since the concept "to believe or not in the divine" was completely alien to him. It is not too much to suppose that the concept of individual, "negative" freedom would be similarly alien to an Athenian, integrated in a tight community, if asked about the significance of his *personal and individual rights*. We might concede to Hansen and others that the Athenians did try to respect some basic rights (what Ober 2005 calls "quasi-rights") that we today consider essential; however, it was not because these rights were inalienable and attested, but because they liked to do so and acted for reasons of equity, from a commonly shared feeling that it was just. They were proud that at Athens, a citizen could "live as he liked" and say whatever he had on his mind, since in Sparta he could not do this (though nor could he even at Athens, if it was considered impious).

Freedom of speech was indeed a marvellous feature of Athenian democracy and one that brings the Athenians closer to us, but it is only superficially identical with our modern concept of democracy, as Saxonhouse (2006) could demonstrate. However, so long as courts, and especially the fifth-century Assembly, could also act wilfully "as they liked", by putting the generals at Arginusae to death, or by condemning intellectuals – notably Socrates – we can only speak of such personal rights with reservation. Theoretically, the assembly could have enacted a law, or at least a decree, to kill all citizens who were cross-eyed (not so far-fetched; witness the decision, later revoked, to send ships to Mytilene to unlawfully kill all the inhabitants, Thuc. 3, 37–40). That said, it is clear where the main differences lie, concerning concepts of freedom, ancient and modern. If we admit that there were customary or common rights, generally accepted by the community, we must insist that the crucial difference from modern individual rights is that they were *not inalienable*. But this is exactly what separates a "*Rechtsstaat*", a constitutional state under the rule of law, from other states, irrespective of whether one can vote there or not (on the theory of the "*Rechtsstaat*", the rule of law, see Sobota 1997).

But what is so horrible about the idea, that the Athenians, the Greeks, did not share the idea of individual and inalienable rights? If true, this would mean that they were not like us. Since we are used to loving "our" Greeks and, quite reasonably, admiring their incredible achievements, it is particularly hard to find them doing things we do not like. Hansen puts the problem, which is mainly an epistemological one, like this: "If the Athenians had no notion of individual freedom, it is a mystery to me that they are able to describe it in words and phrases that are *so close* to those used by modern champions of freedom" (Hansen 2010: 338, italics mine). This closeness is in fact the nub of the issue. We feel this closeness because our language relating to modern concepts was developed and polished by the great thinkers of the Renaissance and especially of the Age of Enlightenment, using and adopting the words and phrases they found in Aristotle, for example. "The Ancients" were the "benchmark" and the only point of reference allowed for philosophy. While Republicanism drew heavily on the Roman ideal, the nineteenth century discovered the "sublime" Greeks (such as Cleisthenes as the founder of democracy), and their civilization, mirrored in the expectations of the nineteenth century, dominated Europe as a guiding principle (Rubel 2012a: 243–50). Thus, the Greeks always will be "our" Greeks, the Athenians will always be "our" Athenians, and this makes it particularly difficult to assess their achievements and their morals in the correct pre-modern context, and to accept that they did not share all of our ideals. Nevertheless, highly idealized accounts of Athenian history are still published that are mere projections of wishful thinking about the altruistic and gentle Athenians, living together in perfect harmony (Herman, 2006; to be read with Christ, BMCR 2007.07.37). J. T. Roberts accurately stated that, by modern standards, "the Athenians were not very nice people" (1994: 312). We should perhaps speak not so much about people, nice or not, but about standards.

The trial of Socrates is only a shameful sign of the "downfall" of Athens if we apply modern standards (and it has therefore to be singled out as a unique occurrence, while references to other trials for impiety must be later inventions). The Athenians tried Socrates because of his evident impiety, which was against their laws (they could have passed others). They tried the generals in 406 because they wanted to. If they thought, in the fourth century, that it would be better to have *nomothetes* to distinguish between laws and decrees (*Norm und Einzelfallentscheidung*), and to concentrate judicial activities in the courts, they were free to do so (they could have done the contrary as well). In a nutshell, the Athenians were great and their democracy was great, but they were not like us.

APPENDIX II
Tragedy and history, Euripides and religion

During the past few years, I have had the opportunity to reflect on Greek tragedy and its political context. Indeed, I have changed my mind on this issue, but only in one minor aspect. In 2000, I held the view that tragedy at Athens was free from any "political" content and should rather be seen puristically as "*l'art pour l'art*" (cf. Griffin 1998). I am now convinced that Athenian tragedy contained allusions to the "issue of the day", as well as to specific politicians (cf. Vickers 2008). But I am also convinced that it is very hard for us to identify these allusions and to make sense of them after 2,500 years; in fact, I very much doubt that we can ever get beyond mere guesswork.

It goes without saying that literature of any kind is always part of a specific context, and reflects traditional mentalities and concepts. In the case of Athenian drama, it was certainly, in the first place, the setting of part of the *Dionysia*. Not only was this its origin, but it also provides the framework within which drama took place. The Athenian playwright did not "create" a theatrical performance "out of the blue", but employed mythological and ritual discourse, reflecting tradition as well as the actual expectations of the audience (Bierl 2007: 2). On the other hand, I am still very much of the opinion that tragedy was not a democratic institution (cf. Rhodes 2003); nor was it a tool or a medium of education; nor, as Meier claimed, did it consist of "*Handlungsanweisungen*", a list of instructions to help citizen peasants cope with the challenge of ruling an empire, or comments on political change as means of appeasing and uniting the community (the disempowerment of the Areopagus is supposedly thus commented on in *Eumenides*). Two points require discussion: (1) the question of our general understanding of tragedy, probably distorted by the didactic role of the modern theatre which, from Gotthold Ephraim Lessing to Bertolt Brecht, Jean Genet and Harold Pinter, has been perceived as a moral court of judgement; as what Lessing called a "*Bildungsanstalt*"

for the bourgeoisie; and (2) the extent to which we may draw conclusions about the personal convictions of the author, especially Euripides, from words spoken by characters in plays.

At the end of the twentieth century, the focus has shifted again with regard to the didactic and instructive aspect of classical tragedy. More recent works (e. g. Meier 1988; Gregory 1991: 3–17; Croally 1994: 17–47) see the dramatic poets as more like educators than real authors, and put the plays in a more sociological context as performances of civic identity and as deeply connected with democracy, where theatre at Athens was a kind of democratic institution (Goldhill 1987, 2000; Seaford 2000). In a marked contrast to Aristotle, modern critics assume, in the overtones of the plays, certain judgements, sometimes general, at other times specific, which seem to have been peculiar to tragedy (esp. Meier 1988: 226–39, esp. 43–4 and 239). Not only the *ekklesia*, but also the theatre, was a place where citizens came together in celebration and assured each other of "civic identity". Plays had a mainly political function "intended for civic instruction" (Gregory 1991: 185), which was achieved by poets acknowledged as superior pedagogues. The stage would thus not only have imparted political or ideological information, but it would have also recommended explicit types of political conduct (Meier 1988: 99–111). It is clear in a play such as Euripides' patriotic *Supplices*, where King Theseus delivers a speech before the arrogant messenger from Argos on the advantages of democracy in Athens, that general political knowledge and patriotic pathos are included (on tragedy and democratic self-knowledge, see now Mills 1997: 97–104 and *passim*). There is no denying that there was some political content in the plays; for example, apart from the defence of democracy in Euripides' *Supplices*, democratic ideals are presented Aeschylus' play of the same name, and he makes observations about the Areopagus in his *Eumenides*. This is precisely what Rhodes called "the ideological underpinning of fifth-century drama" (Rhodes 2003: 113).

There are two major objections to this school of thought. (1) To maintain the democratic-educational approach to tragedy, it is necessary to exclude Artistotle's *Poetics* as completely anachronistic, and to assume that the individual who told us nearly everything we know about Athenian democracy in his *Athenaion politeia* had no idea of the obvious link between democracy and tragedy, and evidently had no idea of the deeper sense of Athenian tragedy that he devoted his *Poetics*, since he came to Athens some forty years after the deaths of Sophocles and Euripides. (2) If the political advisory role was all that there was to tragedy, hardly anyone today apart from a few classicists would give a hoot about *Antigone*, which is staged in dozens of theatres in Europe and the USA every year.

To begin with the second objection, I would argue as follows. Greek tragedy has preserved its charm until today because it displays human values and human conflicts – love, affection, enmity, family ties, revenge, loyalty, treason and so on – and wraps all this in really good stories, performed by authentic characters. There is a rule in poetics: world literature is defined by quality, and if the three tragedians have survived together with Marlowe, Shakespeare, Schiller, Goethe and Brecht,

this is due to their ability to tell stories about us as human beings and not about a special Athenian social setting or an actual "civic" discussion. I agree that there was, to some extent, political content and meaning in classical tragedy, and that Athenians would certainly have listened with pride to Theseus' lecture on democracy. And it is more than likely that both comedy and tragedy were full of allusions to politicians and public figures (Vickers 2008). Theatre thrives on discussing the issues of the day: this is equally valid for Euripides as it is for Ibsen and Pinter. But to become "classical" theatre, it has to be of extraordinary quality, transferring actual questions to eternal ones. For example: In *Intrigue and Love*, Schiller tells the tragic story of Louise, the daughter of a craftsman, and the aristocrat Ferdinand; their love is foredoomed to fail, because of class distinction. Today, even Prince William has his Kate, so class distinction does not matter (so much) any more. Nonetheless, this play is staged very often and is a "classic" in the best sense, because Schiller focuses on the process of the growing alienation between the lovers, who cannot resist the pressure exerted by their socially divided peer-groups and families.

The best example is certainly Bertolt Brecht, who, in the view of many of the best modern playwrights, has enriched world literature with eternal jewels like *The Life of Galileo* or *Mother Courage and Her Children*. These plays are highly influenced by his Communist convictions and his ambition to make the world a better place through drama (he had the same didactic input that some claim for ancient authors). About 1930, Brecht developed the concept of the *Lehrstücke*, incredibly bad pieces in the "Agitprop" tradition, explicitly meant to "educate" the audience in the most assertive way. Nobody today would stage *Lehrstücke* such as *The Baden-Baden Lesson on Consent* or *The Yes Sayer, The No Sayer*, but *The Life of Galileo* or *The Caucasian Chalk Circle* are classics, staged in all major theatres from Warsaw to San Francisco. In a nutshell: political content and a focus on Athenian civic identity and democratic institutions in Athenian tragedy can be considered, at most, a minor aspect of the dramatic message. On this issue, Rhodes stated convincingly: "It seems to me that there is a substantial jump from believing that some plays prompt uncomfortable questions (as I am sure they do) to believing that 'the Athenians', or a significant body of them, saw the prompting of such questions as the point or a major point of their dramatic festivals" (2003: 119). Yes, the dramatic festivals at Athens were major social events and were certainly important for civic identity and social cohesion. Yes, tragedy has something to do with Dionysus and has something to do with democracy, but – to paraphrase Gertrude Stein – tragedy is a tragedy is a tragedy is a tragedy.

As to the first objection, things are rather clearer, and the arguments of Heath (1987b), Schwinge (1992, 1997) and Griffin (1998), insisting on the authority of Aristotle, seem very reasonable. There is no convincing argument why Aristotle – who was, after all, an intelligent individual – might be so much more ignorant than we are today. Even if some seventy years after the apogee of the three tragedians, things had changed (assuming the *Poetics* was written about 335), and Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides had already become classics, how could Aristotle, a pupil

of Plato, who would still have had some notion of classical tragedy in its original context, completely ignore the "democratic background" of tragedy, had it been there? The school of thought that presents tragedy first of all as a social event "embedded" in a functional context of ritual and social interaction, focusing on its political dimension, is, however, mainstream today, as Effe (1998) noted already (and see now Markantonatos & Zimmermann 2012: esp. v–xi).

Euripides is a special case. His works have often been subjected to a political or social interpretation. The way in which he presents the gods and their relations with humans in his plays has given many philologists the impression that Euripides was a herald of religious change, and that his times were marked by a rejection of religious tradition (for a useful discussion of the issues discussed here, see Mastronarde 2010: 154–206, with an account of much recent scholarship). When his characters question the power or even the existence of the gods, critics have seen proof of the poet's own atheistic tendencies, and rather along the same lines as Aristophanic criticism, some have taken such opinions and remarks delivered on the stage, and which are today considered to be "impious", as a reflection of the growing indifference of most Athenians to the traditional gods. This indifference might have been made even stronger, thanks to the great influence exerted by theatrical representations on the public. The radical critique of the gods present in Euripides' plays, and the inclusion of show pieces of sophistic rhetoric in the dialogues (which reveal him as a man of his time), as well as the mockery of the poet by Aristophanes (as a fellow citizen with no belief in the gods), caused certain critics to regard him as a Sophistic teacher, a stage philosopher and a radical critic of religion. These critics also believed that the theatre provided Euripides with the opportunity to influence his fellow citizens in the way he wanted (e.g. Adkins 1978; Humphreys 1986: 95, 99–106; Gregory 1991).

Thanks to Nietzsche's influential interpretation, the image of Euripides, as depicted by Aristophanes, became canonical for modern research (see Snell 1986: 111–26; cf. Nestle 1940: 496, as well as the overview in Michelini 1987: 3–51; with regard to Nietzsche's view of the image of Euripides, see especially Henrichs 1986: 369–97). Kullmann (1986: 34–49) questioned the alleged influence of the philosophical tradition upon Euripides' tragedies, but see on this Hose (2008: 25–7), who mentions the fact that Euripides alludes to Sophistic thought, which was certainly "the issue of the day". Besides invective in comedy, often taken seriously by literary critics (despite the word-play), where Euripides is presented as one who taught people not to believe in the gods (τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀναπέπεικεν οὐκ εἶναι θεούς), there are certain statements by his characters that also contributed to the creation of an image of Euripides with no belief in the gods (e.g. Aristoph. *Thesm*. 451). Often, and usually inadmissibly from a methodical perspective, the famous fragment of the *Bellerophon* has been cited in this context; in this fragment, the hero expresses poignant doubts about the existence of the gods who, if they existed, would not be indifferent to injustice: φησίν τις εἶναι δῆτ' ἐν οὐρανῷ θεούς; οὐκ εἰσίν, οὐκ εἴσ', εἴ τις ἀνθρώπων θέλει μὴ τῷ παλαιῷ μῶρος ὢν

χρῆσθαι λόγῳ. The fragment allows no such explanation, since it has come to us without any context, and we just do not know the dramatic function of this incoherent statement. Those who wish to attribute to Euripides a kind of "atheism", or at least fundamental doubts about the existence of gods based on this fragment, usually forget to mention that Bellerophon, as we know from the myth, has to pay with his life for hubris in the end (Eur. fr. 286, Nauk [cf. fr. 285, 292]). Riedweg (1990: 39–53) gives a full discussion of the fragment.

The modern reader, influenced by the Western Christian tradition, is equally moved by the invective uttered by the desperate Heracles, driven to madness by Hera. After killing his family in complete delusion, and abandoned to his fate by the unkind gods, Heracles is resigned to his cruel fate and can only hope for human solidarity. This is why he uses harsh words to blame the amoral attitude of the gods (Eur. *Herc*. 1340–46). The interpretation of these assertions, often without considering the dramatic context, has involved the poet being estranged from religion and having a disturbed relationship with the gods.

Such an understanding of Euripides' drama does not do justice to the greatest experimenter and master of innovation in the Attic theatre, or to his artistic merit. The most important works for the theme "Euripides and religion" are Kullmann (1986: 35–49; 1987: 7–22), Lefkowitz (1987: 149–66; 1989: 70–82) and Zeilfelder (1991: 135–42); cf. Sourvinou-Inwood (1997: 161–4) and Mastronarde (2010: 154–206). Lefkowitz was able to show that the untenable view that Euripides himself was influenced by atheistic views can be ascribed to two false assumptions. First, credit was given to Aristophanes' slanders, taken out of context and reworked in a manner typical of Hellenistic biographers; second, the opinions formulated by *dramatis personae* were ascribed to the author. See too Lloyd-Jones (1983: 144–155). The opinions supposedly critical of religion enunciated by Euripides' characters are by no means of general application, presented to the public *à part*, but they only perform a specific dramatic function and stimulate the action of the play. The religious actions of a stage character are often "part of the dramatic development of the play" (Yunis 1988: 93; Knox 1985: 322–3). But the theological issues discussed by the protagonists could, indeed, be related in a very general way to the situation of Athens in those times. The inhabitants of a city stricken by war and the plague could rightly assume that the gods had become estranged. This, however, is perhaps the only chronological coincidence we can establish between actual issues and tragedy, which prefers general, broader or more universal subjects (Lloyd-Jones 1983: 146). In this way, Euripides balances Heracles being abandoned by the gods (he was punished by Hera, and thus did not benefit from the help of the other gods) with human solidarity, and he shows that pain and misery can be overcome with camaraderie and friendship. There is no doubt that in the harsh times of the Peloponnesian War, this could be related to the everyday realities of the time (cf. Yunis 1988: 139–40). For a critique of the gods' amoral conduct, see Heath (1987b: 49–64). Such a critique of the mythical gods, and their immoral behaviour, was a constant theme of philosophy, since Heraclitus

(for its presence in Aeschylus and Sophocles, see Heath 1987b: 51), and was by no means only specific to Euripides, or even an invention of his.

As it has been justly pointed out, the presentation of such themes on the tragic stage implies a certain familiarity of Athenian public opinion with such issues. It does not, however, presuppose conscious estrangement from traditional religion (neither of Euripides nor of the theatre-going public, as Sourvinou-Inwood 1997: 162 stated). The individual who formulates a theological issue discusses the justice of the divine, not its existence. A radical critique of the gods is founded on an "existential desperation, for which there would be no place in an atheistic world-view" (Zeilfelder 1991: 135). Kullmann was able to show that Euripides' plays reflect a tension between two different models of religion that attended the Greeks from the beginnings of their literary tradition. The tragic and immoral view of the world in the *Iliad* (according to which the gods are responsible for all the evil in the world) was opposed to the moral point of view of the *Odyssey* (subsequently elaborated by Solon or Aeschylus, stating that gods are the guarantors of justice). Euripides acquires a dramatic effect precisely by an artistic counterbalancing and combination of the two models; this does not lead, however, to philosophical comprehension, still less to a Sophistic attitude (Kullmann 1986: 34–49, esp. 40–45; cf. Kullmann 1987: 7–22; Lloyd-Jones 1983). The chorus in *Hippolytus* emphasizes precisely such ambivalence of the divine, l. 1104–7: ἦ μέγα μοι τὰ θεῶν μελεδήμαθ', ὅταν φρένας ἔλθῃ, λύπας παραιρεῖ· ξύνεσιν δέ τιν' ἐλπίδι κεύθων λείπομαι ἔν τε τύχαις θνατῶν καὶ ἐν ἔργμασι λεύσσων. The two models do not exclude each other, because what in Christianity is the business of either God or the Devil has to be shared in the Greek world by the community of gods. "To present a deity as cruel is not to 'criticize polis religion', since in a religion without a devil gods have a dark and dangerous as well as a benevolent side" (Sourvinou-Inwood 1997: 185).

A comparison between the corresponding passages in Euripides and in the Book of Job reveals that the theme of the questionable behaviour of gods and the theodicy problem are neither new (as shown mainly in the older critique of the gods' anthropomorphization and of their amoral attitude by Xenophanes and Heraclitus), nor founded on rational atheistic beliefs (Zeilfelder 1991: 135–42). Pulleyn (1997: 196–216) showed that the discontent caused by the gods who do not fulfil their task based on the *do-ut-des* principle, part of the mutual relationship between gods and humans, can be expressed in a highly accusatory or demanding way. Euripides, and with him, the other two tragedians of the classical era, Aeschylus and Sophocles, definitely flinch from a one-sided political or social interpretation.

Attic tragedy should thus be understood in an Aristotelian manner, although such a perception might seem outdated from a modern theoretical perspective. If we follow Aristotle's analysis, the tragedian is first and foremost concerned with making the public understand the possible and the general, καθόλου, based on deep human conflicts; history could not reach this profundity, telling only of what

Alcibiades did or did not do (perhaps Thucydides would disagree). Thus, if one takes Aristotle's definition seriously, tragic poetry reaches beyond the narrower horizon of the historical or political dimension. By presenting the general, the purpose and function (τέλος, ἔργον) of tragedy are, first, to stimulate the right degree of "tragedy-specific pleasure" (οἰκεία ἡδονή) with the public. They thus aim to stimulate an emotional reaction, consisting of a "feeling of purification" (κάθαρσις), which purifies the spectators from the sentiments of "pity and fear" (ἔλεος καὶ φόβος) evoked by the play: Arist. *Po*. 1451a36–b33 (on the general character of tragedy); 1449b24–28; 1450a30–31; 1452b29–30; 1453a36, b10–11; 1459a21; 1460b24–25; 1462b12–15. On Aristotle's *Poetics*, see in detail Halliwell (1998), who also surveys research on the theory of *katharsis*: 350–6 (relevant literature is cited at vii–xii); see too Schadewald (1955: 129–71) and Tarán & Gutas (2012). As already mentioned, some scholars question Aristotle's analysis of the functions of tragedy (e.g. Adkins 1966: 78–102; Flashar 1984: 1–23). Flashar draws attention to the different way in which tragedy would have been understood a hundred years after its apogee, which would have distracted Aristotle from the "real" meaning of Greek tragedy. I am inclined, however, to follow Aristotle the "native speaker" on this issue, since when he wrote his survey of tragedy, he had hundreds of tragedies at his disposal. (We only have eighteen left of Euripides, six of Aeschylus and seven of Sophocles; some 1,250 tragedies would have been staged in the classical period.) It is difficult to believe that modern scholarship, which after 2,300 years has thrown light on many interesting aspects of Greek drama (e.g. on its origins: Wise 1998), is on the right track in establishing the social and political importance of classical tragedy by dismissing Aristotle.

APPENDIX III
Diocleides' false testimony (415)

There has been much debate on the importance and backstage aspects of Diocleides' false testimony. Beginning with the scale of the offence (with most of the Herms being mutilated), research has established, in one way or another, that such a deed could only have been effected by many well-organized perpetrators. As a consequence, Diocleides' number of 300 was not rejected on principle. See for example: Busolt, *GG* III, 2: 1298; Beloch, *GG* II, 1: 358; Hatzfeld (1951: 159–62); Fornara (1980: 45); Furley (1996: 28–30, 63). Cf. McGlew (1999: 1 and 19). It cannot be excluded, however, that a small group of energetic and determined men could have damaged, in a single night, most Herms within the city walls even if we assume that there were hundreds of them (thus Furley 1996: 63).

It is hard to separate the reliable and the unreliable passages in Diocleides' testimony. In this context, the denouncer's claim to have recognized the group in the moonlight is extremely debatable. After a fresh investigation of Diocleides' testimony, undertaken after Andocides had presented new information, it became obvious that the night in question, a night of a new moon, had been rather dark. This led to the withdrawal of the denouncer's web of lies, forcing him to make a full confession. We can seriously doubt whether he was able to see anyone that night. Diocleides must, however, have known something about the profaners of the Herms, as is shown by the fact that he blackmailed Andocides' companions (And. 38–9; Plut. *Alc*. 20, 5–8; Diod. 13, 2). The "moon issue" has been thoroughly studied by Keil (1894: 352–3); MacDowell (1962: 187–8); cf. Ostwald (1986: 323).

Dover, *HCT* IV (1970: 274–5), believes that Diocleides would have considered the phase of the moon when preparing his testimony, since it could not have been credible otherwise. The information transmitted by Plutarch would consequently have referred to another accuser. Keil (1894: 352) had earlier come to a similar

conclusion. He believes that the investigative commission were well aware of the date, and that there must have been some moonlight that night, since otherwise the unequivocal character of the expressions ἔνης καὶ νέας οὔσης (Plut.) or τῇ νουμηνίᾳ (Diod.), clearly referring to the lack of moonlight that night, would have invalidated Diocleides' plot. His false testimony would have been seen through by the commission when they realized that, at the time Diocleides supposedly saw the conspirators, the moon had already set.

Meritt (1930: 139) draws attention to the reduced capacity for judgement on the part of the investigative committee on account of all the agitation. The commission would thus have only begun to pay attention to the absurdities and inconsistencies in Diocleides' testimony after Andocides' deposition.

This is not the place to dwell on all the aspects of the testimony; for a balanced discussion of the situation, see Furley (1996: 61–4). Aurenche (1974: 166–7) does not analyse Diocleides' deposition critically enough. See too Lewis (1977: 74–5). The insecure basis for Diocleides' testimony is confirmed by a fragment of Phrynichus (fr. 61 (Kassel and Austin) = Plut. *Alc*. 20, 6): φίλταθ' Ὦ φίλαθ' Ἑρμῆ, καὶ φυλάσσου, μὴ πεσὼν/ σαυτὸν παρακρούσῃ καὶ παράσχῃς διαβολὴν/ ἑτέρῳ Διοκλείδᾳ βουλομένῳ κακόν τι δρᾶν. In conclusion, since Diocleides testified that he completely invented his story, there is no reason to accept any of his statement. It is thus highly improbable that 300 men gathered together to mutilate the Herms.

APPENDIX IV
On Hyperbolus' ostracism and the quorum for ostracism

With regard to the disputed question of whether 6,000 votes were enough for a quorum, or whether 6,000 votes had to be cast against an individual for that individual to be ostracized, see Vanderpool (1970), Lehmann (1981), Phillips (1982), Mattingly (1991) and Dreher (2000). Lehmann (1981) tends towards the second variant, but the *ostraka* published more recently, and which could perhaps have been used at the ostracism trial of 417/5, make the 6,000 figure necessary for a quorum more credible. This figure would have been determined as such for the Athenians by the Assembly, just as there were 6,000 authorized Heliasts. Apart from Nicias (mentioned on an *ostrakon* relating to the questionable ostracism), Hyperbolus and Alcibiades, who played a leading role according to the literary sources, the names of eight other politicians are mentioned on varying numbers of *ostraka* (between one and eight): Phillips (1990: 127–8). For details, see Phillips (1990: 126–9), Lang (1990b: 6), Willemsen & Brenne (1991), Mattingly (1991: 24) and Rhodes (1994: 85).

It is difficult to accept that during the Peloponnesian War, when the Assembly had so few members that the citizens were forced to go from the Agora to the Pnyx (Aristoph. *Ach*. 21–2), many other *ostraka* had been prepared in addition to 6,000 votes supposedly cast against Hyperbolus. (On the small number of participants at the assemblies during the Peloponnesian War, see too Thuc. 8, 72, 1.) It is more than questionable that such a mobilization of the collective, reduced by the Plague as they were, could actually have occurred (on the small number of citizens for the period in question, see Ruschenbusch 1978: 146; Hansen 1988: 22, following Gomme's figures). Even a quorum of 6,000 would have required 24–7 per cent of citizens (Phillips 1990: 137 suggests that 10,000 was the maximum number of likely participants at an ostracism). With regard to attendance at the Assembly, see Sinclair (1988: 114–19), who explains the abolition of ostracism after the exile of

Hyperbolus as a by-product of the difficulty of achieving a quorum as a result of the war.

It has been generally admitted, from Plutarch onwards, that the decision to organize an ostracism came about as the result of the Athenians' need to find a clear direction in foreign policy (after the Battle of Mantinea, relations between Athens and Sparta had come to a dead end). They had to resolve the confrontation between Alcibiades and Nicias, who represented two camps in domestic policy (Allen 1951: 45–7; Lehmann 1987: 41–9). In such a scenario, politicians such as Hyperbolus and Phaeax did not really have a place. Recently published *ostraka*, where the name of Phaeax is mentioned five times, suggest that his role should perhaps be reassessed. Theophrastus (at Plut. *Nic*. 11, 10) tells us that the person earmarked for ostracism besides Alcibiades, was Phaeax, not Nicias. In fact, more and more voices see in Phaeax the man of the moment, apart from Alcibiades: Mattingly (1991: 24–5); Harding (1994: 154–9). The political role played by Hyperbolus, whom Plutarch and Thucydides present as impartial victim, exiled because he was a "villain" (Thuc. 8, 73, 3), seems to have been far from insignificant. Some time ago, it was established that it is highly unlikely that Hyperbolus was only a marginal historical character, or some kind of pawn sacrifice: Andrewes, *HCT* V (1981: 257–64). Harding, using the new *ostraka* finds, does not believe Plutarch's version and provides a plausible new interpretation of ostracism at Athens: "Given the date [sc. 416] and the large number of candidates one might suspect that the matter to be settled was the unofficial post of *prostates tou demou*, top demagogue. ... The fact that Hyperbolos lost shows his significance; he was a leading contender" (1994: 158). Plutarch's account probably derived from the "writings of élitist anti-democrats"; cf. Andrewes, *HCT* V (1981: 257–9). The credibility of Plutarch had been previously questioned by Hansen (1984: 77–89), who argues persuasively that there was no stable base at Athens that modern research could see as consisting of "party" members; cf. Hansen (1995a: 288–98); for a contrary opinion, see Rhodes (1985: 9; 1994: 93). Against this background, it is highly questionable whether the vote had really degenerated to an experimental game of the *hetairiai*. Meanwhile, a lot more *ostraka* have been published, and the discussion goes on. See Missiou (2011); also Forsdyke (2005), Brenne (2001) and Heftner (2000).

Abbreviations

The abbreviations referring to the *corpora* of inscriptions, to Real-Encyclopädie and to the collections of fragments (of ancient authors) are the usual ones. The acronyms for journals follow the conventions published in *L'Année philologique* (for the journals until 1980, see the collection compiled by P. Rosumek, *Index des périodiques et index de leurs sigles, Supplément à l'année philologique*, Vol. LI [Paris: Les Belles lettres, 1982]). The ancient authors are cited according to the abbreviations in the *OCD*. Apart from the abovementioned, I have used the following abbreviations.

APF	J. K. Davies, *Athenian Propertied Families 600–300 BC* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971)
ATL	B. D. Meritt, H. T. Wade-Gery & M. F. McGregor, *The Athenian Tribute Lists*, 4 vols (Princeton, NJ: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1939–53)
Beloch *GG*	J. K. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*, 2nd edn, 4 vols (Strasbourg: Trubner and Berlin: De Gruyter, 1912–27)
Bengtson *GG*	H. Bengtson, *Griechische Geschichte*, 5th edn (Munich: Beck, 1977)
Burckhardt *WGB*	J. Burckhardt, *Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen* (Stuttgart: Alfred Kroner, 1978)
Burckhardt *KG* I/II	J. Burckhardt, *Griechische Kulturgeschichte*, complete works, 2 vols, Vols V and VI (Basel: Benno Schwabe, 1956)
Busolt *GG*	G. Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte bis zur Schlacht bei Chaeroneia*, 2nd edn, 3 vols (Gotha: F. A. Perthes, 1893–1904)
CAH III (1982)	J. Boardman *et al.* (eds), *The Cambridge Ancient History*, *Vol. III, Part 3: The Expansion of the Greek World, Eighth to Sixth Centuries BC*, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982)
CAH V (1927)	E. M. Walker *et al.* (eds), *The Cambridge Ancient History*, *Vol. V: The Fifth Century BC* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1927)
CAH V (1992)	D. M. Lewis *et al.* (eds), *The Cambridge Ancient History, Vol. V: The Fifth Century BC*, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992)
CHCL (1985)	P. E. Easterling & B. M. W. Knox (eds), *The Cambridge History of Classical Literature, Vol. I: Greek Literature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985)
DK	H. Diels & W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 6th edn (Berlin: Weidmann, 1951–2)

ER	L. D. Caskey, N. H. Fowler, J. M. Paton & G. P. Stevens, *The Erechtheum* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1927)
FGrH	F. Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*, 15 vols (Berlin: Weidmann and Leiden: Brill, 1923–58)
GdA	E. Meyer, 1958. *Geschichte des Altertums*, 5 vols (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta, 1958)
GGR I	M. P. Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion*, vol. I, 3rd edn (Munich: Beck, 1967)
GGR II	M. P. Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion*, vol. II, 2nd edn (Munich: Beck, 1961)
Grote	C. Grote, *A History of Greece: From the Earliest Period to the Close of the Generation Contemporary with Alexander the Great*, 2nd edn, 12 vols (London: J. Murray, 1859–65)
HCT	A. W. Gomme, A. Andrewes & K. J. Dover, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1945–81)
Hornblower *CT*	S. Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991–)
HrwG	H. Cancik *et al.* (eds), *Handbuch religionswissenschaftlicher Grundbegriffe* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1988–)
LIMC	*Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae* (Zürich: Artemis, 1974)
LGPN	M. J. Osborne & S. G. Byrne (eds), *A Lexicon of Greek Personal Names, Vol. II: Attica* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994)
LS	F. Sokolowski, *Lois sacrées des cités grecques* (Paris: Boccard, 1969)
LSJ	H. G. Liddell, R. Scott & H. S. Jones (eds), *A Greek–English Lexicon*, 9th edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940)
LSS	F. Sokolowski, *Lois sacrées des cités grecques; supplement* (Paris: Boccard, 1962)
LThK	W. Kasper *et al.* (eds), *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche*, 3rd edn (Freiburg: Herder, 1993–)
ML	R. Meiggs & D. Lewis, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century BC*, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1988)
OCD[3]	S. Hornblower & A. Spawforth (eds), *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, 3rd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996)
Jaeger, *Paideia*	W. Jaeger, *Paideia. Die Formung des griechischen*, 3 vols, 4th edn [vol. 1], 3rd edn [vols 2 and 3] (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1959)
Parke & Wormell	H. W. Parke & D. E. W. Wormell, *The Delphic Oracle*, 2 vols (Oxford: Blackwell, 1956)
RAC	T. Klauser *et al.* (eds), *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum* (Stuttgart: Hiersemann, 1950–)
RGG	K. Galling (ed.), *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Handwörterbuch für Theologie und Religionswissenschaft*, 3rd edn (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1958)
Rohde	E. Rohde, *Psyche. Seelencult und Unsterblichkeitsglaube der Griechen*, 2nd edn, 2 vols (Freiburg: Mohr, 1898)
ThR	G. Krause & G. Müller, *Theologische Realenzyklopädie* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1977–)
Wilamowitz	U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Der Glaube der Hellenen*, 3rd edn, 2 vols [1st edn, 1931 (vol. 1) and 1932 (vol. 2)] (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1959).

Notes

Preface

1. Grafton (1997). (This is only the first!)

Introduction

1. Goethe, *Faust*, I, l. 3415–17. "How thy religion fares, I fain would hear./ Thou art a good kind-hearted man,/ Only that way not well-disposed, I fear" (trans. Bayard Taylor).
2. Pl. *Euthphr*. 3b. Since in the following chapters I shall make a detailed analysis of the subjects approached in this introductory chapter, I have limited bibliographical references here to the minimum. For the same reason, I have not made a separate presentation of the state of current research.
3. Pl. *Krat*. 396d, 399e, 428c; *Euthphr*. 3e. Euthyphro refers to his knowledge explicitly in the context of the discussion; Pl. *Euthphr*. 4e–5a; Allen (1970: 9–12). For a synthesis of criticism of Euthyphro's conceit, see Furley (1985), who describes the seer as a "stickler for adherence to received tradition" (208).
4. Popper (1992). For criticism of Popper's approach, see Frede (1996). Even serious scholars of antiquity cannot always restrain their fascination for the first democracy in history, and they often emphasize only the important political achievements of the Athenians. See, for example, Hansen (1995a: 75–86). In the same way, Cawkwell (1988: 1–12) shows, in the sense of Popper's thesis, that Ephialtes' special achievement would have been the replacement of an aristocratic society through "the open, permissive society of democratic Athens" (11). The exceptional and admirable achievements of the Athenian democracy in the political field prevail over the darker aspects of this pre-modern society. J. Burckhardt had early on outlined a dark, dramatically different picture of democratic Athens (e.g. *KG* 202–39). Cartledge (1998: 111–41) provides a critical treatment of the restriction of the rights of citizenship to a minority and of the importance of slavery. See too Appendix I.
5. Thuc. 2, 37, 2; Arist. *Pol*. 1317b 12, and see the similar formulation at Lys. 26, 5. On the *Epitaphios Logos*, see Loraux (1981) and the literature reviewed by Turasiewicz (1995: 33–41).

6. For example, Burkert (1977: 331–412); Gould (1985: 1–33); Garland (1992: 13ff.); Vegetti (1993: 295–333); Bruit Zaidmann and Schmitt Pantel (1994: 11–19 and 29–54).
7. Garland (1984: 75–123); Garland (1990: 73–91); Sourvinou-Inwood (1990: 301–2); Vegetti (1993: 296–300); Bremmer (1996a: 9–11). This distinction, as Price (1999: 67–88) warns, should not lead to the incorrect conclusion that the Greek polytheistic system was extremely liberal and characterized by tolerance.
8. Cf. Pl. *Epist*. 7, 325b–d; Finley (1980: 102).
9. According to the cautious estimates of Hansen (1988: 19), the war took a toll on the Athenian side of no fewer than 43,000 lives, a huge sacrifice taking into account the situation at the time. Only natural demographic growth could partially compensate for the losses. For the demography of Attica, see Beloch (1886: 54–108, a fundamental paper); cf. Beloch, *GG* III 2, 386–418. Graphs in Gomme (1933: 26, 29) and Ruschenbusch (1978: 146); later, Hansen (1988: 22, 27). Ruschenbusch (who takes as his starting point a large figure for the year 431) even assumes that the number of citizens had decreased on account of the Peloponnesian War from 50,000 to 13,000 (135–52). More recently, Hansen (1988: 25–8) started from a large number of citizens in Athens (60,000 in 431, 24,000 in 404). The Plague took the lives of over 30 per cent of the population; cf. Ruschenbusch (1978: 140); Hansen (1988: 14); Horstmanshoff (1989: 193–4). See also Chapter 3.1. For the demographic aspects of the Peloponnesian War, see the tabular summary in Corvisier (1999: 71–8).
10. Strasburger (1968: 435).
11. For the date, see Chapter 2.
12. The impiety trials at the end of the fourth century belong to a very different context and are not to be compared to those at the end of the fifth century; cf. O'Sullivan (1997: 136–52).
13. Lys. 30; Parker (1996b: 219–20). For Lysias' speech, see especially Todd (1996); for the revision of laws, see Robertson (1990); Rhodes (1991).
14. Only Mehl (1982) has drawn attention to the religious implications of the Arginusae trial. His work has been either ignored (in Anglo-Saxon historiography), or has attracted unduly harsh criticism; cf. Bleicken (1994: 384) and Mehl (1982: 565).
15. For example, Leibundgut (1991); Knell (1993).
16. So far as I know, only Thompson (1981), Powell (1973), Powell (1988) and, at least as an idea, McClure (1994) have consistently taken into account the importance of the event for the subsequent politics of Athens. Mikalson (1984) and, earlier, Dodds (1951) directed research in the right direction. Recent studies that appeared after the publication of the German edition of this book, underline the importance of the Plague for Athenian society, but often in a very general way. See Meier (1999), Lloyd (2003) and Mitchell-Boyask (2008). Fundamental for the religious issues of disease and famine is the seminal work of Huber (2005) on rituals against plague in the Ancient Orient and in Greece.
17. For example, Derenne (1930); Dodds (1951); Mehl (1982); Leibundgut (1991 [Erechtheion]); Garland (1995); Furley (1996).
18. Only Dodds, in his captivating book to which I owe much (Dodds 1951: esp. 179–95), tried to define the Plague and the war experience as important causes for religious issues. His principal evidence is drawn almost exclusively from the impiety trials. In this pioneering work, Dodds really understood the evolution of the spiritual history of the fifth century BCE, not only as a development "From Myth to Logos" (the title of Nestle's book, 1940) that had fascinated classical scholarship with its philological emphases, but also as an "anti-Enlightenment reaction", enriching thereby the study of the classical past with ethnological possibilities. See too Mehl (1982: 76). The term "crisis" has come increasingly under fire due to its inflationary use in the humanities as an analytical category. There was, however, a genuine, deep, crisis during the Peloponnesian War and in the accompanying events. Thuc. 1, 23, 2–3 describes the war as unique: there had never been so many conquered cities, so many refugees, so many fatalities. There were also famine and plague. On account of all these ξυμφοραί (calamities) (2, 17, 1), the war was considered a vast period of crisis: ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα μετὰ τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου

ἅμα ξυνεπέθετω (1, 23, 3, "All these calamities came about simultaneously with the war"). In this way, Thucydides explicitly offers "the analytical paradigm for a crisis situation in ancient literature": Welwei (1975: 9). É. Will studied the concept of crisis in the context of antiquity in several reviews, collected under the title "Crises antiques: de Marx à Burkhardt". On the general efficiency and limits of crisis as a concept (that cannot be examined more deeply here), see Koselleck (1982; *Krise*: 617–50).

19. Furley (1996: 110). See now too Martin (2009) for religious arguments in Demosthenes' speeches.
20. Bleicken (1994: 161–83). For good reason, Hansen (1984: 9–10) and Starr (1990: 3) complain that the Assembly – by far the most important institution of the Athenian democracy – has not been given enough prominence in the specialized literature.
21. Hansen (1984); Ober (1996: 132–8); Starr (1990: 32–8); Finley (1991: 93–124); Bleicken (1994: 161–3); Hansen (1995a: 128–30). On social stratification, see in general Gschnitzer (1981: 100–60). As regards the social structure in Athens, see Davies (1981: 28–35); Wood (1988: 126–72); Ober (1996: 125–31).
22. Jones (1957: 41); Finley (1962: 3–24, esp. 9); Ober (1996: 43–52). On the internal opposition and on the "intellectual critics of popular rule" in Athens, see the comprehensive study by Ober (1998). On the so-called "Old Oligarch", there is the more recent opinion of Lapini (1997). Keen & Sekunda (2007) is a very thorough study of the Old Oligarch question.
23. Concerning the theoretical critique of democracy (e.g. Xen. 1, 5; 2, 17; 3, 3; Thuc. 4, 86, 4; 126, 2; Arist. *Pol*. 1292a 4–13; 1304b 19–24), see e.g.: Meder (1938: 185–207); Larsen (1954: 1–14); Jones (1957: 41–72); Treu (1970: 17–31). However, as Ober (1989: 161) states: "The Athenian masses, unlike the elite theorists, tended to assume that the existing state was good." On the Demos and the Assembly, see, in general, Meder (1938); Hansen (1984); Starr (1990).
24. Pl. *Resp*. 565a; Xen. *Ath. Pol.* 1, 2 and 5.
25. Marinatos (1981); Jordan (1986); Hornblower (1992).
26. Thuc. 2, 54.
27. Ober (1996: 43–9, the citation at 45). The importance of legal speeches to analyse the system of values for the Athenian society was underlined principally by Dover (1974) in a fundamental and methodologically important study of the moral conceptions of the Greeks (e.g. 5–14). See now also Martin (2009) on Demosthenes. Concerning the issue of the difficult "exegesis of Aristophanes", see Stow (1942: 83–92); Chapman (1978: 59–70); Heath (1987a: 41–3): Halliwell (1993: 321–40).
28. For example, Sokolowski (1969); van Straten (1981). On "personal piety" in Greek religion, see now Rubel (2011) with further references.
29. Lalonde (1968); Shear (1973: 127–34); for an overall view, see Thompson (1981). Cf. Camp (1979).
30. Schneider & Höcker (1990: 203–16); Leibundgut (1991); Knell (1993).
31. Since the study of religion plays a secondary role in the context of this book, this chapter does not aim to represent a complete study of the formation and analysis of the relevant concepts. It merely approaches the fundamental issues. This is why I provide only brief and descriptive answers to the vexed question of the definition of "religion". There are in any case only a few comprehensive studies of this particular subject.
32. Holm (1990: 9). Burkert (1998: 17): "What remains is an intercultural family resemblance of religious phenomena throughout the world."
33. Kehrer (1998: 418–25); see also Gladigow (1988); Greschat (1988); Pollack (1995).
34. Antes (1978: 184–97).
35. Cartledge (1998: 142–4). For fundamental religious concepts in ancient Greek, see especially Rudhardt (1958); cf. Bremmer (1996a: 4–5).
36. *Religiones* initially meant the two Christian confessions. "Pagan" religions were generally considered *religiones falsae*. For the history of the word and of the concept, as well as for the semantic change following the Reformation, from cult practice (the religious service) to a concern

with ideas, see Wagner (1991: especially 19–31); see too Bremmer (1998: 10–14), Irmscher (1994: 63–73) and Rudolph (1994: 131–9).

37. Schleiermacher (1799; re-edited in 1956); Durkheim (1912); Malinowski (1948); Otto (1917). A pioneering work on the significance of the rites of passage is van Gennep (1909).
38. Luhmann (1977). In the 1950s and 1960s, scholarly discussion was dominated by the phenomenological orientation of *Religionswissenschaft* through the works of Mensching (1959) and Eliade (1957). Homann (1997: 189–369) offers a highly scholarly summary of the theories within the study of modern religion. Kippenberg (1997) has described and analysed in detail research approaches in *Religionswissenschaft* from 1850 to 1920. Cf. the succinct presentations in Gladigow (1988), Stolz (1997) and Kehrer (1998: 418–25). For the earlier and more recent roles played by the phenomenology of religion in *Religionswissenschaft*, see Colpe (1988: 131–54).
39. This is to a certain extent the view of Berger & Luckmann (1974).
40. Kehrer (1998: 422). Most recently, Pollack (1995: 184–90) again tried to solve this issue and to determine a defining relation between the sociological-functional and the historical-material arguments. See a similar compromise view in Dux (1973: 7–67). McCutcheon (1995: 284–309) has a useful overview of the current state of religious definition.
41. Greschat (1988: 13); cf. Kehrer (1998: 424). The efforts of *Religionswissenschaft*, granted the lack of consensus regarding the concept of "religion", have so far generated numerous attempts at definition. See summaries, examples and general bibliography in Pollack (1995: 163–83). See too Burkert (1998: 17–21).
42. Stolz (1997: 39–42; the quotation at 39).
43. Kitagawa (1963) is fundamental. See too Elsas (1994) and, especially, Klimkeit (1997). For Greek religion, see Bruit Zaidmann & Schmitt Pantel (1994), who take a large-scale approach to the issue of comparative religion.
44. Calder (1993: 83–95); again in Nock (1998: 281–91; the quotation at 284). For similar problems of anthropologists and historians of religion, see Stolz (1997: 186–7).
45. See further Cartledge (1998) with references. Cf. Veyne (1976: esp. 13): "Rien n'est plus loin que cette antique civilisation; elle est exotique, que dis-je, elle est abolie." McGinty (1978: 1–33), invoking the example of Dionysus, demonstrates how different and partially contradictory the methods and concepts of the science of applied religion can be, from hermeneutics to functionalism, when studying Greek religion. Henrichs (1987) offers a historical view of the different opinions expressed to date. On the fundamental issue of the strangeness of other religions, see too Neusner (1990: 3, 273–85).
46. It is therefore somewhat paradoxical that, after "discovering the political history" of Thucydides (Strasburger 1968), we owe a debt to a representative of this culture who, in his historical and obviously political work, ends up speaking, perhaps only briefly, of religious historical moments. This probably means that the so-called "discovery" is somewhat superficial.
47. For the modern concept of politics in its ideological and historical evolution, see Lenk (1987) and Rohe (1978).
48. The following observations correspond to the concept of "Polis-Religion" developed by Sourvinou-Inwood (1988, 1990). The discussion of Polis-Religion implies a modern term, with the corresponding abstractions, that contemporaries would have developed differently. The work of Fustel de Coulanges (1864: 131–202) is still fundamental for the religion of the polis; see also Busolt & Swoboda (1920: vol. 1: 514–27 in general, vol. 2: 1168–76 [Athens]); Gernet & Boulanger (1932: 300–14); Nilsson (1951: 17–48); Nilsson, *GGR* I: 708–34; Yunis (1988: 19–28); Ferguson (1989: 159–72); Vegetti (1993: 295–333); Bruit Zaidmann & Schmitt Pantel (1994: 91–111); Cole (1995: 292–325); Burkert (1995: 201–10); Parker (1996: 1–9); Chamoux (1996: 67–77); Hölscher (1998b: 46–62), who focuses on archaeological aspects.
49. Pl. *Leg*. 716d–e; cf. *Leg*. 771a.
50. Arist. *Ath. Pol*. 55, 5.

51. Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 56, 3–58, 3; see also Connor (1988: 171–3).
52. ἀμυνῶ δὲ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἱερῶν καὶ ὁσίων. The text of the inscription in Daux (1971: 370–83); cf. Poll. 8, 105–6, Stob. 4, 1, 8. See also the comprehensive study by Siewert (1972: the text of the inscription at 5–6) and Siewert (1977: 102–11).
53. Pl. *Leg.* 771a: Ἀρχὴ δὲ ἔστω τῶν [...] νόμων ἥδε τις, ἀφ᾽ ἱερῶν ἠργμένη. Cf. also 771d. Arist. *Pol.* 6, 8, 1322b; 7, 8, 1328b.
54. Lys. 30, 18.
55. Sourvinou-Inwood (1990: 297); cf. Sourvinou-Inwood (1988: 262). Earlier, on the same lines, Busolt & Swoboda (1920: vol. 1, 515: "The cult practices for the protecting deities of the State were, as such, the right and duty of the State community"). Recently reaffirmed by Rhodes (2009).
56. Bremmer (1996a: 3). For the rites of passage, see the classical writing of van Gennep (1909).
57. Bremmer (1982: 52); Sourvinou-Inwood (1990: 305); Bruit Zaidmann & Schmitt Pantel (1994: 66–90). Nilsson (1951: 17): "This religion was bound to society and kept society together."
58. Aesch. *Sept.* 69–77: ὦ Ζεῦ τε καὶ Γῆ καὶ πολισσοῦχοι θεοί [...] γένεσθε δ᾽ ἀλκή· ξυνὰ δ᾽ ἐλίζω λέγειν· πόλις γὰρ εὖ πράσσουσα δαίμονας τίει. Cf. 105, 109, 139, 168–70.
59. Sourvinou-Inwood (1990: 305); Ostwald (1986: 137); Vegetti (1993: 314). Burkert (1987: 25–44) focused on the group stabilizing function. Cf. Chamoux (1996: 73).
60. Chamoux (1996: 69).
61. Price (1999: 67).
62. Burkert is also aware of this emphasis: "The social function of ritual, which has received much interest in this century, is so evident in Greek religion that we rather lose sight of its 'truly religious' dimension", in *CAH* V (1992: 256). An exception is Mikalson (1983), who studied religious beliefs and concepts (e.g. 5). Homann (1997) wittily developed a fundamental critique to the functionalist approach to *Religionswissenschaft* and to Luhmann's theoretical system in over 500 pages. *Inter alia*, he rightly criticizes neglect "of the material side of religious experience" (15).
63. Towards the end of the twentieth century, iconographic material offered new insights into Greek religion. See, for example, Burkert (*CAH* V: 1992: 249); Bremmer (1996a: 74–6). The widespread belief that there was no such thing as Greek "private" religiosity is based less on the fact that Greek religion excluded this aspect than on the lack of sources to attest individual experiences. Nevertheless, there are numerous, mostly epigraphic, examples relating to "private" religious practice. See further the contributions in Versnel (1981); cf. Burkert (1990: 19–20), Parker (1998). Bremmer (1996a: 108) acknowledges a growing trend towards private religious practice in the historical-religious evolution at the end of the fifth century. The Orphics, however, always remained at the level of some kind of sect with few members; see Guthrie (1966^2 – fundamental) and Borgeaud (1991).
64. The warnings of the doyen of anthropology Clifford Geertz not to apply without careful forethought anthropological research and theory to certain fields (such as history) which, despite certain common points, remain foreign, fell mostly on stony ground: Geertz (1995: 248–62). He reasonably criticizes the fact that anthropologists and historians are driven "like so many migrant geese, on to one another's territories". "Everybody seems to be minding everybody else's business" (251). But, he concludes, "most of this interplay remains citational in nature" (258). An unfortunate example in classical studies is the attempt of P. Cartledge to describe Greek tragedy, on the basis of Geertz's article on Balinese cockfights, as a "deep play" (Cartledge 1997: 3–35; cf. Geertz 1973: 412–53). On the role of anthropology in research on ancient religion, see Baudy (1995: 229–58). The author focuses on the importance of initiation rites.
65. Bruit Zaidmann & Schmitt Pantel (1994: 9–19, 91–2). The phrase θεοὺς νομίζειν – decisive for the trial of Socrates – was thus often translated as "worshipping the gods, through cult practice", which clearly only corresponds to the social aspect of religion through cult practice: for example, Gould (1985: 7). Derenne (1930: 217–23), Fahr (1969: 158–68) and Yunis (1988: 63–6) made it clear that in many cases, starting with the last third of the fifth century,

the phrase should be translated as "believing in gods". Cf. Versnel (1990: 124–5). Regarding the general use of the term "belief" and its utility, see Wiebe (1979: 234–49). See now Rubel (2011) on personal aspects of Greek religion.

66. Stolz (1997: 223).
67. Stevenson (1996: 4–10). Nevertheless, the predominantly social aspects of ancient religions may not be as alien as often asserted, to the secular and individualist moderns, as works written at the end of the twentieth century on "civil religion" in modern societies tend to suggest. In the field of religious functionality, there has been research – with interesting outcomes for modern Western cultures – on corresponding phenomena of the reciprocal interplay between politics and religion. Initially, such phenomena had been admitted only for antiquity or for segmented societies (once described as "primitive" or "archaic" societies). See further Schneider (1987).
68. Henrichs (1987: 9).
69. Fundamental for the psychology of religion: James (1889); James (1902); Freud (1968[4]); Jung (1963). Holm (1990: 37–75 – on religious experience) gives an overall view of research in the psychology of religion. Religion, as an important phenomenon, is discussed by Keilbach (1973), Pöll (1974) and Godin (1985). See especially Jung (1999). Burkert (1990: 20) justly underlines that one should not underestimate "the intensity of religious experience" (Rubel 2011, 2013).
70. The more neutral term of divine power has been called the sacred "minus its moral moment": Otto (1917: 6).
71. Otto (1917: 28–37).
72. Otto (1917: 8–12).
73. Gandtke (1995: col. 1270). On the category of the sacred, its applicability and criticism, see especially Colpe (1977) and Colpe (1990). See too Gandtke (1997: 13–25). Criticism of Otto's view refers mostly to the idea that the will of the gods would have been inoculated *a priori* in the human spirit. The universality of this basic experience, postulated by Otto, has no empirical or philosophical basis, but his statement does correspond, in most cases, to many historical situations analysed separately. Dihle (1988: col. 1–63) could equally determine the applicability of the basic category of the sacred to Greek, Roman, Jewish or Christian religion. Concerning the religions of ancient cultures, Burkert (1998: 14) speaks of "an amazing compatibility of the religious". He also believes that murder through sacrifice would have been "the basic experience of 'the sacred'" for the Greeks: Burkert (1972: 9, 51). He also describes the role of "the sacred" within Greek religious ritual: Burkert (1981: 102–3); cf. Burkert (1998: 46).
74. Nock (1942: 481).
75. See especially Ratschow (1958: col. 1791–3); Dihle *et al.* (1972: col. 661–8); Lanczkowski *et al.* (1983: 755–67); Hoheisel (1995: col. 912). Burkert (1998: 43–8) considers fear of the gods and fearfulness as constituents of religion. See also Fischer & Gäbler (1997). It might be to go too far to define here the historical and philosophical evolution of the concepts of "fearfulness" and "fear". Nevertheless, we should note the spectacular work of Kierkegaard, who conceptually delimited fear oriented towards an object (the fear of something) from undetermined fear, leaving this distinction as a legacy to philosophy and psychology: Kierkegaard (1960; initially in Danish, in 1844). See further Bösch (1994). Burkert (1981: 102) has collected the psychological, sociological and biological literature referring to the shapes and roots of fear; cf. Burkert (1998: 45–8). There is a discussion of the connections between fear and religion – based on the contributions of Kierkegaard, Otto and Heidegger – by Buri (1939). See also von Stietencron (1979).
76. Ratschow (1958: col. 1791).
77. Speyer (1995: XIV). Acknowledging death as the last of the "last things" is one of the most pregnant moments in human history. Religion might be described as "a strategy of life against the background of death": Burkert (1998: 47). The issue of the inevitability of death is the central preoccupation of most religions, and is probably the beginning of religion itself. In this context, prehistoric burial customs are crucial (the Neanderthals buried their dead). On

theories regarding beginnings of religion, see the wide-ranging book of Otte (1993) and especially Rapport (1999).

78. Ratschow (1958: col. 1791).
79. Hoheisel (1995: col. 912).
80. Pl. *Euthphr*. 13d. See too Pleket (1981: 159–71). On the just separation between people and gods, see Pindar (*N*. 6, 1–4).
81. See the overview in Dihle *et al.* (1972: col. 661–8). On fear of the gods and fear in Greek religion, see too Dodds (1951: 35–45); cf. Burkert (1977: 408–409). The role of fear in the context of Greek sacrificial practices is discussed by Burkert (1981: 101–25), who elsewhere (1998: 45–8) acknowledges and describes fear as the foundation of religion.
82. Pind. *I*. 5, 53; Soph. *Ant*. 597; cf. 604–605: τὰν σὰν, Ζεῦ, δύνασιν τίς ἀνδρῶν ὑπερβασία κατάσχοι. At Ar. *Lys*. 940, the god is invoked through ὦ Ζεῦ δέσποτα.
83. Theophr. *Char*. 16. Ussher (1993: 24; 135). Cf. Bolkenstein (1929: 78), who also rightly notes (p. 10) that even after Theophrastus, the primary meaning of *deisidaimonía* was still fear of the gods, and only intellectual jokes turned the meaning into exaggerated "superstitions".
84. After a dream, the frightened client goes to an interpreter of dreams and to fortune-tellers to find out, for a price, to what deities he should be praying: Theoph. *Char*. 16, 11. On dreams and interpreters of dreams, see Dodds (1951: 102–21), Hahn (1992; *Xenia*, 27) and Hermes (1996).
85. Thgn. 133–5: Οὐδείς, Κύρν', ἄτης καὶ κέρδεος αἴτιος αὐτός, ἀλλὰ θεοὶ τούτων δώτορες ἀμφοτέρων.
86. Schleiermacher (1835; re-edited Berlin 1960:§ 3). Dihle *et al.* (1972: col. 661). See also Dodds (1951: 28–49). The connection between magic and religion (another curious conceptual division originating in Western thought) will not be discussed here. This connection plays a central role, especially in Malinowski's works; cf. Petzoldt (1978); now also Bremmer (1999: 1–12). On the role of magic for the Greeks, see the comprehensive paper by Bernard (1991). Burkert (1981: 116–23) describes protection and relief rituals, mainly practised through fear of chthonic deities. See also Dickie (2001) and Collins (2008).
87. In the field of ancient religion, this theme is treated exhaustively by Griffiths (1991).
88. Mauss (1978) is fundamental for gift exchange from an anthropological perspective. Just as in anthropology, the "tit for tat" (*do ut des*) principle, "in the history of religion, too, it appears to be a *universale*": Burkert (1998: 164). On this aspect of Greek religion, Parker (1998: esp. 105–106); cf. Latte (1920/21: 254–98); Burkert (1977: 99–190); van Straten (1981: 65–104); Yunis (1988: 50–8); Burkert (1990: 20); Bremmer (1996a: 5–9, 43–61 and *passim*); Pulleyn (1997: 16–38, 56–69 and *passim*); Linders (1997: 31–6); Burkert (1998: 158–88).
89. For example, Lys. 6 (19–20); Antiph. 1, 10–11; 5, 81–3; Andoc. 1, 130–31; 137–9; Dem. 1, 10–11; 24, 121; [Dem.] 25, 16; Lycurg. *Leoc*. 91–2. The orators spoke before juries with between 200 and 1,000 members, and if we assume they wanted to win their cases, then everything points to their having used the religious beliefs of their audience: Dover (1974: 5–14); Mikalson (1983: 7–8); Ober (1996: 43–9). For the gods' involvement in mortal affairs, see Gross (1985: esp. 359–83). Cartledge (1998: 158–62) summarizes theurgy, encountered in historians of the classical period. For Demosthenes and religious arguments, see now Martin (2009).
90. Xen. *Hell*. 2, 4, 14–15; *An*. 3, 1, 22–3; 3, 2, 8–9, etc. See further Popp (1959); Pritchett (1979) and Goodman & Holladay (1986). Garland (1992: 172): "War is ... the prime human activity to scrutinize for evidence of the workings of the gods, since often the only explanation for its outcome is one which concedes to the theoretical possibility of divine intervention."
91. Hdt. 7, 139, 5. Themistocles is made to observe that the victory of Salamis should be considered not as a personal success, but as an intervention of the gods and heroes (Hdt. 8, 109). Another episode in Herodotus can serve as a concrete example of belief in divine intervention: when, in 480 BCE, the Persian fleet anchored at the shore in front of the promontory of Sepias, the Athenians, anchored at Chalcis, invoked Boreas who, according to the myth, was related to Athena (he had married the daughter of Erechtheus), for help against the Persians. After the Persian fleet suffered greatly in a violent storm, Athenians explained that it was certainly

Boreas who destroyed the enemy, and for this reason they built a sanctuary to express their gratitude. After the news spread amongst the Greeks on how most of the Persian fleet had sunk, they brought offerings to their saviour Poseidon, who had also received the epithet of σωτήρ: Hdt. 7, 188–192. On the importance of religion in Herodotus, see Hart (1982: 27–44) and Shimron (1989: 26–57).

92. Xen. *Hell*. 5, 4, 1. In the same chapter, Xenophon says he could mention many more examples to demonstrate that the gods punish each and everyone who violated the law (ὡς θεοὶ οὔτε τῶν ἀσεβούντων οὔτε τῶν ἀνόσια ποιούντων ἀμελοῦσι).
93. Pl. *Leg*. 716d–e, 771a; Isoc. 7, 29–30. Cf. Pl. *Euthphr*. 14b.
94. The material in Raubitschek (1949), Versnel (1981: 1–63) and van Straten (1981: 64–151); for "private" aspects of the Greek religion, see too Nilsson (1940), Jost (1992: 262–87), Parker (1998) and especially Pulleyn (1997: esp. 16–38). Ferguson (1944), Parker (1996: 333–42) refer to cult associations. On the personal aspect, especially apparent in the Mystery religions, see Burkert (1990: 19–34) and now Rubel (2011) with further references. Votive offerings themselves attest an individual aspect of religion, perceptible already in the classical period. In this sense, see Pleket (1981: 155): "Even before the Hellenistic–Roman period we can find traces, in Greek religiosity, of a close affective relationship between deity and worshipper, i.e. of a serving worshipper having the clear sense of depending on an imperious deity."
95. Parker (1996: 200); cf. van Straten (1981: 96–102).
96. Liv. 5, 51, 8. Burkert (1977: 396–402); van Straten (1981: 96–7). The archaeologist Camp (1979: 403) justly comments: "Man's interest in the divine is all too often the direct result of need, and times of trouble might be expected to produce religious fervour. Examples can be cited from throughout Greek history when a cult was founded, a temple built, or a statue erected either to avert a calamity or as a thank offering for deliverance."
97. Yunis (1988: 38–58). Cf. Versnel (1981: 42–62); van Straten (1981: 102–4); Pulleyn (1997: 16–38); Parker (1998: 118–25); Burkert (1998: 158–88).
98. Theophr. *Peri euseb.* fr. 12 (Pötscher). "We must sacrifice to the gods in order to honour them or to thank them or to ask them for something" (trans. van Straten).
99. Pl. *Euthphr*. 14b: "... when one knows how to say and do what is gratifying to the gods, in praying and sacrificing, that is holiness, and such things bring salvation to individual families and to states" (trans. North).
100. Diod. Sic. 12, 38, 2; Plut. *Per*. 12, 1; *Arist*. 25, 3. On this complex problem, see Nesselhauf (1933: 1–3), Meiggs (1972: 109–28) and Schuller (1974: 172–5), who has emphasized that the transfer of the treasury to Athens must be viewed apart from Athenian domination of the maritime League. The place of the treasury was not the issue, but the right to dispose of it: a prerogative exerted by the Athenian Assembly, beginning in 454 BCE.
101. Thuc. 1, 104 and 109–10; Diod. Sic. 11, 71–7, mention 250 and 200 ships sunk together with their crews. By contrast Ctesias, in *FGrH* 688, fr. 14, speaks of only about forty ships, which has led to different views concerning actual losses. Several have rightly argued against Thucydides' large number: Westlake (1969: 61–73) (*CPh* 45; 1950: 209–16) and Salmon (1981: 156–92, esp. 181–9, 285–6). Libourel (1971: 605–15) and Ruschenbusch (1978: 153–6) follow Thucydides and believe that the number of casualties is credible. Meiggs (1972: 104–8 and 473–6) adopts a middle position. Holladay (1989: 176–82) adopts a "reductionist" approach, and argues for the loss of around 100 triremes. Because the data are contradictory, it is impossible accurately to assess the extent of the Egyptian catastrophe. If we accept the (less credible) figure of 250 triremes, then 50,000 men could have perished in Egypt – about as many as during the Sicilian campaign. But at least half the ships belonged to the allies, while in the Athenian triremes, "only a third of the crew were Athenians". Thus, around 8,000 Athenians could have died at the most: Ruschenbusch (1978: 155–6). Cf. Hansen (1988: 14), who calculates around 15,000 victims among the citizens during the Plague of 430 BCE.
102. Thuc. 5, 26, 2.
103. Von Fritz (1967: 573).

104. Main passages: Thuc. 1,1; 5,26. Von Fritz (1967: 565–75), Lesky (1971: 535–3) and Meister (1990: 54–7) summarize viewpoints. Patzer (1937) and Tasolambros (1981: esp. 250–72) are intensely preoccupied with the issue.
105. For the successors of Thucydides, see Will (1991: 113–35). On *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* as a contemporary source, see Bleckmann (1998: 199–266); on Xenophon, see Breitenbach (1966: col. 1669–78).
106. Ste. Croix (1972: 50–63, 180–200). The author supports the idea that Thucydides "fastened upon us for ever the conception of a 'Peloponnesian war' ... and has told us nothing about how the war really began, in *c.* 460 – for it was essentially the same war, merely interrupted for less than fifteen years by the Peace of 446/5" (3). "Thucydides, so to speak, 'swept the First Peloponnesian war under the carpet'" (180).
107. Thuc. 1, 23, 1–3; Murray (1944: 1–9). The direct confrontation between Sparta and Athens during the first Peloponnesian War, and which the Athenians directed especially against the Spartans' allies, is not much stressed: Ste. Croix (1972: 51, 187–96). Boersma (1970: 83) has also discussed the internal unity of the period between 432/1 and 405/4 from an archaeological perspective: "More than the other periods this one is clearly distinguished as an independent chapter in Athenian history."
108. Thuc. 1, 97, 2.
109. *Od.* 3, 48. "All men need (the) gods."
110. Reverdin (1945: 9).
111. See e.g. the informative article of Gschnitzer (1995: 412–31). See too Schuller (1995: 37–8) and Cartledge (1998: *passim*). On the less than delicate treatment that the Athenians meted out to the allies, see Schuller (1978).
112. See further Appendix I.
113. Roberts (1994: 312). The idea is developed further in Rubel (2012).
114. This critique of Dodds (1951: 189–90) on positive appreciations of Athenian democracy still holds good. See too Appendix I. Dodds alludes to nineteenth-century scholars, who did not want to see the "barbaric" side of the Athenians, and who did not have, as Dodds put it – with a glance at the terrible things that happened in the twentieth century – "our advantage of familiarity with this kind of behaviour".

2. Impiety trials against philosophers and Sophists

1. "The superstition in which we were raised does not release its power over us, even if we recognize it." Lessing (1968: 435).
2. For the word σοφιστής and its evolution, see e.g. Kerferd (1950: 8–10); Moreau (1979: 325–35). Cf. Guthrie (1971: 27–34).
3. Beginning with the first calculation of an eclipse of the sun by Thales, by which he showed for the first time that certain natural phenomena obeyed natural laws beyond divine cause, see *DK* 11 A 5; cf. Democrit, in *DK* 68 A 75.
4. See Ueberweg, ed. Flashar (1998); Taylor (1997); Reale (1986). On the pre-Socratics, see Buchheim (1994); Furley & Allen (1970/1975). On the Sophists, see Guthrie (1971); Kerferd (1981); Classen (1976: esp. 641–710; 1985); Wallace (1998); Martin (1976); Buchheim (1986); Romilly (1988). Poulakos (1995), focuses on the reception of sophistry by Plato, Isocrates and Aristotle. See too Kirste *et al.* (2002); O'Grady (2008); and especially Meister (2010).
5. Cf. Kerferd (1981: 1).
6. Cf. Poulakos (1995: 74–112). The passages dedicated to Sophists in Plato are, according to Marrou (1965: 90), "*les plus ambiguës de son œuvre, à l'interprétation toujours délicate*" ("the most ambiguous in his works, and never easy to interpret").
7. Pl. *Phdr.* 268a; *Grg.* 452e. On the importance of rhetoric in the politics of democratic Athens, see Kennedy (1963: 3–51); Poulakos (1995: 11–52); Yunis (1996); cf. Kerferd (1981: 17–18);

Worthington (1994). Wallace (1998: 222) emphasizes that through oratory the Sophists had a decisive influence on the evolution of democracy at Athens, but this is precisely why they were also responsible for their own downfall, after the troubled years following 430.

8. Guthrie (1971: 35–40, 47, 50–51); Kerferd (1981: 78–110).
9. Hippias also taught, for example, astronomy: Pl. *Hp. mai.* 285b; *Prt.* 315c. It is impossible to draw precise distinctions between philosophers and Sophists. The contemporary texts of the fifth century are also not clear on this distinction: Wallace (1998: 205–7).
10. Pl. *Tht.* 171e–172a. At the end of the twentieth century, the general view of sophistry-specific relativism was naturally questioned by Bett (1989: 139–69); cf. Voelke (1990).
11. See Heinimann (1945: esp. 110–62). On the change in the concepts of *nomos* and *physis* from the archaic period to the classical period, see Heinimann (1945: 59–109); cf. Romilly (1971: 73–114).
12. *DK* 82 B11. On the emergence of culture, state philosophy and legal teaching, depending on the Sophistic *nomos–physis* opposition, see Heinimann (1945: 110–25); Romilly (1971: 73–95); cf. Hoffmann (1997: esp. 358–416).
13. Diog. Laert. 2, 16 (*DK* 60 A1). On the relativity of social value and legislative convention, see too Pl. *Grg*. 482c–483e; Pl. *Resp*. 338c; Antiph., *DK* 87 B 1.
14. Jaeger (1953: 199), quoted from the English edition, Jaeger (1936: 174–5).
15. Heinimann (1945: 126).
16. Hes. *Erg*. 267–84. Solon, fr. 1 and 13 (West). See too Dihle (1962: 13–30); Lloyd-Jones (1983: 28–54); Laumann (1988: 55–76). On the divine origin of justice, see also Romilly (1971: 27–38); on the origins of the notion of divine justice, see Dodds (1951); Lloyd-Jones (1983); Dover (1974: 255–61); Laumann (1988); Balaudé (1996); Effe (1997); Adkins (1960, 1972); Creed (1973: 213–31); Dover (1983: 35–48). Besides the immorality and injustice of Olympian gods, known in myth, "there was a hope that could blossom into weak conviction that behind all the apparently wilful and seemingly chaotic actions of the gods there existed an all-knowing Zeus, a deity who from the start of things possessed a scheme of cosmic justice" (McPherran 1996: 101).
17. Büchner (1967: 180).
18. *DK* 21 B 15.
19. *DK* 21 B 23. On religion in Xenophanes, see Babut (1974: 401–40). For the fragments, see Lesher (1992); Schäfer (1996). On religion in the pre-Socratics, see in general: Jaeger (1953); Gigon (1954: 127–66).
20. Anaximenes: *DK* 13 A 10; Heracl.: *DK* 22 B 5; B 32; B 67; Empedocles: *DK* 31 B 133; B 134.
21. Hecataeus, in *FGrH* 1, fr. 25–27; Hellanicus, in *FGrH* 4, fr. 8.
22. *DK* 80 B 4. On Protagoras' agnostic vision, see too Pl. *Tht*. 162d–e.
23. *DK* 80 B 1. Huss (1996: 229–57).
24. *DK* 80 B 8. Martin (1976: 152). Protagoras did not want to assault traditional religion, but was only interested in theoretical issues: Jaeger (1953: 200–201, 215–16); Dietz (1976: 132–42); Müller (1976); Schiappa (1991: 141–8). The phrase, however, discredited the Sophists which is why Protagoras had to undergo a trial in Athens, on which see Chapter 4.1.
25. Hdt. 3, 38, 2–4.
26. *DK* 84 B 5. *PHerc*. 1428 fr. 19; Henrichs (1975: 93–123; 1976: 15–21). On Prodicus' activity in Athens, see too Pl. *Prt*. 315d–316a.
27. See e.g. Guthrie (1971: 298–304); Patzer (1974: 3–19); Sutton (1981: 33–8); Dreher (1983: 28–30; 64–6). On Critias' political career as a leader of the Thirty Tyrants, see Németh (2006: 25–27). Meister (2010: 220–25) "definitely" crossed him "off the list of the Sophists" (257).
28. *DK* 88 B 25. Davies (1989: 16–32) evaluated this surprising and revolutionary theory for the fifth century. Dihle (1977: 28–42) thought the author was Euripides, doubted by Hoffmann (1997: 273–89). For further discussions, see Pechstein (1998: 289–343); Winiarczyk (1987: 35–45, "Critias"); Meister (2010: 220–23, "Euripides"). On the type of satyr play, see Conrad (1997). Németh wisely states (2006: 27) that there is no need to consider the alleged "atheism"

of Critias, so long as we cannot say who was the author of this play. Meister (2010: 224) notes that we should recall that it is Sisyphus who presents the supposedly "atheistic" position.

29. Romilly (1988: 189).
30. Zeller (1892[5]: 1156); Classen (1976: 1–18; 1985: 344–63).
31. E.g. Geffcken (1923: 15–31); Gay (1968: 72–94); Mittelstraß (1970: 15–86, esp. 54–8). Dodds (1951: 180–81) rightly objected to limiting the concept of the Enlightenment in the context of antiquity to just the Sophistic movement (e.g. Solmsen 1975: 3), and sought to extend the concept to the philosophy of nature during the pre-Socratic period.
32. Kant (1913: 294). "*Befreiung vom Aberglauben heißt Aufklärung*."
33. Burnet (1914: 88); cf. Kerferd (1981: 163). Lesky (1971: 387) emphasizes an important difference between the ancient and the modern Enlightenments: "the influence of the Sophists was largely confined to the intellectual and economic elite to whom it was directed." On the applicability of the Enlightenment concept to antiquity, see Müller (1998: 17–29); Rubel (2012b).
34. Reinhard (1960: 228) thus sees the period of the Sophist "Enlightenment" as a kind of "*intermezzo*".
35. Goethe, *Faust*, I, v. 3050.
36. Xen. *Mem*. 1, 6, 13: πωλοῦντας σοφιστὰς ὥσπερ πόρνους ἀποκαλοῦσιν. As already noted, the image of Sophistic philosophy suffered from the tendentious accounts of Plato, Xenophon and Aristotle.
37. Pl. *Prt*. 312a.
38. Plato and Antiphon show that, according to the Sophists, social morals and the law were only products of convention: Pl. *Grg*. 482c–483e; Pl. *Resp*. 338c; Antiph., in *DK* 87 B 1.
39. Pl. *Men*. 90b–94e; 91c: ἐπεὶ οὗτοι [οἱ σοφισαὶ] γε φανερά ἐστι λώβη τε καὶ διαφθορὰ τῶν συνγιγνομένων.
40. Pl. *Soph*. 231 d.
41. Pl. *Ap*. 19b. Socrates was accused of the same thing: Ar. *Nub*. 112–5.
42. Pl. *Prt*. 316d–317d. The frequent persecutions of Sophists are also mentioned in Arist. *Rhet*. 1397b 25–27.
43. Gorgias charged pupils the huge amount of 100 *minae* (*DK* 82). For Sophists' fees see e.g. Pl. *Hp. mai*. 282c–d; *Prt*. 310d, 311b, d, 313c; *Grg*. 319c; *Soph*. 222d–223b; Xen. *Mem*. 1, 2, 6; 1, 6, 5 and 13. On honoraria, cf. Kerferd (1981: 25–8). There were significant differences between the fees charged by the Sophists: thus Prodicus, apart from his fifty-drachma lectures, offered one-drachma advice: a kind of "loss-leader" to get more clients: Pl. *Cra*. 384b; cf. Marrou (1965: 92). Pl. *Ax*. 366b–c, mentions fees ranging from half a drachma to four drachmas – for a single lecture. The high fees charged by famous natural philosophers, such as Zeno of Elea, who had taught before the emergence of the Sophists, were considered normal, and nobody criticized them (Plato): Pl. *Alc. Min*. 119a. On Sophistic education in general: *Paideia*, I: 364–418; Marrou (1965: 90–106); Beck (1964: 147–87).
44. Cf. Plato's dialogues *Protagoras* and *Gorgias*; also, Pl. *Hp. mai*. 282b: καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐπιδείξεις ποιούμενος. Protagoras presented his controversial text – περὶ θεῶν – in the house of Euripides, or that of Megacleides, or at the Lyceum: Diog. Laert. 9, 54.
45. It was only after the emergence of the expensive education provided by Sophists that the children of the rich gained access to higher education. The pupils of Dionysus, visited by Socrates in the late pseudo-Platonic dialogue *Anterastai*, belonged exclusively to the elite: [Pl.] *Anterast*. 132a. On higher education in general, cf. Marrou (1965: 74–147); Freeman (1969: 157–209); Beck (1964: 141–6); Lynch (1972: 32–63). Taking into account the high fees, those outside the elite could, at best, only attend the few cheap lectures organized as publicity talks (Marrou 1965: 92). On the modest diffusion of literacy in the classical period, see Harris (1989: 65–113). Similarly, Marrou (1965: 89) and Lesky (1971: 387) emphasize that in view of the elitist character of education, Sophistic teaching could not extend much beyond elite circles, and that it was based largely on second-hand knowledge, full of preconceived ideas; cf. Lloyd-Jones (1983: 129–34); Schubert (1994: 104). With good reason, Lloyd-Jones (1983: 181) asks

the rhetorical question: "When in human history has a period of intellectual enlightenment freed the uneducated from magic and superstition?"

46. Pl. *Leg*. 886d–e; 967a; Plut. *Nic*. 23, 3.
47. Zimmermann (1993: 258). Gelzer (1971: col. 1393–570) remains essential for Aristophanes.
48. Eup., fr. 157 (Kassel & Austin). For the term ἀλιτήριος ("evildoer", "sinner"), see Furley (1996: 109).
49. Philostr. *VS*. 1, 15, 2.
50. Diagoras: Ar. *Av*. 1071–3. Meton: Ar. *Av*. 993–1024.
51. Ar. fr. 506 (Kassel & Austin). As early as in his first comedy, οἱ Δαιταλῆς, Aristophanes showed the opposition between traditional education and the rhetoric-oriented, questionable teaching of the Sophists; see Cassio (1977: 32–6); MacDowell (1995: 29).
52. Parker (1996: 203).
53. On the image of Socrates in Aristophanes, see Dover (1968: xxxii–lvii, esp. xl). See too MacDowell (1995: 130–33); Auffarth (1999). On the ridiculing of intellectuals in comedy, see Zimmermann (1993). Socrates is featured in other comedies too: Eup., fr. 386, 395; Ameipsias, fr. 9; Telecleides, fr. 41, 42 (Kassel & Austin).
54. Ar. *Nub*. 95–125, 227–61, 376–475. Cf. Dover (1968: XXXV). There are certain real-life features: Dover (1968: XLI–XLIV). "Thus the characteristics of the individual Socrates which are common to Aristophanes, Plato, and Xenophon appear to fall entirely within the limits of the physically obvious. Outside these limits, the disagreements are formidable" (XLIV).
55. Ar. *Nub*. 245–8.
56. Ar. *Nub*. 331–2. According to the Suda and Phot. Lex. s.v. Θουριομάντεις, the reference to Θουριομάντεις is a clear allusion to the influential seer Lampon, on whom see Chapter 2.6.
57. Plato already speaks of Socrates in Aristophanes as a caricature of philosophers in general: Pl. *Ap*. 23d; *Phd*. 64b. Drachmann (1922: 58); Dover (1968: XLV–LII). For different views, see MacDowell (1995: 133); Heath (1987a: 9–10); Halliwell (1993: 336–7).
58. Marrou (1965: 91): "*Les Sophistes … n'ont pas trouvé de clientèle toute faite: il leur a fallu la faire naître, persuader le public de recourir à leurs services, d'où toute une série de procédés publicitaires.*"
59. *DK* 82 A 1a; Pl. *Grg*. 447a: ἐν ἀγορᾷ; cf. Kerferd (1981: 29), who assumes lectures took place in the Gymnasium.
60. Pl. *Eryx*. 397c–e; Pl. *Hp. mai*. 286a; its location is unknown. In Plato's *Euthydemus* (371a–c), Socrates meets Euthydemus and Dionysodorus at the Lyceum. Lynch (1972: 45–6) notes the growing importance of the Lyceum for higher education, and as the epicentre of Sophistic teaching at the end of the fifth century.
61. Pl. *Hp. mi*. 363c–d; Arist. *Rhet*. 1414b 29.
62. Kerferd (1981: 30): "The main instruction by sophists, however, was given quite certainly neither in public lectures nor in public debates, but smaller classes or seminars."
63. Diog. Laert. 9, 50, with reference to Heraclides Ponticus (*DK* 80 A 1): ὃς καὶ Θουρίοις νόμους γράψαι φησὶν αὐτόν. Stadter (1991: 114) believes the information to be questionable; cf. Menzel (1910: 189–229); Bugno (1999: 120–21).
64. Diod. 12, 53, 1; Pl. *Hp. mai*. 281a–b.
65. For example, the speeches of Cleon and Diodotus in the Mytilene debate (Thuc. 3, 36–48), as good examples of argumentation based only on potential gains, without mentioning moral issues; see further Andrewes (1962: 64–85); Macleod (1983: 92–102); Hornblower (*CT*, I: 420–41).
66. The silence of the orators about Sophists confirms this picture: Dover (1974: 10–11); but any discussion can only be speculative, since daily rumours led to contradictory theories relating to *nomos* and to the gods; cf. Lewis (1996) and Coulet (1996).
67. Adkins (1978: 143–58).
68. Davies (1993: 172–3).
69. Michelini (1987: 3–51) has collected the most important proponents of this view. They include Schlegel, Nietzsche, Verall and Wilamowitz; see too Keller (1931: 66–8); *Paideia* (I:

419–78); Nestle (1940: 462–3 and 486–528); Nilsson (1940: 121–2); Nilsson (*GGR*, I: 779); Dodds (1951: 192–5); Ehrenberg (1968: 256–98); Müller (1985: 170–74); Ostwald (1986: 274–90); Humphreys (1986: 92–110); Romilly (1988: 185–219). With Mikalson (1983: 110–18), Versnel (1990) and Parker (1996) in disagreement, it is no longer the *communis opinio*. The introduction of new cults to Athens in the last third of the fifth century has also been viewed as a sign of the decline of traditional religion. Parker (1996: 152–98), however, has shown that the acceptance of new cults to the pantheon was closely related to the practices of Greek polytheism. On "new gods", see further in Chapter 6.

70. Cf. Parker (1996: 210): "Was there, as has often been supposed, a 'religious crisis' in the second half of the fifth century? In the sense that traditional religion was seriously undetermined, certainly not; there is any amount of evidence, from inscriptions, dedications, oratory, and comedy, that it continued to flourish in the fourth century just as before." Moreover, through their frequent references to gods as guarantors of the city wealth, orators provide various evidence on the perpetual importance of religion for the people; see too Parker (1997: 143–60); Montgomery (1996: 125–32); Martin (2009). The decline thesis, widespread thanks to Nilsson (e.g. *GGR*, I: 779, 815) depends on whether the supposed mockery of the gods in Euripides represent a temporary aberration that diminishes after 400: Reinhardt (1960: 228). On Greek piety, see Linders (1997). Bleicken (1987), Davies (1993) and Eder (1995) showed that, after 404/3, continuity was stronger, thanks to scholarly belief in political and economic factors.
71. Ar. *Ran*. 479–90. For similarly disrespectful representations of the gods in Aristophanes, see *Av*. 1170–261; 1494–552; 1565–692; *Plut*. 627–748; 1097–170; see further Ehrenberg (1968: 256–98).
72. *GGR*, I: 782.
73. Nestle (1940: 496); Ehrenberg (1968: 268); Ostwald (1986: 279–80).
74. Adkins (1978: 144); an oversimplified view based on the idea of a direct correspondence between the theatrical and the everyday world; see too Adkins (1960: 127). Dover (1983: 35–48) rejected this idea.
75. On criticism of this attitude, see Appendix II.
76. Lesky (1961: 37). See too Pfeiffer (1932: 20–21); Nock (1942: 478); Dover (1972: 32–3); Snell (1986: 43); Knox (1992: 286); MacDowell (1995: 18): "The Athenian audience would expect some religion at a religious festival, but in the comic part of the festival they would expect religion to be treated comically." Cf. Cartledge (1998: 166). On religion (cult and ritual) in comedy, see Auffarth (2007).
77. Bremmer (1996a: 24–7). On the ritual abolition of the world and on the Saturnalian characteristics of the Dionysus cult, see Hoffman (1989); on the ethnology, see Turner (1969). On the context of the festivities, see Deubner (1932: 93–123); Parke (1987: 159–89).
78. See Halliwell (1984: 83–8); Heath (1987a: 26–8); Hoffman (1989); Halliwell (1991: 48–70), who accepts that comedy was not subject to the usual legal constraints, as supported by the scholiasts (e.g. Schol. Ar. *Ach*. 67, 1150, 1297). Cf. Henderson (1975: 13–17); Finley (1980: 101); Cartledge (1998: 166).
79. Auffarth (1994: 59–86). On the dangers of extrapolating real social and political situations from comedy, see the persuasive arguments of Gomme (1938: 97–109); Stow (1942: 83–92); Chapman (1978: 59–70); Heath (1987a: 41–3); Halliwell (1993: 321–40).
80. Taplin (1986: 163–74) notes a difference between the world of comedy, oriented towards everyday life, and that of tragedy, separated from the real world not only through time and space, but by the reaction of receiving and conserving an imaginary world in its entirety. Mikalson (1991) goes too far, in believing the world of tragedy to be an accurate image of the polis; he is right, however, in seeing tragedy as a vital source of information on cult practices. Sourvinou-Inwood has a critical opinion on this subject (1997: 163–5). Both exceptions – *Persians* by Aeschylus and *Capture of Miletus* by Phrynichus (two historical plays) – are of less importance. Phrynichus was condemned to pay a fine, not because his tragic action was not placed in times immemorial, and did not depict foreign nations, but, by portraying the fall of Miletus, he had

reminded the Athenians – who had partaken in the Ionian revolt – of their own misfortune (ὡς ἀναμνήσαντα οἰκήια κακά): Hdt. 6, 21, 2. Nevertheless, in *Persians* (performed in 472) Aeschylus shows a current theme of the very recent past, but cleverly restricts himself to the misfortunes of the Persians, as well as the Greek, mostly Athenian, triumph. Recently Vickers (2008) has made a brave attempt to detect political allusions and observations in tragedy. His conclusions are attractive, but like religion – our issue here – they have much to do with belief. For more on the limits of tragedy as a historical source, see Appendix II.

81. Burian (1985: VII). See Knox, in *CHCL* (1985: 316–39) for a profound and balanced study of Euripides. See too Lesky (1972: 275–522) and Michelini (1987: 3–51) for differing views on the poet. On the one hand, it is difficult to analyse the poet because of the perception that, as a rationalist Illuminist, he explained Sophistic theories from the stage to the Demos (see e.g. Verrall (1895); Nestle (1901); on the other hand, Dodds (1929: 97–104) called him an "irrationalist".
82. "The ancients called him the philosopher of the stage, and he does in fact belong to the two worlds. We see him as part of the old world which he was born to destroy, but which shines out once more in his work with all its all magical splendour. Once more in him poetry asserts itself as the guide of life, although by doing so it opens the way for the new spirit": Jaeger (*Paideia*, I: 449; quote at 430).
83. For example, Helen's defensive speech when blamed by Hecuba, in the *Troades* (Eur. *Tro*. 895–965); the speech of the nurse in *Hippolytus*, through which she "persuades" Phedra that it is perfectly just to fall in love with Hippolytus (Eur. *Hipp*. 433–76); cf. Heath (1987b: 62).
84. See further Appendix II.
85. Nestle (1940: 496).
86. Lloyd-Jones (1983: 146).
87. The caution of Lesky (1972: 512–22) and Knox, in *CHCL* (1985: 316–39), seems justified, in view of the poet's apparent ability to sit on the fence.
88. E.g. Gregory (1991: esp. 1–17 and 185–9); contrast Dodds (1960: xl). On the essence of Attic tragedy, Heath (1987b: 47–8) presents a somewhat "Aristotelian" view: "He [sc. the tragedian] was writing for the theatre, where his overriding task – the one on which competitive success would depend – was to satisfy an audience that looked for emotional stimulus and aesthetic satisfaction."
89. See further, Appendix II.
90. Jouvet (1952: 132).
91. Ostwald (1992: 351): "Still the most pervasive and lasting cultural imprint was left on Athens by the sophists and the philosophers who preceded them." Cf. Guthrie (1971: 3–13). Contrast Marrou (1965: 90–91): "*A la vérité, les Sophistes ne relèvent pas à proprement parler de l'histoire de la philosophie ou des sciences. ... ils n'ont pas été à proprement parler des penseurs, des chercheurs de vérité. C'étaient des pedagogues*."
92. Muir (1985: 199): "These [sc. Sophistic] ideas did not, of course, touch most ordinary Greek citizens; they occupied the minds of a handful of remarkable intellectuals and, however disturbing and revolutionary their theories might be, theories without interpreters and effective means of diffusion remain relatively harmless. Such a means of diffusion was lacking."
93. Robertson (1990: 419–42); the quote is at 441.
94. Dodds (1951: 192); Lloyd-Jones (1983: 132–5); Bremmer (1996a: 102–8). There is, however, despite Dodds (1951), a tendency in Classics to dwell on the intellectual accomplishments of the Ancients; Mehl (1982: 76) has called the ensuing situation the "*Antagonismus der Denkarten*". The example of Nicias shows that we cannot simply reduce matters to "Rationalism and Reaction" (cf. Dodds 1951: 179). The division between an intellectual elite and a simple-minded Demos is not as straightforward as Bremmer (1996a: 104–8) seems to think. Nor can the people of Athens be seen as an assembly of philosophers.
95. Von Fritz (1971: 229): "*schlechte Presse*".
96. Thuc. 2, 41, 1. J. Burckhard (*WGB*: 123) introduced the term "spiritual exchange market" (*geistiger Tauschplatz*). More recently, Wallace (1998) has objected to the widespread view that

Sophistic thought was closely related to Athenian democracy (1998). He emphasizes, however, the connection between the Sophists and the intellectuals who had come to Athens as "wise men" as early as Peisistratid times, and concludes: "those philosophical developments that we call the Sophistic movement not only began much earlier than 450 but were widespread in the Greek world" (213).

97. On the disputed date of the first impiety trial, see Chapter 2.5.

98. *DK* 80 B 4.

99. Anaxagoras: Diod. 12, 39, 2 (Ephorus, in *FGrH* 70 F 196); Plut. *Per*. 32, 5; Diog. Laert. 2, 12–14 (*DK* 59 A 1, A 17). Protagoras: Testimonia in *DK* 80 A, mostly Arist. fr. 67 (Rose); Diog. Laert. 9, 52–4; Sext. Emp. *Math*. 9, 55; Cic. *De or*. 1, 63. Diogenes of Apollonia: Diog. Laert. 9, 57. Prodicus: Suda (II 2365), s.v. Πρόδικος (*DK* 84 A 1); *Schol. Pl. Resp*. 600c. Aspasia: Plut. *Per*. 32, 1 and 5; Ath. 13, 589e. Eur: *Vita Eur*. 10 (ed. Arrighetti). Diagoras: Ar. *Av*. 1071–4; [Lys.] 6, 17; Diod. 13, 6, 7; Melanthius, in *FGrH* 326 F 3. The musician Damon was ostracized for political reasons, which is why he is not included in the list of impiety trials: Arist. *Ath. Pol*. 27, 4; Plut. *Arist*. 1, 7; *Nic.* 6, 1; *Per*. 4, 1–3; 9, 2–3. On Damon, see further Wallace (1991: 30–54), with testimonia; cf. Wallace (1994: 139–42). On Damon's ostracism, see Raaflaub (2000). Winiarczyk (1984: 157–83) includes further testimonia on the impiety trials.

100. Plut. *Per*. 32, 2. Parallels to the charges brought against Socrates (Favorinus, *apud* Diog. Laert. 2, 40) will be discussed below. On *eisangelia* procedures, see Hansen (1975). For the meaning of the accusation τὰ θεῖα resp. τοὺς θεοὺς (μὴ) νομίζειν, see Fahr (1969: 158–64), who showed that in this context, the term means not "(cult-related) worship", but "believing". Cf. Derenne (1930: 217–23); Yunis (1988: 33–66); Versnel (1990: 124–5).

101. Decharme (1904: 155): "*Maintenant, tout était changé*"; Dodds (1951: 189–95); *GGR*, I: 767–71; Burkert (1977: 460–68); MacDowell (1978: 200–202); Muir (1985: 191–218); Ostwald (1986: 274–90 and 532); Ostwald, in *CAH*, V (1992: 351–69); Schubert (1994: 103–5).

102. Hes. (*Erg*. 238–43) explicitly indicates a "sinner" whose sacrilege was not expiated would endanger the entire polis. The same idea can be found in Soph. (*OT* 27–30, 95–146), where the unexpiated death of Laios is the cause of epidemics besetting Thebes. The reason for occasionally high fines for religious offences was that such deeds were an "offence against community", equivalent to high treason, "because it is the community who may expect to suffer the consequences of the impious act": Todd (1993: 310–11). See too Latte (1920/21); Burkert (1998: 126–57).

103. Vegetti (1993: 331); "*La religion et la patrie étaient indissolublement unies dans le cœur des citoyens: attaquer l'une, c'était aussi porter atteinte à l'autre*": Derenne (1930: 257); see too Sourvinou-Inwood (1990: 304–305). The orator, at [Lys.] 6, 13, points out to the judge that whoever impedes the gods in their just revenge (οἱ ἀφελόντες τὰς τιμωρίας τῶν θεῶν) becomes equal to the lawless.

104. Favorinus, *apud* Diog. Laert. 2, 40: ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης, οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσηγούμενος.

105. Muir (1985: 195): "The questioning of religion was seen as a dangerous threat. ... The welfare of every individual, every family and the state could be at risk"; cf. Derenne (1930: 254–8); Ostwald (1986: 532); Yunis (1988: 24). Ostwald, in *CAH*, V (1992: 368): "The main reason for the unpopularity of the foreign sophists was the conviction that the intellectual training they administered undetermined the authority of religion. ... The doctrines of the Ionian physicists as popularized by the rationalism of the sophists ... were, therefore, regarded by many as a threat to the established religion."

106. Fustel de Coulanges, 1864: 268: "*La liberté de penser à l'égard de la religion de la cité était absolument inconnue chez les anciens. Il fallait se conformer à toutes les règles du culte.*" On the relative lack of religious tolerance, despite polytheistic pluralism, see too Garnsey (1984: 1–27), Baslez (1988/9: 10–18) and especially Price (1999: 67–88).

107. Price (1999: 67); cf. Garnsey (1984: 3, 5).
108. Rahner (1968: 372); some definitions in Winiarczyk (1990: 7–8). We can get an idea of this conceptual "Tower of Babel" from e.g. Edwards (1967: 175–7): "No definition of 'atheism' could hope to be in accord with all uses of this term"; Schwemmer (1980: 205–8); Ley & Wicklein (1990: 270–72): "Taking into account the contents, the term atheism designates different situations and totally distinct meanings regarding the view on the world" (270). Splett (1968: 321–37) rightly admits that difficulties arise from the "imprecision of the term" (321).
109. Sandvoss (1968: 312–29); Meijer (1981: 216–32); Rankin (1983: 135). Rankin's vague definition contributes to the conceptual confusion: "Atheism in the ancient sense often was a matter of taking different views of deity from one's fellow citizens." Fahr (1969: 168–71) disagrees; for a more balanced view, see Kern (1975: 3–40; 6–12 on the ancient term *atheism*). For brief discussions of the ancient concept of atheism, see: Cancik-Lindemeier (2006); Bremmer (2007). The most sober analysis of Greek "atheism" is to be found in the works of M. Winiarczyk, often cited below.
110. See Winiarczyk (1990: 7f). Cf. the entries in the lexicon, mentioned above.
111. Winiarczyk (1990: 80). Similarly, for Drachmann (1922: 1): atheism is "the point of view which *denies the existence of the ancient gods*" (italics in original). For a full bibliography, see Winiarczyk (1994).
112. Pl. *Ap*. 26c; Bacchyl. *Epin*. 11, 109; Pind. *Pyth*. 4, 162; Aesch. *Pers*. 808; *Eum*. 151, 541; Soph. *El*. 124, 1181; *O.T*. 1360; *Trach*. 1036. See too Fahr (1969: 15–17).
113. Sourvinou-Inwood (1990). See Chapter 1.2.3.
114. Bremmer (1982: 50–2); Bremmer (1996a: 3); Burkert (1977: 371–402); Winiarczyk (1990: 8–10).
115. Winiarczyk (1990: 11).
116. Pl. *Leg*. 888d–890a.
117. Winiarczyk (1990: 12). The "Sisyphus" fragment in Critias is very bold, if a charlatan is indeed supposed to have invented the gods (see Chapter 2.1.2); alternatively, the words of a character in a play do not necessarily indicate the writer's own views.
118. See Winiarczyk (1984: 157–83).
119. Arist. *Virt. et vit*. 1251a 31. Cf. Hyp. *Eux*. 6. Similarly, Polyb. 37, 1c (= 36, 15).
120. Pl. *Euthphr*. 7a.
121. Sandvoss (1968: 314); cf. Jacoby (1959: 45).
122. Thalheim (1896: col. 1529); Lipsius (1905: 359); Derenne (1930: 9–12); Cohen (1989: 100).
123. Rudhardt's view (1960) that a clearly stated legal term, with well-defined legal rules, would have already been formulated in the fifth century, is yet to be confirmed by the sources; see further Ostwald (1986: 535); Cohen (1989: 102–103); Cohen (1991: 204).
124. Dem. 21, 104. For more details on what might be considered in general usage to be ἀσεβής, see Lipsius (1905: 366–8); Cohen (1989: 101 and 1991: 206).
125. E.g. Antiph. 2a, 3; 9; 11; Lys. 12, 24; Isoc. 4, 203; add Cohen (1991: 204–5 and 1989: 100–101).
126. Lys. 7; Plut. *Per*. 32, 2.
127. Andoc. 1, 14 and 37. Ostwald (1986: 534).
128. [Dem.] 59, 116.
129. [Lys.] 6, 10. This statement has often been seen as proof that under Pericles there were written norms besides the unwritten laws on the procedure to follow in case of impiety. Ostwald (1986: 528–32) argues against this view.
130. Thalheim (1896: col. 1529); Lipsius (1905: 359–60).
131. Cohen (1989, 1991: 203–17).
132. Arist. *Ath. Pol*. 41, 2; *Pol*. 1275a 22–33, b5–6.
133. Dem. 24, 113–14.
134. "Theft (1). Anyone who takes away any movable thing not being his own from another, with the intent of unlawfully appropriating it, shall be punished by imprisonment up to five years

or fined" (*StGB* (=German Criminal Code) § 242). Regarding theft in Attic law, see Cohen (1983: 34–92).

135. Cohen (1991: 209); "The fact is, I would suggest, that the Athenian legal system was institutionally incapable of providing an exact definition by which difficult cases could be decided, e.g. whether or not a thief who had touched but not yet walked off with the property had committed theft, or whether or not certain kinds of behaviour towards one's parents or towards a murderer was ἀσέβεια" (Cohen 1989: 103). See too Cohen (1995: 242); cf. Ostwald (1986: 535): "It seems, accordingly, that fifth-century law did not define *asebeia* but permitted any act of offensive to the religious sensibilities of the people to become actionable before a court of law." Cf. Todd (1993: 310).
136. Yunis (1988: 25).
137. On the new regulation of § 166 within *StGB*, enforced on 2.01.1975 (*Neubekanntmachung der Neufassung des Strafgesetzbuches*, in *Bundesgesetzblatt 1969*, I: 1–79, at § 166: 49; cf. *Bundesgesetzblatt 1969*, I: 645–82, at § 166: 553), see Kiewitz (1969). Zipf (1969: 1944–5) compares the two versions. See further Leutenbauer (1984: 284–93).
138. On the older view (that contradicts the sources), see e.g. Gigon (1954: 128–9). Cf. Marasco (1976: 114–15) who only considers the impiety accusation in relation to its religious aspect, as does Allen (1996: 7). See further Fahr (1969: 158–64; 1930: 217–23); Rudhardt (1960: 91–2); Mactoux (1990: 289–313); Versnel (1990: 14–15); Parker (1996a: 201): "The old doctrine that θεοὺς νομίζειν never means to 'believe in' but always to 'pay cult to' the gods is wrong; but it is true that borderline cases exist." Wallace (1994: 144) inadmissibly invokes Euripides, who is simply putting words in actors' mouths, and states: "Impious talk or even impious actions, in themselves, seem generally not to have been thought especially dangerous to the city, or else Euripides' play would not have been performed." On Euripides and his attitude towards religion, see Lefkowitz (1987, 1989); cf., on details, Appendix II.
139. [Lys.] 6, 17. Cf. Pl. *Lg.* 907d, where the word and the deed are legally seen as *asebeia*. The common view that ἀσέβεια involving a verbal offence (λόγῳ) only began at the end of the fifth century, being prohibited by the decree of Diopeithes (e.g. Rudhardt 1960: 91–2; MacDowell 1978: 200; Ostwald 1986: 535), does not stand up in the light of Theognis (*floruit c.* 550), who already calls things by their names: Κύρνε, θεοὺς αἰδοῦ καὶ δείδιθι τοῦτο γὰρ ἄνδρα εἴργει μήθ' ἕρδειν μήτε λέγειν ἀσεβῆ (1179–80).
140. Mactoux (1990: 294). Mactoux (1990: 192) understands the prosecutions for impiety at the end of the fifth century not so much a reaction of the Demos troubled by the crisis as an attempt of the polis to recover the initiative: "*Le décret de Diopeithe doit s'entendre comme la première revendication par la cité du droit à tenir un discours religieux face à ceux qui instaurent un discours non autorisé.*"
141. Ostwald (1986: 528–32) argues that the persecution of the Alcmaeonids for killing their opponents in front of the altar, as well as the so-called trial of Aeschylus for allegedly betraying the secrets of the Mysteries, were not formally and legally ἀσέβεια, since the decree of Diopeithes (and his colleagues) represents the first actual legal regulation.
142. Mansfeld (1979: 39–69) argued that Anaxagoras arrived in Athens in 456/5; 463/2 was proposed by Montuori (1988: 150–62). For Anaxagoras and his life, see the commentary of Curd (2007). Protagoras seems to have arrived in town around 450: von Fritz (1957: col. 908–21, esp. col. 908–11).
143. Jacoby (1922: col. 1618). Plutarch explicitly states twice that he used this collection of sources: Plut. *Cim.* 13, 5; Arist. 26, 1–4. Many citations from decrees of the Assembly seem to come from the collection of the Macedonian antiquarian; cf. Ste. Croix (1972: 247): "Plutarch certainly made first-hand use of Craterus' collection." Jacoby, in *FGrH* 342, gathered the fragments, accompanied by a useful commentary. On the sources for Pericles' biography, see, in general, Stadter (1989: lviii–lxxv). Apart from the decision of the Assembly at the request of Diopeithes, the same fragment mentions a decree of *atéleia*, through which, on the initiative of a certain Glaucon, the Meno who denounced Phidias was honoured. Moreover, Plutarch notes

the regulation of the *psephisma* of Dracontides, according to which Pericles was to be put on trial (*Per*. 31–2). For the state archive founded in 409 and 405, see Boegehold (1972: 23–30); Thomas (1989: 38–94). For the resources available to Plutarch, see too Frost (1961: 182–94).

144. Willink (1983: 25–33), however, not only insists on Prodicus' lack of popularity in Athens, but also his flight, because of prosecution for impiety.

145. Satyr., *Vit. Eur*. 10 (ed. Arrighetti); *POxy* 2400 is probably a variant dependent on Satyrus; cf. Dover (1975: 29); Lefkowitz (1981: 88–104).

146. Plut., *Per*. 31, 2–32, 6 derives most of his information from Ephorus who, in Diodorus' summary, only knows of accusations against Phidias, Anaxagoras and Pericles, and is thus unaware of the decree of Diopeithes, and of the accusation for impiety made against Aspasia (Diod. 12, 39). The highly controversial trial of Aspasia, apparently initiated by the comic poet Hermippus, cannot be analysed in detail here. It is thoroughly studied by Henry (1995: 15–16, 72–4), who finds the accounts fictitious. Momigliano (1971: 771–91) and Montuori (1988: 201–26) see only one trial as authentic; the latter, however, believes the reason to be friendship with the Persians, not *asebeia*. Nevertheless, if we take into account the tradition, then we do not clearly understand what kind of ἀσέβεια might have been invoked in Aspasia's case. Rosenberg (1915: 218–19) already drew attention to the misogynistic tradition of comedy, which probably conducted a fictional trial against this "prisoner of history" (Henry 1995): "However, it is clear that the information on the impiety forms the least credible historical material possible. For whoever wishes to reconstitute the struggles between the political parties in the Periclean period, the best thing to do is to forget about these notes altogether." On the role of women in Athenian society, see Schnurr-Redford (1996). As Henry (1995) has shown, it would have been impossible for Aspasia, as a Rahel Varnhagen of Athens, to have been the leader of an intellectual circle.

147. Dover (1975: 24–54) followed only by Lefkowitz (1981: 88–105, esp. 110); Wallace (1994: 127–55); Stone (1988). Raaflaub (2000) assesses critically information about the alleged trials. Against Dover's view: Kerferd (1981: 21); Meijer (1981: 220); Ostwald (1986: 196); Brickhouse & Smith (1989: 32–3); Bauman (1990: 39–40); Garland (1992: 205–206); Longrigg (1992: 42); MacDowell (1995: 124); Parker (1996: 208); Furley (1996: 85). Ostwald (1986: 196) emphasizes that Dover's arguments "fail to carry conviction". Yunis (1988: 68) is also somewhat dismissive: "Dover goes slightly too far in his skepticism"; likewise, MacDowell (1995: 124) considers Dover "probably too sceptical"; Parker (1996: 208), too, believes that "there is no very strong reason to be suspicious".

148. See Meijer (1981: 220) on Dover's reckless scepticism. Beginning with the fact that the decree was not in use later on, it is hard to formulate an argument against authenticity, because the underlying reasons will have been forgotten when legislation was revised in 403. Burkert (1977: 467); MacDowell (1978: 201); Brickhouse & Smith (1989: 32); Versnel (1990: 128–9). On the amnesty and legislative revision of 403: Andoc. *Myst*. 85–97; Xen. *Hell*. 2, 4, 38–9; Arist. (*Ath. Pol*.) 39, 1–40, 3; Diod. 14, 33, 5–6. See too Loening (1987); cf. Robertson (1990) and Rhodes (1991).

149. Dover (1975: 39–41). The question of authenticity hinges on whether or not reports of the decree of Diopeithes updated the legal terminology. See further: Bauman (1990: 39); Jacoby (1922: col. 1618–19); cf. Yunis (1988: 68); Wallace (1994: 138). This renders irrelevant the question whether the sources of Plutarch (possibly Craterus, through Theophrastus), or Plutarch himself, corrected the text. That ancient laws could be adapted to more modern linguistic usage is shown by the Twelve Tables at Rome and their textual tradition.

150. Wallace (1994: 133) and Dover (1975: 24–30) believe that the sources are unreliable, and that stories of impiety trials and the like are later fabrications.

151. Ostwald (1986: 528–38). Raaflaub (2000) overlooks the religious implications of the charges against Anaxagoras. Curd (2007: 136) argues that the trial did actually take place, and that religious motives could be behind the charges made.

152. On the different fates of the natural philosophers and their variants, see Chapter 4.1.

153. Pl. *Prt*. 316d–317d; Pl. *Leg*. 886d–e; 967a; Arist. *Rhet*. 1397b 25–27; Plut. *Nic*. 23; Plut. *Mor*.

14, 169. Euripides apparently shared a negative position towards sophistry via one of his characters: Eur. fr. 913 (Nauck). Aristophanes' anti-intellectual attitude in *Birds* and *Clouds* could well be taken as evidence for prosecutions, when correlated with other testimonies.

154. Diod. 12, 39; Plut. *Per*. 31–2; cf. Philochorus, in *FGrH* 328 F 121 (*Schol. Ar. Pax* 605). Diodorus does not mention a trial of Pericles before the outbreak of the war, or the charges of impiety laid against Aspasia (he only mentions Pericles' dismissal and condemnation in 430: Diod. 12, 45, 4). Stadter (1989: 286–7; cf. lxix–lxx) drew attention to the importance of the decrees of Glaucon (as emended by Pareti: Γλαύκωνος; 32, 3–4; Stadter 1989: 294–303), Diopeithes and Dracontides, mentioned only by Plutarch. See too Bauman (1990: 37).
155. See too Schol. Ar. *Pax* 1085.
156. Delivorrias (1994: 263–4). On the trials of Phidias and Anaxagoras, see Donnay (1968: 19–36); Mansfeld (1979: 39–67; 1980: 17–95). On the sources, see Schubert (1994: 105–39); Podlecki (1998: 31–4; 101–17). Recent biographies of Pericles include Lehmann (2008) and Will (2003).
157. Scholars usually reject this anti-Periclean variant of the story about the rejection of the Megarian decree, employed by Aristophanes as a comic device (*Ach*. 515–39; *Pax* 603–14), preferring Thucydides' causes of the war (Thuc. 1, 23, 5–6; 118, 2; 140, 2–4). Beloch is an exception (*GG*, II, 1: 286–98). On the real reasons for the war, see Ste. Croix (1972: 50–63 and 225–92); Powell (1980); Rhodes (1987: 154–65). Badian (1993: 125–62), like Schwarz, considers Thucydides to be biased, and therefore not credible; for him, Thucydides is a "well-planned piece of apologia" (132), meant to cover Pericles' hawkish actions. Sertcan (1997: 269–93) criticizes Badian and summarizes the recent scholarship on war guilt and the relevant sources.
158. Details of Plutarch's account have been shown to be un-historical (e.g. Delivorrias 1994: 268). Phidias was active at Olympia until *c.* 420: Donnay (1968: 19–36). Stadter (1991: 119–20) believes, despite e.g. Ar. *Pax* 605–11, that friendship between Pericles and Phidias is a later invention. Cf. the doubts of Himmelmann (1977), regarding the prominent role of Pericles in the planning of the Acropolis and the commissioning of the Athena Parthenos. Contrast Arvanitis (1997: 195–208), who rather unconvincingly argues that Pericles supervised the building process. Cf. Hoepfner (1997b: 171–3).
159. Diod. 12, 39, 2. There is no mention of a condemnation, however. The record lacks credibility; cf. Himmelmann (1977: 86).
160. Plut. *Per*. 32, 1. Aspasia seems to have been accused by the comic playwright Hermippus. This, along with charges of procuring (cf. Ar. *Ach*. 526–30), supports Dover's case (1975: 28) that the information first came from a comedy and reached Plutarch via Hellenistic scholars. Rosenberg (1915: 218–19) had already hinted at this. See Henry (1995: 15–16, 72–4), who believes that the trial is fictional; similarly, Gomme (*HCT*: 187); Donnay (1968: 29). Since, however, Plutarch names Aeschines of Sphettus as a witness, Frost (1964b: 395–6) and Schwarze (1971: 110–13) consider that the trial is authentic.
161. For the traditional date of 433/2: Meyer, in *GdA*, IV, 2: 275; Jacoby (1902: 244–50); Busolt, in *GG*, III, 2: 825–9; Decharme (1904: 154–61); Beloch (*GG* I: 294–6); Drachmann (1922: 25–9); Derenne (1930: 30–38); Wade-Gery (1932: 205–27); Nestle (1940: 479); DeSanctis (1944: 243–6); Kienast (1953: 210–29); Schachermeyr (1968: 55–73); Schachermeyr (1969: 201–7); Des Places (1969: 11–12); Fitts (1971: 65–96); Marasco (1976: 113–31); Prandi (1977: 10–26); Burkert (1977: 467); Mikalson (1983: 92); Ameling (1986: 63–8); Montuori (1988: 158–85); Bauman (1990: 38–42); Mactoux (1990: 289–313); Parker (1996: 208–209).
162. Rosenberg (1915: 213); cf. Ameling (1986: 63–4). Plutarch was clearly not very thorough when it came to chronology. Cf. Stadter (1989: 285): "It is typical for P's method to combine items from different years that have a different theme." Referring to the eclipse of the sun on 3 August 431 (Plut. *Per*. 35, 2; Thuc. 2, 28), which Plutarch misdates by a year, Horstmannshoff (1989: 224–8) considers the biographer's information doubtful. Prandi (1977: 26) concludes

that the anti-Periclean version of the events in Plutarch, Diodorus and Aristophanes "*non offra elementi per datare i processi*". Cf. Busolt (*GG* III, 2: 825–9) Schachermeyer (1968: 68–9); Klein (1979: 508–11).

163. The quote: Preisshofen (1974: 67). Philochorus (*HGrH* 328 fr. 121; Schol. Ar. *Pax* 605); *IG* I^3 458–60 (= ML 54); add Mansfeld (1980: 40–47). Since the statue of Athena Parthenos was inaugurated in 438/7, the trial against Phidias could not have occurred later than 436. The older view, according to which the trial against Phidias took place in 432, is now obsolete in the light of Frost (1964a: 70), Donnay (1968: 19–36) and Mansfeld (1980), who concluded that the archaeological evidence (Mallwitz & Schiering 1964) showed that Phidias was definitely in Olympia at the end of the 430s. For older views, see Kienast (1953: 212); Lendle (1955: 299). Prandi (1977: 26) is sceptical regarding the archaeological finds, believing that Philochorus' testimony is "*oscura e ambigua*", and that the data could serve "*ai fini della datazione*". Cf. Fitts (1971: 110–141); Ameling (1986: 63–6) argued against Schubert's proposal of Phidias' trial in 435/4 (Triebel-Schubert 1983: 101–12; Schubert 1994: 129–30). Ameling's reservations on the difficulties arising from the state of the sources are important, but his mistrust of information provided by Philochorus made him go too far (66).
164. Thuc. 2, 65, 3; Diod. 12, 45, 4; Plut. *Per*. 35, 4; Dem. 16, 6; Pl. *Grg*. 516A names the offence for which Pericles was punished towards the end of his life as κλοπή (theft, embezzlement).
165. Plut. *Per*. 32, 2. Beloch (1884: 330–335) already argued for a single trial, believing that there was some connection between the decree of Dracontides and the 430 trial. The most thorough and detailed analysis remains Swoboda (1893: 536–98); see too, Rosenberg (1915: 212–5); Adcock (1927: 478); Gomme (1956: 187); Hansen (1975: 71–3); Klein (1979: 514–15), who agree with Beloch. Frost (1964a: 69–72), by contrast, does not believe that such a complicated legislative act as a decree was necessary to remove Pericles from office; hence, the decree of Dracontides would relate to the events of 438/7. Cf. Mansfeld (1980: 47–51). On the 430 trial when Pericles had to produce accounts, see Chapter 3.6.
166. Frost (1964a: 69–72); Mansfeld (1980: 47–51), followed by Roberts (1982: 59–60); Ostwald (1986: 192) and Stadter (1989: 285) opt for two separate trials against Pericles, connecting the first trial with the charges against Phidias in 438/7. There is no doubt that Pericles did have to resign in 430, and that he had to present the accounts. The association between the decree of Dracontides, transmitted by Plutarch without a date, and the measures taken against Pericles in 430 is much more plausible. Because Plutarch curiously placed the undated decree (cf. Frost 1964a: 71; Hansen 1975: 72) on the eve of the war, Adcock's sensible observation carries weight (1927: 478): "The decree of Dracontides must have meant the suspension or deposition of Pericles from the office of general. It must therefore be connected with the only deposition and trial of Pericles of which we have respectable evidence, see his deposition and trial in the autumn of 430 BCE." Swoboda (1893: 539) already indicated the difficulty of taking into account two trials: "Ephorus is still the only one to guarantee the double trial against Pericles." Hansen (1975: 72–3) brings more arguments in support of Beloch's reconstruction.
167. Plut. *Per*. 16, 3.
168. Diod. 12, 39, 2, only mentions Pericles' trial, not his condemnation.
169. Rosenberg (1915: 215). Raaflaub (2000) supports the view that Phidias was not only put on trial, but also condemned.
170. Diod. 12, 39, 1; Plut. *Per*. 31, 2; 32, 1; cf. Diog. Laert. 2, 12–14.
171. Diog. Laert. 2, 12–14 takes Satyrus as a reliable source for information concerning Thucydides, and Sotion for those referring to Cleon.
172. Thus, e.g. Wade-Gery (1932: 205–27); Kienast (1953: 215–16); Klein (1979: 511). By contrast, Andrewes (1978: 1–8) does not give sufficient credit to Plutarch's observations on the rift between Pericles and the elder Thucydides, on account of the building programme.
173. There has been much discussion of this question. Soundest is Rosenberg (1915: 210): "There is no certain evidence on Thucydides' life after 443; we do not even know for sure whether he outlived Pericles."

174. Frost (1964b: 397–9). In a fragment of Hermippus, cited by Plutarch (*Per*. 33, 7–8), Cleon attacks Pericles' defensive politics from the first year of the war. Frost, however, dates the trial to 438/7, when Cleon was not yet part of political life. In Plutarch's sources, Idomeneus, Cleon suddenly emerged as Pericles' accuser in 430. Plutarch (*Per*. 35, 4) also notes that Theophrastus, by contrast, names Simmias as the accuser in the trial of Pericles. He also (Plut. *Nic*. 2, 2) speaks of rivalry for political power between Nicias and Cleon after Pericles' death. Only Thucydides (3, 36–50) provides reliable information on Cleon, in the Mytilene affair, where he emerges with no glory. On Cleon, see Kahrstendt (1921: col. 714–7); Davies (318–20); Connor (1971: esp. 87–136); Mitchell (1991: 170–92); Mann (2007). For speculation concerning an anti-Periclean coalition between the old oligarchs and the radical group of Cleon: Meyer (141–2); Schachermeyr (1968: 58–9); Klein (1979: 509–10); Welwei (1999: 162).
175. Rosenberg (1915: 213).
176. Mansfeld (1979: 39–65; 1980: 84–9).
177. Thus Meyer (*GdA*, IV, 2: 271) on the alleged conservative movement: see too Nestle (1940: 476–85); Dodds (1951: 189–95); Schachermeyr (1968: 55–73); Marasco (1976: 117–9); Woodbury (1981: 315); Ostwald (1986: 197, 532); Schubert (1994: 103).
178. On the lack of popularity of the Sophists and philosophers: Eur. (fr. 913, Nauck); Xen. *Symp*. 6, 6–7; Pl. *Prt*. 316d–317d; Pl., *Leg*. 886d–e, 967a; Arist. *Rhet*. 1397b 25–7; Plut. *Nic*. 23; Plut. *Mor*. 14, 169. Marasco (1976: 118) believes that a current "*di insicurezza e di superstizione*" emerged immediately once the impending war had become predictable.
179. There are explicit references to the destruction of olive trees at this period at Lys. 7, 5–8. On the destruction of crops in Attica, see Hanson (1998: 131–84), whose experiments (222) showed that the regeneration of olive trees did not take twenty years: one could have sizable (though smaller) crops in five. He also showed that the five Peloponnesian invasions during the Archidamian war did less long-term damage than is usually thought. "The real damage ... was not the loss of agriculture, but the physical and psychological problems caused by moving a great number of people off their lands into cramped and depressing conditions within the walls": Hanson (1998: 132–53; quote at 152). The destruction of crops was, however, part of the classic arsenal in any Greek warfare. From an economic perspective, the most important and damaging destruction was that of wine and oil presses, as well as of the means of production and of rural households in general. Young trees were among the usual targets of the enemies' destroying wrath; vine stocks were also easy to damage. See further Foxhall (1993: 134–45).
180. Adcock (1927: 478): "It may belong to the year 430 BC"; Gomme (1956: 187): "This is in much better accord with Thucydides"; Horstmanshoff (1989: 226): "The chronology of Plutarch is – that is a fact – notoriously unreliable ... the trial against the philosopher Anaxagoras, who was a friend of Pericles, would be better explicable in the year of the outbreak of the Plague." Similarly, Longrigg (1992: 42). Stadter (1989: 285) and Frost (1964a: 71) have also noted the weakness of Plutarch's chronology. Prandi (1977: 26) usefully suggests that it would be better to date the trials related to the accusations against Pericles towards the beginning of the war (the Sparta-related imputation regarding the Cylonian affair, the deposition), "*relativamente prossimo al 431*". Herlihy (1997: 59–81) notes that even during the European plague in the Middle Ages, the typical reaction of the population before the threat was to find a scapegoat.
181. Stadter (1989: 285).
182. The eve of the war is usually thought to have been when the Demos' state of mind, marked by religious hysteria, led to the first trials and the publication of the decree of Diopeithes: Dodds (1951: 180–195); Marasco (1976: 113–31); Ostwald (1986: 191–98).
183. Sotion in Diog. Laert. 2, 12; cf. 9, 34; cf. Pl. *Ap*. 26d; Geffcken (1907: 127–33). On Anaxagoras' interpretation of the stars, see too Diog. Laert. 2, 8.
184. There are different versions of, variously, his condemnation, his flight (before being condemned *in absentia*), his escape with the help of Pericles, a bribe, or even his being sentenced to death. Diogenes Laertius (2, 12–14) follows the testimonia of Sotion, Satyrus, Hermippus of Smyrna and Hieronymus of Cardia. Plutarch (*Per*. 32, 2) produces a variant in which Pericles gives

his friend timely advice to flee. The passage in Plato (*Ap*. 26d), where Socrates asks Meletus (who implies that he would embrace heresies of natural philosophy) Ἀναξαγόρου οἴει κατηγορεῖν, ὦ φίλε Μέλητε!, is generally used (for good reasons) as an indicator for the authenticity of the trial against the natural philosopher: Mansfeld (1980: 82); cf. Geffcken (1907: 127); Montuori (1988: 166); Brickhouse & Smith (1989: 32–3). However, Dover (1975: 27–32) doubts that such a trial took place and he warns that a legend emerged with Socrates' sensational execution. Despite the internal contradictions, all the ancient sources agree that the philosopher was put on trial; Dover ignores this and stubbornly insists on the differences between variants. See further Yunis (1988: 67).

185. Alcidamas at Arist. (*Rhet*. 1389b 15–16) (*DK* 59 A 27); cf. Diog. Laert. 2, 14. His death probably occurred 428/7. See detailed information in Mansfeld (1980: esp. 84–9).

186. Yunis (1988: 68–72). According to an anecdote transmitted by Plutarch (*Per*. 6, 2–4), the philosopher of rational argument found a natural explanation for the presence of a ram with one central horn, like a unicorn. The prophet Lampon saw it as a divine sign, but Anaxagoras was able to show that it was a deformation of the skull that led to a single horn. However, such enlightened activity would have endangered the category of soothsayers and their profitable activity. Nilsson (*GGR*, I: 791–2) argued similarly, considering natural philosophy as the destruction of the economic basis for the activity of prophets. Stadter (1991: 111–24), however, questioned the special connection between Pericles and famous contemporary scholars and researchers, well known and seen as indisputable. The connections between well-known Sophists and philosophers, emphasized in the later sources, making Pericles appear to be some kind of Maecenas of the new education and science, would have been only marginal; in fact, most of it was but the biographical invention of the Hellenistic scribes. One can hardly agree with Stadter's opinion, according to which Anaxagoras himself was not part of Pericles' circle. His attempts to relativize knowledge of a closer relationship between the two (120–22), known thanks to early records in Plato (*Phdr*. 269e–270a), Isocrates (*Antid*. 235) and Ephorus (Diod. 12, 39, 2), and unanimously accepted by scholars, seem too forced.

187. Stadter (1991: 111–24); contrast Vickers (1997: 29–30) on Pericles' philosophical interests.

188. Ar. *Eq*. 1085; *Vesp*. 380–81; *Av*. 988 (with the relevant scholia); Plut. *Per*. 32, 2; *Ages*. 3, 3; *Lys*. 22, 5; Xen. *Hell*. 3, 3, 3; *IG* I³ 61 (ML 65), r. 4–5. In fragments of Old Comedy: fr. Ameipsias 10; fr. Phrynichus 9; fr. Telekleides 7 (Kassel and Austin; fragments transmitted in Schol. Ar. *Av*. 988). It is difficult to extract useful information from fragments or scholia. When Diopeithes is described by scholiasts to Aristophanes (*Birds*, 988) as a little crazy (ὑπομανιώδης), we have to wonder, with good reason, what other sources the commentators used besides information from Old Comedy. Cf. Garland (1992: 140).

189. Ar. *Eq*. 1085.

190. Ar. *Av*. 988. In Decharme's view (1903: 73) this is an ironic title. For the opposite, see *GGR*, I: 794.

191. Schol. Ar. *Eq.* 1085. Connor (1963: 115).

192. Derenne (1930: 20): "*Il était ami de Nicias et sans doute, comme tel, conservateur*"; Oliver (1950: 6–16); Fahr (1969: 24). Ostwald (1986: 197–8) and Stadter (1989: 298–300) cover the specialized literature.

193. Connor (1963: 115).

194. *IG* I³ 61 (ML 65); Connor (1963: 116), with references; cf. Ostwald (1986: 197). Derenne (1930: 20); Bowden (2003: 268–70) identify the proponent of the Methone decree with the famous seer. On the Methone decree and its economic implications, see Rubel (2001).

195. Connor (1963: 116); Ostwald (1986: 197): "The view that Diopeithes was not a democrat has been laid to rest by W. R. Connor."

196. Xen. *Hell*. 3, 3, 3; Plut. *Ages*. 3, 3; *Lys*. 22, 5. On the dispute for the throne, see Cartledge (1987: 99–115). Yunis (1988: 70), unlike Swoboda (1903: col. 1046), Oliver (1950: 15), Connor (1963: 116), Ostwald (1986: 198) and Stadter (1989: 298), does not agree that Diopeithes is the Athenian *chresmologos*, but his argument is weak, which is why he formulates it as a question:

"Might not 'Diopeithes' have been a common name for gentlemen of his profession?" Connor (1963: 116, n. 8) rightly showed that the name was far from common in the fifth century.

197. Schol. Ar. *Eq*. 988c; Schol. Ar. *Vesp*. 380a: ἦν δὲ εἷς τῶν ῥητόρων. For the word ῥήτωρ, see Hansen (1983: 227–38; 1995a: 278–87).

198. On the profession of prophet from an ethnographical perspective: Burkert (1998: 189–97). Bouché-Leclercq (1879–82) and Halliday (1913: 54–98) remain fundamental for soothsayers and *chresmologoi*. See too Kett (1966). On mantic practices and their various expressions, see: Bloch (1991); Dickie (2001); Bowden (2003), Eidinow (2007); Johnston (2008); Flower (2008).

199. A good example of the indecision of the sources between *chresmologoi* and *manteis* is the seer Lampon, discussed further below, who is mentioned both as *chresmologos* and *mantis*: *mantis* in Plut. *Per*. 6, 2; Athen. *Deipn*. 344E; Schol. Ar. *Av*. 521; Schol. Ar. *Nub*. 332; Hsch. s.v. ἀγερσικύβησις; Suda s.v. Θουριομάντεις; *chresmologos* at Ar. *Pax* 1084; Schol. Ar. *Av*. 521 and 988; add Ostwald (1951: 41) and Garland (1990: 82): "*chrêsmologos* or *mantis* was, it seems, a title accorded to anyone who could command a following for his skill in divination, irrespective of the source of that skill." *Chresmologoi*, as masters with certain practical skills (executing a τέχνη), are thus not characterized by divine inspiration, ascribed only to *manteis* in epic and drama. For the distinction between the two terms, see Nilsson, in a review of Oliver (1951: 421–2). Bowden (2003: 263) notes that "there is not a clear distinction between *chresmologoi* and *manteis*". There is a brief presentation of the duties and nature of prophets in Garland (1984: 113–14). Nevertheless, there is the fundamental work of Kett (1966: *passim*, esp. 102–25). See too Fontenrose (1978: 152–8); Baumgarten (1998: 38–69); Dillery (2005); Flower (2008); Johnston (2008).

200. *Il*. 1, 68–72; 6, 76; 7, 53; 18, 250–51; 24, 221; *Od*. 2, 157–9; 11, 281–97; 15, 222–55; 17, 382 (*mantis* as a term designating the profession; the soothsayer is included among the οἳ δημιοεργοί: 17, 383); 24, 451–2. See further: Casevitz (1992: 1–18, esp. 2–11); *GGR*, I: 164–9; Bremmer (1993: 151–9; 1996b: 97–109), with the specialized literature. On Teiresias, the soothsayer in tragedy (e.g. Soph. *OT* 300), see Staehlin (1912).

201. Hdt. 5, 90, 2; 7, 6, 3; Oliver (1950: 6–7); Shapiro (1990: 335–45). The legitimation of the reign: Hdt. 5, 93, 2; Garland (1984: 81); Bremmer (1993: 157).

202. Arist. *Ath. Pol*. 54, 6; Hdt. 7, 142, 3; *IG* I^3 40 (= *ML* 52), 64–7; Plut. *Nic.* 4, 2; 13, 1; 23, 5; Thuc. 2, 8, 2; 21, 3; Schol. Ar. *Av*. 988 (δωροδόκος).

203. Garland (1984: 114).

204. On the importance of prophets in the political field, see Kett (1966: 104–9 and 123–5).

205. Diod. 12, 10, 3; Schol. Ar. *Nub*. 332; Phot. *Lex*., s.v. Θουριομάντεις. As a political ally of Pericles: Plut. *Per*. 6, 2–3. See too Kett (1966: 54–7); Burkert (1974: 81–104); Dillery (2005: 195–7); Flower (2008: 123–4). The important role of soothsayers in the foundation of *apoikiai* is already attested in Pindar, who invokes the foundation of Syracuse (*Ol.* 2). Cf. the role of the seer Silanus in Xenophon's failed attempt to found a city in the Pontic area: Xen. *An*. 5, 6, 16–28.

206. *IG* I^3 78 (ML 73) 47–61. The addendum includes decisions regarding the inviolability of the Pelargikon, a sacred place on the Acropolis (cf. Chapter 3.4.); cf. the commentary in ML: 221. On the sacred place, see Parker (1983: 161–6).

207. Thuc. 5 (19, 24); Powell (1973: 141; 1988: 387); Burkert (1992: 263–4). Prytaneum: Schol. Ar. *Av*. 521; *Pax* 1084. See especially Ostwald (1951: 40–41).

208. Kett (1966: 106).

209. Ar. *Av*. 963–5, 983; *Pax* 1045, 1087, 1120–21.

210. "Aristophanes' plays call our attention to the phony, self-serving diviner, whose political employment of oracles is a threat to the welfare of the city": Smith (1989: 146; cf. 155–6); Lateiner (1993: 188). The view of Fontenrose (1978: 154) that "Aristophanes' comedies provide our best, most plentiful, and most intimate information about chresmologues and their activities" is to be rejected, since comedy shows us what Athenians laughed at, but behind the exaggeratedly

ridiculous representations, there is always a seed of truth, not always easy to spot behind the comic exaggerations; see especially Chapman (1978). The fact that comedy presents Lampon, both responsible for the Peace of Nicias, and the founder and principal *mantis* of the city of Thurii, as a moron implies that those with religious functions fell foul of Aristophanes, as did Cleon or his colleagues. Ziehen (1930: col. 1352) noted that that the comment on mantic practice, clear in comedy and present at Thuc. 8, 1, 1, does not imply doubts about mantic practice in general, but criticism of an individual μάντις.

211. Thuc. 2, 8, 2; 17, 1; 21, 3; 54, 2–4; 3, 104, 1; 5, 26, 4; 32, 1. On the exceptional importance of prophecy at Athens, see Powell (1979: 15–31; 1988: 383–413). On the issue of oracles and the Plague, see Chapter 3.4.
212. Plut. *Nic.* 13, 1. We should be cautious in imputing a cynical manipulation of a superstitious Demos (e.g Smith 1989: 147). It would be going too far to suppose such a degree of secularization even among educated people of the fifth century in leadership positions (for example, the case of Nicias).
213. Ar. *Eq*. 109–143 (195–210, esp. 999–1096). Cf. Smith (1989: 145–6).
214. E.g. *Il*. 1, 106–110; *Od*. 2, 178–90.
215. Hdt. 7, 142–3.
216. Xen. *An*. 5, 6, 29; 6, 4, 13; *Cyr*. 1, 6, 2. For mantic practice in Xenophon, see Pfeffer (1976: 40–42). The reservations of Hippocrates (*De morb. sacr*. 1, 10–26) who argues against getting medical treatment with the help of charlatans and soothsayers, should be interpreted similarly; see further, Van der Eijk (1990: 87–119).
217. Burkert (1998: 143–4): "*In Zeiten von drängendem Unheil*."
218. On the obligations of soothsayers, before and during military campaigns, see Popp (1959: 11–38); Pritchett (1979: 47–90).
219. Garland (1990: 85); cf. Fontenrose (1978: 153); Baumgarten (1998: 40–41).
220. Thuc. 2, 21, 3; 54, 2–3; 5, 103, 2.
221. Hdt. 7, 142–3; Thuc. 7, 50, 4; 8, 1, 1; Plut. *Nic.* 13, 1. On the activities of *chresmologoi* and *manteis* at the beginning of the war and during the plague, see Chapter 3.4. Cf. Powell (1979: 19).
222. See further, Powell (1979: 15–31).
223. *IG* I^3 61(ML 65). For the generally accepted dating of the document to 430 BCE, see the commentary in ML.
224. Powell (1988: 386). Examples: Hes. *Erg*. 238–43; Soph. *OT* 95–146; Antiph. 1, 1, 10; Xen. *Hier*. 4, 4. In the same way, there were regulations excluding from public life anyone suspected of murder, a murderer, or anyone who killed another in self-defence, until they were cleansed. Powell (1988) gives an anthropological explanation for the emergence of such beliefs about the "responsibility of the collective", regarding divine punishment. "This belief may have developed from one which still seems to be reasonable: that a community which knowingly or negligently sheltered a guilty person was culpably promoting evil." Parker (1983) is fundamental in this field (on death and homicide, esp. 104–43); see also Burkert (1998: 126–157). Concerning the theme of the justice of the gods cf. Dihle (1962: 13–30); Lloyd-Jones (1983: 156–64); Laumann (1988); Balaudé (1996); Effe (1997). Besides the Old Testament, the early modern era provides an interesting parallel. Leutenbauer (1984: XI and *passim*) showed, based on sixteenth- and seventeenth-century laws against blasphemy, that the legislators believed that blasphemers brought down God's punishment in the form of plagues, famines and wars (I owe this information to R. Schlögl, Konstanz).
225. Burckhardt (1964).

3. The Plague, Pericles and the Peloponnesian War

1. Liv. 5, 51, 8.
2. Thuc. 2, 47–54; 3, 87. Although Thucydides was exact in presenting the symptoms and used

specialized medical terms, we cannot, today, determine the exact nature of the disease. The plausible propositions in this sense are *typhus exanthematicus* – Gomme, *HCT* II (1956: 150–53) – or measles – Page (1953: 97–119). Morens & Littmann (1992: 271–301) believe that "typhus and smallpox" factors must have been responsible for the epidemic. No explanation can, however, unquestionably match the pathology of the disease, as outlined by Thucydides. Starting from the minute and exact description of the symptoms in Thucydides' narrative, we might almost conclude that the Plague of Athens was a pestilence that has become extinct, and one that changed symptoms and presentation over two millennia through a mutation of the pathogenic agent (Pool & Holladay 1979: 282–300). Leven (1991: 128–60) gathered exhaustive bibliographic material on the pathology and nature of the epidemic, as well as on its less medical aspects. Hornblower (*CT* I: 316) and Horstmanshoff (1989: 189, n. 20) provide useful additional information. Cunha (2004) approaches the evidence from the perspective of a specialist in infectious diseases, and his favourite for the Athenian Plague is measles. Papagrigorakis *et al.* (2006) examined the remains of presumed victims of the Plague, discovered recently in excavations. In their molecular diagnosis, Papagrigorakis *et al.* identified the "plague" of Athens as typhoid fever. This new DNA-based approach is very promising, but has already been harshly received on methodological grounds: Shapiro & Gilbert (2006). Even though Papagrigorakis *et al.* (2008) challenged their arguments, the question is far from closed.

There has been much discussion of the possible influence of contemporary specialized medical literature on Thucydides' description, and many scholars believe that he had some medical training (Weidauer 1958), while others find no trace of any influence of medical literature in his work (Parry 1969: 106–18). There is an exhaustive bibliography by Rechenauer (1991), who believes that the entire historical work of Thucydides is marked by the organic thinking of Hippocratic medicine, according to which the historian identified the Peloponnesian War with a pathological process (e.g. 359–67 and esp. 366). Rechenauer has recently reminded us that the Plague lasted for four and a half years, since the first onset of the disease lasted from summer 430 to summer 428, and the second from winter 427/6 to winter 426/5 (2011: 244). For many aspects of the Plague, see too Meier (1999), Longrigg (2000), Lloyd (2003) and Schmitz (2005). Meier (1999), in an important article I could not take into account in the German edition of this book, developed independently ideas concerning the importance of the Plague and the "anti-rationalistic trend" in Athens during the last quarter of the fifth century. Longrigg (2000: 61–3) also develops similar ideas.

3. Thuc. 2, 52, 4.
4. Thuc. 2, 53, 4.
5. In the same sense, Diod. 12, 45, 4; 12, 58, 3–6.
6. Thuc. 2, 52, 2.
7. Thuc. 51, 4: δεινότατον δὲ παντὸς ἦν τοῦ κακοῦ ἥ τε ἀθυμία.
8. Thuc. 50, 1; 2, 53, 4; 3, 87.
9. The mortality rate reached around 34 per cent at Athens (among the hoplites): Ruschenbusch (1979: 140–41); Horstmanshoff (1989: 193). Regarding the statistics of the plague victims in France and Europe in the fourteenth century, see Biraben (1975: 192–230). Leven (1991: 145–6) regards Thucydides' figures as too high, and argues for a 25 per cent mortality rate. Hansen (1988: 14), who accepts a high mortality rate in all social categories, plausibly argues for 15,000 citizens having been victims of "the plague".
10. Thuc. 2, 51–2, 54, 1. In fact, the collapse of public life lasted only a couple of weeks when the disease was at its height: Mikalson (1984: 219).
11. Thuc. 1, 139, 4–1; Ar. *Ach*. 527–43; Plut. *Per*. 31, 1.
12. Thuc. 2, 64, 2.
13. Sigerist (1951: 148): "for thousands of years, until the scientific era, the main reactions to epidemics have been much the same ... and for thousands of years, and today still among primitives, epidemics were attributed to the wrath of the deities." See also King (1963: 5–11). The biblical plagues are noteworthy in this connection: the fifth was an epidemic that Yahweh had

sent on the Egyptians: Exodus 9, 3–7 (murrain of cattle) and 9, 8–16 (the plague). See also 2 Samuel 24 and 1 Chronicles 21 (plague as punishment for God's displeasure at David's census). See too the important book by Huber (2005).

14. Austin Alchon (2003: 9–15).
15. Concerning earthquakes and other natural calamities, see the more recent researches of Waldherr (1997), Mylonopoulos (1998: 82–9) and Sonnabend (1999: 119–59).
16. Speyer (1979: 30–39): "Among the basic experiences of people belonging to a pre-scientific and pre-technical era there is also the experience belonging entirely to a authority above one's own power" (citation at 30); see also Beloch, *GG* II 1: 234–5; *GGR* I: 541; McNeill (1978).
17. Burkert (1998: 126–57). For the ancient Orient, see Huber (2005); with historical examples from all over the world, see Austin Alchon (2003: 9–15).
18. Mikalson (1983: 50) and Mikalson (1984: 220); *GGR* I: 541. Parker (1983: 257) shows, referring to the plague in Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus*: "This is a typical situation that constantly recurs both in myth and in the Greek's own perception of historical reality"; cf. 271–80. See also Dodds (1951: 28–49). On the religious aspects of a plague, see also Huber (2005: 228–38; 241), cf. Longrigg (2000).
19. *Il.* 1, 35–317. Burkert notes that (the typical) Apollo in the *Iliad*, with his bow and arrows, derives from a Semitic plague god. See Burkert (1975: 51–79). In his speech before the assembly of the Greeks, Achilles mentions the war and the plague as causes of the misfortunes brought upon the Achaeans. This is why he asks Agamemnon to consult a prophet who can tell them why Apollo is so angry (*Il.* 1, 59–61): Ἀτρεΐδη, νῦν ἄμμε παλιμπλαγξθέντας ὀίω /ἄψ ἀπονοστήσειν, εἴ κεν θάνατόν γε φύγοιμεν, /εἰ δὴ ὁμοῦ πόλεμός τε δαμᾷ καὶ λοιμὸς Ἀχαιούς.
20. Hes. *Erg.* 238–43: οἵς δ' ὕβρις τε μέμηλε κακὴ καὶ σχέτλια ἔργα, /τοῖς δὲ δίκην Κρονίδης τεκμαίρεται εὐρύοπα Ζεύς. /πολλάκι καὶ ξύμπασα πόλις κακοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἀπηύρα, /ὅστις ἀλιτραίνῃ καὶ ἀτάσθαλα μηχανάσται. /τοῖσιν δ' οὐρανόθεν μέγ' ἐπήγαγε πῆμα Κρονίων, /λιμὸν ὁμοῦ καὶ λοιμόν, ἀποφθινύθουσι δὲ λαοί. On the frequent connection λιμός–λοιμός, see Demont (1990: 148–51). Cf. Camp (1979).
21. Soph. *OT*, 27–30: ἐν δ' ὁ πυρφόρος θεὸς /σκήψαν ἐλαύνει, λοιμός ἔχθιστος, πόλιν, /ὑφ' οὗ κενοῦται δῶμα Καδμεῖον· μέλας δ' /Ἅιδης στεναμοῖς καὶ γόοις πλουτίζεται. On Sophocles' Oedipus and the Plague, see Mitchell-Boyask (2008: 56–66).
22. The list could continue with the Phlegyans being punished by a plague for their disbelief in the gods (Pausanias, 9, 36, 2–3), or with Herodotus' account of the disease brought upon the inhabitants of Agylla as divine punishment, after they had plundered the Phocaeans who has asked for protection (Hdt. 1, 167). This fact is particularly significant, because it attests the typical explanation of an epidemic as divine punishment in the second half of the fifth century, regardless of the real or legendary character of the narrative. Parker (1983: 104–43, 271–80) provides a comprehensive discussion of mythical narratives, referring to the punishment caused by the sin of one individual. Because Locrian Ajax had raped Cassandra at Troy, his people were punished with "a plague". A subsequent oracle required the Locrians to send an annual tribute of virgins to Troy in order to stop the epidemic (Aen. Tact. 31, 24; Lycoph. *Alex.* 1141–73, with scholia; Apollod. *Epit.* 6, 20–22). This aetiological history clearly illuminated an old cult ritual (a possible rite of initiation). *IG* IX/I² 703 shows that the Locrians actually paid this "tribute of virgins". See further Graf (1978: 61–79), Hughes (1991: 166–84 for a detailed discussion).
23. Thuc. 2, 47, 3. On the supposed (ὡς λέγεται) way that the epidemic spread from Ethiopia, Egypt, the Persian Kingdom to Piraeus, see Thuc. 2, 48, 1.
24. Parker (1983: 130); cf. Parker (1996: 200); Huber (2005: 237) For other examples of pestilence, famine, sea storms and other divine punishments, see Parker (1983: 271–80). Natural calamities provide an interesting point of comparison, notably earthquakes which, as with epidemics, were believed by pre-modern societies to be an expression of a deteriorating relationship with the gods. Waldherr (1997) fully discusses earthquakes in the ancient sources;

Mylonopoulos (1998) uses religious elements to support his ideas; Sonnabend (1999: 119–59) has dedicated an entire chapter to the religious meaning of natural calamities.

25. Already, in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, epidemics and famine in Bavaria and in the German Empire were related to impiety, and are expressly described as such in contemporary legislation: Leutenbauer (1984: XI and *passim*). On religious strategies in coping with plague in medieval times, see Esser (1999).
26. Hankinson (1995: 26).
27. Thuc. 2, 47, 4; 48, 1–2; 50, 1–2; 51, 4 and 5; 52, 1–2; 54, 5; 58, 2.
28. Leven (1991: 133), with more references. See too Solomon (1985: 121–3); Holladay (1987: 95–6). The article by van Raalte (1979: 105–17) remains fundamental. It is true that in the *Corpus Hippocraticum* there are hints of rational medical theories concerning the transmission of disease. Hence, in the book περὶ φυσῶν, it is said that diseases spread through air when the latter becomes "infected": μεμιασμένον νοσηροῖσι μιάσμασιν (Hippoc. *De flat*. 5, 1. Cf. Hippoc. *Epid*. 1, 2, where there is a passage on a disease that strikes mainly the male population). The theory of "infected" air, however, is more plausible than the contamination theory; before microbes were discovered, the second theory was much more foreign to the mindset of the times than the concept of *miasma*; in this sense, see Leven (1991: 133). Similarly, Parker: defence reactions against madmen or epileptics – like throwing stones at them or spitting at them, in order to prevent the misfortune from touching others – corresponded to the theory of "contamination" or "transmission". "It is not clear that diseases ever truly became infectious in any other sense than this in Greek thought. Greeks were practically aware, in time of plague, that the disease could be contracted by contact, but in popular perception this may have been no more than an acute instance of the contagiousness of misfortune" – Parker (1983: 219–20). The book *On the Sacred Disease* clearly shows that Hippocratic doctors rose against the religious explanatory models, contesting their effectiveness in determining the causes of maladies. On this, see too Edelstein (1937: 201–46) and Van der Eijk (1990: 87–119).
29. Hankinson (1995: 38); cf. Longrigg (2000: 61).
30. Hankinson (1995: 40). As Hippocratics fought rationally against the rumours spread among the Demos, the writings of early physicians hint at "the wholesale rejection of the infectious transmissibility hypothesis" (*ibid.* 64).
31. In 1546, in *De contagione*. See further Stettler (1972: 255–73; here 256). Solomon (1985: 121; see above).
32. Plut. *Mor*. 5, 383d (*De Is. et Os*.). Akron was definitely not a Hippocratic. On the role of fire in purification rituals, see Parker (1983: 227); cf. Burkert (1977: 130–134); see Eur. *Hel*. 869, *Heracl*. 937, *IA*. 112, 1471. One can find, even in the rationalist polemic – often cited as representative of Illuminist thinking – that the author of *On the Sacred Disease* conducted "a band of homeless charlatans" against healing by magic-related practices (Hippoc. *Morb. sacr*. 1, 10–26), and "one can recognize the rank that the religious view of disease in the folk-thinking of the Periclean century must have conserved": Jouana (1996: 28–79; citation at 47). Similarly Wohlers (1999: 29–31).
33. Procop. 2, 22–3 (esp. 2, 22, 2: ἐς τὸν θεὸν ἀναφέρεσθαι); add Leven (1995: 393–407). See also Meier (1999: 177–210). On the plague during the Parthian War of 167, when the affected cities asked for the help of oracles, see Burkert (1998: 131), with additional references.
34. Thuc. 2, 58.
35. Drachmann (1922: 28): "Thucydides completely eliminated the supernatural element". Hornblower (1992: 170) observes that "Thucydides seriously understated the religious aspects of the war he set himself to describe". I do not believe it is admissible to come to any conclusions from this situation, regarding Thucydides' personal attitude towards religion, though the observations regarding Nicias (7, 50, 4–5: ἦν γάρ τι καὶ ἄγαν θειασμῷ τε καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ προσκείμενος) and the narrative of the failed attempt to ask for the deity's help against "the plague" (2, 47, 4) hint at the historian's sceptical attitude, at least regarding expressions and

behaviour that we would define as "superstitions". The *communis opinio* attests, at least, a lack of interest in religion or even the atheism of Thucydides. See the *Forschungsgeschichte* in Marinatos (1981: 1–16) and Jordan (1986: 119–20). Oost (1975: 186–96), however, argues for a more prudent evaluation. These scholars assert that Thucydides had no trouble accepting traditional cults, religious institutions and oracles as such, but that he did not have the same opinion of the "superstitious" attitude towards religion expressed by most of the population (including Nicias). See too Meier (1999: 191).

36. Strasburger (1968: 435): divine agency was eliminated "*gewissermaßen arbeitshypothetisch*" as a model of historical explanation. Also, Schuller (1991a: 101–5), Crane (1998: 5), and Meier (1999: 181, 190–2).
37. See first Hart (1982: 27–44); add Pötscher (1958: 5–29); Huber (1965); Waters (1985: 96–118) and Shimron (1989: esp. 26–57). On Xenophon and religion, see now Parker (2004).
38. See e.g. Mora (1986: 27–79); Burkert (1990b: 1–32).
39. Thuc. 1, 23, 3; 3, 87, 1–3.
40. Marshall (1990: 169): "The illness was to appear extraordinary, but natural, not divine-due, not to downfall following unexpected success, but to the stupidity of events." Allison (1983: 14–23) has a very different view of the matter. The relations that he acknowledges and the textual correspondences between the first speech of Pericles on Athens' defence strategy and the description of the "plague" denotes a connection between Pericles' politics and the Plague catastrophe. "They [sc. recollections of Pericles' first speech] reflect ... Thucydides' shrewd understanding of the interrelation of events and convey the underlying sense that a commander, however good his gnome, inevitably must bear some blame for a disaster, no matter how unforeseen, even if it is only for having put people in the wrong place at the wrong time" (23). Cf. Strasburger (1968: 454).
41. Demont (1990: 152–3).
42. Hornblower (*CT* I: 317 and 326). Also, Horstmanshoff (1989: 200–11) underlines the dramatic function of the narrative, placed between "Epitaphios logos" and the last speech of Pericles: "a tragedy with Pericles as protagonist" (202). Add Morgan (1994); Bellemore & Plant (1994); Allison (1983: 14–23); Mittelstadt (1968: 145–54); Woodman (1988: 32–40); Allison (1997: 65–73).
43. Thuc. 3, 75–83. Orwin (1988: 831–47) uses a comparison between the narrative of the Plague and the presentation of the civil war in the island of Kerkyra. However, he fails to present the importance of evoking the "plague" in the construction of the book.
44. M. Vickers has discovered another literary version of the plague theme, and he establishes amazing coincidences between the evolution of the disease – in the pestilence described by Thucydides – and the scene in Aristophanes' *Clouds* where Strepsiades is assaulted by bed-bugs (694–745). The unfolding of the action in the bed-bug scene has a striking resemblance to the course of the disease, as described by the historian Vickers (1997: 38–41). Vickers concludes that: "For all that Thucydides had experienced the symptoms himself, these lines reinforce the view ... that Thucydides in exile may have made use of Aristophanes as a handy means of recalling significant historical events" (39–40). Cf. Vickers (1991: 64).
45. Thuc. 2, 47, 4.
46. Schmitz (2005: 64) is completely wrong when he assumes that the "illuminated Athenian society could not have had another reaction than [that of] Thucydides". Other societies, he states, would adopt religious practices and offer sacrifices or even display religious fanaticism, but not the Athenians. Of such things, "we do not feel very much in Thucydides' account". I hope to demonstrate the contrary. Despite the obvious fact that Athens was far from being an "*aufgeklärte Gesellschaft*", Thucydides refers *expressis verbis* to the oracles and religious practices of the – in modern terms – superstitious population. The statement that "there were evidently not a few Athenians, who did not share the view, that religious guilt evoked divine wrath" (Schmitz 2005: 61) is nothing more than an assumption. There was only Thucydides, and possibly the author of the Hippocratic text *On the Sacred Disease*, but they

are special cases and far from representative of the majority of their contemporaries: Wohlers (1999: 29).

47. Burkert (1998: 156).
48. *GGR* I: 541. Similarly, Pausanias tells of the statue of a bronze goat dedicated by the inhabitants of Kleonai, as the result of a prophecy from an oracle to Apollo at Delphi, in an attempt to bring an end to a pestilence (Paus. 10, 11, 5).
49. These usual attitudes in the face of an existential threat are impressively presented by the seventy-nine oracular prophecies collected by Fontenrose (1978, *s.vv.* "plague, famine, drought, catastrophe"; see index), mentioned in Demont (1990: 148). On the "normal" method indicated by myth in case of a divine punishment, see Fontenrose (1978: 77); cf. Horstmanshoff (1992: 43–65). According to Livy, the Romans too had the custom of making peace with the gods in case of an epidemic, with the entire people praying led by *duumviri sacris faciundis* (Liv. 4, 21, 5–6). The fire ritual performed by the physician Akron – mentioned by Plut. *Mor.* 5, 383d (*De Is. et Os.*) – is related to the same attitude to disease. For medieval practice, see Herlihy (1997: 59–81) and Esser (1999).
50. On Procopius' account, see Meier (1999: 182–90); for other sources on the Justinianic plague, see Little (2007). On other pre-modern societies: Austin Alchon (2003: 9–15).
51. Thuc. 2, 8, 2. Powell (1973: 97–105) sees as plausible the fact that this behaviour of the Athenians did not cease after the outbreak of the war, in the way that Thucydides suggests; cf. Powell (1988: 394–406).
52. Thuc. 2, 54, 2; 2, 54, 4; 2, 17, 1.
53. Citation: Thuc. 2, 54, 2–3.
54. Marinatos (1981: 48–9), who believes that Thucydides does not question the principle of oracular consultation, but only objects to the false interpretation that people placed on it: 47; against, Hornblower, in *CT* I: 327: "I am not sure that a touch of irony can be excluded." Assuming, however, that behind the supporters of the λοιμός version, there were "no doubt" opponents of the war, and behind the λιμός variant, there were its supporters, is an exaggerated interpretation; as Dover (1988: 5–73; citation at 70). In this study, Dover also pleads against generalizing οἱ ἄνθρωποι in the sense of "people (*per se*)", but he does not agree with this objection.
55. Thuc. 2, 54, 5.
56. Thuc. 1, 118, 3; 2, 54, 4; 3, 104, 1.
57. *Il.* 1, 48–58. Adcock, *CAH* V (1927: 201): "To many at Athens the plague was more than Fortune's criticism of a calculated plan – it was a sign that the wrath of heaven rested on their city. They remembered that Apollo had promised to the Spartans his help, and now he was helping them with the farshooting shafts with which he had avenged the wrongs of his priest on the Greeks before Troy." See also Powell (1988: 395–402).
58. E.g. And. 1; [Lys.] 6. In the same sense, see Furley (1996: 103–18), with other examples.
59. Thucydides' observations on religious issues during the Peloponnesian War are only "the tip of the iceberg"; as Furley (1996: 75), who gives a good deal of credit to the importance of religious issues for this period.
60. Thuc. 2, 17, 1. On the sacred place unaffected by constructions, see Parker (1983: 161–6). For discussions related to this passage, see Gomme, *HCT* II (1956: 65–6); Parke & Wormell (vol. I, 189–90); Marinatos (1981: 50–51); Jordan (1986: 130–31); Horstmanshoff (1989: 229); Hornblower, *CT* I: 270. In Ziehen's opinion, there was probably a misunderstanding in the episode where Thucydides reads the oracle (*quod Thucydides ab Atheniensibus ineunte bello neglectum narrat*), since, in *Anthologia Palatina*, 14, 73 there is an oracle for Megarians: [Γαίης μὲν πάσης] τὸ Πελασγικὸν Ἄργος ἄμεινον: Von Prott & Ziehen (1988; = Leipzig, 1886–1906): 22.
61. Thuc. 2, 17, 2.
62. There are indications on how to read this passage (προῆδε or προήδει) in Gomme, *HCT* II (1956: 66); Hornblower, *CT* I: 270.
63. Gomme, *HCT* II (1956: 65–6); the same, Marinatos (1981: 50).

64. Gomme, *HCT* II (1956: 66).
65. Thuc. 1, 23, 2–3.
66. Parke & Wormell (vol. I, 190): "Thucydides accepts the belief that there was some connection between the occupation of the *Pelargicon* and disaster in Athens."
67. *IG* I^3 78 (ML 73), 54–9. On the highly disputed dating (the most favoured dates range between 423 and 415), see ML. More recently, Furley (1996: 36–9) strongly supports a date of 415, and relates the profanation of the Mysteries to the initiative proposed by the inscription. Cavanaugh (1996), however, dates the decree (not very persuasively) to the mid-430s. Lampon's supplement, regarding the protection of the Pelargicum, implies the temporary habitation of the place after the outbreak of the war, for which reason 431 should be considered a *terminus post quem* for the decree. See the detailed discussion in Smarczyk (1990: 235–52).
68. Furley (1996: 80).
69. Paus. 1.3.4: πρὸς δὲ τοῦ νεὼ τὸν μὲν Λεοχάρες, ὃν δὲ καλοῦσιν Ἀλεξίκακον Κάλαμις ἐποίησε. τὸ δὲ ὄνομα τῷ θεῷ γενέσθαι λέγουσιν, ὅτι τὴν λοιμώδη σφίσι νόσον ὁμοῦ τῷ Πελοποννησίων πολέμῳ πιέζουσαν κατὰ μάντευμα ἔπαυσεν ἐκ Δελφῶν.
70. *Communis opinio* in Thompson & Wycherley (1972: 137–9); Parke & Wormell (vol. I, 190); Mikalson (1984: 218). For an overall discussion and additional literature, see Hendrick (1988: 185–210, esp. 196–8).
71. Dörig (1965: 138–265); Horstmanshoff (1989: 231) does not agree with an association between the statue of Apollo Alexikakos and the Plague of 430 and following years. He tentatively accepts Pausanias' testimony only for the Athenians having consulted the oracle at Delphi during the great Plague; cf. Horstmanshoff (1992: 61); See further Boardman (1996^4: 105).
72. Dörig (1965: 262).
73. Dörig (1965: 265).
74. Paus. 10 (19, 1). Dörig (1965: 265).
75. *Schol Aristoph. Ran*. 501.
76. Tagalidou (1993: 11). On Heracles Alexikakos in Athens, and on the identification of Ageladas, see 7–19, with additional literature. Tagalidou acknowledges that on stylistic grounds, the statue of Apollo would have been executed earlier than the Heracles, since later authors, influenced by folk-belief, related it to the Plague. Von Heinze (1965: 14–40, esp. p. 30) adopting the older thesis of A. Frickenhaus, takes the opposite view, dating the statue of Heracles Alexikakos, a replica of which he sees in the so-called herm of Theseus of the Ludovisi collection (Rome, National Museum, no. 8627), to the years of the epidemic (430–26). See too Woodford (1976: 291–4). Cf. Kearns (1989: 14).
77. Paus. 8, 41, 8–9: τὸ δὲ ὄνομα ἐγένετο τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι ἐπικουρήσαντι ἐπὶ νόσῳ λοιμώδει, καθότι καὶ παρὰ Ἀθηναίος ἐπωνυμίαν ἔλαβεν Ἀλεξίκακος ἀποτρέψας καὶ τούτοις τὴν νόσον. ἔπαυσε δὲ ὑπὸ τὸν Πελοποννησίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων πόλεμον καὶ τοὺς Φιγαλέας καὶ οὐκ ἐν ἑτέρῳ καιρῷ. Regarding the temple of Bassae, see the detailed archaeological report of Cooper (1992–6); on Apollo Epikourios and the Plague, see esp. vol. 1: 75–80. On the archaizing architecture of the temple, see also Knell (1993).
78. Knell (1993: 10).
79. Thompson (1981: 347). On these places of worship, see especially Lalonde (1968). Cf. Thompson & Wycherley (1972: 120–21); later, Miles (1989: 231).
80. Dem. 60, 29; Ael. *VH* 12, 28; Paus. 1, 5, 2; Aristid. 13, 119. As regards the identification of the Leokorion, see Shear (1973: esp. 127–34). Cf. Thompson & Wycherley (1972: 121–3). See also Thompson (1981: 347–8) and Miles (1989: 231). Wycherley gathered the literary testimonies on the sanctuary in *Agora* III (1957: 108–13). On the myth of the sacrifice of these virgins, see Kron (1976: 195–201); Hughes (1991: 73–9).
81. Thompson (1981: 348).
82. Crosby (1941: 82–103); Thompson & Wycherley (1972: 129–36). Cf. Miles (1989: 231).
83. See especially Miles (1989: 221–35) and Chapter 7.

84. For Attic funerary reliefs, see the fundamental work of Stupperich (1977), now also Hildebrandt (2006). On funerary luxury and related legislation, see Engels (1998: 77–154).
85. Engels (1998: 114).
86. Fuchs, review of Dohrn, in *Gnomon* 33 (1961: 237–42, esp. 241). Cf. Stupperich (1977: 135) and Hildebrandt (2006: 209–11).
87. Hildebrandt (2006: 210).
88. Thuc. 3, 87, 2: ὥστε Ἀθηναίους γε μὴ εἶναι ὅτι μᾶλλον τούτου ἐπίεσε καὶ ἐκάκωσε τὴν δύναμιν. MacDonald (1981: 159–68) attributes a decline in Athenian pottery production to the Plague.
89. Plut. *Per*. 13, 8. Croon (1986: col. 1204–1205); Auffarth (1995: 354). For the latest archaeological research, see Monaco in Greco (2010: 91–2).
90. For the column bases, see Travlos (1971: 124–6) with illustrations. On the inscriptions (*IG* I^3 506), see too Raubitschek (1949: 185).
91. Camp (1979: 403).
92. Pericles attended several state funerals during the Plague (Plut. *Per*. 36), when other ceremonial burials of generals took place (Paus. 1, 29, 3 and 7; Thuc. 2, 34, 7; 65; 69). In 429/8, Phormio dedicated *rostra* and shields to Apollo at Delphi (Paus. 10, 11, 6); cf. Pomtow (1901: col. 2558); Mikalson (1984: 219); Welwei (1999: 160–61).
93. Baziotopoulou-Valavani (2002). See also Papagrigorakis *et al.* (2008).
94. Lawton (2009: 74–82).
95. Lawton (2009: 79).
96. Parker (1996: 200). Herlihy (1997: 59–81) notes a comparable attitude towards plague epidemics in medieval Europe. Longrigg (1992: 37–44) has a different argument: apart from the Athenians' eschatological tendencies, evidenced by the acceptance of new ecstatic cults after 430, he acknowledges, at the same period, a contradictory evolution, promoted through an "Illuminist" philosophy. He sees the influence of a critical approach to religion in the fact that Athenians neglected their burial duties (described in Thucydides 2, 52), leading to bodies lying unburied in sanctuaries (a phenomenon that could also be accounted for by the sheer inability of the Athenians to deal with so many fatalities). He characterizes this contradictory evolution thus: "In effect, the plague served as a catalyst and accelerated the dissemination of those ideas most characteristic of that period of intellectual ferment, the fifth-century Enlightenment. However, ... the plague also helped to engender a reaction amongst the more conservative-minded .... There can be little doubt that the catastrophe of the plague, in addition to destroying the traditional religious beliefs of some, served also to heighten the more conventional religious sensitivities of others." It is the case, however, that his group of "Enlightened" Athenians represented only a small minority of citizens; see Chapter 2.1.4. On the general tendency to look for scapegoats in hard times, see the theoretical work of Girard (1982).
97. We can only speculate as to the charges. Pl. (*Grg*. 516A) speaks of embezzlement (κλοπή). A combination of Pericles' reputation for integrity, and the similarity to the trial of Phidias ("it looks like an echo of the charge against Phidias, in which Pericles was involved"), led Gomme to conclude that the information was not that reliable. Pericles may have been suspended because of "he deceived the people", or because of the failed expedition to the Argolid: Gomme, *HCT* II (1956: 182–3).
98. Thuc. 2, 65, 9.
99. Thucydides only speaks of a fine that Pericles had to pay, that Diodorus puts at eighty talents, adding that in his opinion, the *strategos* was condemned on the basis of "some minor evidence" (μικράς τινας ἀφορμὰς – 12, 45, 4). Plutarch's research produced fines of between fifteen and fifty talents, and the names of different accusers, who included Cleon (Thuc. 2, 65, 3; Diod. 12, 45, 4; Plut. *Per*. 35, 4; *Schol. Aristoph. Nub*. 859). There is still scholarly disagreement concerning the course of the trial, the procedures employed and even the date. The proceedings could be considered as an *eisangelia*, adopted on the proposal of Dracontides, with the immediate consequence that the *strategos* was suspended from office (*apocheirotonia*). Fundamental

studies: Beloch (1884: 330–35); Swoboda (1893: 536–98); *contra* Frost (1964a: 69–72) and Mansfeld (1980: 47–51), who challenge the usual interpretation and believe that the Assembly would not have needed a legal pretext to get rid of a *strategos*. In any case, it would be possible run an argument connecting the decree of Dracontides and the trial of Phidias. In response, Hansen (1975: 72) notes: "It is impossible to reject Frost's solution definitively, but Beloch's theory is, in my opinion, the most likely reconstruction of the events." I agree. On the trial of Pericles, see too: Kienast (1953: 210–229); Schachermeyr (1969: 229–33); Harrison (1971: 59); Hansen (1975: 71–3); Roberts (1982: 30–34); Ostwald (1986: 191–4); Bauman (1990: 42–5); Schubert (1994: 138–9); Podlecki (1998: 150–52); Welwei (1999: 161–2); Lehmann (2008: 242–4).

100. Thuc. 2, 65, 2.
101. Diod. 12, 45, 4.
102. Plut. *Per*. 35, 3.
103. Thuc. 2, 59, 1–2.
104. Thuc. 1, 23, 2–3.
105. Thuc. 2, 61, 3; add Thuc. 2, 61, 2: ὑμεῖς δὲ μεταβάλλετε.
106. DeSanctis (1944: 261); Ostwald (1986: 191). The interesting argument was recently revived by Kallett (2009: 99) that the Argolid campaign, whose principal objective was Epidauros, aimed at bringing Asclepius the healer and patron of Epidaurus to Athens on account of the Plague. This was actually done in 420 (see Chapter 6).
107. Thuc. 2, 13; Klein (1979: 513). Welwei (1999: 162) talks about "losing popularity".
108. For the story that Pericles started the war for personal reasons in order to avoid facing the accusations, see Plut. *Per*. 31, 1–32, 3; Diod. 12, 39, 2; Ar. *Ach*. 515–539; *Pax* 603–14. See further Frost (1964a: 69–70). Braunert (1969: 38–52) discusses the causes of the war, as does Wirth (1979: 395–417). Cf. the exhaustive analysis by de Ste. Croix (1972: 50–63 and 225–92); see too Rhodes (1987: 154–65).
109. Bauman (1990: 43); plus Kienast (1953: 222); Schachermeyr (1969: 228–9); Kagan (1974: 78); Klein (1979: 513); Roberts (1982: 32); Schubert (1994: 138).
110. Leven (1991: 151).
111. Plut. *Per*. 34, 1. If the impiety trials against members of Pericles' circle occurred before the outbreak of the war (which is doubtful; see above), then they clearly had no effect, since Pericles continued to be elected general, and it was he who persuaded the Athenians to start a war with Sparta.
112. Cf. Thuc. 2, 13, 2; 2, 62, 2–3; Powell (1988: 150–51). Cf. Thucydides' assertion (2, 65) that Pericles would have been victorious if his strategic vision had been strictly followed.
113. Thuc. 2, 59, 2; Diod. 12, 45, 5 (in Diodorus, the peace envoy follows Pericles' downfall). There is an interesting reconstruction of the conditions for both parties in Kagan (1974: 81–6). On the unbearable circumstances caused by the evacuation, see Thuc. 2, 17–20; Ar. *Eq*. 792–3; Diod. 12, 45, 2.
114. Powell (1973: 100) assumes that, behind the wish for peace, lay the oracle that had predicted a Spartan victory: "In 430, after onset of the plague, the Athenians sent ambassadors to Sparta to try to get the war stopped, and I suggest that respect for Apollo's prediction about the outcome of the war may well have been a large part of the cause of their doing so." Cf. Powell (1988: 395).
115. Thuc. 1, 126, 2; 127, 1; 139, 1. Williams (1952: 58–71, esp. 65–6) concludes that the Spartans were supported by aristocratic circles in Athens in their attempt to connect Pericles with a crime based on a sacrilege committed by his ancestors.
116. Thuc. 1, 126, 3–11; Hdt. 1, 61; 5, 62–63; 5, 70–72; cf. 6, 126–30; Arist. *Ath. Pol*. 1; Plut. *Sol*. 12. The presentation of the crime and its implications are analysed by Williams (1951–52: 32–49; 3–21; 58–71 (in detail); Gomme, *HCT* I (1945: 428–30); Lang (1967: 243–9); Davies (*APF*: 368–85); Lévy (1978: 513–21); Andrewes, *CAH* III (1982: 368–75); Welwei (1992: 133–7).
117. Thuc. 1, 127, 1.
118. Plut. *Per*. 33, 1–2.

119. Powell (1973: 102); cf. Badian (1993: 153).
120. Diog. Laert. 1, 110 (Epimenides, *FGrH* 457 T1). Diogenes also describes offerings for escaping the epidemic. Athenaeus, citing Neanthes of Cyzicus (third century BCE), tells how on account of an "old iniquity", Epimenides had to perform a ritual cleansing; alleged human sacrifices are also discussed (Athen. 13, 602c–d). Cf. Plut. *Sol*. 12, 4–5. On the chronology of Epimenides and human sacrifice: Hughes (1991: 155–6); Huxley (1969). The reliability of this anecdote is still uncertain, although it is known from third-century BCE testimony, but it could well have circulated in Athens during the war. While Hughes has serious doubts about the Epimenides episode, Burkert (1998: 123–4) treats it as a historical fact.
121. Thuc. 1, 126–7; Arist. *Ath. Pol*. 1; Heracl. *Lemb*. 2; Plut. *Sol*. 12, 3; Ar. *Eq*. 445–6. The official banishment was never formally revoked: Davies (*APF*: 371). On offerings: Hdt. 5, 62; Andrewes, *CAH* III (1982: 375); Davies (*APF*: 369–70).
122. Parker (1983: 5–12); Rudhardt (1958: 41–6).
123. Hdt. 1, 61; 5, 70–73.
124. Raubitschek (1947: 257–62, esp. 259–60); Boneer (1948: 341–3); for another reading: ML 21: 42. Cf. Parker (1983: 270).
125. The unpublished *ostraca* are presented, with illustrations, by Brenne (1994: 13–24: 16–17). On ostracism in general, see too Mattingly (1991: 1–26) and the recent edition (with commentary) by Brenne in Siewert (2002).
126. Smertenko (1932: 233–5); Dover (1957: 230–37); cf. Dover (1987: 161–75). Ar. *Eq*. 445–6, too, alludes to the curse.
127. Aesch. *Eum*. 280–283; Hdt. 7, 137: χρόνῳ δὲ μετέπειτα πολλῷ ἐπηγέρθη [ἡ Ταλθυβίου μῆνις] κατὰ τὸν Πελοποννησίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων πόλεμον.
128. Ar. *Eq*. 445–6.
129. Thuc. 3, 104; Diod. 12, 58, 6–7.
130. On *Délia*, see Smarczyk (1990: 506–507) and Parker (1996: 150–51), with additional literature. Cf. now also Kowalzig (2007: 56–128, esp. 110–18).
131. Plut. *Nic*. 3, 4–6. See Powell (1973: 132–3). On his religiosity, see Thuc. 7, 50, 4; Plut. *Nic*. 3, 3–6; 4, 1–2; 5, 3; cf. Powell (1973: 134–7) and Powell (1979: 15–31) cf. now also Geske (2005: 77, 82, 168–75). An inscription from Delos attests dedications offered by Nicias: Homolle (1886: 461–75, especially 465, lines 113–14). A fragment of a marble base with the name of the *strategos*: *Inscriptions de Délos*, no. 41; see also Bruneau & Ducat (1983: 147). See a detailed discussion in Coupry (1954: 285–94). Other dedications by Nicias: *IG* II^2 1652 and 1653.
132. Plut. *Nic*. 2, 2–4.
133. Plut. *Nic*. 9, 6. Powell (1973: 135–6, 148–9; 1988: 398).
134. Diod. 12, 58, 6. Thucydides (3, 87) also presents a chronology relating to the second outbreak of the Plague. See the detailed discussion in: Powell (1973: 131–4); Smarczyk (1990: 504–25); Hornblower (*CT* I: 517–25; *CT* II: 422) and Hornblower (1992: 194–6). Cf. Westlake (1969: 17–19); Parker (1983: 276–7); Parker (1996: 150–51).
135. Thus, correctly, Laidlaw (1933: 67–9); Powell (1973: 131–2); Thompson (1981: 347); Parker (1983: 276–7); Powell (1988: 396–7); Miles (1989: 229); Smarczyk (1990: 505–506); Hornblower (*CT* I: 519); Hornblower (1992: 194–5); Garland (1992: 131). Hornblower (*CT* I: 520–22) justly showed that the revival of the pan-Ionian festival was also a kind of propagandistic action ("imperial aspect") of the Delian League. See too the detailed discussion of Smarczyk (1990: 507–25); cf. Parker (1996: 150).
136. See Courby (1931: 220–25) and the observations in Chapter 7 on architecture and its importance during the Peloponnesian War. Cf. Miles (1989: 229).
137. Thuc. 5, 1; 32, 1. Dover, *HCT* IV (1970: 30). The banishment of the Delians has often been considered a mere piece of power politics, with religious motivations as a pretext: Jordan (1986: 137–9); Smarczyk (1990: 520–21). Diod., 12, 73, 1, admits that the banishment had been thought of as revenge on account of alliances between the Delians and the Spartans. See too

Meiggs (1972: 302). Westlake (1969: 18) takes the opposite view; he rightly notes the low strategic importance of the island of Delos, which would have caused the Athenians not to see it as militarily significant. Powell (1973: 132) interprets the banishment and repatriation of the Delians a year later as measures with religious motivations: "the explanation which most economically accounts for the Athenians' policy on both occasions is that the Athenians hoped thereby to dissuade Apollo from intervening against them."

138. Huxley (1969: 235–9) uses evidence for Nicias having undertaken a mission to Apollo on Crete to seek help against the epidemic rampage in Athens. Cf. Miles (1989: 228).
139. Thuc. 3, 87, 2: ὥστε Ἀθηναίους γε μὴ εἶναι ὅ τι μᾶλλον τούτου ἐπίεσε καὶ ἐκάκωσε τὴν δύναμιν.
140. Thuc. 6, 12, 1. In the controversy surrounding the ill-fated Sicilian expedition, Nicias refers to the still-present effects of the epidemic and of the war, from which the Athenians had barely begun to recover. See too Thompson (1981: 347): "There can be little doubt that it was their experience of the Plague that induced a wave of religiosity among the Athenians in the immediately following years."
141. Mitchell-Boyask (2008: 29–30), who did not also take into account either Huber (2005) or the 2000 German edition.
142. Mitchell-Boyask (2008: 184–5). Cf. Girard (1982).
143. On the dating issue, see Knox (1956), cf. Vickers (2008: 36–8).
144. Huber (2005: 98).
145. Pl. *Euthphr*. 3b: καὶ ὡς διαβαλῶν δὴ ἔρχεται [ὁ Μέλετος] εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον εἰδὼς ὅτι εὐδιάβολα τὰ τοιαῦτα πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς. On this topic, see Chapter 1.1.

4. Other prosecutions for impiety

1. Burke (1887: 32).
2. Heraclid. Pont., *apud* Diog. Laert. 9, 50 (*DK* 80 A1). Cf. Menzel, *BSG* 62 (1910: 189–229) and Bugno (1999: 120–21).
3. Timon of Phlius (*DK* 80 A12); Philostr. *Vit. Phil*. 1, 10, 1–4; Sext. Emp. 9, 55–6; Diog. Laert. 9, 52; Cic. *De or*. 1, 23, 63.
4. His first stay in Athens belongs to the period before the constitution of the colony, around 450 BCE; the second, beginning about 433, if one accepts Plato's fictitious date for his *Protagoras*. A more likely date, however, is from 423/2, until his banishment from Athens; on which see von Fritz (1957: col. 908–21, esp. col. 908–11) and Guthrie (1971: 262).
5. On the issue of the problematic sources, see, in general, Schiappa (1991: 20–38) and Guthrie (1971: 63–4); cf. Dreher (1983: 11–17). The most recent and detailed examination of the issue regarding the extent to which parts of Plato's *Protagoras* (esp. 320c–8d) can be seen either as by Plato himself, or as summaries of Protagoras' ideas, is that of Manuwald (1996: 103–31). There is a wide variety of views: at one extreme, the myth of Protagoras in the dialogue reproduces the authentic voice of the real Protagoras; at the other, it is simply an invention of Plato ascribed to Protagoras. Alternatively, there is a connection between authenticity and invention, implying both Plato and Protagoras (at least in part): besides Manuwald (1996), see also Müller (1976: 312–13) and Dietz (1976: 38–9). In a study of the gods on the Parthenon freize, Mark (1984: 289–342, esp. 325–42) believes that Protagoras' theology can be reconstructed to the extent that the religious "programme" of the frieze is a reflection of the Protagorean civilizing myth. He perhaps overestimates the influence of Protagoras' theory, and the reliability of the few testimonia that can be ascribed with relative certainty to the Sophist, and thus the possibility of recreating his theories at all.
6. On this dictum and its implications, see Chapter 2.1.2.
7. Arist. *Rhet*. 1402a, 24–6. For his role in the intellectual and political life of Athens, Morrison (1941: 1–16) offers many details.

8. Pl. *Prt*. 320c–28d; von Fritz (1957: col. 917–18). Add Dreher (1983: 11–24).
9. *DK* 80 B 4: περὶ μὲν θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω εἰδέναι, οὔθ᾽ ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶν οὔθ᾽ ὁποῖοί τινες ἰδέαν· πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κωλύοντα εἰδέναι ἥ τ᾽ ἀδηλότης καὶ βραχὺς ὢν ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.
10. Derenne (1930: 47: "*Protagoras n'était pas athée, mais le début de son livre pouvait blesser le sentiment religieux des Athéniens*"). See too: Nestle (1950: col. 738); Dodds (1951: 189); Sandvoss (1968: 315–16); Carbonara Naddei (1969: 87–98); Guthrie (1971: 234–5, 262–9); Dietz (1976: 132–42); Marasco (1976: 119–20); Burkert (1977: 462); Muir (1985: 202); Ostwald (1986: 532–3); Mactoux (1990: 294–5); Ostwald, *CAH* V (1992: 369–70); Parker (1996: 212–13).
11. *DK* 80 A 23.
12. Eupolis, fr. 157 (Kassel and Austin). ἀλιτήριος (from ἀλιταίνω, to trespass against somebody – see too the critical apparatus in Kassel and Austin and LSJ) designates anybody who trespassed against the gods. Furley (1996: 109) recognizes in this word a Greek *terminus technicus*, which designates anybody "who has sinned against the gods and lived a subsequent life of misery".
13. The principal testimonia are: Timon of Phlius, fr. 5 (*DK* 80 A 12); Arist., fr. 67 (Rose); Diog. Laert. 9, 52–4; Jos. *C. Ap*. 2, 266); Philostr. *Vit. Phil*. 1, 10, 1–4; Sext. Emp. 9, 55–6; Cic. *De or*. 1, 23, 63 (cf. *DK* 80 A 1, 2, 12, 23); further citations below from *DK*). For testimonia on Protagoras and the charges of impiety, see Winiarczyk (1984: 177–8); Müller (1976: 324). On Protagoras' agnosticism, see too Carbonara Naddei (1969: 87–98).
14. *DK* 80 A 1, 12, 23. The earliest documentary report is that of Timon of Phlius (*DK* 80 A 12).
15. *DK* 80 A 1, 23.
16. *DK* 80 A 2, 12); Jos. *C. Ap*. 2, 266. On his death at sea, see *DK* 80 A 2, 12 and Philoch., *FGrH* 328, fr. 217. Arguing by analogy, Müller (1976: 330–38) believes Philochorus to be the earliest reliable source for the Protagoras' impiety trial. He considers the conservative Attidographer, to be bound "in multiple ways to the religious and cultural traditions of his native city" (334), and to be the initiator of the tradition about the trial (338).
17. Derenne (1930: 51–4) dates the trial to 416; von Fritz (1957: col. 908–21); Guthrie (1971: 262).
18. Pl. *Men*. 91e: οἶμαι γὰρ αὐτὸν [scil. Protagoras] ἀποθανεῖν ἐγγὺς καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα ἔτη γεγονότα, τετταράκοντα δὲ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ ὄντα· καὶ ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ χρόνῳ ἔτι εἷς τὴν ἡμέραν ταυτὴν εὐδοκιμῶν οὐδὲν πέπαυται.
19. Most recent works, following Burnet (1914: 90–91), have questioned the authenticity of Protagoras' trial: Dover (1975: 34); Schiappa (1991: 144–5); Wallace (1994: 134–5). However, some find the tradition reliable, as I have noted earlier. See, for example, Ostwald (1986: 533): "In any event, evidence we have ... is too strong to reject the notion of a trial for impiety altogether."
20. Piccirilli (1997: 20): "*Circa l'asserzione di Socrate ... essa non costituisce un obiezione tale da invalidare la tradizione sul procedimento giudiziario*."
21. Dodds (1951: 189, n. 66); Guthrie (1971: 263). In addition, we can definitely say that Plato wanted to present the condemnation of his *magister* as a unique judical error: Finley (1980: 102).
22. Nestle (1950: col. 738); Rudhardt (1960: 91); MacDowell (1978 201); Bauman (1990: 67).
23. Book burnings mentioned in testimonia: Liv. 39, 16, 8 (a book burnt as part of measures taken against the Bacchanalia); Liv. 40, 29; Plin. *HN* 13, 27, 84–8 (burning religious and philosophical books in Rome in 181); 1 *Macc*. 1, 59–60 (while putting an end to the Jewish revolt in 168 BCE, Antiochus Epiphanes set fire to all the Jewish law books he could find). Regarding the philosophical literature set on fire, see Diog. Laert. 6, 95. The idea of book burning is also attested in the fourth century. According to the testimony of Aristoxenus (Diog. Laert. 9, 40), Plato intended to set fire to the works of Democritus. Müller (1976: 327, 339–40); Dover (1975: 34–8); Schiappa (1991: 143–4); Wallace (1994: 133–5). Wallace (1997: 229–30) believes that the entire tradition of burning Protagoras' books is pure fiction.

24. *DK* 80 A 12.
25. Piccirilli (1997: 17–23), who mercilessly criticizes Dover's unacceptable view, formulated without any reference to the sources, according to which the *topos* of *autodafé* was invented in the writings of Demetrius of Phalerum (18–19); cf. Dover (1975: 37). For the variant ἔθελον, used in the fragment of Timon, Piccirilli (1997: 20) admits that it "*non implica affatto che egli alludesse a un'azione che sapeva non essere accaduta*".
26. Piccirilli (1997: 21); cf. Harris (1989: 65–113), see also Missiou (2011: 109–35). According to Plato's testimony (*Ap*. 23d), the works of Protagoras were sold for a drachma each in *c*. 400. Wallace (1997: 230) maintains that the books had such a limited dissemination, it was useless to burn them.
27. Thus Wallace (1997: 230): "In the fifth century, books were still primarily scripts for recital, rather than texts for individual study."
28. Piccirilli (1997: 22). In reality, only the oral diffusion of a text can affect large groups of the population, as well as the numerically manageable literate upper class: Harris (1989: 93–115); on literacy, see now Missiou (2011).
29. *DK* 80 A 1.
30. Piccirilli (1997: 21–2).
31. We might invoke, *de facto*, some fifth-century examples of the "official destruction of documents", though not in the politico-religious field, but in that of law; such destruction rendered inscriptions illegible, and archive copies of certain documents were turned to ashes: [ἐ]χσαλεῖφσει τὰ ὀνόμα[τα] [...] [ὅ]πο [ἐσὶ ἀν]αγεγ[ρ]αμμένοι – *IG* I^3 118 (ML 87), 38–40); [ἅπαντα ἐξαλειψά]ntwn – *IG* I^3 127 (*ML* 94), 30); Andoc. 1, 79; *IG* I^3 52 (ML 58), 9–12; cf. Dover (1975: 35–6), who states that the procedure was a "normal practice in Athenian administration".
32. Heine, *Almansor*, Act 1, Scene 1 (1969: 859): "*Dort wo man Bücher verbrennt, verbrennt man auch am Ende Menschen.*"
33. Liv. 39, 16, 8); Plin. *HN*. 13, 27, 84–8, cf. Liv. 40, 29; 1 *Macc*. 1, 59–60. Müller (1976: 340) rejects such an interpretation, since to accept it is to view the book as a sacred or magical object, rather than a product of the sober and practical relationship of the Greeks with the written word.
34. Parker (1983: 227); cf. Burkert (1977: 130–34); see Eur. *Hel*. 869, *Heracl*. 937, *IA*. 112, 1471; Plut. *Mor*. 5, 383d (*De Is. et Os*.).
35. Mactoux (1990: 297).
36. The most important testimonia: Ar. *Av*. 1071–8 (with *Nub*. 826–30); *Ran*. 318–20 and scholia); [Lys.], 6, 17; Melanthius, *FGrH* 326, fr. F3 (= *Schol.* Aris. *Av*.); Diod. 13, 6, 7; Craterus, in *FGrH* 342, fr. F16. Further references in Jacoby (1959: 3–8). Winiarczyk (1981) has an exhaustive, state-of-the-art collection of sources relating to Diagoras, including testimonia hitherto neglected. Passages marked (T) in the remainder of this book are from this edition.
37. Scholarship beginning in 1677 relating to Diagoras of Melos is thoroughly discussed by Winiarczyk (1979: 191–4). Other studies include: Jacoby (1959); Woodbury (1965); Winiarczyk (1979); Winiarczyk (1980); Smarczyk (1990: 278–87); Bremmer (1995); Will (2006); Dunbar (1995: 581–3).
38. Earlier literature relating to the "philosophical thesis" is cited by Winiarczyk (1979: 191). The few fragments of poems ascribed to Diagoras are collected by Page (1962: 382–3) and Winiarczyk (1981: 29). The sources describing the relationship of the poet with Mantinea and the lawgiver of the city – the pugilist Nicodorus – to whom he also dedicated a poem, are highly plausible: Ael. *VH* 2, 23 (T 13); Philodemus of Gadara, *Pap. Nerc*. (1428: col. XI–XII, 12; T 69); on this subject, see Bölte (1930: col. 1320) and Jacoby (1959: 14). The wandering poet stopped at Athens, probably as early as in the 430s. Towards the mid-420s he was in Mantinea, but because of his relationship with the democrat Nicodorus, he had to leave the city after the defeat in the battle of Mantinea and the oligarchic coup of 418, and probably headed to Athens; see further Winiarczyk (1979: 206–8), who gives a precise picture of the most important events in the life of Diagoras (212–13).

39. Winiarczyk (1980: 75); Woodbury (1965: 210–11).
40. Will (2006: 61) subscribes to the view that Diagoras lost his faith completely and became an atheist after the brutal capture and destruction of Melos in 416.
41. Winiarczyk (1980: 74–5 and *passim*).
42. Hermippus, fr. 43 (Kassel and Austin); on this subject, see Jacoby (1959: 9–10). It is still disputable whether the term ὁ Τερθρεύς (something like "windbag" or "boaster") – used by Hermippus to characterize Diagoras – can truly serve as an indication of his lack of belief in the gods already in *c*. 430; Ar. *Nub*. 826–30 (T 38). The remark in *Clouds* that Socrates was a "Melian" indicates, according to the general view, that Diagoras was suspected of impiety as early as 423. The passage is probably part of an original first text, elaborated in 423 and then adapted in 418; see Dover (1968, *ad loc*.) and Winiarczyk (1979: 195), also Will (2006: 65).
43. Wehrli (1961: 123–6) and Woodbury (1965: 210–11, followed by Winiarczyk 1980: 75) consider that the Melian would probably have been part of a group such as that of the κακοδαιμονισταί, led by Cinesias (in Lys., fr. 73 Thalheim = Athen. 551e) which, by mocking the gods, would deliberately isolate themselves socially, without being part of the criticism of religion motivated by philosophical arguments. Smarczyk (1990: 282) disagrees and refers to the private character of Cinesias' preoccupations, and to the fact that he and his cronies were afraid to attack publicly an Athenian state cult; the relationship of Diagoras with one of those groups is thus questionable. On Cinesias' club, see Chapter 5.5.2.4.
44. The view that his bad name – which made him the best-known ancient atheist – was based on a book against the Mysteries or on his questioning the very existence of the gods, as Jacoby (1959: 16 and 24–31) and others assume based on later testimonia, has been convincingly rejected by Winiarczyk (1980: 53–69), who believes the work to be apocryphal. Many still believe, however, that Diagoras wrote such an atheistic book. The view that Diagoras was an atheist in the modern sense of the word (i.e. avowing a general denial of the existence of divine powers) can only be argued, as Winiarczyk (1980: 72) correctly showed, by means of a mass of brief and varied testimonia. A more careful analysis has shown these testimonia to be highly uncertain and late. Later authors called the Melian ἄθεος because of his critical attitude towards the Mysteries; they use the term correctly, because ἄθεος did not necessarily mean "atheistic" in an absolute and modern sense. On the ancient concept of atheism, see Chapter 2.3.1.
45. Melanthius, *FGrH* 326, F3 (T 7): Μελάνθιος δὲ ἐν τῷ Περὶ μυστηρίων προφέρεται τῆς χαλκῆς στέλης ἀντίγραφον [...] »ἐὰν δέ τις ἀποκτείνῃ Διαγόραν τὸν Μήλιον, λαμβάνειν ἀργυρίου τάλαντον. ἐὰν δέ τις ζῶντα ἀγάγῃ, λαμβάνειν δύο«. According to information in Craterus, *FGrH* 346, F16 (T 7), Diagoras denigrated the Mysteries by revealing them to everybody (κοινοποιῶν), "by depreciating them" (μικρὰ ποιῶν), and he made those who wanted to be initiated give up the idea (τοὺς βουλομένους μυεῖσται ἀποπέμπων). From a contemporary speech against Andocides (delivered in 400 or 399), we discover that the Melian was guilty of impiety through the use of the words περὶ ἀλλότρια ἱερὰ καὶ ἑορτάς, [Lys.], 6, 17 (T 16): ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ λόγῳ περὶ ἀλλότρια ἱερὰ καὶ ἑορτὰς ἠσέβει. Smarczyk (1990: 284) believes that Diagoras must have revealed those matters only to a restricted group, since, had they been made known to the larger circle of a *hetairia* or even in public, it would have triggered legal measures sooner.
46. Ar. *Av*. 1071–8.
47. Diod. 13, 6, 7 (T 17). Rosenthal (1937: 21–67) offers a German translation of the biography of the philosopher Zeno of Elea, elaborated in Arabic in the eleventh century AD by Al-Mubashir; Winiarczyk (1981: 5–6; T 10) provides a Latin transcription, Bremmer (1995: 74–5) an English one. I have used Rosenthal's translation, reproduced by Jacoby (1959: 4–5).
48. As Thucydides relates, the informers also presented earlier sacrileges during the investigation – Thuc. 6, 27, 2; 28, 1. "His critical observations certainly hark back to the Eleusinian Mysteries": Winiarczyk (1979: 210); cf. Woodbury (1965: 181) and Smarczyk (1990: 282). 415 is accepted as the date by most scholars; cf. Derenne (1930: 66–70); Wehrli (1961: 124); *GGR* I: 771; Fahr (1969: 90); Guthrie (1971: 237); Dover (1975: 26–7); Ostwald (1986:

275–7); Bauman (1990: 67–8); Smarczyk (1990: 278–87); Parker (1996: 208). Since the Eleusinian cult seems to have become the principal cult of the Maritime League at this period (Smarczyk 1990: 167–297), Auffarth (1995: 340–41) assumes a political motivation behind the persecution of Diagoras, which began precisely in 415.

49. Melanthius, *FGrH* 326, F3 (T 7); Al-Mubashir, in Jacoby (1959: 4–5; T 10). On hostility towards Athens: Thuc. (5, 58, 4; 8, 3, 2); Xen. *Hell*. 4, 2(20); cf. Jacoby (1959: 42).
50. (T 7): ἐκκεκήρυκται δὲ μάλιστα ὑπὸ τὴν ἅλωσιν τῆς Μήλου, οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει πρότερον. The siege and conquest of the island of Melos do not appear relevant enough to exclude the presence of Diagoras in Athens in that moment, because, in the context of the military confrontation, the Athenians would not have really hated the Melians. Killing or enslaving the population was part of the "normal" circumstances after a conquest: Winiarczyk (1979: 209–10). All relevant material on the attack on Melos is in Will (2006).
51. Jacoby (1959: *passim*, esp. 19–23).
52. Woodbury (1965: 192–7); Winiarczyk (1979: 200–204); cf. Wehrli (1961: 123–6).
53. Jacoby (1959: 21): "there certainly was intense religious excitement at Athens in 415 BCE, but as certainly not only in 415." Romer (1995/6: 393–401) questioned – not very convincingly – the reliability of Diodorus and Al-Mubashir. He dated the measures taken against the Melian between 421/20 and 416/5, assuming that older decrees were regularly read out in the assembly and that Aristophanes alluded to such a proclamation.
54. *IG* I^3 421–30. On the profanation of the Mysteries, see Chapter 5.6.
55. Cf. Winiarczyk (1979: 210), who also assumes that once he had returned to Athens in 418, Diagoras would not have reiterated his critical observations regarding the Mysteries. Given the uncertainty with regard to the character of Diagoras' "teachings", it is still disputable if the "teachings of Diagoras" would have served as "spiritual grounds for the profanation of the Mysteries" in 415, as Smarczyk (1990: 282) believes. Auffarth (1995: 340–41) thinks that the Melian tried to drive away potential initiates to the Mysteries with his behaviour as a reaction to the destruction of his native town.
56. Melanthius, *FGrH* 326, F3: Μελάνθιος δὲ ἐν τῷ Περὶ μυστηρίων προφέρεται τῆς χαλκῆς στέλης ἀντίγραφον, ἐν ᾗ ἐπεκήρυξαν καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς <μὴ> ἐκδιδόντας Πελλανεῖς; Jacoby (1959: 43); Winiarczyk (1979: 211); Smarczyk (1990: 280).
57. Smarczyk (1990: 167–298). In this sense, see Chapter 5.6.3.
58. Rosenberg (1915: 315).
59. Mark (1984: 340).
60. An example is the fact that Dover categorically rejected all testimonia relating to religious trials. He ascribes to the ancient authors the use of a "systematic distortion applied within a single politico-philosophical tradition" (1975: 47), and he emphasized that the trial of Socrates was an unfortunate, isolated case. Cf. Wallace (1994). See now on the general character of the Athenians also Balot (2001) and Herman (2006) (but only in the light of the review by Christ [2007]). See also Appendix I.
61. Finley (1980: 102). Socrates was probably not condemned on the basis of the decree of Diopeithes; on which see Brickhouse & Smith (1989: 32–3). See Chapter 9.2.
62. For an overall discussion, see Reverdin (1945). If Plato had been able to enforce the *Laws*, then his teacher, had he been still alive, would have been the first to be put to death in accordance with those laws; cf. Reverdin (1945: 9). On the issue of guilt in the trial of Socrates, see Chapter 9.5.
63. Garland (1992: 141).
64. Girard (1982).
65. Dodds (1951: 189); Finley (1980: 91).
66. Forrest (1975: 37–52), also Strauss (1993).
67. Harrison (1968: 189–95).
68. Unlike the free Athenians, whom a decree protected from such misfortunes: Andoc. 1, 43; Lys., 13, 27 and 59; Harrison (1971: 150).
69. Mactoux (1990: 289–313; the citation at 299).

70. Mactoux (1990: 301).
71. Mactoux (1990: 302).
72. The view that the elite (taught by the Sophists) used the religious feelings of the "crowd" as a political tool has been present in many modern accounts. Such an approach assumes that prominent upper-class politicians had already moved far away from the traditional views of their fellow citizens, and that they considered religion – in a very modernist fashion – as the "opium of the people", employing it for their own political purposes. Thus, for example, Nilsson (1951: 134); see too Nilsson (1940: *passim*); Humphreys (1986). Bremmer (1996a: 102–8) offers explicit indications of a structural religious change that led to the upper classes distancing themselves further from traditional religion. The case of Nicias clearly shows that not all leading personalities of the time were cynical agnostics or disciples of a modern sophistic Enlightenment, marked, to a certain extent, by the Ionian free-thinkers. Finley (1991: 122) believes that it is impossible for an enlightened "dominant class" to have used religion as a tool in Athens. On Nicias' religiosity, see Chapter 3.7. It is theoretically feasible for an elitist "clique" to have consciously used the religious fears of the Demos, but there is no direct evidence in the sources. See Finley (1991: 121–3).
73. Dodds (1951: 191).

5. The mutilation of the Herms and the profanation of the Mysteries

1. Hos. 10, 13: "If you sow impiety, you will harvest injustice."
2. Clearly, Thucydides' statement (6, 27, 1) that the faces of the statues had been mutilated is not the entire truth, for the erect phallus, the most characteristic feature of the Herms, was also mutilated during the nocturnal events: Ar. *Lys*. 1094; add Henderson (1987, *ad loc*.); see also Dover, *HCT* IV (1970: 288–9); Osborne (1985: 65). See now the exhaustive discussion in Hornblower CT III (2008: 373–5).
3. For example, Osborne (1985: 67).
4. Thuc. 4, 2–41 (esp. 38). On the events of Pylus, see Wilson (1979), and, more recently, Flower (1992: 40–57).
5. Thuc. 4, 78–88 (Brasidas in Thrace); 5, 10 (the Battle of Amphipolis; 5, 14–24); Plut. *Nic*. 9, 8; *Alc*. 14, 2 (the Peace of Nicias).
6. Thuc. 5, 43–8.
7. See Kagan (1981: 19–158), Lehmann (1987: 33–73) and Heitsch (1996). On the situation after the Peace of Nicias, see, for example, the studies of Westlake (1971: 315–25) and Seager (1976: 249–69).
8. Cf. Connor (1971: *passim*, esp. 139–98). These developments after the death of Pericles, when the politicians of the new, somewhat mercenary nobility became ever more influential, were suggestively described by Forrest (1975: 41) as "a change from a Rolls-Royce administration to a Jaguar administration". See too, on some aspects, Mann (2007).
9. Thuc. 5, 43–45; Eup., fr. 99; Plut. *Nic.* 10–11.
10. Thuc. 5, 63–81.
11. On Alcibiades and his versatile character, see: Hatzfeld (1951); Ellis (1989); Forde (1989); Romilly (1995); now also Bleckmann (1998: 443–508); a systematic and overall study related to his character is Schuller (1999), see also Rhodes (2011) and Heftner (2011); on possible allusions in drama, Vickers (1997, 2008 and forthcoming a). For the portrait of Alcibiades reflected in the ancient literary tradition, see Gribble (1999). It is important to emphasize that, apart from any enthusiasm that the skilful orator stimulated, nobody really trusted the young hothead and his mercurial politics; cf. Seager (1967). Other sources, besides the historiographic tradition: Ar. *Ran*. 1420–21; Lys. 14 and 15; [And.], 4; Isoc. 16).
12. The most important data on Nicias can be found in Davies (*APF*: 403–404). For his religiosity, see Thuc. 7, 50, 4; Plut. *Nic.* 3, 3–6; 4, 1–2; 5, 3; cf. Powell (1979: 15–31); for his character and

personality, see too Westlake (1968: 86–96, 169–211), Adkins (1975: 379–92), Rood (1998: 183–201).

13. Thuc. 6, 6–7. The alliance between Athens and Egesta is recorded in *IG* I³ 11 and it has been traditionally dated on stylistic criteria to 458/7; see the commentary to ML 37, and Bradeen & McGregor (1973: 71–81). Now, however, an important study using objective scientific methods (Chambers *et al.* 1990) has shown that the inscription belongs to 418/7. The ramifications of the agreement with Egesta, crucial for the entire chronology of the fifth century, are convincingly summarized by Vickers (1996: 171–4). The new discovery has important consequences, and it is no longer possible to be certain any more about fifth-century chronology; it seems that Mattingly was essentially right (1991 and 1986: 167–70; see now also Mattingly 1999), as opposed to what had become the standard view of e.g. Meiggs (1966). (I had already arrived at this position in 1999/2000.) For the now generally accepted view of the criteria, see Moroo (2002) and Rhodes (2008); and see too Chapter 7.3.1. With a late date for the treaty, the alliance with Egesta is better viewed as part of an Athenian foreign policy that only took Sicily into account from *c.* 427 onwards (Thuc. 3, 86 and 88). On relations between Sicily and Athens during the Archidamian War, see Westlake (1969: 101–22).
14. Thuc. 6, 8–25. A decisive role may have been played by the democratic politician Demostratus, as a supporter of the expedition: Plut. *Alc*. 18, 4–5; Ar. *Lys*. 390–398; *Schol. Thuc.* 6, 26, 1. On the verbal duel between Alcibiades and Nicias, and on the Athenians' attitude to the expedition, see Dover, *HCT* IV (1970: 223–64); Kohl (1977); Kagan (1981: 157–91); Andrewes, *CAH* V (1992: 446–51, with bibliography), and especially Macleod (1983). The decisive element, however, seems to have been the desire for adventure on the part of the Athenian youth: Plut. *Nic.* 11, 3. Cf. Forrest (1975: 37–52); Strauss (1993: 148–53).
15. The most detailed analyses are the fundamental studies of Keil (1894: 352–6) and Meritt (1930: 125–52); see too Dover, *HCT* IV (1970: 264–76); Aurenche (1974: 155–60); Furley (1996: 119–30); Hornblower *CT* III with abundant references (2008: 367–81). The mutilation of the Herms took place either around 25 May or 6–7 June. Dates between the beginning of June and the beginning of July have been proposed for the departure of the fleet. Any reconstruction of the chronological sequence, no matter how careful, remains highly speculative and inherently inconsistent. But in the present context, the precise moment of the crime is of secondary importance. The important thing is that the crime was committed immediately before the beginning of the planned expedition; it could thus be regarded by the Athenians as an ill omen for future action: Thuc. 6, 27, 1 and 3.
16. Main sources: Thuc. 6, 27–9; 53, 60–61; Andoc. 1 (*De Myst.*); Plut. *Alc*. 18–21. The so-called "Attic stelai" (Poll. 10, 36), which document how the property of those prosecuted for their crimes fared under the hammer, are also highly important: *IG* I³ 421–30, with additional literature; add Pritchett (1953: 225–99; 1956: 178–317); Amyx (1958: 163–310). The events of the summer of 415 are also briefly noted by the following authors: Ar. *Lys*. 1094; *Av*. 1054; [Lys.] 6; Diod. 13, 2; Nep. *Vit. Alc*. 3; Anon. *Vita Alc*. (*POxy*. III, 411); Hellanicus, *FGrH* 4, F 24b; Philoch., *FGrH* 328, F 133–4.
17. Apart from Thucydides' account, preferred by most scholars to that of Andocides, the latter's forensic speech delivered in his own defence in 400 or 399, but related to the accusations of 415, is also a reliable source. In keeping with the decree of Isotimides, which prohibited those who had committed acts of impiety from entering holy ground, even if they had profited from an amnesty that applied to key witnesses or from the general amnesty of 403, Andocides would not have been allowed to enter any sanctuary. However, not only was he accused of having done this (And. 1, 71), but at his trial it was stated that the orator had brought an olive branch as an offering in a sanctuary, an act that was against the Eleusinian law (Andoc. 1, 117–23). These new charges once again brought Andocides' earlier impieties under the spotlight of the law. It is easy to understand why Andocides should have attempted to present his role in the 415 profanities as insignificant; contemporary testimonia related to the earlier events guarantee the reliability of his witness, at least for the officially documented events and for the

incidents presumably discussed in the Assembly and before the Council. The scraps of information, gleaned by Plutarch from other, lost, sources, serve to fill in the gaps in the narratives of Thucydides and Andocides. On the documentary value of the narratives, see Allen (1951: 4–26), and above all Furley (1996: 1–12).

18. Thuc. 6, 27, 1–2. Plut. *Nic.* 13, 3, and Nep. *Alc*. 3, 2 agree with this view; they also speak of "most of them". According to the testimony of Andocides (1, 62), followed by Philoch. (*FGrH*, F 133), not most, but all the city's Herms fell victim to the perpetrators, except for one that stood near his house. MacDowell (1962: 103) rightly believes this to be an exaggeration. See too Cratippus (*FGrH* 64, F 3), who emphasizes that only the Herms within the Agora and nearby would have been harmed. An initial reward of 1,000 drachmas was increased, on the proposal of Peisander, to 10,000 drachmas: Andoc. 1, 27.
19. Thuc. 6, 27, 3, indicates fear of ominous songs and tyranny as reasons for the immediate investigation into the crime, which led to excesses. In what follows, however, it will be suggested that the impression that the mutilation of the Herms was orchestrated by revolutionary oligarchs emerged only as the investigations progressed and that it was stimulated by (partly false) denunciations: Andoc. 1, 36.
20. Thuc. 6, 27, 2: καὶ τοὺς δράσαντες ᾔδει οὐδείς.
21. Busolt, *GG* III, 2: 1290.
22. Thuc. 6, 28; Andoc. 1, 11–2.
23. Thuc. 6, 29.
24. Andoc. 1, 36; Thuc. 6, 53, 2.
25. Teucer: Andoc. 1, 15; 34–5; Agariste, the wife of Alcmeonides: Andoc. 1, 16; see also Davies, *APF*: 382–4; and Wallace (1992: 328–35); Lydus: Andoc. 1, 17. On the denunciations in general: Thuc. 6, 53, 2.
26. Andoc. 1, 37–47; 53; 58; 60. There had been at least a month between the deed and the denunciation of Diocleides (Andoc. 1, 42). On the dating of the testimonia, see Furley (1996: 123–6).
27. Andoc. 1, 44–6; 61. The data regarding the movement of troops and the mobilization are confirmed by Thuc. 6, 61, 2. When he speaks of the bad men (πονηρῶν ἀνθρώπων), whose denunciations were simply believed without being checked, Thuc. 6, 53, 2 is definitely referring to Diocleides.
28. Andoc. 1, 48–53. Besides the eighteen enumerated by Teucer, Andocides named four other accomplices. He himself only knew about the sacrilege, but he did not agree with it and he could not, in any case, have taken part in it for objective reasons, since he was wounded (Andoc. 1, 61–4). The issue of Andocides' guilt, which he avoids as much as possible even mentioning in his defence speech, became the subject of much speculation. Still, it is certain at least that he was in on the plot. The solemn assertions (Andoc. 1, 61, 63) that he was opposed to the deed and that he knew nothing about what was actually done are highly suspicious. His alibi is credible, however, since it was confirmed by one of his servants under torture (Andoc. 1, 64). Thucydides (6, 60, 2) considered the key witness, Andocides, to be rather more guilty than those who were actually incriminated. On the issue of his guilt, see, in detail, MacDowell (1962: 167–76,), who believes that the orator was also guilty of profaning the Mysteries. Marr (1971: 326–38) rejected this theory with sound arguments. See now also Furley (1996: 52–69).
29. Andoc. 65–6; Plut. *Alc*. 20, 5. From the frequent appeals addressed to witnesses present at his trial to interrupt him if he said something wrong (Andoc. 1, 25–6; 35; 55–6), we can conclude that Andocides mainly spoke the truth regarding the character and testimony of Diocleides.
30. For a discussion of the false testimony of Diocleides, see Appendix III.
31. Thuc. 6, 60, 4–5. The historian doubts that the testimony threw any light on the shady affair (Thuc. 6, 60, 2): τὸ δὲ σαφὲς οὐδεὶς οὔτε τότε οὔτε ὕστερον ἔχει ἐπεῖν περὶ τῶν δρασάντων τὸ ἔργον. Still, the Athenians were persuaded that only the *hetairia* of Andocides had been involved, and that there could not have been a larger group responsible: Kagan (1981: 201).

32. Thuc. 6, 53, 1–2; 60–61.
33. Thuc. 28, 2; 61, 1. Furley (1996: 41–8).
34. Thuc. 61, 6–7: δείσαντες τὸ ἐπὶ διαβολῇ δίκην καταπλεῦσαι. Some of those who were condemned and had their property expropriated for the profanation of the Mysteries are mentioned in *IG* I^3 421–30, and are systematically collected by Dover, *HCT* IV (1970: 277–80); see also Lewis (1966: 177–91).
35. Plut. *Alc*. 18, 3–4.
36. For earlier judgements, see, for example, Droysen (1836: 27–44, esp. 39–43); Götz (1875/6: 546–51); Gilbert (1877: 250–253); Meyer, *GdA* IV, 2: 216; followed by Henderson (1927: 255–357); Heuß (1962: 323): "an obvious prank done by brats"; Bengtson, *GG*: 241. Dover, *HCT* IV (1970: 285–6), also chooses an apolitical interpretation; Herter (1976: 227) and Murray (1990: 151–3). More recently, Graf (2000) brought useful arguments against modern attempts to reduce the crimes of 415 to their political dimension alone. Graf reached similar conclusions to mine, underlining the primarily religious nature of the challenge. By contrast, other scholars, notably Fornara (1980: 43–55), Lehmann (1987: 52–9) and McGlew (1999: 1–22), believe that behind the profaners of the Herms, there were well-organized political forces. Likewise, Raaflaub (1985: 271–2); Smarczyk (1990: 268–71). Marr (1971: 337–8) sees this action as the beginning of an oligarchic revolution. See too: MacDowell (1962: 192–3); Aurenche (1974: 165–76); Kagan (1981: 207–9); Osborne (1985: 64–7); Ostwald (1986: 537–50); Ellis (1989: 60–62); Bauman (1990: 66–7); Furley (1996: 28–30); Prandi (1996); Welwei (1999: 204–6). They all, in effect, admit that the nocturnal events were a political attack or at least some kind of loyalty test for the members of a secret association, as a preventive measure in preparation for a *coup d'état*. In any case, they exclude the possibility of a thoughtless act or a scandal created by drunken youngsters. Most recently, Mann (2007: 244–61) has attacked the interpretations of Furley (1996), Graf (2000) and Rubel (2000); his arguments will be discussed below. See now also Will (2006: 46–57), Heftner (2011: 98–105) and, for further references, especially Hornblower *CT* III (2008: 367–81), who have all accepted most of my ideas. Todd (2004) has nothing new to add.
37. The fact that the religious aspects of the deed should not be overlooked is also underlined by Dover, *HCT* IV (1970: 284); Powell (1979: 21–5); Parker (1996: 202); Furley (1996: 22 and *passim*; an exhaustive discussion with a comprehensive bibliography); Graf (2000). Although Furley believes that the mutilators of the Herms had a political motivation, he also insists on the religious implications of the events.
38. Graf (2000: 116): "The city only pursued and focused on the religious side; probably not just because the legal situation was clearer on this front."
39. Grote VII: 168–9.
40. Apart from the fact that both offences were considered serious religious crimes, and/or proofs of an oligarchic conspiracy, they have little in common: Aurenche (1974: 165); Kagan (1981: 206); Todd (1993: 314); Prandi (1996: 66). Furley (1996: 41–8, whom I follow here), pleads for a separation of the cases. The fifteen legible names in the Hermocopid inscriptions include only four of persons identified as mutilators of the Herms, which probably only serves to demonstrate a random coincidence between the guilty persons. Cf. Murray (1990: 155). Lists of the persons known to have been involved in the two scandals have been elaborated by Allen (1951: 80–84); Sartori (1957: 96–7); MacDowell (1962: 71–2); Dover, *HCT* IV (1970: 277–82); Hansen (1975: no. 11–60); Ostwald (1986: 539–40).
41. On the origin, form and function of the Herms, see in general Wrede (1986, 1988: col. 701–22). For a richly illustrated catalogue, see Siebert (1990: 285–378); Rückert (1998: 10–25 with a discussion of research literature) follows Burkert (1979: 39–41).
42. On the aspects of the god Hermes, see especially Herter (1976: 193–241) and Simon (1998: 254–71); for a subsequent systematic discussion with more recent bibliography, see Baudy (1998: col. 426–31). Graf (2000: 123) proposes an interpretation of the Herms not so much as cult statues, but as votive offerings; he illustrates his case with scenes of offerings placed before Herms.

43. E.g.: *Schol. Hom. Od.* 16, 471; Paus. 2, 38, 7; 4, 33, 3; 8, 34, 6; 35, 2; *Anth. Pal.* 9, 314; 316; 318. In general, Wrede (1986, 1988: col. 706–13, with additional literature). The generally accepted opinion that the Herms had a designated place, usually outside the city (e.g. Herter 1976: 226), has been disputed more recently by Rückert (1998: *passim*, esp. 225), who believes the urban space to have been the proper place for statues. Herms as an Attic particularity appear in Hdt. 2, 51; Thuc. 6, 27, 1; Paus. 4, 33, 3. On the interpretation of scenes on vases, highly important in the cultic context, see Rückert (1998: 185–220).
44. Paus. 1, 22, 8; Plut. *Thes*. 12, 3. Add Harrison (1965: 122–4); Wrede (1986: 33–4; 1988: col. 709–10). The inscriptions on the Acropolis concerning the cult of Hermes and the Herms are collected by Rückert (1998: 80–81). On the high density of cult statues in the Agora, see especially Harrison (1965: 108–22 and no. 160–217); Wrede (1986: 8–12); cf. Rückert (1998: 87–97).
45. Thuc. 6, 27, 1: ἐν ἰδίοις προθύροις; Athen. 10, 437b; *Anth. Pal.* 6, 143.
46. Plut. *Cim.* 7. On the offerings brought by archons, *prytaneis* and *strategoi*, see the comprehensive discussion of Rückert (1998: 97–103). Since the time of Hipparchus, Herms had also been used to carry inscriptions, which indicates their use as *mnemata* of events, as well as of individuals worthy of commemoration, such as the Herms of Cimon, dedicated after the Battle of Eion. According to Aeschin (3, 183), three such Herms were placed in the Agora, in the "portico of the Herms" (ἐν τῇ στοᾷ τῇ τῶν Ἑρμῶν). This led to Robertson (1999: 167–72) identifying this "portico of the Herms", assumed by archaeologists to be somewhere in the Agora (e.g. Wycherley 1978: 81–3), with the Royal Stoa, which he maintained was just another name for the "portico of the Herms".
47. Rückert (1998: 94); cf. Harrison (1965: 114–15). Referring to more recent excavations, Rückert (1998: 104–9) assumes that the Herms in the Agora largely served the cult of Hermes Agoraios, who, according to the prevailing view, protected commerce and the economy. On this, see Herter (1976: 212).
48. Wrede (1986: 12); cf. Aurenche (1974: 175); Osborne (1985: 47–73); Smarczyk (1990: 269–70); Rückert (1998: 94–5). Von Domaszewski (1914: 11–12) had already indicated possible interdependence between the worship of the Herms and the increasingly numerous representations of the first third of the fifth century BCE, and the reform of the tribes initiated by Cleisthenes. However, it should be emphasized that there are dedications from archons that only begin in 404/3 (or even later), and some from *prytaneis* only beginning in 393/2 (if we do not count the so-called "Herm of Andocides", that Andoc. 1, 62 says had not been profaned, and that was dedicated to the tribe Aigeis: Aeschin. 1, 125, 9; Plut. *Alc.* 21, 1; *Nic.* 13, 2); Harrison (1965: 118–19); Rückert (1998: 91–2: 243, with the bibliography).
49. Rückert (1998: 94–5). On the importance of the Agora as a democratic centre see, for example, Shear (1994: 225–48).
50. Hornblower CT III (2008: 376).
51. Osborne (1985: 47–73) p. 65: "The Herm represented the individual Athenian to himself .... Whenever the Athenian prepared himself to make contact with another he had first to make contact with the other that was himself in the Herm." As a simple German, I must confess that I do not understand this.
52. Osborne (1985: 65–7). The interpretation of McGlew (1999: 17–19) is equally misguided; although he does not follow Osborne in every respect, he sees the Herms as the protectors of all roads and crossroads, and as statues that gave symbolic meaning to the daily journeys of Athenians from their homes to the places where the democratic institutions functioned. The mutilation of the Herms, for which McGlew blames the oligarchs, would thus be an indirect attack on democratic institutions: "In mutilating the herms, the nascent oligarchs symbolically disrupted the path the common Athenian took to the assembly" (19). Mann (2007: 244–61) essentially follows Osborne and McGlew. His main point is that the affair of 415 marked the "awakening" of the *hetairiai*, the oligarchical clubs that were responsible for the revolution of 411.

53. Kasper-Butz (1990: esp. 167–207) emphasizes that Athena was the special embodiment of democratic Athens. On the Eponymous Heroes, see Kron (1976: esp. 242–7). See Shear (1970: 145–222) for the monument of the Eponymous Heroes, whose remains date to the fourth century but which must have been preceded by a similar monument, situated somewhere else in the Agora; cf. Thompson & Wycherley (1972: 38–41). On the political importance of the Eponymous Heroes, see Kearns (1989: 80–92).
54. Parker (1996: 81). For example, on the third day of the Anthesteria, Hermes was honoured as Chthonios; during the *Hermaia* festivities, the god was worshipped in the gymnasium. On Hermes' place in the calendar of Athenian festivities related to the Attic cult of Hermes, see Deubner (1932: 55, 217); Parke (1987: 177). On Attic vases, see Zanker (1965: *passim*, esp. 65–70); on vases and public representations in general, see the detailed catalogue of Siebert (1990: 285–378). By means of images of the public veneration of Hermes, Rückert (1998: 224) has shown "that, however, the god Hermes had a more important function within the polis than is generally thought, by reason of the fact that his cult appears to be under-represented in the calendar of Greek festivities and especially the Attic".
55. É. Will, *RPh* 51 (1977: 92–6; review of Aurenche; citation at 94). Ostwald (1986: 325): "They were associated with the city as such rather than with its form of government." More recently, Graf (2000) drew attention to the exaggeration of the political aspects of the Herms incident.
56. Andoc. 1, 61.
57. Ar. *Lys*. 1094 (with Henderson 1987, *ad loc*); Dover, *HCT* IV (1970: 288–9).
58. Thuc. 6, 27, 3; 28, 2; 53, 3; 60, 1; 61, 1.
59. To mention only the more recent works: Osborne (1985); Lehmann (1987); Smarzcyk (1990). Cf. Chapter 5.4.
60. Thuc. 6, 27, 3: καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα μειζόνος ἐλάμβανον· τοῦ τὲ γὰρ ἔκπλου οἰωνὸς ἐδόκει εἶναέ. Emphasized by Powell (1973: 142–3) and Powell (1979: 21). There has been less focus on this aspect, since most scholars have paid attention to the political motivation of the mutilators.
61. Thuc. 6, 27, 2.
62. "Even the soberest of Athenian might see these [sc. the mutilation of the Herms and the profanation of the Mysteries] as acts of hubris that, if not corrected, could bring down the wrath of the gods against Athens." Thus McGlew (1999: 4), who, however, places more credence in a political interpretation and believes that an anti-democratic opposition had orchestrated the crimes.
63. See the informative paper of Powell on this topic (1979: 15–31). Cf. Chapter 5.5.2.5, and on the Plague, see Chapter 3.4.
64. Mann (2007: 255) maintains that if the Athenians did not call on diviners (since we do not hear of oracles in the context of the mutilation), they would have considered the issue not as one between "men and gods" but "between different groups of men".
65. The first two can justly be called "turncoats", since both had been deeply involved in the 411 putsch. Peisander: Thuc. 8, 49; 53–4; 56, 63–8; 73; 90; 98; Arist. *Ath. Pol*. 29. On the mocking of Peisander in comedy, see references in MacDowell (1962: 80–81); Charicles: Lys. 13, 74. Charicles was later one of the "Thirty": Xen. *Hell*. 2, 3, 2; Xen. *Mem*. 1, 2, 31; Lys. 12, 55; Andoc. 1, 101; Isoc. 16, 42. On the demagogue Androcles, Alcibiades' adversary, see: Ar. *Vesp* 1187; Thuc. 8, 65; Plut. *Alc*. 19.
66. Ostwald (1986: 326): "Suspicion of tyrannical or oligarchical designs arose only after Alcibiades had been inculpated." Fear of tyranny became a slogan under the democracy, being actually encouraged by the worship of the tyrant slayers. The rise of Alcibiades made the fear of tyranny evolve into a "mass psychosis" at Athens, as Berve (1967: 197–212) concludes. Ar. *Vesp.* 486–99 mocks what were, after all, unfounded fears in 422. Here, the obsession of the Athenians to suspect a potential tyrant at every street corner is mocked, as there had not been a tyrant in Athens for fifty years. On this, see especially Lenfant (1997). The reason of a fear of tyranny is invoked by Thuc. 6, 15, 4; And., 4, 24; 27; Ar. *Eq*. 257, 447, 452, 475–9; *Vesp.* 417, 473–6; *Av*. 1072–6; *Lys*. 616–35. See also Rosivach (1988) and Barceló (1993:

143–9, 187–96). Cf. MacDowell (1971: 199–201); Lévy (1976: 137–42); Bleicken (1984: 383, 387); Raaflaub (1985: 258–61); Henderson (1987: 150–54); Romilly (1995: 103–104). Ostwald (1986: 323), with whom I agree, gives the following interpretation of the agitation and manipulation of the fear of tyranny by the demagogues: "Charges of conspiracy against the people and of attempting to establish a tyranny are known from Aristophanes ... to have been bruited by Kleon in the 420s. There is no reason to believe that this were anything more than the rhetorical excess of a crude, emotional demagogue against political opponents" (cf. 224). Interestingly, the fears, intensified by the demagogues, often were not only related to the destruction of the democracy, but dominated the discussion in terms of the fearful image of the tyrant. It would seem that contemporary public opinion did not consider an oligarchic alternative to democracy. Before the oligarchic putsch of 411, Athenians were not certain that "the primary threat to their democracy lies not in the one (i.e. the tyrant) but in the few": Rosivach (1988: 52). Cf. Bleicken (1984: 387).

67. Andoc. 1, 36. In Thuc. 6, 28, 2–3, Alcibiades' adversaries come forward only after the accusation was made that he had taken part in the profanation of the Mysteries. The parameters of a supposed opposition movement already in 415 will be discussed below.
68. Romilly (1995: 102).
69. Andoc. 1, 67.
70. Calhoun (1913: 35); MacDowell (1962: 192); Dover, *HCT* IV (1970: 286); Marr (1971: 337); Kagan (1981: 206); Lehmann (1987: 53–4); Furley (1996: 29, 58–9).
71. Thuc. 3, 82, 6; 8, 73, 3. One can similarly understand the collective death sentences against the "democrats" decreed by the "Thirty": Xen. *Hell*. 2, 4, 9. See too Furley (1996: 29–30).
72. Lehmann (1987: 54; spacing: Lehmann); the same way, Furley (1996: 29–30, 58–9); Cf. Marr (1971: 337).
73. Thuc. 6, 28, 1.
74. Andoc. 1, 61.
75. Missou (1992); cf. Furley (1996: 59–61).
76. MacDowell (1962: 190–93); Will (1972: 350–53); Aurenche (1974: 173); Kagan (1981: 206–9); Powell (1988: 398–9); Ellis (1989: 53); Furley (1996: 59).
77. Prandi (1996: 67); Welwei (1999: 204–6).
78. Aurenche (1974: 175). See also the view of Grote VII: 171, who said much the same 150 years ago; cf. Hatzfeld (1951: 187).
79. Lehmann (1987: 53); in the same sense, see Aurenche (1974: 175).
80. Lehmann (1987: 41–52); Hose (1995: 22–5). For the date, see especially Lehmann (1987: 43–4), with comprehensive bibliography. Lehmann prefers 417, Mattingly (1991: 23), however, argues for the usually accepted 416; cf. Allen (1951: 24; Harding (1994: 156–7). Rhodes (1994: 86–97) prefers 415, and relates the ostracism to the planned expedition to Sicily. It is difficult to believe that Thucydides, who pays detailed attention to the Sicilian expedition, would have overlooked such a fundamental decision.
81. Lehmann (1987: 44–55). On the ostracism of Hyperbolus: Plut. *Nic*. 11; *Arist*. 7; *Alc*. 13. Other sources: Thuc. 8, 73, 3; Philoch., *FGrH* 328, F 30; Androtion, *FGrH* 324, F 42. On recently published *ostraca*, with consequences for the ostracism of Hyperbolus, see Phillips (1990); Lang (1990b); Willemsen & Brenne (1991). On Hyperbolus in comedy, see: Ar. *Nub*. 549–50; *Thesm*. 840–41; *Ran*. 570. In general, see Camon (1961: 182–97); Andrewes, *HCT* V (1981: 258–9). On his ostracism: Rhodes (1994); Heftner (2000); Missiou (2011: 39); Rhodes (2011: 116).
82. See further Lehmann (1981); his assumption is, however, highly disputable, as is the reliability of Plutarch's reconstruction of events in the light of the publication of new *ostraca*. See Appendix IV.
83. For example, Thuc. 3, 82–6. On the role of the *hetairiai* in Greek uprisings and conspiracies, see Gehrke (1985: 309–51). On the oligarchic putsch of 411, which cannot be discussed in detail here, see Flach (1977: 9–33) and Andrewes, *HCT* V (1981: 184–256).

84. *Pace* Connor (1971).
85. He also rejects with the same arguments Powell (1979) and Graf (2000).
86. Mann (2007: 254–5). On the analytical separation of these spheres, see Chapter 1.2.
87. Mann (2007: 255). People were certainly convinced that relations between humans and the gods were disturbed: Graf (2000: 115). See too the speech of Ps.-Lysias against Andocides, where the orator makes clear that "the goddesses (Demeter and Kore) will take severe revenge upon impious offenders", having certainly Andocides in mind: [Lys.] 6, 3.
88. Mitchell-Boyask (2008: 190).
89. Thuc. 6, 60, 5. Cf. Mitchell-Boyask (2008: 190).
90. On the concept and terminology of the clubs, such as *synomosiai* and *staseis*, see Calhoun (1913: 4–9), Sartori (1957: 17–33) and especially Aurenche (1974: 7–48).
91. Thuc. 8, 54, 5: ἐπὶ δίκαις καὶ ἀρχαῖς. Cf. Plat. *Tht*. 173d.
92. Thus Busolt, in *GG* III, 2: 1256–9; 1456–513; Allen (1951: 135–73). *Pace* Bleicken (1979), Bleicken (1994: 377–8) and Wolff (1979). Raaflaub (1985: 264–72) notices strong differences, even after 462, between the supporters and the opponents of democracy, which implies a developed constitutional conscience on the part of the Athenians.
93. Connor (1971); Aurenche (1974); Gehrke (1984, 1985); Ostwald (1986: 356); more recently, Hölkeskamp (1998); cf. Hansen (1984: 75–89); Garner (1987: 66–7); Starr (1990: 60); Murray (1993: 283–4). Calhoun (1913) is the first to have described the private character of these convivial associations.
94. Connor (1971: 25–32); Aurenche (1974: *passim*); Garner (1987: 66). On how many members such an association might have, see Calhoun (1913: 29–30); Aurenche (1974: 191–2). Since such groups were organized with a view to spending leisure time together, the size of the group will have depended on the available space, which did not offer the possibility of really big reunions. On this, see Murray (1993: 263–5).
95. Wolff (1979: 298).
96. The well-known dispute between Miltiades and Themistocles concerned foreign policy in the early fifth century: Gehrke (1984: 544–50); Herrmann-Otto (1997: 142). Thucydides, too – the son of Melesias – only exercised his opposition to Pericles through confrontation in the Assembly, and only in the normal setting of democratic institutions: Plut. *Per*. 11–14). See, in detail, Hölkskamp (1998); cf. Welwei (1995: 30–36). Thuc. 1, 107 gives details of a plot organized in 457, with implications that are highly mysterious even today; Hornblower, *CT* I: 170–71; Wolff (1979: 301): "Except for the 457 conjuration, the democratic constitution had not been threatened before 412." Raaflaub (1985: 264–72) concludes that a direct conflict between "oligarchy" and "democracy" began after 462. Ober (1998) has studied internal opposition at Athens in detail.
97. For the essence of political criticism in comedy, see in general Halliwell (1993). For an assessment of Aristophanes' critique, see Wolff (1979: 295).
98. Xen. *Ath. Pol*. 3, 13; Herrmann-Otto (1997: 139–40): "Since, however, Pseudo-Xenophon sees himself as the representative of an insignificant minority, whose yearning for an eternal yesterday had no chance of success, his writing can only be described as a political-fatalist analysis." On the complicated matter of dating the work, see Connor (1971: 207–9) and Ste. Croix (1972: 307–10). The most plausible explanation is that it was composed in the first years of the Archidamian War. This oligarchical manifesto should be seen not as a call to revolution, but, "on the contrary, a purely theoretical work, a political analysis": Forrest (1975: 43).
99. Forrest (1975: 39); Ruschenbusch (1978: 40); Gehrke (1984: 551). Forrest (1975: 39) does not exclude the possibility that, just like Pseudo-Xenophon, "some old grumblers ... in odd corners of the *agora*" expressed their discontent about the system, but with no serious consequences. See also Forrest (1983: 285–96).
100. Wolff (1979: esp. 295–6); Ruschenbusch (1978: 30–40); Bleicken (1994: 377); Welwei (1995: 36–8); Cf. Hölkeskamp (1998). Wolff (1979) argues convincingly that we cannot speak of an anti-democratic opposition before the Sicilian catastrophe. He arrives at this conclusion by

focusing on contemporary sources alone, in order to avoid the *ex eventu* interpretations that slipped into later testimonia (280). But see too the contrary opinion of McGlew (1999: 16 and *passim*), who prefers to view the events of 415 as the action of an anti-democratic opposition. In that year, believes McGlew (1999: 16), the *hetairiai* began "to express their hostility to democracy openly". The sources show clearly, however, that the events of 415 could not be interpreted as anti-democratic acts *per se*. Hose (1995: 36–47) tried to find allusions to the anti-democratic activities of certain secret associations in the *hypothesis* and fragments of the tragedy *Alexandros*, as well as from fragments of Euripides' *Palamedes*. This attempt is not only methodologically problematic, but it overestimates the influence and the degree of organization of the *hetairiai* in *c.* 415. Thanks to the scanty documentary references, it is still not clear whether the apparent *laconophilia* of certain noblemen (e.g. Critias, *DK* 88, B 6–9) was ever expressed in concrete political views. Even in the case of the second oligarchic putsch of 404, we do not know to what extent the "Thirty Tyrants" tried to enforce a Spartan model. On this, see: Krentz (1982: *passim*); Lévy (1976: 197–203); Cartledge (1987: 281–2).

101. Wolff (1979: 283). It is also important to stress that after the reinstatement of the democracy in 403, despite the existence of certain groups with oligarchic views, but who had accepted democracy *de facto*, there were no more discussions of principle concerning the form of government; the putsches of 411 and 404 thus remain only episodic and discredited oligarchy for all times; see Pecorella Longo (1971). Mann (2007: 257–9) is correct in stating that the affair of the Herms only marks the "political awakening" of the *hetairiai*, which began to act only later.
102. Thuc. 8, 1, 3; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 29, 2; Bleicken (1984: 398).
103. Bleicken (1994: 378); Welwei (1995: 38). Wolff (1979: 301): "Opposition to democracy in Athens seems to have become an important political phenomenon only after the democracy had managed to discredit itself through unprecedented failures." See too Ruschenbusch (1978: 94–128).
104. Wolff (1979: 299).
105. Thuc. 8, 68; Arist. *Ath. pol.* 32, 2.
106. Wolff (1979: 300). This very ignorance of who the perpetrators were indicates the absence of a permanent opposition, for the leaders and their followers would have been known if they had expressed themselves previously through anti-democratic opposition.
107. Forrest (1975: 48): "The immediate political result [sc. of disaster] was a desperate desire to abandon power, to shift responsibility on to someone else, on to anyone willing to take it."
108. Lenfant (1997: 196–200). "*Il semble bien … que l'auteur comique n'ait cru que se dissimulait derrière les affaires de 415 une conspiration oligarchique ou tyrannique. Mais après 411, il renonça à faire rire de menaces antidémocratiques qui s'étaient révélées bien fondées*" (200).
109. Lenfant (1997: 199).
110. Beloch, *GG* II, 1: 357 ("*töricht*").
111. It is striking that during his trial, Andocides does not offer any indication of a possible political motivation. He could perhaps have used a *post factum* explanation, according to which his group committed the deed to prevent the Athenians departing on the ill-fated expedition to Sicily. The observation at And. 1, 41, according to which Diocleides' companions offered him not only money for his silence, but also membership in the *hetairíai*, "had we obtained want we wanted" (ἐὰν δὲ κατάσχωμεν ἡμεῖς ἃ βουλόμεθα, ἕνα αὐτὸν ἡμῶν εἶναι), should not be seen as an indication of a plan for an oligarchic revolution. This was rightly noted by MacDowell (1962: 91): "But would And. want to refer, even in this indirect manner, to the group's plans for establishing an oligarchy?"
112. Lehmann (1987: 53).
113. Thus Murray (1990: 153), who underlines the undoubted loyalty within their *hetairiai*: "The creation of such ties of loyalty might well involve sacrilege solely for the sake of a *pistis*." Cf. Dover, *HCT* IV (1970: 286).
114. For example, Clarke & Berger (1981), Grotum (1994) and Bohnsack *et al.* (1995) for the violent youth culture during the 1950s in Germany. An interesting parallel results from a

comparison with the "iconoclasts" during the Reformation. Recent research has shown that the frequent destruction of icons and liturgical items during the Reformation did not always have religious motives; see Schnitzler (1999: 285–315),who convincingly shows that youths were largely responsible for the iconoclastic riots of Stralsund in 1525. Apart from personal rivalries, which did play a role in these events, social conflict and the clash across the generations played a more important role compared with a perceived need to damage church property. In other cities, too, many young people took part in such events, as Schmitz notes (I owe this observation to R. Schlögl).

115. Groups of "bad boys" such as *kakodaimonistai*, *autolekythoi*, *triballoi* or *ithyphalloi* were structurally similar to private cult associations (*orgeones*, *thiasoi*): Parker (1996: 335–6), with testimonia. "The bad boys had a taste for sacrilege which might represent an inversion of religious practices found in more orthodox societies: the *Triballoi* ate polluted relics, and it was in such milieux that the parody of the Mysteries took place" (336). Religious non-conformity seems the most frequent feature of historical secret societies. For details, see Schreiber & Schreiber (1993).
116. Forrest (1975); Strauss (1993: 100–29, 136–53).
117. Lys. fr. 5; (Xen. *Mem*. 4, 6, 2 and 5). Liddell and Scott translate this word inexactly as "devil worshippers": LSJ, s.v. κακοδαιμονισταί. (Cf. Bailly – κακοδαιμονισταί – the members of a brotherhood dedicated to an evil genius, seen as his brothers.)
118. The dithyrambic poet, notorious for his impiety, apparently defecated on one of the statues of Hecate, which, like the Herms, marked the urban landscape of Athens. Ar. *Ran*. 366 (with the scholia). See also Decharme (1904: 135–40); Fahr (1969: 109–10). Other references to Cinesias: Ar. *Pax*. 149; *Av*. 1377; *Ran*. 153; 1437; *Eccl*. 330; see too Dunbar (1995: 660–69). There are, in fact, many similarities between the Herms and the *hekataia*. The statues of the chthonic goddess were also usually placed at entrances and had an apotropaic character, similar to that of the Herms (Ar. *Vesp*. 804). In Aeschylus, Hecate is described as the guardian of the entrance to a palace (Aesch. fr. 388 [Nauck]). Harrison (1965: 96) thus rightly notes: "The functions of the domestic Hekataia and of the herms seem to have been closely related in the 5th century." Cf. Simon (1985: 271–84) on *hekataia*.
119. Murray (1990: 151–3). See also Kagan (1981: 201). On the Greek symposium, see, for example: Lissarague (1990); Murray (1993); Schäfer (1997).
120. On the scandal created by drunken individuals at a *komos* in order to prove "the power and lawlessness of the drinking group" (Murray 1990: 150), see Lamer (1922: col. 1286–304) and Heath (1988: 180–95). Ghiron-Bistagne (1976: 207–98, esp. 208–38) is a fundamental study; cf. Lissarague (1990: 29–31, 39–44, 115–7); Vierneisel & Kaeser (1990: 293–98); Schäfer (1997, with a detailed catalogue and illustrations). Schmitz (2004: 280–312) has gathered all the information about the *komos* and discusses recent literature.
121. Thuc. 6, 28, 1.
122. A photo of this *pelike* (Lausanne, Musée d'archéologie et d'histoire, no. 3250) appears on the cover of Furley (1996), but it is not mentioned in the text. On the classification and dating of the piece, see Bérard (1966: 93–100, with illustrations).
123. The representation of a phallus-shaped bird, on the reverse of a *luterion*, suggests that the *pelike*, attributed to the Geras Painter, should be interpreted in the context of the phallic-Dionysiac cult (Bérard 1966: 94–6).
124. On the satyr as *komast*, frequent on painted pottery, see Ghiron-Bastagne (1976: 231–8); Lissarague (1990: 38–44, 77–80). Moreover, *Komos* appears as a proper name for satyrs on vase inscriptions: Fränkel (1912). On the nature of the silenus and satyr in imagery and literature, see: Hartmann (1927: col. 35–53); Brommer (1937); Schöne (1987: esp. 116–42); Lissarague (1993: 207–20); Conrad (1997); and, more recently, Krumeich *et al.* (1999: esp. 1–73).
125. In a similar vein, there is a vase in Copenhagen (National Museum, No. 598) showing a satyr stealing a Herm (Brommer 1959², fig.66). The connection between a mischievous satyr in a Dionysiac context and the Herms does not seem really out of line.

126. Plat. *Symp*. 212c–d.
127. Thus Gribble (1999: 251–2), who sees, in Alcibiades' manner of speaking (repeated allusions to silenuses, satyrs and Mysteries [e.g. Plat. *Symp*. 221d–e]), subtle indications on Plato's part of what had occurred in 415. Rosen (1987: 285) speculates that Plato might have chosen 415 as the historic date for his dialogue, and have placed the action of the symposion precisely during the night the Herms were profaned. Towards the end of the dialogue, another group of noisy drunks enters the house (Plat. *Symp*. 223b).
128. Aurenche (1974: 123–53) believes that the mentality of the perpetrators of the impious act was mainly determined by the privileged social position of "the young and the wild".
129. In the opinion of Marr (1971: 326–38), Diocleides would have been paid to testify on behalf of Alcibiades' cousin (of the same name), from the deme of Phegus (Andoc. 1, 65; Davies *APF*: 17), to support the troubled general. Cf. Hatzfeld (1951: 193–4).
130. Lehmann (1987: 54). Cf. Fornara (1980).
131. Forde (1989: 58).
132. Thuc. 2, 63, 1–2; 3, 27, 2; cf. Schuller (1978).
133. For details, see Chapter 3.7.
134. Thuc. 6, 12, 1: Καὶ μεμνῆσθαι χρῆ ἡμᾶς ὅτι νεωστὶ ἀπὸ νόσου μεγάλης καὶ πολέμου βραχύ τι λελωφήκαμεν. Cf. Thuc. 6, 26, 2.
135. Thuc. 3, 87, 2: ... ὥστε Ἀθηναίους γε μὴ εἶναι ὅτι μᾶλλον τούτου ἐπίεσε καὶ ἐκάκωσε τὴν δύναμιν. For the demographic evolution of Athens during the Peloponnesian War, see Chapters 1.1 and 3.1.
136. The Athenians believed that defeat in the Archidamian War had also been influenced by Apollo. Thus they hastened to bring back the previously banished Delians in 421, on the advice of an oracle: Thuc. 5, 32, 1; see further Powell (1973: 129–30). Powell (1973: 157) believes that the illegal occupation of the temple of Apollo at Delion (Thuc. 4, 90; 98) would have caused the Athenians to assume that Apollo's hand was behind the military failure. On the purification of Delos, see Chapter 3.7.
137. Chapters 6 and 7 are dedicated to the introduction of new deities and to the urban planning programme after the Periclean period.
138. Cf. Hes. *Erg*. 238–43; Soph. *OT*. 27–30. Add Todd (1993: 310–11); Laumann (1988: 55–66); Balaudé (1996: 25–6).
139. Thuc. 7, 50, 4 states that most Athenians (οἳ πλείους) in the army took omens very seriously, indicated by their (fatal) reaction to the eclipse of the moon on 27. 08. 413.
140. Thuc. 8, 1, 1; Plut. *Nic.* 13, 2; 14, 7; Paus. 8, 11, 12; in general, see Powell (1979: 15–31).
141. Powell (1979: 20).
142. MacDowell (1962); Kagan (1981: 194–5, 206). See Chapter 5.4.
143. On the function of Hermes as messenger and mediator between the worlds, see e.g.: Hom. *Il*. 24, 153, 333–5, 437–61; *Od*. 1, 84–7; 5, 29–31; 15, 435–6; *Hom. H*. 2, 407; *Hom. H*. 4, 331; *Hom. H*. 19, 29, 42–3; *Hom. H*. 29, 4–14; Aesch. *Cho.*, 124–6; *Eum*. 89–93. Furley (1996: 25–7) has collected examples in comedy. The aspect of the god as "*dieu de la médiation*" has been studied mostly by Kahn (1978: 165–86).
144. Furley (1996: 21): "The Athenian Herms themselves, then, were set up to facilitate the conveyance of worshippers' prayers and offerings to the Olympian or chthonian deity addressed."
145. Furley (1996: 21). To support his thesis, Furley also suggests that in images on painted pottery Herms were placed near sacrificial altars that he believes belong to other deities (23). See too Zanker (1965: 93–5, with references to images). Furley (1996: 23–4) invokes the evidence of inscriptions to support his thesis; the partially preserved column of the Callimachus monument is adduced in support (*IG* I^3 784); ML 18: [Καλίμαχός μ' ἀν]έθεκεν Ἀφιδναῖο[ς] τἀθεναίαι: ἄν[γελον ἀθ]ανάτον hοὶ Ὀ[λύμπια δόματ'] ἔχοσιν (text: ML). This, however, is problematic, since, although it used to be thought that the column supported a statue of Hermes, it is now generally recognized that the statue of ἄνγελος ἀθανάτων was of Nike, not Hermes: Raubitschek (1940: 53–9); Harrison (1971: 5–24); Hansen (1988:

482–3); Thöne (1999: 18–20). Graf (2000: 123) stresses that Herms should not be interpreted without reserve as images of the god or as cult images. We should understand the Herms more as votive offerings, as ἀναθήματα or ἀγάλματα. In Graf's opinion, the crime meant challenging the divinity, even when the mutilation "only" hit the goods belonging to the god.

146. Furley (1996: 22).
147. Parker (1996: 202).
148. Ostwald (1955); Bleicken (1984); Lavelle (1988: 35–7).
149. On the procedure known as *eisangelia* as a measure typically employed against politicians and generals, see Hansen (1975: esp. 58–65). As regards the accusation of high treason, see MacDowell (1978: 175–91). Cf. the thorough research of Lipsius (1905: 374–80); later, A. R. W. Harrison (1971: 52–9).
150. Thuc. 6, 28, 1; Andoc. 1, 12–18.
151. Plut. *Alc*. 22, 3. Alcibiades played the role of the hierophant, and the accusation brought against him in this context – mentioned by Plutarch – was formulated by Thessalus, son of Cimon. Cf. [Lys.] 6, 51. On the Eleusinian sacred officials, see Clinton (1974).
152. Thuc. 6, 61, 1–5.
153. Plut. *Alc*. 22, 3: ἀδικεῖν περὶ τὼ θεώ, τὴν Δήμητραν καὶ τὴν Κορήν.
154. Thuc. 6, 28, 2.
155. Smarczyk (1990: 268). The importance of the Panhellenic cult cannot be overestimated; see e.g. Mylonas (1961); Nilsson, *GGR* I: 469–77, 653–67; Burkert (1972: 274–27); Graf (1974); Burkert (1977: 426–32); Gasparro (1986: 29–134); Clinton (1992: 78–99) and Clinton (1993: 110–24); Parker (1996: 97–101); Simon (1998: 85–98). Around 460 BCE, the cult already had 3,000 initiates; see *IG* I³ 6; with Smarczyk (1990: 255). The Eleusinian cult was integrated into the Athenian state religion beginning in the sixth century and, despite many claims to the contrary, it was not opposed to the polis religion. The *basileus* was thus in charge of organizing the celebration of the Mysteries; since he was one of the archons, he concentrated mainly on religious observance. Arist. *Ath. pol*. 57, 1. Burkert (1972: 279–81).
156. Diod. 13, 69, 2; Plut. *Alc*. 33, 3, 34, 3–6; Xen. *Hell*. 1, 4 (20). Murray (1990: 156). For Alcibiades' return, see: Bloedow (1973: 67–71); Prandi (1991); Bleckmann (1998: 461–87). In contrast to the *communis opinio*, Nagy (1994) believes that Alcibiades did not return to Athens in glory and that he planned his return in a far from skilful manner.
157. See further Lewis (1966).
158. [Lys.] 6, 51; Andoc. 1, 11–14. Murray (1990: 156). Following Murray, Graf (2000: 124–5) questions the parodic aspect of the crime and believes that the accusation on which the trial was based concentrated on the revelation of the secret of the Mysteries. They would just have "celebrated" the Mysteries, since it was perhaps "*à la mode*" at the time. This would mean that they did not intend to mock the rites. This, however, seems to be contradicted by the motives of the perpetrators as reported by Thucydides; they acted ἐφ' ὕβρει (6, 28).
159. On the Eleusinian ritual, see Mylonas (1961: 224–9), Burkert (1972: 274–327), Graf (1974: 126–39) and Clinton (1992: 84–95), whose discussion is based mainly on the archaeological evidence. Cf. Bremmer (1995: 70–78). Clinton (1993) stresses the connection between the celebration of the Mysteries and the feast of the Thesmophoria. On the importance of the Hymn to Demeter for the cult, see Parker (1991). Accounts of Christian authors are highly tendentious and they are useless in defining the *aporretha*. Only Clement of Alexandria succeeds in transmitting reliable details: Clem. Al. *Protr*. 2, 21; cf. Hippolyt. *Refutat*. 5, 8, 39); Mylonas (1961: 287–316); Burkert (177: 426–8).
160. Bremmer (1995: 72).
161. See Chapter 4.2. It is unlikely that the Melian had anything to do with the actual profanation of the Mysteries, since he had nothing to do with Alcibiades and his friends. More likely, the angry Athenians chose the most recent disturbance to take measures against him. Aeschylus is said to have been the first to have unintentionally revealed, in one of his plays, some of the secrets of the Mysteries. He managed to avoid condemnation, since he said he was unaware, not

having been initiated: Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1111a; Heracl. Pont. fr. 170 (Wehrli); Clem. *Strom*. 2, 14; 60, 3; see further Ostwald (1986: 529–30).

162. Andoc. 1, 12 and 29.
163. Dover, *HCT* IV (1970: 283).
164. Nestle (1940: 487): "People who dared to be that frivolous must have lost even the last trace of fear of gods." Cf. MacDowell (1962: 192). Aurenche (1974: 165, 171) makes a quite unfortunate comparison between the parodying the Mysteries and a Black Mass in seventeenth-century France. Graf (2000) assumes that staging the Mysteries during a symposion could have been fashionable among elitist youth. At such an event, the ostentatious character of the deed must have been highly important, as well as the excitement of doing something that was forbidden.
165. Bremmer (1995: 77–8). Smarczyk (1990: 167–298) has a detailed discussion of the integration of the Eleusinian cult and the religious and political propaganda of Athens; cf. Garland (1992: 106–9); Furley (1996: 35–40). See further below, in connection with the First Fruits Decree (*IG* I^{2} 78).
166. Bremmer (1995: 78).
167. Murray (1990: 156–7). Cf. Furley (1996: 33). Graf (2000) follows him.
168. Murray (1990: 157). Cf. Graf (2000 124–5), who refers to the sophistic background of individuals such as Cinesias.
169. Murray (1990: 157–8); Ellis (1989: 59): "These profanations of the Mysteries were probably never a serious threat to either government or religion. ... They were probably meant as parlour games or, at worst, as initiation ceremonies for a club." Cf. MacDowell (1962: 192); Aurenche (1974: 171); Kagan (1981: 206).
170. On Alcibiades as the main character in the profanation of the Mysteries see, for example, Busolt, *GG* III, 2: 1317; Hatzfeld (1951: 177–95); Aurenche (1974: 160–71); Kagan (1981: 202–6); Dover, *HCT* IV (1970: 283).
171. On the accusation of tyranny, see Seager (1967); Berve (1967: 197–212); Forde (1989: 183–8). Cf. Palmer (1982: 103–24), who is not altogether on the right lines, in suggesting that Thucydides wanted to rehabilitate Alcibiades by relating the fear of tyranny to his troubled life, also invoking the so-called "excursus on tyranny" (esp. 115).
172. Plut. *Alc. passim* (esp. 16); Athen. 12, 534c; Andoc. 4 (20); 27; Thuc. 6, 12, 2; 15, 3–4; 16, 2–3; Isoc. 16, 35; Hatzfeld (1951: 127–31); Romilly (1995: 35–58); Schuller (1999). On his victory at the Olympics in 416, see Vickers (2008: 123–6); Gribble (2012).
173. Seager (1967: 16).
174. Ibid..
175. Thuc. 6, 15, 4. On the way Thucydides presents the personality and intentions of Alcibiades, see Forde (1989); Gribble (1999: 159–213); and Vickers (2008: 133–52).
176. Thuc. 6, 28, 1–2.
177. Ostwald (1986: 326).
178. Plut. *Alc*. 22, 3. Ostwald (1955); Bleicken (1984); Lavelle (1988: 35–7).
179. Thuc. 6, 53, 1. On this grammatically very difficult sentence, see Dover, *HCT* IV (1970: 317).
180. Bloedow (1973: 15). Cf. Smarczyk (1990: 276).
181. Furley (1996: 34).
182. Smarczyk (1990: 167–298), for a detailed discussion and references to secondary literature, especially: 167–84; 216–24; 253–66.
183. Cf. Bremmer (1995: 75): "The First Fruits decree had made the Mysteries into the symbol of Athenian power *par excellence*."
184. Smarczyk (1990: 253–65; the citation at 256). For the archaeology, cf. Mylonas (1961: 113–29).
185. Smarczyk (1990: 266–75).
186. Smarczyk (1990: 287).
187. Furley (1996: 38–9). On the highly disputed date of the decree (*IG* I^{3} 78; ML 73), see the summary in ML; discussed more extensively in Smarczyk (1990: 224–52), who also argues for

416/5. See too Chapter 3.4. Furley's hypotheses are confirmed by the archaeological record. According to E. Simon, "peace" was the most frequent Eleusinian motif in vase imagery from the sixth to the fourth century: (1997b: 97–108; esp. 108). More recently, Graf (2000: 125) has expressed doubts about Furley's peace ideology; following Smarczyk (1990) and Bremmer (1995), he believes that the myth of Demeter above all as a bearer of culture is related to the self-image and identity of the Athenians. Hence, an attack on the Eleusinian goddesses meant an attack on Athenian identity.

188. The offerings made by Nicias (Plut. *Nic.* 3, 3–4), and his central role in restoring the *Delia* festivities after the ritual purification of the island, make him the protagonist of the Athenian religious policy of the 420s. Cf. Powell (1973: 131–4). See Chapter 3.7 and Geske (2005).

189. The Eleusinian Mysteries have nothing in common with mysticism (Pakkanen 1996: 66), but are nevertheless superficially viewed as an eschatological religion, satisfying mainly individual needs. If so, we might conclude that this was the reason why the Athenians investigated the event so rigorously, at a time of crisis, when there would have been a rapidly growing need for such an escapist cult. In contrast with later influences exerted upon some Mystery cults, the cult of Demeter at Eleusis was in no way an expression of sectarianism, since it was integrated in so many ways with the religion of the polis: Burkert (1972: 279–81); Pakkanen (1996: 24–47). At the centre of the religious celebrations at Eleusis was a collective, not an individual, ceremony: Simon (1998: 88). The Oriental origins that have been assumed to underlie Greek Mystery religions cannot be substantiated. Despite this newer and widely accepted information (summarized in e.g. Burkert 1990; Gordon 1996: 1017–18; Delneri 2006), even some recent works exaggerate the individual aspect, as, for example, Giebel (1993). "The Mysteries are", however, "a personal option within the general setting of the polytheistic system, somewhat comparable to the pilgrimage to Santiago de Compostela within medieval religiosity": Burkert (1990: 17; cf. 97).

190. Romilly (1995: 105).

191. Finley (1991: 122) doubts that representatives of the upper class would have exploited religion in their own interest. Smith (1989: 147), by contrast, stresses that during the classical period, politicians would have manipulated the Demos through religion, but it is practically impossible to formulate a clear position on this issue. In order to make the Assembly agree to the Sicilian campaign, Alcibiades, for example, presented his own soothsayers (Plut. *Nic.* 13, 1) who, unlike those who had prophesied earlier, predicted a favourable outcome for the planned campaign. Did Alcibiades really believe that his prophets had a better "hotline" to the gods, or did he simply use appropriately coached and loyal charlatans to implement his political ends? It is difficult not to see Alcibiades as having a cynical attitude towards religion; but when a politician played the "religious card" against his adversaries, it did not necessarily mean that those individuals were persuaded of their opponent's impiety. Regardless of the possible motivation of leading politicians, the decisive aspect is still the fact that religious crimes and related issues dominated public discussion.

192. Thuc. 7, 75, 5; Thuc. 7, 77, 3: εἰ τῷ θεῶν ἐπίφθονοι ἐστρατεύσαμεν, ἀποχρώντως ἤδη τετιμωρήμεθα. In this situation, as thunder and rain prevented them from advancing, the men grew even more despondent, and they believed that all of this had been sent by the gods for their destruction: Thuc. 7, 79, 3. See too Powell (1973: 153–5): "there was probably a widespread belief and fear among Athenian forces that the expedition was heading for divinely-planned destruction" (155).

6. Tradition and innovation

1. De Montaigne (1962: 591). "Man is certainly crazy. He could not make a mite, and he makes gods by the dozen" (English translation: Donald M. Frame).

2. Burkert (1977: 396). Cf. Auffarth (1995: 342).

3. The cults practised by slaves, metics and other foreigners (progressively more and more established at Athens and especially in the Piraeus) were limited to certain groups, and play a secondary role in the developments discussed here. On this topic, see e.g. Bömer (1990); on the Piraeus: Garland (1987: 101–38); Parker (1996: 160–61). On metics, see Whitehead (1977), who discusses, for the most part, the places of worship of the "barbarians" (mostly freemen and slaves); Bäbler (1998). See now also Adak (2003). For Oriental influences on Greek religion before the classical period, see Cowell (1971) and Burkert (2004).
4. The cult of Asclepius, who was worshipped at Athens from the end of the fifth century, had a private character at first, but towards the end of the fourth century, it was probably turned into a state cult; see Chapter 6.4.
5. For example, Bremmer (1996a: 104–8). See also: Nilsson (1940; *GGR* I: 725–8; 831–9); Dodds (1951: 192–5); Humphreys (1986: 108); Longrigg (1992: 37).
6. Cowell (1971: 25–6). The "foreign character" of the new cults would have made a negative impression on most Athenians, with most contemporaries associating them with the promiscuity, wild character and low social status of the participants: Versnel (1990: 121–2).
7. Versnel (1990: esp. 121–3, 181–9).
8. Derenne (1930: 232). On the law against imported cults, see Chapter 6.2.
9. Parker (1996: 152–3; 158–63, 196–98). At 196: "The common supposition that the last quarter of the fifth century saw a sudden outburst of interest in barbarian gods is simply false." Nock (1933: 18) is the first to realize that the introduction and official acceptance of the Thracian goddess Bendis was really unimportant: "There was in this nothing more revolutionary than there was in the introduction of the potato and tobacco into England from America."
10. Simms (1985: 274–86; cited at 286).
11. Asclepius: Mikalson (1984: 220); Garland (1992: 130–32); Parker (1996: 180); Burkert (1998: 114); Riethmüller (2005); Wickkiser (2008); Bendis: Ferguson (1949); Dodds (1951: 105); Planeaux (2000); Deoudi (2010: 47–63); Cybele: Cerri (1983); Frapiccini (1987); Roller (1999), Munn (2006).
12. Details of the new cults have been thoroughly researched in special studies; the discussion will consequently not be extended here. Apart from Asclepius and Bendis, the other gods introduced during the war will be discussed in Chapter 6.5, with additional bibliography. With regard to fear of the "new" gods in general, see Parker's excellent work (1996: 152–98). See also Versnel (1990: 102–31). On polytheism in general, see now Parker (2005). Garland (1992) is too selective. See now especially Beschi (2002) and Delneri (2006) for various aspects of new or oriental divinities.
13. Nock (1933: 17–32); Burkert (1977: 273–4); Garland (1992: 46); Auffarth (1995: 347); Parker (1996: 152–3). On Greek polytheism, see now the standard work of Parker (2005).
14. For example, Nilsson (1940: 121–2); *GGR* I: 779–82; Ehrenberg (1968: 256–98). Bremmer (1996a: 102–8) expresses a nuanced standpoint that demonstrates a "structural change" in Greek religion, mostly regarding the representation of the gods.
15. Garland (1992: 1); Auffarth (1995: 342).
16. Nock (1933: 6–7); Gladigow (1990); Burkert (1990: 21); Garland (1992: 4); Auffarth (1995: 338–9). On polytheism in general, see Gladigow (1998: 321–30, with additional bibliography). The famous "Judgement of Paris", as well as the fate of Euripides' Hippolytus, show, at the level of myth, that these options were not always undisputed.
17. Hdt. 1, 46. See also Gladigow (1990: 239–40). Burkert (1990: 21) justly observed: "Votive religion is downright experimental. Somebody can, in case of sickness, try several possibilities, one after the other, to find what he eventually needs."
18. Peek (1972, no. 44). Regarding this complex theme in general, see Dodds (1965: 39–46). Cf. Festugière (1954: 85–104); Lane Fox (1986: 151–3); Zeller (1993: 58–65); Trombley (1993: 119 *et passim*).
19. Versnel (1990: 122). Rhodes (2009: 13) has recently concluded that all religious change and innovation required the explicit consensus of the polis.

20. Diog. Laert. 2, 40 (citing Favorinus). Cf. Xen. *Mem*. 1, 1, 1; Pl. *Ap*. 24c; *Euthphr*. 3b.
21. Lys. 30; Dem. 19, 259–81; Jos. *C. Ap*. 2, 37; 267; Serv. *Aen*. 8, 187. Add Derenne (1930: 224–36); Reverdin (1945: 213, 217); Rudhardt (1960); Versnel (1990: 123–31), who accepts the existence of a special law against the unofficial introduction of new gods. See too Rhodes (2009).
22. Derenne (1930: 233–4).
23. Versnel (1990: 128). See now on private cults Purvis (2003). Rhodes (2009) insists that no new cults could have been introduced surreptitiously.
24. Dodds (1940: 171–6) despises the "invasion of the western mind by eastern religious ideas" (171); Dodds (1951: 193–4); Cowell (1971: 25); Versnel (1990) focuses on the barbarity and the foreign character of the new cults; on a similar note, Humphreys (1986: 108); Bremmer (1996a: 104). Cf. Muth (1998: 129–34).
25. On Bendis, see Simms (1985: 7–50; 1988). Parker (1996: 158–9) emphasizes that only modern research calls these gods foreign and "barbarian", while for Athenians, the phrase ξενικοὶ θεοί could also mean Greek importations (e.g. Asclepius of Epidaurus, thus described by Apollophanes, fr. 1 [T 720a]). On the similarities between Artemis and Bendis, see Simms (1988: 68). Cf. Beschi (2002: 15–19). Recently, several papers have been published on Bendis and her cult; well summarized by Deoudi (2010: 46–66). See also Delneri (2006: 125–248), overlooked by Deoudi.
26. *IG* I^3 383 (l. 142–3). On the inclusion of the inscription in the context of financing Attic cults, see Linders (1975: 19–32). On the dating and other aspects of the introduction of the cult, see Planeaux (2000).
27. Pl. *Resp.* 327a–8a. With regard to the dating, the dialogue is unhelpful since, as with exact dates for the introduction of a new cult, the fictive date of the dialogue is not established with certainty. Not even the fact that Plato's brothers, Adeimantus and Glaucon (born before 430 and *c.* 428, respectively: *APF*: 332–3), were depicted as present in this dialogue helps in dating this work, since the philosopher is known to have used anachronisms in his opus. If we literally accept the information (327a) that Socrates assisted at the first celebration of the festival, then his adlocutors would have been babies at best, since *IG* I^3 383 attests the institutionalization of the cult as early as 429/8. On the "dramatic date" of the dialogue, see Gigon (1976: 21–3); cf. Waterfield's commentary (1993: 380). Another possible explanation that would place the "dramatic date" around 410 (favoured by many scholars) is to assume that a number of years had passed between the official introduction and the first organization of the new festival described by Plato. In this way, Parker (1996: 172) argues, citing Bingen (1959), the festival could reflect not so much the introduction of the cult, as its alterations and subsequent extension. On the *Bendideia* that took place every year on 19/20 Thargelion (*Schol. Plat*. 327a), see Deubner (1932: 219–20); on the role played by Thracian and Athenian *orgeones* in the preparations for the festivities, see Ferguson (1944: 97–107). On Bendis at the Piraeus and the metics settled there, see Garland (1987: 118–22).
28. *IG* II^2 1283, 7.
29. *IG* II^2 1496 (86–7, 117). Cf. Nilsson (1960: 64). Simms (1988: 59): "The prominence of the goddess and the popularity of her cult are obvious from Plato's description of her first festival." On the long-term importance of the cult in Athens, see now also Archibald (1999).
30. Nilsson (1960: 64); Simms (1988: 61).
31. *IG* II^2 1283, 4–7. It is no coincidence that the inscription proudly shows the Thracians as the only nation (ἔθνος) that benefited from such privileges at Athens. On the repartition of estates, see Pečírka (1966).
32. *IG* I^2 136; see also *SEG* X, 64; *SEG* XVII, 5; *LSS*, 6 and commentaries. Cf. Pl. *Resp.* 328a. The fragmentary decree, dated by Bingen to 413/2 ("impossible": Nilsson 1960: 80), should not be related to the inclusion of the cult, but it may be related to subsequent alterations: Bingen (1959: 31–4). Regarding the dating issue and the importance of the inscription see, in detail, Ferguson (1949: 131–52) who, followed by Nilsson (1951: 46–7) and *GGR* I: 833, dates the

inscription to 430/29 and relates it to *IG* I³ 383. Cf. the discussion in Nilsson (1960: 74–80) and Pečírka's comprehensive summary (1966: 123–30).

33. Parker (1996: 170). Popov (1975) provides an excellent summary of research. See too Simms (1988). P. Foucart has argued, less reliably, that the cult of Bendis was important for economic reasons, given the Athenians' relations with Thracian merchants: (1903: 95–102).
34. Nilsson (1960); Nilsson (1951: 45–8); *GGR* I: 833–4. On the military and strategic implications, see too Popov (1975: 56–8).
35. Ar. *Ach*. 141, with scholia; Thuc. 2, 29; 62; 95, 1–2; 4, 101, 5.
36. Ferguson (1949: 160–61).
37. Parker (1996: 173). Archibald (1999: 456) also rejects Nilsson's political interpretation.
38. Ferguson (1949: 157–62). Before him, Hartwig (1897) assumed that Bendis was introduced in the Piraeus in 430, because of the Plague; he explains, followed by Nilsson later, that a male figure shown next to Bendis on a relief (today in Copenhagen) should be interpreted as Asclepius, since the clothing and posture are reminiscent of typical representations of that deity (Hartwig, pl. I; Nilsson 1960: 59; inscription: *IG* II² 1256). On the possible identification of this figure with the Thracian divinity and hero Deloptes – usually overlooked (cf. *IG* II² 1324), see Popov and especially Simms (1988: 67, with additional literature).
39. Ferguson (1949: 161). In this context, *IG* I³ 136 and *IG* I³ 383 are seen as "Bendis decrees" (157). It is, however, difficult to date *IG* I³ 136, since the only certain elements are a *terminus post quem* of 431 (a reference to the war) and a *terminus ante quem* of 411 (the board of *kolakrétai*, abolished after 411, is mentioned). Orthographic arguments are highly debatable, and none of the variants proposed are satisfactory (the most complete and contradictory are Ferguson 1949; Bingen 1959). It is difficult to accept the argument that the inclusion of the secretary Pasiphon, *strategos* in 410/09, excludes an early dating (cf. Bingen 1959: 36–7). The reconstruction of the proponent's name, Κλε[όνυμος εἶπε], favoured by Ferguson *et al.* (1941: 207–17), is as believable as Bingen's hypothesis (1959: 37) that it is the eponymous archon of 413/2 (Κλε[οκράτες ἔρχε]). Simms (1988: 63–6), following Bingen, studies in detail the conclusions to be drawn from *IG* I³ 136.
40. *IG* II² 1283. On the cult associations, see Ferguson (1944). Other regulations for the cult of Bendis: *IG* II² 1255; 1284; 1324; 1361. The fact that the oracle at Dodona was favoured over Delphi (which was more frequently consulted) has also been taken as an indication that the cult was included after the outbreak of the war, since it is generally admitted that the road to Delphi (controlled by the Spartans) was closed to the Athenians, and that relations between Athens and Delphi were consequently disturbed: Parke & Wormell (vol. I, 196). See further Smarczyk (1990: 513–5, with additional literature). This assumption is, however, questionable, as contacts between Athens and Delphi during the Archidamian War indicate. On this much debated theme, see: Daux (1940: 46–7); Mattingly (1966: 61–76); Pritchett (1979: 299).
41. Nilsson (1951: 47); Parker (1996: 173). On Thracian religion in general, see Petazzoni (1954: 81–94) and Archibald (1999). On Bendis' particularities, Popov (1976: 289–303) is especially useful.
42. Planeaux (2000: 182). Deloptes' popularity would have been short-lived, since a decade later, the Athenians introduced the powerful healer Asclepius.
43. Thompson (1981); Miles (1989: 231–2). See further Chapter 3.5.
44. For the date and significance of the construction, see Miles (1989: esp. 221–35), especially 233: "Construction in honour of Apollo and Artemis and the introduction of the cult of Asklepios to Athens were a natural reaction to the Plague. ... Nemesis, although not specifically a 'plague' goddess, nonetheless could have been perceived as kin to the others, ... furthermore, she had already assisted the Athenians at Marathon and would surely help them against other threats to the inhabitants."
45. Garland (1992: 99).
46. The similarity to Artemis, also seen as a protector from evil (Hartwig, 1897: 10–11), might appear to support Ferguson's thesis. Cf. Simms (1988: 68): "If Bendis also acquired this

attribute [sc. of Artemis], it is possible that Ferguson's attempt to connect her with the plague of 430 is not completely far-fetched."

47. Ferguson (1944: 89); Dodds (1951: 193); Burford (1969: 20–21); Mikalson (1984: 220); Simms (1985: 284–6); Kearns (1989: 18); Miles (1989: 230); Burkert, in *CAH* V (1992: 260–61); Garland (1992: 130–132); Longrigg (1992: 41); Clinton (1994: 29, 32); Auffarth (1995: 342–7); Parker (1996: 180); Burkert (1998: 139). On the cult of Asclepius in general, see e.g. *GGR* I: 805–8, Burkert (1977: 327–30), Holtzmann (1984: 863–97) and Benedum (1990). The sources and testimonia for the cult of Asclepius were collected by Edelstein (1945: vol. I). The new standard reference is Riethmüller (2005); see too Wickkiser (2008: 62–105).
48. *IG* II² 4960; *SEG* XXV 226. Clinton (1994: 22–3) presents a slightly altered text; in what follows, the text of Beschi in *SEG* is employed; for a detailed reconstruction, see Beschi (1967/8: 31–43) (for the two fragments cf. *SEG* XXXII 266). Koerte's epigraphic study (1896: 287–332) is still fundamental. For the date and the history of the cult of Asclepius at Athens in general, see the detailed work of Aleshire (1989: 7–36). In what follows, it is Asclepius' divine (rather than his heroic) status that is stressed. On the latter, see e.g. Kutsch (1913); Kearns (1989: 14–21). On the monument, see too Riethmüller (2005: 241–50), and Sartori in Greco (2010: 184) with further references.
49. *SEG* XXV 226, 21–3. Garland (1992: 126) and Clinton (1994: 28) assume that the disputed land might have been part of the Pelargicum (on which, see Chapter 3.4). The view had already been put forward by Koerte (1896: 320–21, 329–32).
50. On the offerings in the Asclepieum, see the inventory catalogue of Aleshire (1989: 113–369). Cf. van Straten (1981: 105–33). On the location and construction of the sanctuary, see Travlos (1971: 127–42), Aleshire (1989: 386, fig. 1), Riethmüller (2005: 241–78) and Melfi (2007: 313–432). For the latest archaeological literature on the Asclepieum, see M. Saporiti in Greco (2010: 180–4).
51. On the connection between Demeter and Asclepius, see, in general, Benedum (1986). Cf. Aleshire (1989: 8); Garland (1992: 123–4, 126). The close connections between the Eleusinian sacred officials and the new cult are clearly illustrated by Clinton (1994). The view that a dispute with the Eleusinian *kérykes* indicates a somewhat reserved attitude on the part of the established representatives of the traditional cult, cautiously suggested by Parker (1996: 177, who also underlines the close connection between Eleusis and Asclepius), is not very persuasive, considering the close relations between the cult of the Mysteries of the two goddesses and that of the healing god. However, Kutsch (1913: 18–19) believes that there could have been competition between the cults, expressed by the resistance of the priest serving Demeter and Kore. Clinton (1994: 29), too, believes that the representatives of the Eleusinian cult and Telemachus "were not acting in concert in their plans for the new cult of Asclepius".
52. *SEG* XXV 226, 10–12. Cf. Philostr. *VA*. 4, 17. In regard to *Epidauria*, see Deubner (1932: 72–3) and Clinton (1994). There has been intense discussion as to whether the god was accompanied by the sacred serpents. The emendation proposed by Koerte (from ΔΙΑ[.], legible on the stone, to δ<ρ>ά[κ/οντα]) is no longer universally accepted; see further Clinton (1994: 23–4). Parker (1996: 178–9), however, sees the emendation as necessary.
53. Garland (1992: 130).
54. Aleshire (1989: 7): "Before the Peace of Nikias conditions of war are likely to have prevented the journey to the Epidaurian sanctuary to fetch Asklepios." Cf. Miles (1989: 230).
55. *SEG* XXV 226, 9. In regard to this thesis, see: Burford (1969: 20); Sartori (1972/3: 364–78, esp. 369, 372); Benedum (1986: 152); Garland (1987: 115); Garland (1992: 132). A passage in Aristophanes' *Vesp.*, where Bdelycleon takes his father on what proves to be a fruitless trip to Aegina to spend a night in Asclepius' temple to cure him of his obsession with jury service (Ar. *Vesp.,* 122–3 and scholia), probably indicates that the cult was already present on the island in 422. See MacDowell (1971: 147–8) and Benedum (1986: 151–2). On the topography of the Zea harbours, see Garland (1987: 154–6, with illustrations).

56. Mikalson (1984: 220); reiterated by Garland (1987: 115), Garland (1992: 132) and Auffarth (1995: 344). For the 430 campaign against Epidaurus that proved to be a military and strategic failure, see Thuc. 2, 56, 4. Add Holladay (1978: 399–427, esp. 401–2); Kallett (2009: 99).
57. *IG* II² 4351–4, with Aleshire's commentary (1989: 14–15). The public inclusion probably occurred earlier: Ferguson (1944: 89). Cf. Aleshire (1989: 8): "There is, however, slight and uncertain evidence that by the end of the fifth century the Athenian state bore the expense of some sacrifices at the Asklepieion and that at this time certain sacred officials of the Eleusinian Mysteries were involved in the festival of the Epidauria ...." As a matter of fact, as Clinton (1994: 24–5, 28–9) stated, "an important cult, especially a cult accessible to the public, could not be set up without permission of the Demos" (28).
58. Pl. *Phd*. 118a. It is still a matter of speculation as to whether the imported cult statue of Asclepius did find a temporary shelter in Sophocles' house during the litigation with the Eleusinian officials (late sources associate the author with Asclepius: *Vit. Soph*. 11; *Etym. Magn*. s.v. Δεξίων). This opinion is shared by Ferguson (1944: 90–91), Clinton (1994: 29) and Auffarth (1995: 346). Parker (1996: 185) does not agree. Aleshire (1989: 9–11) adduces new evidence, and admits the later identification of the famous Sophocles with Δεξίων, honoured as a hero, "the one who received" Asclepius; see too Conolly (1998: 1–21). Mitchell-Boyask (2008: 105–21) argues that Asclepius had a special connection with drama: he assumes that there were "deeper associations among drama, healing and the Athenian polis" (107). On Socrates' last words, see Most (1993: 96–111).
59. Auffarth (1995: 346–7). The addition [κ]α[τὰ χρησμό]ς (*SEG* XXV 226, 15–16), referring to an oracle (probably the Delphic oracle) is only mentioned in Beschi's text, not in *IG* II² 4960. However, Auffarth (who did not use Beschi's text) believes that the addition is "attractive" (346). Concerning its reliability, see too Kutsch (1913: 20).
60. Aleshire (1989: 4); Benedum (1990: 210–26). On the flow of pilgrims to Epidaurus, see Dillon (1997: 74–80).
61. Auffarth (1995: 344); cf. Garland (1992: 132).
62. Liv. *Epit*. 11 (T 846). On the date at which Asclepius was brought to Rome, see Szemler (1972: 67).
63. See, in general, Parker (1996: 146–9, with additional literature). All the testimonia and the most important archaeological evidence are collected by Schachter (1981: 19–26); for more details, see Kraukopf (1981: 690–719).
64. Ar. Fr. 17–40. Add Lesky (1972: 494); Gelzer (1971: col. 1406); Bearzot (1987: 80–99, esp. 94–5). Bearzot also treats in detail the fluid situation on the Attica–Boeotian frontier.
65. Paus. 1, 34, 2. On the evolution of the sanctuary in the later period, see Schachter (1981: 24).
66. Thuc. 2, 23, 3.
67. Strab. 9, 2, 10.
68. Parker (1996: 146–8). Similarly, see too Schachter (1981: 23).
69. See in detail Vermaseren (1977: 13–37). Cf. Will (1960: 96–104). See now also Roller (1999: 27–115, with regard to prehistoric discoveries, and 119–41 on the goddesses' entrance in the Greek world). Borgeaud (1996) has detailed information on Cybele/Magna Mater. Munn (2006) suggests that Cybele was introduced by Alcibiades in 408 as recompense for the murder in 491 of a Persian envoy to Athens, who had been, according to Munn, a priest of Cybele. Thus, the introduction of Cybele was a nod in the direction of Persia, since in 408 a reconciliation with the ancient foe was not impossible. See, however, the review by M. Dillon in CR 58 (2008: 194–5).
70. See the full discussion in Parker (1996: 188–98) and Borgeaud (1996: 31–55). The earliest literary mention of the cult is Cratinus (fr. 66, Kassel and Austin; cf. fr. 86 and 87), but the date is uncertain. Robertson (1996) proposed that Cybele was in fact a Greek or Athenian Bronze Age Goddess, since her cult was introduced at Athens not as a "foreign" import, but as the result of syncretism.

71. Thompson (1937: esp. 135–40), supported among others by Will (1960: 100), Travlos (1971: 352) and Thompson & Wycherley (1972: 29–38). Simms (1985: 59–112), with Thompson, argues for an early acceptance of the goddess and assumes a connection with the religious policy of the Peisistratids. There are critical discussions on this issue in Francis & Vickers (1988: 160–61), Frapiccini (1987), Versnel (1990: 105–11) and Parker (1996: 188–94). More recently, Miller (1995) and Shear (1995) have presented many objections from an archaeological perspective to the construction of an early temple of the Mother of the Gods, based only on three walls (that are barely connected to the same complex), as proposed by Thompson (1937). The discussion in Munn (2006: 58–66) does not add anything new.
72. Miller (1995: 136–7) disagrees. See *ibid.* 135, and Francis & Vickers (1988: 158–9) for an overview of the equally disputed dating of the Old Bouleuterion, most recently dated in the second quarter of the fifth century.
73. Thompson (1937: 135–40). From the mid-fourth century, orators use the term Metroon only to designate the state archive identified with the Old Bouleuterion: Aeschin. 1, 60–61; 2, 59; 3, 187; Dem. 19, 129; [Dem.] 25, 9; Lycurg. *Leoc.* 67. Aeschin. 2, 59 designate the archive as the Bouleuterion. Epigraphic records from the fourth century onwards: *IG* II² 140; 463; 583.
74. Cf. Boegehold (1972: 23–30); Thompson & Wycherley (1972: 35–6). On the archive, see now Shear (1995: 178–89) and, for an overall view, Sickinger (1999: 62–113).
75. The earliest literary dates are in Eur. *Hipp.* 141–4; Cratinus, fr. 66 (Kassel and Austin). Parker (1996: 190–91), despite reservations, adopts the early date proposed by the Americans. Since the records before the end of the fifth century are not well preserved, he believes that it is irrelevant to set the literary dates around 430: "the earlier silence counts for very little" (191). An argument for an early date is the small, poorly preserved archaic terracotta found on the Acropolis and said to be a seated Μήτηρ Θεῶν. See Naumann (1983: 145–7; cf. no. cat. 111, illustration: pl. 19, 3), who follows the American chronology (see also 160–61). The statuette, without "the head, legs and distinctive signs" (Naumann 1983: 145), clearly had an animal (a lion?), now undistinguishable, on her lap. The posture and the folds indicate that it was not an Ionian importation, but an Attic adaptation: Naumann (1983: 146). However, the same author points out (134) that such statuettes could also be interpreted as Hera, who was occasionally shown with a lion on her lap. On the difficulties in identifying the statuette, see Frapiccini (1987: 17).
76. Nässtrom (1998: 29–43) presented the idea again without further discussion. Roller (1999: 139 and 162–4) repeats Thompson's earlier view, but she also refers to Miller's objections (1995). Nilsson, who accepted the conclusions of the Americans, was particularly influential: *GGR* I: 725–7. The "impact on the historiography of Greek religion", beginning with Thompson, is already justly regretted by Francis (1990: 113). See too Shear (1995: 176), who notes: "Curiously, it has gone unremarked that the archaeological record in no way supports the identification of the distyle building as an archaic predecessor of the Hellenistic Metroon."
77. Picard (1938: 97–101).
78. Boersma (1970: 31–4) and Frapiccini (1987) disagreed with Thompson and proposed other identifications. Although the remains of the archaic temple were to be identified without question as belonging to the sanctuary of the goddess Μήτηρ Θεῶν, it did not mean that, as early as *c.* 500, the Athenians saw in that goddess the Phrygian Cybele: Parker (1996: 191). Other scholars have also criticized the conclusions of the American archaeologists, and they believe a date around 430 to be more likely: Martin (1951: 328–35); McCargar (1976: 248–52); Roux (1976: 475–83); Francis & Vickers (1988: 160–61); Francis (1990: 17–20, 112–20). More recently, Thompson's reconstruction has been rejected, with well-founded arguments, by Miller (1995) and Shear (1995).
79. Julian. *Or.* 5, 159a-b; Suda, s.v. Μητραγύρτης; (cf. s.v. βάραθρον); *Phot. Lex.*, s.v. Μητραγύρτης; cf. in both *Lex.* s.v. Μητρῷον and *Schol. Aristoph. Plut.* 431; and Poland (1932: col. 1471–3).
80. Cosi (1980/81); Cerri (1983). Nilsson, *GGR* I: 725–7, also considers that the testimony to be essentially reliable, but following Thompson's reconstruction, he believes that the transmitted

tradition was not related to the epidemic of 430, but an earlier one. Will (1960: 101) has another view, and Roller (1999: 167) believes the history to be an *aition*.

81. Cerri (1983: 163–4).
82. *Schol. Aeschin*. 3, 187. See also Wycherley (1957: 151–2).
83. *GGR* I: 725–6. In referring to Thompson, Nilsson, however, speaks of a "plague" at the end of the sixth century. Cf. Vermaseren (1977: 32).
84. On the ecstatic aspects of the cult, criticized in earlier research, see: von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1879: 194–218), who calls the veneration of Μήτηρ in Athens a "shameful cult" (194, "*Schandkult*"); Burkert (1979: 102–5); Garland (1987: 129–31); Burkert (1990: 40–41); Burkert (1998: 112–13). Plutarch tells (*Nic.* 13, 3–4) of an unknown man who leapt upon the altar of the Twelve Gods before the departure to Sicily; he could have been a *gallos* (priest of Cybele); Dodds (1940: 172); Cosi (1980/81: 84); "almost certainly an adherent of the Mother of the Gods": Garland (1987: 130). For the cult festival of Cybele – γαλαξία – see Deubner (1932: 216) and Borgeaud (1996: 36–7). In Athens, the goddess also had an officially named priest. It seems that there was a mythical and cult identification between the Mother of the Gods and Demeter and Rhea: "the Great Mother had long been subject to a process of hellenization, which may have favoured her entry into the official cult of Athens": Versnel (1990: 108). Simms (1985: 89–94) argues that in the fifth century the goddess would have almost completely lost any Oriental connotations, and that cult-wise, she would not have been essentially different from her Greek equivalents. There is a general discussion in Borgeaud (1996: 39–45).
85. Cerri (1983: 173).
86. Paus. 1, 3, 5; Arr. *Per. P. E.* 9 (Phidias); Plin. *HN.* 36, 17 (Agoracritus). See further: Cerri (1983: 173–4); Frapiccini (1987: 18). Von Salis (1913: 1–26) and Despinis (1971: 111–5) plausibly argued for Agoracritus having made the statue, and they associate his creation with the direct entry of the cult after 430. See too Naumann (1983: 159–69), Borgeaud (1996: 33–4) and Roller (1999: 145–6).
87. Borgeaud (1996: 31–54); Parker (1996: 188–92).
88. Frapiccini (1987: 16); Francis (1990: 112–20).
89. Miller (1995: 137): "The restored plans of an archaic 'Temple of Meter' should be rejected. That Building is, I believe, entirely imaginary." He mentions, however, attempts to interpret the so-called Bouleuterion as the early Metroon, which is why he also chooses an earlier date for the introduction of the cult (esp. 141–4). The Old Bouleuterion would thus have been placed near this Metroon as a place for meetings, directly in front of the later Hephaisteion, at the foot of Colonus Agoraios (esp. 151). Shear (1995: 157) considers Miller's reconstruction to be a "sweeping and provocative reinterpretation", and he presents a different explanation.
90. Shear (1995: 171).
91. Shear (1995: 171–8) and the conclusion at 177.
92. Later, Thompson revised his opinion on the Old Bouleuterion and dated the construction towards 460 (1988: 198–203). In the light of such a date, the cult of the Mother of the Gods would have had no shelter for twenty years, since the small archaic temple was not rebuilt after 480. This view would also prevent an earlier date, as Frapiccini (1987: 17–18) admitted. On the dating of the Bouleuterion, see also Francis & Vickers (1988: 158–9; the chronology proposed by Francis & Vickers challenged by Biers 1992: 82–5).
93. Versnel (1990: 107).
94. Cerri (1983: 163–4). Borgeaud (1996: 33–5) and Parker (1996: 189–91) do not agree with this opinion.
95. Ar. *Lys*. 387–98; Plut. *Alc.* 18, 4–5; *Nic.* 13, 10–11. Furley (1988) discusses the subject in detail; he interprets the celebration of Adonis at an awkward moment, as a protest of the women who feared that too many men would perish in Sicily. On the cult of Adonis, the fundamental works are *GGR* I: 727–8; Detienne (1972); Burkert (1979: 99–102, 105–11); Winkler (1990: 189–202); Versnel (1990: 103–5, with rich bibliography) and Baudy (1996:

col. 120–22). See especially the useful discussion in Dillon (2002: 162–9). On the Adonia, see now also the rather strange interpretation of Burnett (2012), who, however, provides a comprehensive bibliography.

96. Dillon (2002: 166) insists that the cult simply prescribed such ritual behaviour and not that the women were thinking about lost lovers or those they never found. For a different view, see Burnett (2012: 188–91).
97. Ar. *Vesp*. 9–10; *Av*. 875; *Lys*. 387–8; fr. 578 (Kassel and Austin). The most important source on the rites of Sabazius is Demosth. 18, 259–60, where the orator tries to compromise his adversary, Aeschines, by referring to the role played by Aeschines and his mother, a priestess of Sabazius, during the celebration of the cult. In the opinion of Nilsson, *GGR* I: 836, the cult would have been practised mostly by the lower class, which would explain Demosthenes' fatuous comments. On Sabazius and his cult, marked by sexual connotations, see Picard (1961: 129–76), Burkert (1990: 90), Versnel (1990: 114–8) and Gicheva (1997: 1068–71, with a large bibliography). Simms (1985: 124–40) does not believe that the Thraco-Phrygian god was very important in Athens. Theophr. *Char*. 16, 4, describes the worship of Sabazius as a typical "superstition" of his age. See too Delneri (2006: 15–124, esp. 31–40).
98. *Schol. Dem*. 19, 281 states that the Delphic oracle itself would have commanded toleration of Sabazius' cult. Cf. Versnel (1990: 115–16).
99. Jos. *C. Ap*. 2, 37. On this subject, see especially Versnel (1990: 115–8, 127–30). For the issue of the cult of Sabazius, we might invoke a cult-decree from Sardis (an order of Artaxerxes II of the first half of the fourth century), prohibiting worshippers of Zeus from attending the mysteries of Sabazius and Ma: *SEG* XXIX 1205. On Nino, see further Dillon (2002: 104–05), who holds that she had nothing to do with Sabazius (in *CR* 52, 2002: 92), but see Delneri (2006: 38), as well as Connelly (2007: 216), presenting her correctly as a priestess of Sabazius, with further references. Cf. *GGR* I: 836.
100. Dodds (1940: 173): "Neither men nor gods are worth satirizing until they have made themselves fairly notorious."
101. Nilsson (1940: 121–2); *GGR* I: 779–82; Ehrenberg (1968: 256–98); Borbein (1995).
102. Bremmer (1996a: 104–8); Borbein (1995). Versnel (1990: 181–89, 204–205) has a rather different explanation; he perceives in the emergence of the new cults at the end of the fifth century a tendency to found "new charismatic groups" (185). With regard to the content of religion at the end of the fifth century, scholarship was divided, generally speaking, in two directions. One would have it that the period was clearly marked by individualistic tendencies towards religious experience and the religious event (thus, e.g. Bremmer 1996a: 104–8). The other, based on archaeological data, argues for a sustainable continuity of cult (e.g. Parker 1996: 185–7; Linders 1997).
103. Wilamowitz II: 498–500; see too Dodds (1965: 39–46) and Zeller (1993: 58–65).
104. The most influential works along these lines are: Cumont (1981); Foucart (1914); Reitzenstein (1927). Cf. Festugière (1954).
105. Pakkanen (1996: 71–2).
106. The comparison is that of Burkert (1990: 17). Cf. Chapter 5.6.
107. Pakkanen (1996: 29): "When discussing the cult of Demeter, we should bear in mind that in Hellenistic Athens her cult was still a cult of the city-state and showed remarkable continuity."
108. On continuity in religion: e.g. Mikalson (1983: 110–118); Linders (1997); on the Athenians' backward-looking and "conservative" religiosity in the early Hellenistic period: Mikalson (1998: 11–45). See also Chapters 2.1.4 and 9.7.
109. Clinton (1994: 32) persuasively shows that Demeter and Kore, in effect the "classical" Athenian saviour deities, had, in Athenian eyes, ceased to support them during the Archidamian War. The Eleusinian Mysteries as a healing cult: Rubensohn (1895: 360–367); Burkert (1990: 26). Parker (1996: 186) justly emphasizes the "pragmatic view of pagan religion", aimed at *do ut des*.
110. Auffarth (1995: 337 and 344).

111. Francis (1990: 17).
112. Lys. 30, 18–22. See Todd (1996) and Chapter 9.6. Rhodes (2009) insists that nothing could happen in the field of religion without the consent of the polis.
113. Garland (1992: 172).

7. Building for the gods

1. Renan (1948: 754): "A fine architect with whom I travelled used to say to me that so far as he was concerned, the truth of the gods was in proportion to the solid beauty of the temples erected in their honour."
2. Schneider & Höcker (1990: 208, 203).
3. For example: Hölscher (1973); Hölscher (1974); Strocka (1975); Bianchi Bandinelli (1978); Borbein (1995); Schefold (1998); cf. Leibundgut (1991: 5–27); Isler (1997); Hölscher (1998a). On contemporary archaeological currents, see Shanks (1996). For the origins of the view that style and politics were interdependent, see Winckelmann (1764) and Sauerländer (1983: 259–61).
4. Noteworthy among many publications on this topic: Schuller (1984); Knell (1990: 95–126); Castriota (1992); Stähler (1993); Coulson (1994); Grütter (1997); Hurwit (1999: 222–34). Cf. Donnay (1979); Knell (1979). The collected essays in Boedeker & Raaflaub (1998) reflect the current state of research; add Greco (2010) and Palagia (2009a). On the imagery of Greek architectural sculpture at Athens and elsewhere, see Knell (1990). See Zinserling (1985: 206–46) on the ideological character of Pericles' building programme. On "democratic" elements in the Parthenon frieze, see Osborne (1987: 98–105; 1994: 143–50). The frieze is generally interpreted as the procession during the Παναθήναια; for another view, see Pollitt (1997: 51–65). On the debate as to whether the Parthenon was a temple or a treasury (as Preisshofen 1984), cf. Hurwit (1999: 163–4), Korres (1997: 235–6: "temple"). On the altars on the Acropolis and elsewhere, see e.g. Schmalz (1981: 21); cf. Schmalz (1993: 125–53, esp. 132–3). For recent studies of the Parthenon, see Monaco and Aversa in Greco (2010: 101–14). The source of funds is also disputed; Giovannini (1997: 145–56) argues that the Athenians built the Parthenon without touching the League's treasury. For the opposing view, see e.g. Hoepfner (1997a: 152), Kluwe (1984: 11–14). Kallet (1998) is neutral.
5. Pollitt (1972: 64–110); Fehr (1979–81: 71–91 [1]; 113–25 [2]; 55–93 [3]); Schuller (1984); Knell (1990); Shapiro (1996).
6. For example, Willers (1975), Leibundgut (1991) and Knell (1993); see also Palagia (2009b).
7. Palagia (2009b: 33).
8. Leibundgut (1991: 25). Leibundgut defines style as "the sum of the various formal features specific to a group of works of art" (7), and also discusses the characteristics of the archaic style, following Hölscher (1988: 141–2).
9. See in particular the critical review of Schneider (1999). Hölscher (1974: 111) notes that public influence on works of art and the sponsoring of certain artists by political circles at the end of the fifth century should not "mean that the different artistic possibilities of the period were closely connected to the political groups".
10. Cf. Hölscher (1974); Willers (1975); Borbein (1989); Borbein (1995); Knell (1990).
11. Cf. Wittenburg (1978: 109): "As we can only outline Pericles' influence on the new configuration of the Acropolis initiated by him ... it is also impossible to determine the personal contribution of the persons involved in the building activity." See Coulton (1977: 15–29) and Müller-Wiener (1988: 15–39) on the tendering procedures for public works and the complex relations between the polis, its institutions and architects and sculptors. See also, on this, Schuller (1997) and Hoepfner (1997a, 1997b).
12. Open to question. Plutarch (*Per.* 13, 3) calls the buildings Περικλέους ἔργα. See e.g.: Boersma (1970: 73–4); Knell (1979); Knell (1990). Periclean influence on stylistic form is

much debated. Grütter (1997: 124) rightly drew attention to a concordance between public opinion and building policy. Himmelmann (1977) believes that Phidias and Pericles would have had only a minor influence on the design of the Parthenon, drawing attention to the fact that urban planning commissions and the board of *epistatai* changed every year, making a continuous influence highly unlikely. Arvanitis (1997: 195–208) believes, however, that all the buildings on the Acropolis were inspired by Pericles and Phidias.

13. For example, Knell (1979: 50–56); Schneider & Höcker (1990: 203–16); Leibundgut (1991: 30–33); Schefold (1998: 292).
14. The archaizing tendencies are attributed to conservative influence, while the classical style ("*reicher Stil*") is associated with "progressive" movements: Leibundgut (1991: 28 and *passim*). Such "archaism" is not restricted to Athens; cf. the temple of Apollo at Bassai (Cooper 1992–6); for more examples, see Knell (1993).
15. "Meisterforschung" has been prevalent ever since Furtwängler (1893). On the "cult of Phidias", see e.g. Höcker & Schneider (1993: 130–39). Older scholarship tends to be dismissed as tainted with fascism. More recent scholarship (e.g. Carpenter 1960) invokes impersonal structures that sometimes underlie the power of individual artistic expression; see Palagia & Pollitt (1996). On the somewhat exaggerated personal influence of Phidias, promoted by moderns to the position of clerk of the works of Pericles' Acropolis project (cf. Plut. *Per*. 13), see e.g. Buschor (1936: 57; toned down in the Piper edition [Munich, 1981]). Himmelmann (1977) rejected such reconstructions, pointing out how flimsy was the evidence. On the social position of artists, see in detail Lauter (1974), Coulton (1977: 23–9) and Müller-Wiener (1988: 15–25).
16. Schuller (1997). Cf. Himmelmann (1977); Wittenburg (1978); Grütter (1997: 124).
17. See Willers (1975), for a cautious and well-founded analysis. On style, see too Borbein (1989, 1995); Leibundgut (1991). For a harsh criticism of German stylistic research, see Schneider (1999: 150). For a more balanced view, see Bianchi Bandinelli (1978: 142–68). Cf. Sauerländer (1983); Himmelmann (1996: 228–32).
18. Cf. the temple of Nemesis at Rhamnous; Miles (1989). On stylistic dating, see Biers (1992: 17–60). Needless to say, the results of such stylistic dating are far from accurate. Cf. Hölscher (1997: 145); Wesenberg (1998: 238).
19. Despite earlier interpretations (e.g. Dinsmoor 1950), the view that the outbreak of the war meant that building did not cease, but was intensified even during the Archidamian War, becomes ever more convincing: Miles (1989); Mark (1993).
20. Boersma (1970: 87). On the financial situation at Athens, see the data in Chapter 8.1.
21. Knell (1968: 68).
22. Kron (1988: 923–51, esp. 924).
23. Boersma (1970: 95).
24. The same is probably true in the field of vase painting, on which see, in general: Boardman (1996^{2}: esp. 227–44); Richter (1967^{2}: 139–53); Webster (1972: esp. 126–51).
25. Vickers (2008: viii).
26. For plans, illustrations and descriptions, see *ER*; cf. Travlos (1971: 213–27); Monaco in Greco (2010: 132–7); Lesk (2004). For the literary and epigraphic sources relating to the Erechtheum, see Harris (1995: 259); fundamental are: Paus. 1, 26, 4–27, 2; *IG* I^{3} 474–6.
27. This is what Pausanias means when he says that the building is "double": διπλοῦν γάρ ἐστι οἴκημα (1, 26, 6). Cf. Kron (1976: 41).
28. Travlos (1971: 213–14).
29. Stern (1986: 51).
30. Gruben (1986: 198).
31. Knell (1979: 53); Gruben (1986: 193, 196). Cf. Knell (1968: 68).
32. Dörpfeld (1904: 101–7); Dörpfeld & Schleif (1942: 82–90); Elderkin (1912: 49–58).
33. *ER*: 456–8 (Paton). On the archaic temple of Athena, see Childs (1994: 1–6) and Korres (1997: 218–25).

34. For example, Dinsmoor (1950: 187); Boersma (1970: 88); Kron (1976: 41); Wycherley (1978: 147); Knell (1988: 138); Hurwit (1999: 204–205).
35. Paus. 1, 26, 5; Plut. *Mor*. 843e.
36. Jeppesen (1987: esp. 7–24).
37. Schädler (1990); Hurwit (1999: 200–202). The cult connection between Erechtheus and Athena, mentioned as early as in Homer (*Il*. 2, 546–51; *Od*. 7, 78–81), implies that the two were worshipped in the same shrine. Cf. Hdt. 5, 83, 8, 55. On such cult connections, see in detail Kron (1976: 40–8; 1988: 923–51).
38. Travlos (1971: 213–14). Regarding the compartmentalization of the different cults, see below. The wisest opinion is that of Hurwit (1999: 203): "The interior of the building has been gutted, so its plan is largely conjectural." In particular, difficulties arise from the fact that a Christian church overlay the sanctuary, and a cistern was built during the Turkish domination; see *ER*: 169–71 (Stevens); 492–536 (Paton).
39. *IG* I^3 474–6. For a fuller commentary: *ER*: 279–322 (Caskey). Strab. 9, 1, 16 (ἀρχαῖος νεώς).
40. For example, *ER*: 452–6 (Paton), Wittenburg (1978: 61–73) and Wesenberg (1985).
41. On the general plan of the Acropolis cf. Hoepfner (1997a: 153–4). For an early date, see Dix & Anderson (1997: 323). Vickers (1985: 17–28; forthcoming a) dates the beginning of construction to 412. For the building history, see *ER*: 452–92 (Paton). Attempts have been made to associate new papyrus fragments of Euripides' *Erechtheus*, approximately dated to the late 420s, with the construction of the temple. Calder (1969: 147–56) considers the play, which he dates in 422, as inspired by the decision to build the Erechtheion, taken by the Assembly a little earlier. Clairmont (1971: 485–95) takes a different view; cf. Treu (1971: 115–31), who see construction beginning in 421. But, as Clairmont (488) admits, "We can only guess".
42. Hurwit (1999: 206).
43. *IG* I^3 52 (ML 58).
44. Plut. *Per*. 13; Hoepfner (1997a) notes that if there was a general building plan for the entire Acropolis elaborated around 450, then early planning and late execution must logically follow. Paton's judgement of 1927 perhaps still stands: "The unsatisfactory conclusion is thus inevitable that in the light of our present knowledge the year in which the Erechtheum was begun cannot be definitely determined" (*ER*: 456).
45. Possibly also the temple on the Ilissus: Mylonas-Shear (1963: 388–99). On buildings ascribed to Callicrates, see too Svenson-Evers (1996: 225–6).
46. For example, *ER*: 455 (Paton) and Dinsmoor (1950: 188) both favour Mnesicles; Mylonas-Shear (1963: 408–24) favours Callicrates.
47. *IG* I^3 474 (r. 3); 476 (l. 60–61). See further Wesenberg (1985) and Svenson-Evers (1996: 273–80).
48. Schefold (1998: 289).
49. Østby (1993: 213). But see now the recent works on the Erechteum by Lesk (e.g. Lesk 2004), Gerding (2006) and Vickers (forthcoming a).
50. On the pre-classical discoveries: *ER*: 424–52 (Paton); cf. Hurwit (1999: 85–137, with recent literature).
51. See Elderkin (1941); Kontoleon (1949); Kron (1976: 40–55); Wycherley (1978: 143–54); Papachatzis (1989). On the tomb of Cecrops, see especially Kron (1976: 87–9) and Scholl (1995). Cults that were later fostered together in the Erechtheum were related to this place even before construction began: Kron (1988: 923–51, esp. 924).
52. E.g. *ER*: 457–62 (Paton); Knell (1979: 53); Stern (1986); Hurwit (1999: 203): "the eastern room was almost certainly the location of the statue of Athena Polias." Cf. Travlos (1971: 213–14), followed by Papachatzis (1989: 181), and the critique of Kron (1976: 41); Hoepfner (1997a: 158–9). Stern's proposal (1986) that the unusually splendid North Porch was an attempt by the architects to create some kind of palace for Erechtheus is very convincing, and fits perfectly the likely assumption that Erechtheus was worshipped in the lower part of the cult complex, while the east side was reserved for Athena.

53. Overall, the *temenos* hosted no fewer than thirteen cults, all described in detail by Kontoleon (1949).
54. Paus. 1, 26, 6. Judeich (1931: 279–80); Kontoleon (1949: 6–7); Kron (1976: 43–4) assumes that the *thalassa* would have been in the western room after all, interpreting the opening in the rock in the North Porch as the mark of the trident or Zeus' lightning, sent to strike Erechtheus at Poseidon's request; Wycherley (1978: 152); Knell (1988: 141); Schneider & Höcker (1990: 212). Schädler (1990: 373–5), too, interprets the North Porch as the funerary monument of Erechtheus. What is remarkable is the fact that most of the gods, heroes and heroines worshipped in the Erechtheum seem to be closely associated in the mythological tradition: thus Hephaestus, Erechtheus, Butes, Cecrops and Pandrosos are associated through kinship and education; on which see Kron (1988: 923–51, esp. 923–4). Interestingly, the so-called Eleusinian war involving Erechtheus and his daughters, who sacrifice themselves, is seen as a reiteration of the fight between Athena and Poseidon (924), which includes all the cults in the Erechtheum in mythological interdependence rich in meaning (Kron suggests that proximity of the cult-places may have directly influenced the myth). See too Kearns (1989: 113–14).
55. Kron (1976: 84): "The name of Cecrops simply reminded the Athenians in the classical era of the old times." Cecrops was, to a certain extent, the "first true Athenian": Shapiro (1998: 131). On Cecrops, see now Kasper-Butz *et al.* (1992: 1084–91).
56. Vickers (1985: 27). The use of female-shaped support pillars, named Caryatids, was not new on the Erechtheum. The Siphnian treasury at Delphi, for example, had similar columns. For the historical evolution, see Schmidt (1982). Vitruvius (1, 1, 5) discusses the origin of the Caryatids and of their name, according to which the women in the Peloponnesian city of Caryae (= Karyai) had allied themselves with the Persians, and as a consequence the Greeks enslaved their womenfolk. The Roman architect thus sees Caryatids as symbols of servitude. This etiological presentation has often been rejected as unhistorical (if only because Karyai was only destroyed in the fourth century) – see, for example: Lauter (1976: 15); Schmidt (1982: 22–6); Wesenberg (1984: 172–85); Scholl (1995: 197–8). For another view, see Vickers (1985: 3–5; forthcoming a). See too the discussion below.
57. Scholl (1995: 180).
58. Scholl (1995, 1998); Lauter (1976); Vickers (1985, forthcoming a); Leibundgut (1991: 33–40). What follows depends largely on Scholl.
59. *IG* I^3 474, l. 83 (ἐν τε)ι προστάσει τε)ι πρὸς το)ι Κεκροπίοι); see also the commentary in *ER*: 288 (Caskey); Antiochus Pherecydes, in *FGrH* 333 fr. 1; Kontoleon (1949: 69–79). On the archaeological evidence: *ER*: 116–8; 127–37 (Stevens). Cf. Scholl (1995: 183–90). The inscription dated to 409 (l. 84–5) includes a reference to the construction of the roof of the Caryatid porch, implying that the Caryatids were already in place; for Lauter (1976: 16, 40) they would thus have been made between 420 and 415.
60. Lauter (1976). Cf. *ER*: 232–6 (Fowler); Schmidt (1982: 81–83). With regard to the general shape of the Porch, see Scholl (1995, 1998).
61. Gruben (1986: 199).
62. Schmidt (1982: 83).
63. *ER*: 235 (Fowler); Elderkin (1941: 120–22); Lauter (1976: 14–16).
64. Rejected by Scholl (1995: 197). On the *arrephoroi*, see Paus. 1, 27, 3; Burkert (1977: 162 and 348–9; 1966: 1–25). Earlier literature identifying the *korai* with the *arrephoroi* is reviewed by Lauter (1976: 16).
65. Vickers (1985). Muss & Schubert (1988: 121–3) add a feminist note.
66. Vitr. 1, 1, 5. See too Vickers (forthcoming a).
67. Scholl (1995: 198). Vickers consequently gives a late date for the construction of the Caryatids or *korai* which, by 409, had probably been integrated in the South Porch for a long time, awaiting the addition of a roof. The Spartans only established contacts with the Persians in 412/11, the date from which hostile propaganda would have made sense. Vickers dates Euripides' *Erechtheus* to 412, and he wants to see allusions to the Caryatids in *Lysistrata* (Ar. *Lys*. 422–31)

of 411. He thus argues for a date of 412 for the Caryatids and, in my view, wholly unjustifiably, for the beginning of the construction for the entire complex: Vickers (1985: 17–28; forthcoming a). On the aetiology of Vitruvius, by which Vickers supports his theory, see Wesenberg (1984: 172–85), who considers this account as unreliable; cf. n. 57 above.

68. Scholl (1995: 199–212). On the cult of the dead see Chapter 8.5, and on the role of women in the Attic cult of the dead, see Scholl (1998: 43–9).
69. Scholl (1995: 204–205). For an arm fragment from one of the Athenian Caryatids wearing a triple bracelet similar to those on the Hadrian's Villa versions, see Brouskari (1984: 61, figs 6 and 7).
70. Scholl (1995: 210). Lauter (1976: 10–12), followed by Schmidt (1982: 83–4), sees no connection between the Porch of Caryatids and the Cecropion.
71. I owe this suggestion to Prof. Simon, to whom I also owe much of what follows.
72. Simon (1972: 219–20).
73. *IG* I^3 474–6. Such an interpretation would also help to explain the archaic predecessors of the *korai* on the Erechtheum, such as the Delphian Caryatids. On which, see Simon (1972: 218–19); in general, Schmidt (1982: 72–88).
74. On the cult of the nymphs at Athens, see Parker (1996: 165–7). For the archaeological evidence, see Kron (1979: 49–65). On nymphs in general, see Herter (1937: col. 1527–81); Halm-Tisserant & Siebert (1997: 891–902).
75. Emphasized by both Simon (1972: 220) and Scholl (1995: 210).
76. Lalonde (1968); Shear (1973); Thompson (1981); see Chapter 3.5. Scholl (1995: 192–3).
77. Schädler (1990: 374–5); Leibundgut (1991: 30–36); Knell (1993: 13–14); Willers (1975: 66–70). The fragmentary condition of the Erechtheum frieze inhibits interpretation, although the theme is doubtless mythological (for another view, Felten 1984: 110–17 [*Skirophoria*]). For attempts at a partial interpretation, see: Boulter (1970: 7–28); Stern (1985: 405–26); Leibundgut (1991: 40–44); Glowacki (1995: 325–31).
78. E.g. Schneider & Höcker (1990: 203). After 462, "the religious contents seem to have been [progressively] politically profaned": Höcker & Schneider (1993: 45). The distinction, which is often drawn between the supposedly lay character of Periclean cult buildings and a religious spirit that imbues those erected after his death, is invalid. The statesman who always began his public speeches by invoking the gods (Plut. *Per*. 8, 4) might well consider, in elaborating his building plan, employing religion to further his own ends. See e.g. Himmelmann (1997b: 40) on the famous gathering of the gods on the East frieze of the Parthenon: "In reality, their throne is on Olympus, as one can even see from Aphrodite being placed to the fore." The different sizes of the participants, with the seated gods as tall as standing mortals, make an interpretation based on democratic equality highly unlikely.
79. Hurwit (1999: 200).
80. Shapiro (1998) presents the heroes Cecrops and Erechtheus above all as carriers of an "*ideology* of autochthony" (133); he believes that the North frieze of the Erechtheum is an explicit representation of the Erechtheus autochthony myth related to a larger public (145).
81. E.g. Boersma (1970: 88); Knell (1979: 56); Gruben (1986: 195–6); Knell (1988: 136–43); Muss & Schubert (1988: 124); Schneider & Höcker (1990: 208); Leibundgut (1991: 30–33).
82. Wesenberg (1998: 237).
83. Garland (1984); Mark (1993); Hoepfner (1997b: 169–71); Wesenberg (1998). On the priests of Erechtheus, *eteoboutadai*, see too Kearns (1989: 210–11).
84. Although the precise procedure for the design and planning of public buildings remains uncertain, it is likely that the Assembly played a prominent role in deciding how the Erechtheum should be compartmentalized. On the role of the Demos in the field of urban planning policy, see: Himmelmann (1977); Wittenburg (1978); Schuller (1997).
85. Nevertheless Leibundgut (1991: 32) believes that "through clever manipulation, it was possible for someone to impose his wishes on the Assembly". Ruling elites are given a privileged position

in such a scenario. In fact, as Leibundgut admits, the scanty evidence allows for speculations, that "often depend on the personal views of the interpreters".

86. Scholl (1995: 212).
87. ἀμφιπρόστυλος *having a portico on either front*: LSJ, s.v.
88. Fundamental: Wesenberg (1981); Mark (1993); Travlos (1971: 150–57, for plans and illustrations); more recent studies: Palagia (2005); Lippman *et al.* (2006); Schultz (2009). The cult relationship between Athena and Nike is problematical. It is attested from the archaic period – see the inscribed altar published by Raubitschek 1949, no. 329 – but it could be explained in a historical and religious context, in that Nike is represented in figurative art as a being of unique appearance, but with no specific cult. Nike could thus be interpreted as an epithet of Athena, as worshipped as one who brings victory (e.g. Usener 1895: 370); or we might assume Nike's relative independence. See further Daly (1953: 1124–8) and Thöne (1999: 57–8, with additional literature).
89. For example, Knell (1979: 47–53); Gruben (1986: 192); Schneider & Höcker (1990: 203–8). On the Propylaea, see Waele (1990: esp. 5–17).
90. *IG* I^3 35 (ML 44); Judeich (1931: 218); Boersma (1970: 85); Travlos (1971: 148–9); Mark (1993: 105). In regard to the conventions when dating the inscriptions, see Meiggs (1966). The decree has often been related to the Peace of Callias and hence dated to 449 or 448, since the proposer could be identified with Hipponicus, the son of Callias. See e.g. Judeich (1931: 218, with earlier literature). As Dinsmoor (1941: 159) noted, in the light of the poor state of preservation of the stone, such an association is not simply uncertain, but downright impossible. Only the letter forms could be used as a possible (but now very uncertain) dating criterion. See too Wesenberg (1981: 294–30) and Mark (1993: 104–7, 118). See too the discussion of the three-bar *sigma* in what follows.
91. For the relative chronology of the various stages of the building, see Mark (1993). See now Gill (2001) with dates revised in the light of more recent epigraphic research, and with arguments that support the case presented here. Gill's reconstruction of events would see the Nike temple as part of a Periclean plan for the Propylaea, but with detailed planning and execution postponed until the mid-420s.
92. Hoepfner (1997b: 169–70). For another view, see Wesenberg (1981: 45), who assumes that the Propylaea and the Nike temple were roughly contemporary; cf. Wesenberg (1988: 20). Mark (1993: 115–20) discusses the history of the study of the monument.
93. On the conventional dating of the buildings on the Acropolis and the supposed interruption of urban planning activity, see: Dinsmoor (1939, 1950: 179–82); Boersma (1970: 65–96); Wesenberg (1981: 51). Kalpaxis (1986: 127–33) and Miles (1989: 221–35) have another view.
94. For example: Miles (1980: 323); Wesenberg (1981: 47–52).
95. Mattingly (1961: 169–70). At this time Mattingly's ideas were almost unanimously rejected, on which see Meiggs (1966).
96. Chambers *et al.* (1990); Dawson (1996); Vickers (1996) and again Mattingly (1999); see too Moroo (2002); Mattingly (2007); Butz (2010: 30–31). The position of the defenders of the view that three-bar *sigma* and tailed *rho* can be considered refuted; even P. J. Rhodes, once sceptical, has now changed his opinion (2008). Cf. Chapter 5.2.
97. This was rightly admitted by Hurwit (1999: 160): "the Nike Temple Decree *could* date to the early 440s, but it does not *have* to. And that complicates our conception of events on the Nike bastion considerably" (emphasis added). On a similar note, see Wesenberg (1998: 239). Thöne (1999: 59) disagrees. He knows only Mattingly (1961), "whose late dating cannot be justly retained". Cf. Hoepfner (1997b: 169): "depending on the shape of the letters, [the decree] should be dated in the middle of the classical period." The manuscript of Mark (1993) had been ready for the press since 1988, and only a few subsequent works were taken into account. The discussion is now somewhat redundant, as the early three-bar sigma doctrine is no longer canonical (Rhodes 2008: 501).

98. Meiggs (1972: 501) once actually admitted that a later date would fit better in the historical context ("it would satisfy what at first sight seems common sense if the inscription could be moved down to the early twenties"). He was, however, persuaded by dating criteria derived from stylistic research.
99. Mark (1993: 137), referring to *IG* I³ 36 (a decree on the salary of the priestess).
100. Mark (1993: 105–6, 121–2).
101. The thesis that the decision regarding the construction related to the small temple (*naiskos*) on the bastion and that it had nothing in common with the temple of the goddess Nike can scarely be accepted. This "elegant solution" (Mattingly 1982: 385), previously formulated by Bundgaard (1974: 43–9) and accepted by Wittenberg (1978: 54–5), had already been criticized by Mattingly. Cf. the critique of Mark's interpretation, expressed by Wesenberg (1998: 238–9), Hoepfner (1997b: 170) and Thöne (1999: 61). See now Mattingly (2007) on this inscription and its dating *c.* 424/3.
102. Mattingly (2007: 110).
103. Thus, Mark (1993: 79–80).
104. See the reconstruction proposed by Mark (1993: 57); Hurwit (1999: 160).
105. *IG* I³ 35 (ML 44). Wesenberg (1981: 44); cf. Wesenberg (1998: 239); see also ML: 111, also concerning the salary of a priestess. In the first instance, in *IG* I³ 35 (ML 44), no place is named for the pay, but in *IG* I³ 36 (424/3), the *kolakrétai* are responsible for paying the priestess; Wesenberg (1981: 30–31; 1998: 239) concludes that naming the priestess, as well as the measures concerning the new construction, were an afterthought. Mattingly (1982: 385), however, emphasizes that the decision of *IG* I³ 35, referring as it does to the priestess, allows for the conclusion that she assumed the function early, as well as allowing for an early construction of the temple. It is also possible that in *IG* I³ 36, unlike *IG* I³ 35, another authority was in charge of paying the salary; otherwise the time of payment would have been changed that year, as Mark (1993: 108) suggested. Then, the democratic process of appointing a priestess "from the Athenians" is an indication of the "democratization" of religion during the fifth century. On Myrrhine, the first priestess of Nike (and also the only priestess elected from all the Athenians, and not descended from a specific family), see Dillon (2002: 76).
106. *IG* I³ 35 (ML 44), ll. 15–18. Mattingly (1982: 385). Boegehold (1969: 175–80) also believes that the supplementary proposal made by Hestiaios names "a four-man financial committee" (175). For a different view: ML 111.
107. E.g. Bundgaard (1957: 70, 177–83); Wesenberg (1981: 46); Mark (1993: 79–80); Hoepfner (1997b).
108. Boersma (1970: 71); Mark (1993: 79–82). The modernization of the bastion, dependent on the Propylaea, was probably intended to be part of the gatehouse construction. On this issue, see Boersma (1970: 71) and Tomlinson (1990: 411–13). Mark (1993: 80): "It is noteworthy that while the architect of the Propylaea, Mnesikles, anticipated a rise in the level of the Nike Bastion, he failed to provide for a number of aspects of the Stage IV Nike sanctuary as actually built."
109. Wesenberg (1988: 20).
110. Dörpfeld (1885: 38–56); Cf. Knell (1979: 49); Hellström (1988); Hoepfner (1997b); Waele (1990: 5–17). Cf. Mark (1993: 119): "That the Propylaia might never have been intended to be symmetrical, unthinkable to Dörpfeld or Bohn, is now well accepted." On the other hand, the purpose of the eastern gallery is not open to question, since it was projected from the beginning; the wall exists and the foundations are preserved: for example, Wesenberg (1988: 17–18) and Tomlinson (1990: 411–12). The latter has plausible economic arguments to explain why the extension idea was dropped. By contrast, Kalpaxis (1986: 132) draws attention to the northwards extension having been dropped in the early stages of the construction through the scarcity of materials, and the abandonment of the works should not be attributed to the outbreak of war.
111. Travlos (1971: 482); Kalpaxis (1986: 130–31); Tomlinson (1990: 406, 408). On the Pinacotheca as a room for symposia, and on the *klinai* assumed to have been placed there, see

Hellström (1988). De Waele (1990: 32) believes that space was some kind of store for offerings and *pinakes*. Cf. Wesenberg (1988: 20).

112. De Waele (1990: 41 and *passim*); Mark (1993: 140). De Waele established the basic module, namely the foot employed by Mnesicles. Tomlinson (1990) reaches the same conclusions, on other grounds. See too Wesenberg (1988: 20), who, however, believes that the Propylaea and the Nike temple were built consecutively.
113. Tomlinson (1990: esp. 407–408). It is widely accepted (cf. Bundgaard 1957: 66–75) that the architect of the Propylaea worked without detailed plans, solving problems that arose *ad hoc*; see Mark 1993: 119. Against Bundgaard's theory, see Hoepfner (1997b).
114. Mark (1993: 121) summarizes the more recent research as follows: "Research has shown the established explanation for a delay between the two, the seeming conflict between the Propylaea and Nike projects, to be unfounded." In fact, Wesenberg and Hoepfner see the buildings as related. Hoepfner (1997b) even speculates that the two architects, Mnesicles and Callicrates, collaborated closely on both projects (169–70); cf. Bundgaard (1957: 177–85). Wesenberg (1981) also believes there was a close connection between the two projects but, unlike Hoepfner (who dates the Nike temple later), he believes that the two buildings were planned together.
115. The first variant is supported by Wesenberg (1981, 1988) and the second by Tomlinson (1990: 411–3); Hurwit (1999: 209–11) is neutral. Tomlinson (1990) understands from Paus. 1, 22, 4/6 that only the central part of the structure was known as the Propylaea, and that the wings to each side could have been erected after 432. It is hard to believe that research will ever come up with an exact dating. Some date the column bases early (Blümel 1950–51: 135–65, esp. 155), others late (Dinsmoor 1950: 185–6); cf. Wesenberg (1981: 31–43), who believes the building was begun after the mid-430s and that the Nike temple columns are the earliest form of such Attic bases. Thus, the first building stage of the new Nike temple would be older than the Propylaea. Knell (1993: 21) wonders whether Wesenberg's conclusions "are not too forced from an academic perspective". For another view, see Büsing (1985: 159–205, esp. 191–4).
116. This temple is not mentioned in the Callias decree or in Plutarch; cf. *IG* I^3 52 (ML 58); Plut. *Per*. 13. Add Boersma (1970: 71), who rightly excludes the Nike temple from the Periclean building programme.
117. *IG* I^3 64; *IG* I^3 132; *IG* II^2 403; add Mattingly (1961: 170); among the supporters of a 420s date: Lippold (1950: 193–4); Dinsmoor (1950: 185–6); Dohrn (1957: 23–4); Boersma (1970: 84–5); Wesenberg (1981: 29); Gruben (1986: 190–91); Schneider & Höcker (1990: 203); Knell (1990: 140–41). On architectural details, see Mark (1993: 82–6).
118. Mark (1993: 87–92); Wesenberg (1998: 238). For the friezes and parapet, see: Felten (1984: 118–31); Knell (1990: 140–49); Harrison (1997); Simon (1997a); Hölscher (1997). The last two date the parapet very early, around the year 420.
119. Mattingly (1982) stresses this. See now also Mattingly (2007).
120. Thus Boersma (1970: 85); cf. Miles (1989: 230). The historical and religious implications of the cult of Nike are still unclear; see above, n. 81.
121. Thuc. 4, 2–41; Wilson (1979). See Chapter 5.2.
122. Knell (1979: 47–53); Schneider & Höcker (1990: 203); Knell (1993: 13–14). The differences between the monumental Periclean buildings and the Nike temple might well be due to the topography, which did not allow for a substantial building on the Nike bastion.
123. Schneider & Höcker (1990: 203).
124. Knell (1993: 12–13): "Through the ancient proportions of its columns and parapet, the temple could have alluded to the venerable traditional centres."
125. Knell (1990: 140).
126. A view that took root with Dörpfeld (1885); e.g. Knell (1979: 49); Gruben (1986: 185–6, 190); Schneider & Höcker (1990: 203–8). See Chapter 7.2.3.
127. Mikalson (1984: 223). The imagery of the frieze is difficult to interpret, beyond mythical battles (Troy?), a gathering of gods and a battle of Greeks against barbarians. The parapet

represents the celebration of a victory and Nike. They repeat a common pattern: venerating the distant, mythological, past and more recent history (the Persian wars), in order to acquire more prestige; see Knell (1990: 140–49) and, persuasively, Simon (1997a). Some explain the west and the north friezes not only as mythical, but also as historical battles between Greeks. Thus Hölscher (1997: 146) believes that they represent Athenian victories in the decades following the Persian wars. Harrison (1997) offers a similar historical explanation. The Persian war interpretation lacks conviction, based as it is on the example of the Parthenon, as a "symbol and foreshadowing of the contemporary confrontations between Athens and Sparta" (Knell 1990: 148). Recalling Athens' victorious past was, however, reason enough to improve the temple of Athena Nike after 425. On the dating of the architectural sculpture, see Mark (1993: 87–92).

128. Miles (1989: 221–35) discusses the chronology of the temple construction. The traditional date (436–2) is supported by Dinsmoor (1939: 152; 1950: 181–2). The decisive factor in determining the date is the idea (speculative, cf. Knell 1988: 63–4) that a single architect, Dinsmoor's "Theseum Architect", oversaw the construction of the temple of Nemesis, the Sounion temple and the Hephaisteion (Theseum).
129. Miles (1980). Von Eickstedt (1994: 105–11) discusses recent research on the Ilissus temple.
130. E.g. Dinsmoor (1950: 182); Boersma (1970: 70–71, 76); Gruben (1986: 180).
131. Kalpaxis (1986: 127–33). After the implementation of the Callias decree (434/3), the Propylaea project was clearly thought to be a completed project since, even in the years following 425 (when there was a veritable "boom in building activity"), they were left unfinished.
132. Lalonde (1968); Shear (1973); Miles (1989: 231).
133. On the Hephaisteion, see Wetzel (1996). On the Delian temple of Apollo and the Artemision, see below.
134. Miles (1989: 235): "The continuous activity ... in sanctuaries on the Akropolis, in the Agora, in the city of Athens, and in Attica establishes that there was no building recession during the Peloponnesian War." On the "outburst of building activity" after 421, see Boersma (1970: 87).
135. Hurwit (1999: 157).
136. Paus. 1, 33. On the cult and myth of Nemesis, see Dietrich (1967: 157–76). Cf. Miles (1989: 137–8).
137. Besides Miles, see Boersma (1970: 77–8, no. cat. 61); Knell (1988: 63–4).
138. Miles (1989: 221–35 and 160–64, 170, for an analysis of the capitals and the columns). The connection between Nemesis and Erechtheus, reflected in the myth, might also account for the Erechtheum and the temple of Nemesis being close in time. Suda, s.v. Ῥαμνούσια Νέμεσις relates the mythological variant, according to which the Attic king Erechtheus, presented there as son of Nemesis, founded the temple of Rhamnous. See too Kearns (1989: 160).
139. Miles (1989: 233) notes that it is not possible to ascribe the building to an architect. She explicitly rejects Dinsmoor's view that the so-called "Theseum Architect" also designed the temple at Rhamnous: Miles (1989: 239–42). Cf. Dinsmoor (1950: 181–2).
140. Knittelmayer (1999).
141. Thuc. 3, 104; see further Chapter 3.7. For the architecture and date, see: Dinsmoor (1950: 183–4); Boersma (1970: 86, cat. 36); Courby (1931: 220–25); Mylonas-Shear (1963: 399–408); Bruneau & Ducat (1983: 129–30); Gruben (1986: 149–50).
142. Mylonas-Shear (1963: 399–408).
143. Boersma (1970: 86).
144. See Bubenheimer & Mylonopoulos (1996a, 1996b); Coulton (1976: esp. 40–43 and 226–7).
145. Wilamowitz I: 175. On the functions and cults of the goddess Artemis, see: *GGR* I: 481–500; Burkert (1977: 233–7); Graf (1985: 228–43); Vernant (1988: 9–24); Graf (1997: col. 53–8); Simon (1998: 132–55).
146. Bubenheimer & Mylonopoulos (1996a: 16; 1996b: 49).
147. Papadimitriou (1959: 37).
148. The main testimony for "she-bears" is Ar. *Lys*. 645 (with scholia); see too Henderson (1987, *ad*

loc). On the cult, see e.g. Deubner (1932: 206); Sale (1975: 265–84); Bevan (1987: 17–22); Hamilton (1989: 449–72). On Brauron, see especially Kahil (1977: 86–98; 1983: 231–44; 1984: 618–753). On cult-related initiation ritual, see Sourvinou-Inwood (1988b).

149. Burkert (1977: 234–5).
150. *Il.*, 21, 483–4. Women who died in childbirth were considered to be direct offerings to the goddess: Eur. *IT*. 1466–7; Burkert (1977: 236). In Homer, Artemis sends death to women, while her brother is responsible for the passing of men. See, in detail, *GGR* I: 482, with further references.
151. *I. Del.* 2448; *IG* XI, 4, 1276; quote: Burkert (1977: 236); for details, see Graf (1985: 228–43).
152. Vernant (1988: 16).
153. The relevant inscriptions are published by Meritt & Traill (1974: 156, no. 183–4; 165, no. 197; 208, no. 261); Graf (1985: 229–31).
154. Bubenheimer & Mylonopoulos (1996a: 22–3; 1996b: 59–60). For the Brauronion on the south side of the Acropolis, see Linders (1972).
155. Boersma (1970: 95). Some recent publications shed new light on the architectural features: Despinis (2004), Goette (2005).
156. On the bad state of finances: Ferguson (1932: 153–71); Thomsen (1964); Mattingly (1968); Schmitz (1991: 136–42); Brun (1999).
157. For an improved text: Bubenheimer & Mylonopoulos (1996a: 8–10, with discusssion). The inscription has not yet been properly published; for preliminary publications, see Papadimitriou (1962: 25; 1963: 111–20).
158. Bubenheimer & Mylonopoulos (1996a: 12). I have been careful to bear in mind R. Parker's injunction not to place too much emphasis on the word σωτηρία, since it appears in many inscriptions as a topos.
159. Bubenheimer & Mylonopoulos (1996a: 12).
160. Clem. Al., *Strom*. 1, 163, 2. Cf. Graf (1985: 230).
161. Boersma (1970: 82–96) offers an overall view of other architectural projects not described here.
162. Knell (1993: 17).
163. Miles (1989: 227).
164. "The accumulating archaeological evidence shows that construction in sanctuaries continued throughout the 5th century in Athens and Attica, certainly after *c.* 425, and even during the still more difficult conditions of the later part of the Peloponnesian War" (*ibid*.).

8. The Arginusae trial

1. Cic. *Mil*. 4, 11: "In times of war, the laws fall mute."
2. Thuc. Book VIII; Xen. *Hell*., I and II; Kagan (1987: *passim*); Andrewes, in *CAH* V (1992: 464–98). For the domestic political upheavals of 411, related to the oligarchic constitutional changes (the constitution of the 400 and of the 5,000), see Chapter 5.5.2.3, and, in general: Flach (1977); Kagan (1987: 131–210); Lehmann (1997); Bleckmann (1998: 358–86); Welwei (1999: 212–31).
3. On the *eikosté*, see Thuc. 7, 28, 4; add Dover, in *HCT* IV (1970, *ad loc*). On the reserve fund, see Thuc. 8, 15; add Andrewes, in *HCT* IV (1970, *ad loc*). On the financial situation of the Athenians, see *IG* I^3 375 (ML 84); Ferguson (1932); Thomsen (1964); Mattingly (1968); Bleckmann (1998: 450–56); Brun (1999). Cf. Ostwald (1986: 424–6, 433); Welwei (1999: 231–2).
4. Οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, ἔφη, χρήματα ἡμῖν, Alcibiades laments at Xen. *Hell*. 1, 1, 14. On how the Athenians raised funds (through robbery and extortion), see: Xen. *Hell*. 1, 1, 21; cf. 1, 2, 4; 1, 3, 3. On the tax policy in the Hellespont area, see Rubel (2001).
5. See Chapter 7, with a description of the complex.
6. Cynossema and Abydus: Thuc. 8, 103–6; Cyzicus: Xen. *Hell*. 1, 1, 1–26. On Lysander, see Lotze (1964). On the military operations in the Aegean and the area of the straits in general, see

Andrewes, in *CAH* V (1992: 464–98). For the reinstatement of democracy, see Sealey (1975: 271–95) and Bleckmann (1998: 387–442).

7. *Hell. Oxy*. 4, 1–4; Xen. *Hell*. 1, 5, 11–17; Diod. 13, 71; Breitenbach (1971: 152–71); cf. Bommelaer (1981: 90–95), Andrewes (1982) and Kagan (1987: 310–19).
8. Only seventy could be crewed given the lack of seamen; this occurred partly because of the defeat at Notion, but mostly because the Peloponnesian fleet paid better and some oarsmen deserted to join it: Xen. *Hell*. 1, 5 (20); Kagan (1987: 327).
9. Xen. *Hell*. 1, 6, 15–18. On Xenophon's favourable portrait of Callicratidas, see Moles (1994: 70–84).
10. Xen. *Hell*. 1, 6, 24–26; cf. Diod. 13, 97, 1–2. Together with the ships of the allies, the fleet had more than 150 triremes. It is not clear whether the slaves who fought at Arginusae were freed afterwards; see Worthington (1989: 359–63). On the financial burden caused by these building works, see Ferguson (1932: 359–60).
11. The dating issue was thoroughly analysed by Busolt, in *GG* III 2: 1592.
12. Xen. *Hell*. 1, 6, 31. Kagan (1987: 344).
13. Diod. 13, 98, 5; Cf. 13, 102, 4. For descriptions of the battle, see Xen. *Hell*. 1, 6, 27–38; cf. Diod. 13, 97, 3–100, 4; Kagan (1987: 325–53) and Morrison & Coates (1990: 105–10).
14. The defender of the generals speaks of *prodosia* ("treason") at Xen. *Hell*. 1, 7, 33. It is generally accepted that the procedure used in the case of the Arginusae trial was indeed *eisangelia*: Hansen (1975: 84–5); MacDowell (1978: 186–7). Cf. Swoboda (1893: 566); Busolt, in *GG* III 2: 1600; Valeton (1920: 61–2). Soon after the return of the generals, Erasinides was first put on trial, περὶ τῆς στρατηγίας (Xen. *Hell*. 1, 7, 2).
15. Xen. *Hell*. 1, 6, 35–36; 7, 29–32; Diod. 100, 1–4. Beginning from the fact that Diodorus only speaks of collecting the bodies, and not saving the shipwrecked, the stories are even more different. In Xenophon's version, the generals first called a meeting on land to reach a compromise, namely to follow the enemy and to begin the rescue mission, while Diodorus (who says that the meeting took place at sea) mentions nothing of such a decision, since all subsequent measures would have been prevented by the storm and the crews would have refused to recover the dead because of the heavy weather; cf. McCoy (1991: 318–19). Individual studies on the Arginusae trial: Cloché (1919); Andrewes (1974); Adeleye (1978); Mehl (1982); Lang (1992); Burckhardt (2000); Giovannini (2002). Hunt (2001) overlooks Mehl and Bleckmann.
16. Xen. *Hell*. 1, 6, 36–8.
17. See the historical and juridical analysis of every procedural irregularity in Bonner and Smith (1938: 265–6). Mehl (1982) attempts to prove in detail that the Assembly was not guilty of any procedural flaw. Giovannini (2002) tries to show that the Assembly was deceived by the council, and that the trial should not be viewed as a sign of the degeneration of democracy.
18. Mehl (1982: 41), Bleckmann (1998: 537) and Giovannini (2002: 17–23) agree that Xenophon intentionally exaggerated the vindictive aspects of the trial as well as the atmosphere of panic and terror, in order to compromise democracy. "The truth is that Xenophon hated the Athenian democracy and that he would convey this hate to posterity, and he did that with success" (Giovannini 2002: 17).
19. Xen. *Hell*. 1, 7, 16–33. It is doubtful that the speech actually represents a *verbatim* account recorded at the time, as Bleckmann (1998: 540–41) suggests. An argument against this is that the most important and longest speech (in Xenophon's *Hellenica*) was delivered by a marginal figure in the group of "political nobodies" (Mehl 1982: 39). It is more likely that Xenophon presented, via the insignificant Euryptolemus, something of his own beliefs, since the ethical values in the speech are typical of his: Mehl (1982: 39–40). Gray (1989: 86–7) assumes that the narrative in Xenophon was "a memorial to the good qualities of Euryptolemus", when he uses his voice to present ideas influenced by "philanthropia", one of Xenophon's central tenets. Lang (1992: 276–7) believes it is impossible for such a long speech to have been delivered during a tumultuous meeting of the Assembly (cf. Mehl 1982: 40). Xenophon would thus have used "the popular 'memory' of Euryptolemus' role" as defence

attorney for his own purposes, in order to make the generals seem nobler. Henry (1967: esp. 193–200) believes that Xenophon's presentation of the trial, and in particular Euryptolemus' speech, had as its main purpose the emphasis of the positive role of Socrates who, as *prytane*, had taken a position against the procedural irregularities; this is unconvincing, however, and was opposed by Due (1983). The latter rightly states that that the main purpose of the speech is to give a critical picture of Athenian society at the end of the fifth century, seen through Xenophon's eyes (41).

20. Xen. *Hell*. 1, 7, 34–5.
21. Xenophon, however, is the only one to mention Theramenes' plots (Xen. *Hell*. 1, 7, 8–9). Adeleye (1978: 96–8) and Lang (1992: 269–70) have reservations regarding the reliability of the information. His colleague, Thrasybulus, does not seem to have been involved in these intrigues, or else he let Theramenes express his views; see McCoy (1991: 318–23) and Buck (1998: 59–60). For another view, see Cloché (1919: 44–5), who assumes that Thrasybulus would have taken a position against the generals.
22. Apart from Xenophon and the moralist Diodorus, the trial was criticized as procedurally unjust by Plato and others (*Ap*. 32b-c; *Menex*. 243c; Pl. *Ax*. 368–9b and Arist. *Ath. Pol*. 34, 1; Plut. *Per*. 37, 6; cf. Xen. *Mem*. 1, 1, 17–20). Sources belong mainly to the Socratic circle, however, as Mehl rightly noted (1982: 38). Lysias (12, 36), by contrast, believes the punishment to have been correct, and a fair recompense for the bravery of those who had perished in battle, but who had not been buried. See further Bleicken (1994: 564–5). Bleckmann is probably correct in stating (1998: 510) that the procedure "should remain within the limits of the legal norms acknowledged by the Athenians themselves".
23. Xen. *Hell*. 1, 7, 35; Diod., 13, 103, 1–2. Callixenus, who is the main one criticized among the "inciters of the people", suffers a different fate in each of the two versions. Bleckmann (1998: 510–14) has reservations about the Demos' post-trial remorse. Lys. 12, 36 allows us to conclude that even later, the Demos regarded the punishment of the generals as just; cf. Bleckmann (1998: 513): "the legend of the people's repentance cannot be invoked as an indication for the unjust character of the Arginusae trial."
24. For example, Busolt, in *GG* III 2: 1597–609; Beloch, *GG* II 1: 420–22; Meyer, in *GdA* IV 2: 349–51; Cloché (1919); Hansen (1995a: 41); Lehmann (1997: 47–8); Bleckmann (1998: 570). Roberts (1977), Németh (1984), Buck (1998: 59) and Bleckmann (1998: 539–71) assume that the party-based struggles between the generals and the circle around Theramenes triggered the process. On the already outdated concept of "parties", see: Connor (1971); Bleckmann (1998: 334–57); Hölkeskamp (1998).
25. On Xenophon's anti-democratic tendencies, as manifested in his reaction to the Arginusae trial, see: Mehl (1982: 41); Riedinger (1991: 68); Bleckmann (1998: 539–40); Giovannini (2002: 17 and *passim*); Due (1983). On his oligarchical attitude in general, see, for example, Moore (1975: 67–73) and Bruell (1990).
26. Bruce (1967: 1–3); McKechnie & Kern (1988: 3–7); Behrwald (2005).
27. Bruce (1967: 21–2): "Now that we can see the quality of Diodorus' source, his history of this period must be approached with greater respect when it is found to be at variance with Xenophon." See further: Walker (1913: 111–33); Bruce (1967: 20–22); Andrewes (1982: 15); Meister (1990: 65–8); Engels (1993: 125). For Diodorus and the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, see Andrewes (1974: 120–21). Schwarz (1903: col. 663–704) is sceptical, as is Bleckmann (2006): all highly speculative, see the reviews by Walter (2008), Tuplin (2008) and Rollinger (2009).
28. Andrewes (1974); Adeleye (1978); Mehl (1982); Ostwald (1986: 434); Lang (1992); Schefold (1998: 292).
29. For Diodorus' sources and his dependency on the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, see: Drews (1962); Breitenbach (1970: col. 383–426); Meister (1990: 65–8, 171–81); differently Bleckmann (1998: 31–40 and *passim*). More recently, there has been a tendency to attribute the work to Cratippus; see: Breitenbach (1970: col. 410–23); Harding (1987: 101–4); Meister (1990:

65–8); see the review of relevant literature in McKechnie & Kern (1988: 7–14) and Bleckmann (1998: 19–31 and 2006 *passim*), who opts for Theopompus. On Diodorus' presumed unreliability, see the critical remarks by Gray (1987: 72–89). Ephorus' distortions and Diodorus' additions and omissions make it difficult to appreciate the original value of the source. For Diodorus' original contributions, see Bleckmann (1998: 31–40).

30. See Cloché (1919), Mehl (1982) and Bleckmann (1998: 509–71). For internal contradictions in Xenophon, see Andrewes (1974), Lang (1992), cf. Robertson (1977), Adeleye (1978) and Due (1983).
31. On the procedural irregularities, see Bonner & Smith (1938: 265–6); Mehl (1982: 42–8), with Bleckmann (1998: 523–31), argues that the collective condemnation was not a violation of the law, because collective was equivalent to collective leadership (as in the case of the Arginusae battle).
32. Xen. *Hell*. 1, 7, 4; 6 and 17; cf. 1, 7, 9 and 11. English translation by Carleton L. Brownson.
33. Diod. 13, 100, 1–4 (four times); 101, 1–6 (four times).
34. Mehl (1982: 59–66, esp. 63–4).
35. On the various absurdities of the narrative, see Andrewes (1974: 112–8); Adeleye (1978: 95–8); Mehl (1982: 38–42 and *passim*); Due (1983); Lang (1992: 267–77); cf. Buck (1998: 53–5). Grote (8: 179) was the first to draw attention to Xenophon's enormities.
36. Diod. 13, 101, 5. Diodorus' general agreement with Xenophon here is indicated by the presentation of the two generals who chose not to come before the Demos, retiring from the fleet in time: Xen. *Hell*. 1, 7, 1. The conclusion is that the people were set against the generals long before they returned. We learn in part about the events before the trial from Xenophon's account of Euryptolemus' speech, while Diodorus is mainly interested in chronological accuracy; see Andrewes (1974: 113–16).
37. Andrewes (1974: 113): "The effect of this abrupt transition is to reinforce the general impression which Xenophon gives, of an unprovoked attack on innocent men." Cf. Krentz (1989: 157, 159, 165). In this context, Bleckmann's description (1998: 543) of "the precise narrative of Xenophon on the pre-history of the trial" seems downright absurd.
38. Andrewes (1974: 113–18); Adeleye (1978: 95–7); Mehl (1982: 38–41); Lang (1992: 267–77). Bleckmann (1998: 514–23, 542–8 and *passim*), however, again prefers Xenophon's version, defending his account and assuming that Diodorus' source depended directly on Xenophon. He also draws attention, however, to the anti-democratic tendencies of his favourite author (539). See Walter's review (1999): "In principle, large parts of the book could have been written this way even a hundred years ago."
39. Diod. 13, 97, 6–7; 102, 1–3.
40. Mehl (1982: 61); on other absurdities in Diodorus, see Buck (1998: 55–6) and Bleckmann (1998: 539–42).
41. On Theramenes' role, see Xen. *Hell*. 1, 7, 4–12.
42. Busolt, in *GG* III 2: 719; Meyer, in *GdA* IV 2: 350; Bleckmann (1998: 551–4). On the "myth of Theramenes", see Engels (1993: 145–54).
43. Xen. *Hell*. 2, 3, 30.
44. Diod. 13, 101, 1; Xen. *Hell*. 2, 3, 32. Andrewes (1974: 113–18); Adeleye (1978: 98); McCoy (1991: 321–2); Riedinger (1991: 68); on Theramenes' possible motivation, see Bleckmann (1998: 554–8).
45. Lys. 13, 10. Németh (1984) insists on Theramenes' ambition; cf. Bauman (1990: 75). It is, however, unlikely that the trial came about as the result factional conflict; see Roberts (1977; 1982: 64–9) and Németh. On the characters of the condemned generals, see Lang (1990a); cf. Ostwald (1986: 435); Kagan (1987: 358–9). For the view that Theramenes harboured revolutionary plans to overthrow the democracy, see Sordi (1981).
46. Andrewes (1974: 118); Adeleye (1978: 95–8); Riedinger (1991: 68). Understanding what happened is made more difficult by philological issues. While authors such as Grote (VIII: 194), Cloché (1919: 47), Mehl (1982: 35–6), Due (1983: 36), Kagan (1987: 389), Lang (1992:

273–4) and Welwei (1999: 237) interpret the problematic passage of Xen. *Hell*. 1, 7, 8 in the sense that Theramenes and his companions tried to manipulate public opinion by using "fake" relatives who put on mourning clothes, Bleckmann (1998: 561–3) believes that the plotters hired real relatives. Cf. besides Bleckmann's reflections, see too Mehl's grammatical analysis (1982: 36) of the complicated sentence. If we consider the great number of victims (2,500 according to Mehl [1982: 65]; 5,000 according to Giovannini [2002: 19]), there could have been so many "real" relatives that Theramenes and his friends would not have had to look for "actors". On the size of a trireme crew, see Morrison & Coates (1990: 124–44). The emergence of a real survivor who accused the generals before the Assembly seems also to be related to this plot, if, in fact, the episode really happened (Xen. *Hell*. 1, 7, 11).

47. E.g. Bleicken (1994: 565); cf. Andrewes (1974: 113): "Xenophon ... can hardly be wrong in making the rescue of living survivors the main issue."
48. Beloch, in *GG* II 1: 421; Hatzfeld (1940: 165–71); Roberts (1982: 179).
49. Diod. 15, 35, 1. Cf. Thuc. 1, 47–51, according to whom the Corinthians, victorious in battle, first gathered the wrecks, saved the shipwrecked and recovered the bodies of the fallen, thus prioritizing rescue measures; cf. Mehl (1982: 62), who drew attention (60–62) to the fact that Diodorus' alleged source must have included the issue of neglecting to pick up the dead.
50. Mehl (1982: 60–61). For Bauman (1990: 72), this would not be a contradiction because "Diodorus' source concentrated on the religious aspect".
51. Lys. 12, 36; Pl. *Ap*. 32b. Indeed, Plat. *Menex*. 243c clearly talks about those who had fallen in battle (οὐκ ἀναιρεθέντες ἐν τῆς θαλάττης κεῖνται ἐνθάδε), but since the passage is concerned with the "funeral speech", it can only be used to support Diodorus' version with the greatest caution; cf. Andrewes (1974: 115).
52. Bleckmann (1998: 515). Cloché (1919); von Wedel (1971: 159); Andrewes (1974: 115); Roberts (1977: 108); Roberts (1982: 65). Kagan (1987: 354), Lavelle (1988: 19), Bauman (1990: 69) and Schuller (1991b: 76–7) combine the accusations, maintaining that both Xenophon and Diodorus appear to be right in making a connection between the reproach against the generals related to abandoning the shipwrecked, and that relating to the failure to recover the bodies. Andrewes (1974: 115) and Buck (1998: 56), however, believe the two versions to be incompatible.
53. Cf. Mehl (1982: 63); followed by Schuller (1991b: 77). Schuller's attempt to "cut the Gordian knot", despite its laconism, includes important arguments of both variants, but without explaining why Xenophon does not mention those who had fallen in battle and remained unburied: "The tone of Xenophon's narrative – who calls the demos a 'mob' ... reflects Xenophon's moral depreciation of the demos, who closed its mind to rational causes. And the outrage of the demos, looking for those guilty of not performing the sacred ritual of the burial, is also founded on a pejorative concept, the notion of the rationalist mentality of a part of the elite. Both, elite and demos, thus support positive values, but neither sees – in the fray of public debate – the just cause, not even partially, of the others, but each of them deforms and simplifies."
54. *Il*. 24, 468–674. On burial traditions in the Homeric period, see Kurtz & Boardman (1971: 49–67); Pritchett (1985: 100–102); Sourvinou-Inwood (1995: 108–40). On the ethnology of the cult of the dead in general, see van Gennep (1909: 142–59).
55. *Il*. 24, 479: χεῖρας δεινὰς ἀνδροφόνους, αἵ οἱ πολέας κτάνον υἷας.
56. Eur. *Supp*. 526, 563: νόμος παλαιὸς δαιμόνων. On the duty of burial, see: Rohde I: 216–58; Garland (1985: 101–3); Pritchett (1985: 94–259). Tragedy is a useful source, on which see Mikalson (1991); on death, burial and the belief in the afterlife, especially 114–31; 121: "The fullest descriptions of such [sc. burial] ritual come from tragedy, and these descriptions are generally in accord with the occasional evidence from vase paintings and other fifth- and fourth century literary and archaeological sources." See further, Griffin (1998) and Appendix II. Bernstein (1993) provides a general presentation of the concepts on the afterlife.
57. See the text in Siewert (1972: 8–9).
58. Lysander commits a heartless crime when he fails to bury the executed Athenian prisoners

after Aegospotami: Xen. *Hell*. 2, 1, 31; Paus. 9, 32, 9. Significantly, Xenophon, a friend of Sparta, only describes the execution of the prisoners, while Pausanias is outraged by Lysander's impious attitude; even the Persians were buried after Marathon. Cf. Pritchett (1985: 237) and Kagan (1987: 394), who believe that it was not Lysander, but Spartan allies who committed the massacre.

59. Thuc. 7, 75, 3; Diod. 13, 60–63; 75; Paus. 9, 32. See also Pritchett (1985: 235–41), with more examples and with the observation at 236: "The historians who narrate these incidents devote space to them because they were exceptional."
60. Soph. *Ant*. 450–55. Cf. Soph. *Aj.* 1343; Eur. *Supp*. 524–7, 563. On the burial duty theme in *Antigone*, see Cerri (1979: 17–32). Cf. Ehrenberg (1956: 34–40); Rösler (1980: 14–15); Lesky (1971: 320–23); Oudemans & Lardinois (1987); Geisenhanslüke (1999).
61. Lys. 12, 96; Soph. *Ai*. 1385; Eur. *Supp*. 512, 575, 630–33, 728–30, 743; *Phoen*. 1663; *Herc*. 708; Soph. *Aj.* 1091–2, 1151. Cf. Isoc. 14, 55; Other examples in orators: Lys. 31, 21; Dem. 25, 60; 60, 33; Hyp. 1, 21; 6, 35 and 43; cf. Garland (1985: 7); Pritchett (1985: 95–6); Mikalson (1991: 126–7).
62. Aeschin. 1, 13.
63. Ael. *VH*. 5, 14.
64. Thuc. 4, 44, 5–6. Cf. Plut. *Nic.* 6, 5–6.
65. Onasander *Strategikos* 36, 1: Προνοείσθω δὲ τῆς τῶν νεκρῶν κηδείας, μήτε καιὸν μήθ' ὥραν μήτε τόπον μήτε φόβον προαισιζόμενος, ἄν τε τύχῃ νικῶν, ἄν τε ἡττώμενος· ὁσία μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἡ πρὸς τοὺς ἀποιχομένους εὐσέβεια, ἀναγκαία δὲ καὶ ἡ πρὸς τοὺς ζῶντας ἀπόδειξις. On Onasander's use of fourth-century sources, see Peters (1972: 84–7; 229–31) and Ambaglio (1981: 353–72). On the duty of burial, Onasander relies on older material, since "this custom seems to have been questioned" later on (Peters: 230). See e.g. Philip V's refusal to pick up the dead after Cynoscephalae: Liv. 36, 8.
66. E.g. Thuc. 2, 34, 3–5; Garland (1985: 165).
67. On the concept of the unity of body and spirit, see Dodds (1951: 136–40); followed by Mehl (1982: 67–8); van Gennep (1909: 142–59); Rohde I; Bremmer (1983). On the demarcation between body and soul, *Il*. 23, 103; *Od*. 11, 216–24; Jahn (1987); Bernstein (1993: 21–33); Bremmer (1994); King (2006); Frede (2009).
68. Kurtz & Boardman (1971: 143); Garland (1985: 101–3); Johnston (1999: 36–81). On the Greeks' attitude towards death and the dead, see, in general: Garland (1985); Bremmer (1994); Garland, in *OCD*[3], s.v. *Death, attitudes to*: 433–4; Johnston (1999). On the concept of the afterlife, see Bernstein (1993). On the influence of Mystery cults, see Burkert (1990: 19–34). Neglect by heirs of the duty of burial was punishable in law, κάκωσις γονέων: Dem. 24, 107; Cf. Xen. *Mem*. 2, 2, 13. In the *dokimasia*, the official examination to test capacity to hold public office, candidates were examined to see if they had carried out the required tasks in connection with their parents' burials: Arist. *Ath. Pol*. 55, 3. If the relatives of the deceased neglected these duties, the administration of the demes took charge of the funeral: [Dem.] 43, 57–8. Mikalson (1991: 128) underestimates the religious importance of the burial duty.
69. On the cult of the dead, see Rohde I: 216–258; *GGR* I: 174–99; Burkert (1977: 293–300). Cf. Garland (1985: 21–120); Johnston (1999: 32–81). On the archaeological data related to the burial practice and to the cult of the dead, see Kurtz & Boardman (1971: esp. 142–61); Herfort-Koch (1992). On the Homeric period, see especially Griffin (1980). On the role of prayer in the cult of the dead, see Pulleyn (1997: 116–31). Lloyd-Jones (1983) convincingly showed that early religious representations are surprisingly similar to those of the classical period.
70. *Od*. 11, 55–83 (citation 11, 73: μὴ τοί τι θεῶν μήνιμα γένωμαι). On an unburied person failing to find peace in the afterlife, see too *Il*. 23, 71–4, where Achilles sees the grieving soul of Patroclus, who asks him to bury his body.
71. Eur. *Hec*. 27–34; *Tro*. 1081–5; cf. Isoc. 14, 55; Garland (1985: 101). On magical practices, see in detail Graf (1996).

72. In order to find the body of J. F. Kennedy Jr, who had died in a plane crash, teams and marine divers of the American coastguard were mobilized, at considerable expense (*Frankfurter Allgemeiner Zeitung*, 20 July 1999, 24 July 1999), only for his ashes to be cast into the sea a few days later. After plane crashes or train derailments, rescue teams only give up when there is no longer any chance of finding bodies or human remains. There are, of course, significant differences in attitudes towards death, as well as in the measures taken to deal with it, in different cultures and at different periods. Freud's dictum of 1919 has considerable merit: "In hardly any other sphere has our thinking and feeling changed so little since primitive times or the old been so well preserved, under a thin veneer, as in our relation to death" (Freud 2003). Nilsson, in *GGR* I: 180–81, rightly draws attention to the similarities between the funerary customs of the Greeks today and those of their ancestors. On the ethnography of death, see van Gennep (1909: 142–59) and Stolz (1997: 94–100).
73. Lys. 12, 96. Cf. Soph. *Ant*. 77, 450–55, 745, 749.
74. Soph. *Ai*. 1129–31, 1155, 1389–92. Cf. *Od*. 11, 73.
75. E.g. Isoc. 14, 55. Cf. Mehl (1982: 68, with examples). On ghosts and the undead, see Rohde I: 189–94; II: 362–5; *GGR* I: 182–4; Bremmer (1994: 105–106); Johnston (1999); Ogden (2008). On necromancy, see Hdt. 5, 92; Plat. *Leg*. 909b; Burckhardt, in *KG* II: 238–9; Garland (1985: 1–4, 114–15, 123); on magic, see especially Graf (1996: 174–80). For Nilsson, in *GGR* I: 183–4, heroes are the ghosts of the classical period, with a "dark side" and who occasionally appear in ghost stories; cf. Burckhardt, in *KG* II: 236–7. People had to take precautionary measures even against the wrath of the buried dead: thus, Odysseus would not attend the funerals of his adversary Ajax, just as Alcamene had to perform blood offerings at the grave of her enemy Eurystheus in order to appease him (Soph. *Aj.* 1393–9); Eur. *Heracl*. 1040–44). On conciliating the dead through libations: Aesch. *Cho*. 15; Eur. *Hec*. 535; cf. Garland (1985: 5–7, 110–15). On fear of the unburied dead and ghosts, see Johnston (1999).
76. Diod. 13, 101, 6: οὐκ ἐλάχιστα δ' αὐτοὺς ἔβλαψαν οἱ συγγενεῖς τῶν τετελευτηκότων, παρελθόντες μὲν εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἐν πενθίμοις, δεόμενοι δὲ τοῦ δήμου τιμωρήσασθαι τοὺς περιεωρακότας ἀτάφους τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος προθύμως τετελευτηκότας.
77. Mehl (1982: 65) emphasizes that, if we take into account "the Mediterranean extended family", there must have been many relatives and friends of those who had perished in the battle; and see n. 46.
78. Mehl (1982: 63–4).
79. Bleicken (1994: 565–6). Cf. Parker (1983: 45).
80. Bleckmann (1998: 516).
81. Wolff (1968: 99–100); Ostwald (1973, 1986). Hillgruber (1988: 105–20), however, was able to show that orators and judges had considerable freedom in interpreting the law. Sometimes the law was not only misinterpreted, but the letter of the law was actually ignored, by invoking the spirit of the law and the alleged intention of the legislator (Hillgruber 1988: 109).
82. Thuc. 2, 37, 3. According to [Lys.] 6, 10, Pericles would have asked the Athenians to use, in impiety cases, not only the written law, but also ἄγραφοι νόμοι, as e.g. orally inherited by the board of priests at Eleusis, the Eumolpidae, on whose role, see Oliver (1950: 18–23). In regard to the importance of ἄγραφοι νόμοι, see Hirzel (1903), Ehrenberg (1956: 25–62), and especially Romilly (1971: 25–49), Cerri (1979: 33–49) and Thomas (1996). Ostwald (1973), however, disputes the existence of orally transmitted legal norms in the fifth century.
83. Andoc. 1, 83–6, where the orator is preoccupied not with the moral norms, but with preventing the application of laws in force before the legal reform of 403 and not admitted in the new legislation. Cf. MacDowell (1962: 125); Romilly (1971: 27).
84. Cohen (1995). Ostwald (1986) understands the development of the state throughout the fifth century as a process of growing judicialization of the state structures and of an evolving awareness that sovereign acts must have a statutory basis. Cf. Hansen (1995a), who characterizes the

fourth-century Athenian democracy, perhaps over-optimistically, as effectively ruled by law. Cohen (1995) discusses notions of "the rule of law" at the time. See too Appendix I.

85. Dem. 24, 149–51; Hyp. 3, 40; Wolff (1968: 101); Hansen (1995a: 188–9); Christ (1998: 196): "Indeed, whereas magistrates were expressly forbidden to enforce 'unwritten laws' (Andoc. 1, 85–7), jurors were apparently free to do so."
86. Wolff (1968: 102). Thomas (1996) suggests that written laws had their origins not so much in the interests of democracy (as was the case in the fourth century), but that laws – initially only sanctioned religiously – used the monumentality of inscriptions in order to obtain divine protection.
87. Arist. *Pol*. 3, 11, 6; 1287b.
88. Xen. *Mem*. 4, 4 (19); Isoc. 4 (19. Cf. Soph. *Ant*. 450–60. See also Romilly (1971: 32–8).
89. See, however, Thomas (1996: 30): "Unwritten law often continued alongside written law, rather than being forced out by it."
90. Andocides (1, 115–6) shows that here, when there were both written and unwritten laws, priority was given to the former. In order to embarrass Andocides, Callias the keryx cited a supposed νόμος πάτριος, stipulating that whoever brought to the Eleusinion an olive branch should be killed without a trial. Fortunately for him, Andocides was able to invoke a law written on a stele that mentioned only a fine for such an offence. In the case of the Arginusae trial, the statutory basis of the procedure could have played a lesser role than many accounts of Athenian law suggest. The protests of the irritated citizens, that it would be scandalous if someone prevented the Demos from expressing its will (πράττειν ὃ ἂν βούληται: Xen., *Hell*. 1, 7, 12), were also interpreted as the reflection of an unconditioned popular sovereignty in the fifth century. "For the first time in Athenian history the principle of popular sovereignty was asserted to its logical conclusion" (Ostwald 1986: 444). For a similar opinion, see von Wedel (1971: 163–70), who insists, in the confrontation between Euryptolemus and the accusers during the trial, on the opposition of two principles: the sovereignty of the people and the rule of law. See too Bauman (1990: 73); cf. Beloch, in *GG* II, 1: 421, who refers to Fränkel (1877: 75–83), and Wolff (1970: 23). For another view, see Bleicken (1994: 564) and Bleckmann (1998: 535), who see the furious exclamations just as "an expression of spontaneous discontent".
91. Hillgruber (1988: 116–17) emphasizes the strong influence of the orators, in their role as lawyers or prosecutors, on non-professional jury members in the law courts or in the Assembly.
92. Mehl (1982: 78–80), followed by Schuller (1991b: 77). On Xenophon's religiosity see e.g. Xen. *Anab*. 3, 1, 4–8; 6, 4, 12–22; cf. Diog. Laert. 2, 56; Anderson (1974: 34–40); Dillery (1995: 179–94); Dietzfelbinger (1992: 133–45); Parker (1992). Lang unconvincingly attempts to explain (1992: 274–5) the distortions in Xenophon's version as the repercussion of a "collective regret" of the Demos; she also tries to suggest that Xenophon is a historian who wrote only "what the Athenian Demos wanted to believe had happened". Bleckmann (1998: 510–14), however, showed that the Demos clearly saw the sentence as just.
93. Bleicken (1994: 565). On a similar note, see Bleckmann (1998: 514–23), who also emphasizes that the Athenians should have put the generals on trial for impiety, not *eisangelia*, if the accusation had been one of neglecting the burial duty. This cannot be right, however, since impiety trials before 403 did not have a definite procedure, but were characterized by a certain vagueness. Moreover, Euryptolemus' proposal for two different kinds of procedure – the decree of Cannonus, against those "who bring harm to the people (ἀδικεῖν)" and a law against temple robbers and traitors (Xen. *Hell*. 1, 7 (20–23) – shows that the legal situation was far from clear. See too Lavelle (1988). On *asebeia* procedures, see Chapter 2.3.2. The accusation of treason (*prodosia*), formulated against the generals (Xen. *Hell*. 1, 7, 33) for omitting to pick up the bodies, should also be taken into account, since it was indeed an "abandonment" (the literal meaning of *prodosia*) of the "bravest in the service of their country". See further Bleckmann (1998: 514–15).

94. Adeleye (1978: 94–9); Mehl (1982: 38–41); Due (1983: 36–7); Lavelle (1988: 41); Krentz (1989: 157); Schuller (1991b: 77); Lang (1992: 273); Giovannini (2002: 19–26).
95. Xen. *Hell.* 1, 7, 12–13; quotation: Due (1983: 37).
96. Andrewes (1974: 114); Adeleye (1978: 98); Lang (1992: 268–9). Xenophon appears to confirm the fact in a subsequent passage (Xen. *Hell.* 2, 3, 35): Theramenes recalls in his defence speech that the generals began making accusations, and then his allegation, taken under oath, that the storm would have prevented the rescue mission, was accepted by the Demos. Meyer (*GdA* IV, 2: 350) and Bleckmann (1998: 551) do not give much credit to this late testimony of Theramenes, since it appears in the context of his defence speech.
97. Mehl (1982: 78–9). Krentz (1989: 157), however, believes that "Xenophon's silence about the corpses suits his overall attempt to show the generals as innocent victims".
98. Xen. *Hell.* 1, 7, 2. On Archedemus, see Ar. *Ran.* 416–430; Xen. *Mem.* 2, 9, 4; Lys. 14, 25; see also Christ (1998: 87–9). Cloché (1919: 41) argues – not very convincingly – that the accusation against Erasinides was a diversionist manoeuvre of the "democratic party" to get the other generals out of the line of fire. The fact that Protomachus and Aristogenes – after cleverly assessing the tense atmosphere – removed themselves from the troops (Xen. *Hell.* 1, 7, 1) shows that the "sword of Damocles", in the form of legal action, hung over the heads of the generals even before their return.
99. Xen. *Hell.* 1, 7, 29. Lang (1990a: 27); Kagan (1987: 366). Kagan also believes that perhaps Archedemus "wanted to be sure that someone was punished; perhaps he hoped that if Erasinides was singled out he might give evidence against his colleagues".
100. Xen. *Hell.* 1, 7, 2–4. On the time of his dismissal, see Xen. *Hell.* 1, 7, 1; add Diod. 13, 101, 5. According to the information provided by Diodorus, the generals were relieved of their posts after a preliminary investigation, while Xenophon says that it occurred immediately after their return. See too Bleckmann (1998: 542–5).
101. Xen. *Hell.* 1, 7, 5. The accuser, Theramenes, also speaks of ναυαγοί.
102. Xen. *Hell.* 1, 6, 35; 7, 7–8 and Diod. 13, 100, 3 agree. Later, Theramenes invoked the storm in his own favour as an impediment to the rescue mission (Xen. *Hell.* 2, 3, 35).
103. Xen. *Hell.* 1, 7, 9.
104. In combining the information in Xenophon and Diodorus, Mehl (1982: 63) emphasizes that the accusation "must have had as initial subject just 'rescuing', with no particular distinction made", and it was only later in the trial that a distinction was made between rescuing the living and burying the dead. For a contrary opinion, see Bleckmann (1998: 519).
105. Xen. *Hell.* 1, 7, 9.
106. LSJ s.v. ἀναίρεσις: "Taking up or away; *esp. of dead bodies for burial*" (emphasis added). For the verb form, see Ar. *Vesp.* 386; Xen. *An.* 6, 4, 9 (active); Hdt. 4, 14; Thuc. 4, 97, 1 (middle); Pl. *Resp.* 614b. The semantic field relates to all three voices, but most frequently the middle. See further LSJ s.v.
107. Diod. 13, 100, 4 speaks of bodies brought to the shore after the battles of Kyme and Phokaia. Mehl (1982: 63): "The bodies could have been picked up easily after the stormy weather had stopped." Pritchett (1985: 204–6) suggests that the fact that the bodies of the drowned would not resurface in the first day after their death does not exclude the possibility that the Athenians could have picked up both the dead on the floating remains of ships and the bodies brought to the shore the next day, as Krentz (1989: 157) justly noted.
108. Xen. *Hell.* 1, 6, 36–38; Diod. 13, 100, 6. Burckardt, *KG* I: 335, is the first to underline that this would be a correct military decision.
109. See further Bleckmann (1998: 558–71).
110. *Ibid.*: 510–14.
111. Schefold (1998: 292): "The superstitious dispositions were also … [to blame] for convicting the victorious generals in the Battle of Arginusae; they were accused of not having buried their dead."

9. The trial of Socrates

1. Lichtenberg, *Sudelbücher*, D274: "God created man in his image, says the Bible; the philosophers do the opposite, as they create God in their image."
2. Welwei (1999: 256). Equally anachronistically, Funke (1999: 97) calls the conviction of Socrates "judicial murder", as mistaken as the Arginusae trial, also described as "scandalous".
3. See e.g. S. Rebenich in *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 29 May 2012. I owe this information to Volker Göttel.
4. Cartledge (2009: 76–90) comes to similar conclusions, unaware, however, of the German edition of this book.
5. Schleiermacher (1818: 50–68); Nietzsche (1872); Taylor (1911 and 1932); Vlastos (1991); Kahn (1992: 233–58). On Socrates' legacy, see e.g.: Dannhauser (1974); Gründer (1976: 539–54); Patzer (1987: 9–40); Montuori (1992).
6. After Schleiermacher, Nartop (1884: 337–70) was one of the first to draw attention to Plato's writings. One of the most influential supporters of the "Platonist hypothesis" was A. E. Taylor (1911, 1932). Gomperz (1924: 377–423), by contrast, gave much credit to the testimonia in comedy. On the relationship between Socrates and Aristophanes and on the character of *Clouds*, see Auffarth (1999) and Newell (1999). Plato, especially through the early dialogues and *Apology*, became the most important witness concerning "Socrates as historical person"; other sources were employed in a subsidiary role, as for example, by Guthrie (1971b) and Vlastos (1991); cf. Patzer (1985; 1987: 1–40).
7. Gigon (1947: 64).
8. With regard to the much-disputed issue of reliability of the *Apology*, see e.g. Havelock (1935), who believes the *Apology* to be the most important and reliable Socratic testimony. See also Vlastos (1991: 49–50; 1995b: 25), who compares the *Apology* with speeches in Thucydides, claiming the same degree of "reality". See further: Brickhouse & Smith (1989: 2–10); Hansen (1995b: 4–15). It is only if we believe in the *Apology*, however, that we can make any historical appreciation of the trial of Socrates at all. This is the "Socratic problem" in a nutshell: all assertions on this issue are based on assumptions.
9. Brickhouse & Smith (1989: 272–310); cf. Winiarczyk (1994: 106–25), who has a 256-title bibliography.
10. I have consulted: Brickhouse & Smith (1989); Versnel (1990: 123–31); Connor (1991); Vlastos (1991); McPherran (1996); Parker (1996: 199–217); Steinberger (1997); McPherran (1997). Prior (1996) offers more recent important works on the trial of Socrates. See too: Scholz (2000); Brickhouse & Smith (2002, 2004); Cartledge (2009).
11. Diog. Laert. 2, 40, who cites Favorinus, who would have seen the testimony in the Metroon. Cf. Pl. *Ap*. 24 b–c; *Euthphr*. 2b; Xen. *Mem*. 1, 1, 1. Brickhouse & Smith (1989: 24–37) gathered everything on the formal side of the trial and of the accusation. The similarity between the formulation of the accusation and the decree of Diopeithes made some scholars believe that Socrates was prosecuted because of that *psephisma* (e.g. Finley 1980: 94). But, since this decree had lost its force after the legislative reform of 403, thus using the *graphé* and not the *eisangelia* type of procedure, this can be excluded, as Brickhouse & Smith (1989: 32–3) persuasively argue.
12. On the reign of terror in 404/03, see Krentz (1982). On Socrates and politics, see Vlastos (1996), who argues that his fellow citizens saw the philosopher as an enemy of democracy, and that this reproach would have played a role in the trial. In reality, Vlastos states, Socrates would have been a partisan of democracy. For a contrary opinion, see Wood & Wood (1996: 45–68).
13. For example: Taylor (1932: 113–14); Finley (1980: 95–8); Bauman (1990: 114–15); Hansen (1995b); Wallace (1996: 113–14); Welwei (1999: 256–7). Allen poignantly summarizes this opinion: "Socrates died, not for what he did, but because he was the sort of man he was" (1996: 7).
14. O'Sullivan (1997). In this context, Bauman (1990: 105) speaks of the impiety accusations as a "willing workhorse".

15. Brickhouse & Smith (1989: 69–87; 1994: 166–75; 1996; "It seems that the trial was, after all, a religious one": 1994: 174). They suggest that Socrates was blamed for the close connections with suspect politicians such as Alcibiades and Critias only by later authors; this blame had nothing to do with the trial itself and Socrates – significantly – does not mention it in his defence speech.
16. Reeve (1989: 75–8); Vlastos (1991: 293–4); McPherran (1996: 119).
17. For example, Xen. *Mem.* 1, 4, 16; 4, 6, 4. On this, see, above all, Narcy (1997).
18. Vlastos (1995b: 26). On Plato's presentation of Socrates, see Giannantoni (1997, sadly without references).
19. Pl. *Ap*. 26c. There are two principal, and opposed, positions as to the exact form that "Socrates' religion" took. Brickhouse & Smith (1989, 1994) conclude that Socrates' religious views did not generally contradict the religion of the polis, but Vlastos (1991), McPherran (1996) and McPherran (1997) more convincingly illustrate the ways in which they did.
20. Vlastos (1991: 158).
21. E.g. *Ap*. 21b; *Euthphr*. 10a–b; 15a and *passim*; *Resp.* 379a–383c (central: 379b–c); *Krit*. 48b–49d.
22. McPherran (1996: 108). Cf. Auffarth (1995: 35).
23. On the general diffusion of retaliation, see: Dihle (1962); Blundell (1989: 26–59); Vlastos (1991: 179–86); Watson (1991: 42–6 and *passim*).
24. Pl. *Criti*. 48b–49d. See, in detail, Vlastos (1991: 179–99).
25. Dihle (1962: 61–5).
26. Dihle (1962: 21–2): "When someone waits for a gift from the gods, he must bring them counter-gifts first." See further Parker (1998). Cf. Chapter 1.2.4.
27. See further: Watson (1991; 1996: 108–57); Vlastos (1991: 176–7); Pulleyn (1997: 70–95); Dickie (2001); Collins (2008); Ogden (2008).
28. Pulleyn (1997: 790): "praying and cursing are, in the civic context, just two sides of the same coin." See too Versnel (2009).
29. Deinarch. 2, 16. See too Rhodes (1972: 36–7).
30. Dem. 23, 97; Isoc. 4, 157; cf. Ar. *Eccl*. 349–51. Pulleyn (1997: 78–9).
31. Pl. *Resp.* 364b–e.
32. Pl. *Leg*. 948c.
33. Vlastos (1991: 176); McPherran (1996: 146–9). Other literary examples: Hom. *Il*. 1, 175–385; 9, 497–501; Eur. *Med*. 803.
34. McPherran (1996: 147); cf. Auffarth (1995: 350).
35. Central passages: Pl. *Ap*. 31c–32e; *Ap*. 40a–c; *Euthphr*. 3b; *Euthyd*. 272e; *Resp.* 496c; *Phdr*. 242b; Xen. *Mem*. 1, 1, 4–5; *Ap*, 13.
36. Price (1999: 87).
37. See further: Vlastos (1991: 280–87); Brickhouse & Smith (1994: 189–95); McPherran (1996: 133–9, 175–208). This is not the place to discuss the highly controversial problem of the relation between Socratic rationality and the clearly irrational *daimonion*.
38. F. Nietzsche, *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches*, I, III, 126 ("*ein Ohrenleiden*").
39. Pl. *Ap*. 31c; *Euthphr*. 3b; cf. Xen. *Mem*. 1, 1, 2–3; *Ap*. 12.
40. McPherran (1996: 136–7) draws attention to the fact that Socrates could have used, in his plea, various unambiguous expressions in his own interest, concerning his *daimonion*. Xenophon leaves the impression that this *daimonion* was a kind of "legal divinatory practice". Socrates' behaviour would in no way have differed from that of those using mantic practices (ὁ δ' οὐδὲν καινότερον εἰσέφερε τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσοι μαντικὴν νομίζοντες): Xen. *Mem*. 1, 1, 3. See also Narcy (1997: 18).
41. See: Brickhouse & Smith (1989); Reeve (1989); McPherran (1996: 83–174). The full meaning of the *Apology* is open to debate. Was it ironic (e.g. Allen 1996: 9–10), or does it represent a real speech for the defence (see Brickhouse & Smith 1989; Reeve 1989)? The sum of thirty *minae* that Socrates offered to pay by way of atonement was not, according to Brickhouse & Smith (1989: 230), an insult to the jury, but a real compensatory amount.

42. Pl. *Ap.* 18b.
43. Diog. Laert. 2, 40; Vlastos (1991: 166); Burnyeat (1997); McPherran (1997). Meletus blames him for generally not believing in gods, which Socrates can easily rebut: Pl. *Ap.* 26c–28a. Steinberger (1997), Vlastos (1991: 166) and McPherran (1997) solved the apparent contradiction between the written charge, according to which Socrates is accused of not believing in the gods of the city, and the charge of atheism formulated by Meletus. Brickhouse & Smith (1989: 119–24) have another view. The meaning of νομίζειν has also been much discussed; for it can mean both "to believe" and "to worship in a cult" (see further Chapters 1.2.4 and 2.2). The Solomonic judgement of McPherran (1997: 127) is to be preferred: "θεοὺς νομίζειν' should be understood to mean 'to accept the gods in the normal fashion', indicating that both customary religious behaviour *and* the set of attitudes that are conventionally taken to underlie such behaviour may be implied" (cf. McPherran 1996: 120); Yunis (1988: 65–6). In Plato's *Apology*, where Socrates does not use even a word for the practical side of his religiosity, the cognitive aspect of νομίζειν clearly comes to the fore: Pl. *Ap*. 26b–d, 29a; 35d.
44. Yunis (1988: 65–6) proposes the translation: "To reject the normal way of accepting the gods." Cf. Dover (1968: 203).
45. Pl. *Euthphr*. 3b; cf. Xen. *Mem*. 1, 1, 2–3; *Ap*. 12. See, in detail, McPherran (1996: 133–9). Cf. Mikalson (1983: 66); Yunis (1988: 63); Connor (1991: 56); Auffarth (1995: 347–51); Parker (1996: 203); Price (1999: 87).
46. Versnel (1990: 126–9); McPherran (1996: 135).
47. Pl. *Ap*. 19c. Other comic poets brought Socrates on stage: Eup., fr. 386, 395; Ameipsias, fr. 9; Telecleides, fr. 41, 42 (Kassel and Austin). On the "old accusers", see Brickhouse & Smith (1989: 62–86) and McPherran (1996: 83–116).
48. Dover (1968: xxxii–lvii); Zimmermann (1993). See too Chapter 2.1.4.
49. E.g. Pl. *Ap*. 19b–e.
50. Ar. *Nub*. 245–8: ποίους θεοὺς ὀμεῖ συ; πρῶτον γὰρ θεοὶ ἡμῖν νόμισμ' οὐκ ἔστι.
51. Ar. *Nub*. 426.
52. Pl. *Ap.* 18b.
53. McPherran (1996: 98–108). See Chapter 2.1.4.
54. McPherran (1996: 113–14). It is possible that the intention and influence of *Clouds* may have been overestimated by modern scholarship. Assuming that it was intended to portray the real Socrates involves prejudging the audience's reaction. But how on earth to know whether Athenians could distinguish between dramatic "Socrates" and the real person? The final scene of Plato's *Symposium* (Pl. *Symp*. 223c–d), where Aristophanes and Socrates appear to be on friendly terms, shows there was not a grudge between them. See further: Heath (1987a: esp. 9–12); Auffarth (1999); Newell (1999). Souto Delibes (1999: 145–53) argues that Aristophanes only knew Socrates later on, and that he would not have known him when the play was produced (423).
55. Pl. *Ap*. 19d; 24b. Dover (1968: LXXX); Allen (1996: 9–10).
56. See too Brickhouse & Smith (1989), who believe that Socrates' unusual religious beliefs could not have led to a lawsuit, being justified by the polytheistic tolerance of Greek religion (cf. McPherran 1991: 166–8). We must also bear in mind that, when assessing the circumstances, we depend on the "biased" accounts of the pupils of Socrates: Xenophon and Plato.
57. McPherran (1991: 167; 1996: 8, 272–91). Cf. Connor (1991: 55–6), further Vlastos (1991: 157–78). Relevant perhaps is the practice of *defixiones*, lead tablets inscribed with curses wishing evil on people who had not necessarily done anything wrong. See further Faraone & Obbink (1991), Pulleyn (1997: 82–95) and Versnel (2009).
58. McPherran (1996: 155–6).
59. McPherran (1996: 173); cf. Mikalson (1983: 66); Yunis (1988: 63); Connor (1991: 56).
60. Funke (1999: 81).
61. Schuller (1991b: 77).
62. McPherran (1996: 108) speaks of Socratic "reform".

63. Vlastos (1991: 165).
64. *Ibid*.: 166, citing Pl. *Euthphr*. 2b.
65. McPherran (1997: 134; 1996: 160).
66. E.g. Pl. *Ap*. 21b; 23a–b; *Euthphr*. 6a–c; 15a; *Resp.* 377e–382e (esp. 379b–c); Xen. *Mem*. 1, 1, 19; 4, 4, 25.
67. See Chapter 2.3.2.
68. He does name Zeus, however, but only in phrases such as μὰ Δία or πρὸς Διός (e.g. 26c–d). The nymph Thetis, Achilles' mother, is defined as θεὸς οὖσα (28c).
69. Vlastos (1995b: 26).
70. McPherran (1996: 169–72); Parker (1996: 205).
71. Pl. *Ap*. 33a. On his pedagogical efforts, see e.g. Nehamas (1985, 1992: 298–316).
72. Vlastos (1991: 294–7, quote 297); Parker (1996: 205).
73. Pl. *Ap*. 21a–22d; 28a–31c (esp. 30a–b and 31e).
74. McPherran (1991: 168). Cf. McPherran (1996: 156).
75. Pl. *Ap*. 35d.
76. Price (1999: 86).
77. Parker (1996: 201–2).
78. Cartledge (2009: 84).
79. Xen. *Hell*. 2, 2, 20–23; 3, 11–56; 4, 35–39; Krentz (1982: 89–108); Kagan (1987: 400–412); Loening (1987: 13–16); Buck (1998: 71–93); Bleckmann (1998: 604–14).
80. Xen. *Hell*. 2, 4, 43; Just. 5, 10, 8–11; cf. Krentz (1982: 109–24).
81. Dodds (1951: 180–95). On the situation in Russia, see e.g. Stuch (1995), who speaks of a "religious boom" (8). After the end of the Second World War (indeed already after 1943), church attendance grew exponentially in Germany, but diminished when the "economic miracle" occurred. See further Boyens *et al.* (1979) and Blessing (1990: 3–113, esp. 60–108).
82. The trial against Andocides probably occurred a year earlier: McDowell (1962: 204–205). Connor (1991: 51–2) notes that the three religious trials were simultaneous. Miletus was again the main accuser in the case of Andocides: Blumenthal (1973: 169–78).
83. Lys. 30, 22. On the trial of Nicomachus and on the revision of the laws between 410 and 399, see: Clinton (1982: 27–37); Robertson (1990); Rhodes (1991); Parker (1996: 218–20); Todd (1996); Edwards (1999: 154–74); Todd (2007), *ad loc*.
84. Lys. 30, 18–22. The type of accusation laid against Nicomachus remains controversial (cf. Todd 1996: 104–8; Edwards 1999: 155–7). There was no impiety charge, as in the case of Socrates, but there could have been an *eisangelia* procedure; see Hansen (1975: 116–17) and Edwards (1999: 156). However, the accuser placed religious guilt at the centre of the case: Edwards (1999: 167–8).
85. Cohen (1991: 215); McPherran (1996: 170–71): "Thus the belief that Athens had been the recipient of punishments that – in the end – had a divine origin would be easily incited" (171). Cf. Allen (1996: 7).
86. McPherran (1996: 171).
87. Cartledge (2009: 89).
88. On the economic situation of Athens, in a process of stabilization throughout the fourth century, see French (1991: 24–40).
89. Henrichs (1984: 139–58), however, sees a certain interdependence between the religious theories of Prodicus – who saw the gods as deified natural powers and as important deified historical characters – and the Hellenistic trends towards human deification.
90. Davies (1993: 172–3).
91. On the religious policy of Lycurgus, see: Parker (1996: 242–55); Hintzen-Bohlen (1997: 119–26); Mikalson (1998: 11–45). Vielberg (1991: 49–68) believes Lycurgus used religion as a useful tool for his worldly ends, and that he was much influenced by the Greek Enlightenment. In Vielberg's view, Lycurgus was "less of a pious priest and more of a brilliant virtuoso" who "understood how to play with the complete repertoire of religious feelings, not because he wanted to

delight or convert the listeners, of course, but in order to use them for his personal ends" (68). Salmone (1976: 41–52), however, argues persuasively for Lycurgus' conservative religiosity.

92. Martin (2009: 203), who notes that speeches delivered by himself do not use as many religious arguments, as those speeches he wrote for others.
93. Parker (1996: 227–8, esp. 195–6), who notes that Ammon was a "special case". The cult of Isis at Athens was only important for Egyptians metics: Mikalson (1998: 30–31, esp. 293–4): "The introduction of the cults of Isis and Aphrodite Ourania for a few foreigners in Piraeus would have had virtually no effect on state or private religion" (294).
94. Parker (1996: 221–7).
95. For example, Shapiro (1996); in detail, Smarczyk (1990).
96. Parker (1996: 228–38).
97. Nilsson (1952: 31–40; citation at 39).
98. On the worship of abstract concepts, see: Parker (1996: 228–38); Hamdorf (1964: esp. 69–70); Shapiro (1993).
99. Phenomena often described as later innovations, such as honouring abstract concepts, or the beginnings of ruler cults (typical for the Hellenistic and Roman periods), can often be attested much earlier. A well-known example of early cult divinization is the case of Lysander, who was granted divine honours at Samos: Plut. *Lys*. 18, 5–6; cf. the inscription of Lysander, edited by Bousquet (1961: 69–97, esp. 71–4); cf. Bommelaer (1981: 18–23). On the worship of mortals, see Habicht (1970) and Parker (1996: 260–61). Mikalson (1998: 300–304) showed that the ruler cult only had "a very brief history" at Athens (300), between 307 and 287 BCE.
100. Mikalson (1998: 45): "religious beliefs and attitudes remained very much what they had been in the late fifth century and throughout the fourth century." Pagan cults survived in Athens down to the Christian period and even later, but naturally in very different circumstances. Trombley (1993: 283–332) describes some amazing continuities, surviving in Greek folk-religion of the modern period (esp. 331).
101. For an overall view, see Kühnert (1988: 588–94); cf. Schubart (1937: 28); Mikalson (1998: 11–45, 294).
102. Graf (1995: 104). On the supposed decadence of the polis structures and the consequent decline of traditional religion, see Green (1990: 586–601). For evidence that the Greek polis with all its peculiarities survived much longer, see Hansen (2006: 48–50).
103. Gehrke (1990: 75). Schubart (1937: 9) believes that the influence of the Mysteries has been overrated. The concept of a specifically Hellenistic "individualism" in the religious sphere at Athens is questioned by Mikalson (1998: 309–11).
104. For a different view, see Bremmer (1996: 104–8); cf. Humphreys (1986), criticized by Mikalson (1998: 293–4).

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Fear and Loathing in Ancient Athens

Religion and Politics during the Peloponnesian War

Athens at the time of the Peloponnesian War (431–404 BCE) was the arena for a dramatic battle between politics and religion in the hearts and minds of the people. *Fear and Loathing in Ancient Athens*, originally published in German but now available for the first time in a revised English edition, casts new light on this dramatic period of history and offers a new approach to the study of Greek religion.

Alexander Rubel argues powerfully and persuasively that talk of a "Greek enlightenment" in fifth-century Athens has been overstated and that, with the exception of a few zealous but marginalized philosophers, Athenian society was characterized by religious traditions based on the fundamental beliefs that gods exist, that they influence events, and that one would be wise to keep in with them. Athenians at this time, stricken by plague, war and the loss of empire, genuinely feared that their sky was about to fall in.

Rubel challenges us to view the events of fifth-century Athens through the lens of ordinary Athenians' religious fears. In doing so, we get a different perspective on, for example, the impiety charges and prosecutions of the period, the mutilation of the Herms and the profanation of the Mysteries, the military conflicts themselves, and the culture and architecture of the time. The book marks an important contribution to the study of Athenian religion and politics and is a much-needed corrective to the tendency among some scholars to see fifth-century Athenians, with their free-thinking philosophers, as sceptical modernists just like us.